![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
A constructive and effective interaction between politicians and their military advisers is an essential element in the successful conduct of strategy. The author draws on his own experience at the political-military interface and the operational level to argue that the political-military relationship is inherently problematic and that it has become increasingly so in the twenty-first century in the United Kingdom, partly due to changes in the character of conflict, but also due to an erosion of trust between political decision-makers and their senior military advisers. The article concludes that certain approaches need to be taken to resolve these challenges.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Citation1957).
2 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press Citation1960).
3 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Citation1977).
4 Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn (eds.), Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Citation2001). See also Peter Feaver, Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Citation1991), and Thomas S Szayna et al (eds.), The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does it Exist, Why, and Does It Matter? (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Citation2007).
5 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in War (London: Free Press Citation2003).
6 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: ClarendonPress Citation1997).
7 Hew Strachan, ‘The Civil-Military “Gap” in Britain’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/2 (Citation2003), 43–63.
8 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: A Study in Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Citation2013).
9 Strachan, The Direction of War, 97.
10 Sir John Chilcot, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. (London: Dandy Booksellers Ltd Citation2016).
11 See, for example, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (eds.), War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson Citation2001), xv, xvii-xviii.
12 Quoted by HR McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Citation1997), 28.
13 McMaster, Dereliction of Duty.
14 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (London: WH Allen Citation2015), 573.
15 See, for example, Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume 1; Not For Turning (London: Penguin Citation2013), 697.
16 See, for example, Peter Oborne, ‘An Officer and a Politician’, The Spectator (27 May 2000). Available at http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/27th-may-2000/21/an-officer-and-a-politician.
17 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life: My Autobiography (London: Penguin Citation1989), 263.
18 See, for example, Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brasseys Citation1992), 126, 134, 136, 182–83, 267.
19 Keith Jeffery, ‘Sir Henry Hughes Wilson, baronet’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press Citation2004).
20 ‘Perhaps epitomized by the appointment of Field Marshal the Earl Kitchener of Khartoum as Secretary of State for War.’
21 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, 85–86.
22 Georges Clemenceau: ‘War is too important to leave to soldiers’, commonly paraphrased as ‘War is too important to be left to the generals’, quoted in John Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic (London: Hodder and Stoughton Citation1948).
23 Cohen, Supreme Command, 4–5 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83-85.
24 Cohen, Supreme Command, 4.
25 Emphasis in original. Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Regan Citation2004), 440.
26 Franks, American Soldier.
27 Thomas E Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin Citation2012), 411.
28 John Kiszely, ‘The British Army and Thinking About the Operational Level’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 119–130, 128. See, for example, Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 5–00, Campaign Planning, (London: MOD Citation2013), Section 2.
29 Desmond Bowen, ‘The Political-Military Relationship on Operations’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 273–280, 275.
30 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Penguin Citation2003), 780.
31 Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press Citation1976), 121.
32 For example, in the decision to send a task force to the Falkland Islands in 1982. See Hugh Bicheno, Razor’s Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson Citation2006), 24.
33 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Michael Joseph Citation1983), 62; Alastair Finlan, ‘War Culture. The Royal Navy and the Falklands Conflict’, in Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers and Mark Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons For the Future (London: Frank Cass Citation2005), 193–212, 201.
34 Emphasis in original. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan Citation1967), 562.
35 Bowen, ‘The Political-Military Relationship on Operations’, 279.
36 Quoted by Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001–2014 (London: The Bodley Head Citation2017), 73.
37 Hew Strachan, ‘Conclusions’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 327–346, 341. See also Sir Mike Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson (London: Corgi Citation2008), 358–359.
38 David Galula, Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice (Westport: Prager Citation2006), 63.
39 General Charles Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal. Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marine Corps Gazette 83/1 (Citation1999).
40 Quoted in Christopher Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London: Hurst & Company Citation2015), 193.
41 Royal College of Defence Studies, Getting Strategy Right (Enough) (London: MOD Citation2017), 55.
42 Report of the Iraq Inquiry, (London: HMSO Citation2016), Executive Summary, 134.
43 Valentina Soria, ‘Flawed “Comprehensiveness”: The Joint Plan for Helmand’, in Michael Clarke (ed.), The Afghan Papers. Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005–06 (Royal United Services Institute Citation2011), 30–48, 37.
44 See Jack Fairweather, The Good War: The Battle for Afghanistan 2006–2014 (London: Jonathan Cape Citation2014), 152.
45 General Sir Nicholas Houghton, evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee, 6 July 2011, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/11051101.htm.
46 See, for example, Ben Barry, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War (Abingdon: Routledge Citation2017), 65–71; General Sir Richard Dannatt, Leading from the Front: The Autobiography (London: Bantam Press Citation2010), 296; Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict (Saffron Walden: Military Studies Press Citation2011), 137.
47 Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Summary, 81 and 86.
48 Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Section 10.4, 535.
49 Barry, Harsh Lessons, 49.
50 Dannatt, Leading from the Front, 296. See also Jackson, Soldier, 418; and Justin Maciejewski, ‘“Best Effort”: Operation Sinbad and the Iraq Campaign’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 157–174, 164.
51 Soria, ‘Flawed “Comprehensiveness”’, 43; John McColl, ‘Modern Campaigning: From a Practitioner’s Perspective’ in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 109–118, 111–112.
52 John Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations (London: Royal United Services Institute Citation2008), 2–3.
53 Shashi Tharoor, ‘Should UN Peacekeeping Go “Back To Basics”?’, Survival 37/4 (Citation1995), 52–64, 60.
54 General Sir David Richards, evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee, 11 May 2011, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/11051102.htm.
55 Michael Clarke, ‘The Helmand Decision’, in Michael Clarke (ed.), The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005–06 (London: Royal United Services Institute Citation2011), 5–29, 21.
56 Farrell, Unwinnable, 272.
57 Farrell, Unwinnable, 367. See also Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Citation2011), 34, 85.
58 Quoted by Elliott, High Command, 177.
59 Mark Urban, at RUSI conference 11 September 2017.
60 Bowen, ‘The Political-Military Relationship on Operations’, 275.
61 See, for example, Maciejewski, ‘“Best Effort”’, 160.
62 Quoted by Elliott, High Command, 43.
63 Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West`s Afghanistan Campaign (London: HarperCollins Citation2011), 282.
64 Ibid.
65 Bowen, ‘The Political-Military Relationship on Operations’, 277.
66 Nick Beadle, ‘Afghanistan and the Context of Iraq’, in Michael Clarke (ed.), The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand 2005–06 (Abingdon: Routledge Citation2011), 74–75; Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, 58.
67 Quoted by Elliott, High Command, 21.
68 See John Kiszely, ‘Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors’, in Patrick Cronin (ed.), The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise (Westport: Prager Citation2008), 129–152.
69 General David Richards, Taking Command: The Autobiography (London: Headline Publishing Citation2014), 78.
70 Dannatt, Leading from the Front, 248.
71 Richards, Taking Command, 294.
72 Chris Brown, ‘Multinational Command in Afghanistan – 2006: NATO at the Crossroads’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate Citation2013), 217–224, 217; Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations, 19; UK Parliament, House of Commons Defence Committee Thirteenth Special Report (Oct 2007), paragraphs 50–51, and Government Response, paragraph 15.
73 Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Summary, 127. See also Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003–2009 (London: Jonathan Cape Citation2011), 255–256.
74 Gates, Duty, 117–126.
75 Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography (London: Hodder and Stoughton Citation2000), 262.
76 See, for example, Dannatt, Leading from the Front, 245–251.
77 See, for example, Deborah Haynes, ‘US military officers raise fears over Royal Marine cuts’, The Times (25 October Citation2017).
78 James de Waal, Depending on the Right People: British Political-Military Relations, 2001–10 (London: Chatham House Citation2013), vi.
79 de Waal, Depending on the Right People, vi.
80 de Waal, Depending on the Right People, vi.
81 de Waal, Depending on the Right People, 25.
82 Alex Massie, ‘You Do the Fighting, I’ll Do the Talking’, The Spectator (20 June 2011).
83 General Sir Richard Dannatt, Boots on the Ground: Britain and her Army since 1945 (Profile Books Citation2016); Jackson, Soldier, Richards, Taking Command.
84 Joe Devanny and Joe Harris, The National Security Council: National Security at the Centre of Government (London: Institute for Government Citation2014), 30–32.
85 CDS annual lecture at Royal United Services Institute (3 December 2009). Available at http://www.rusi.org/cdslectures.
86 Ministry of Defence, Organising Defence’s Contribution to National Strategy (London: MOD Citation2012).
87 Quoted in Royal College of Defence Studies, Getting Strategy Right (Enough), v.
88 Martha Gill, ‘Michael Fallon Sets Up Team To Trawl For Chilcot’s Buried Recommendations’, Huffington Post (19 July Citation2016).
89 Quoted in Royal College of Defence Studies, Getting Strategy Right (Enough), Annex A, 19.
90 Ministry of Defence, Making Better Strategy (London: MOD, Citation2016), Ministry of Defence, JDP 04. Understanding and Decision Making (London: MOD Citation2016), and Royal College of Defence Studies, Getting Strategy Right (Enough).
91 Emile Simpson, ‘America Must Leave the Defeat of Isis to Local States’, Financial Times (11 September Citation2014).
92 PJHQ, ‘Our Organisation and Responsibilities’. Available at https://wgovernment/government/groups/the-permanent-joint-headquarters.
93 Clausewitz, On War, 607.
94 Clausewitz, On War, 146.
95 Clausewitz, On War, 608.
96 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, Survival 37/3 (Citation2005), 33–54, 47.
97 Gates, Duty, 49.
98 Cohen, Supreme Command, 242–261.
99 Ricks, The Generals, 214.
100 See, for example, Herman Wong, ‘Here are the four-star generals Donald Trump has publicly bashed’, Washington Post (20 October Citation2017).
101 Lawrence Freedman, ‘On Military Advice’, RUSI Journal 162/ 3 (Citation2017), 12–19, 18.
102 Freedman, ‘On Military Advice’.
103 de Waal, Depending on the Right People, 35.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
John Kiszely
John Kiszely served in the British Army for 40 years rising to the rank of lieutenant general. He was deputy commander of NATO forces in Bosnia (2001–02) and of the coalition in Iraq (Citation2004–05) and served three tours of duty in the UK Ministry of Defence, latterly as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff. His final appointment was that of Director General of the UK Defence Academy. From 2013–17 he was a visiting fellow at the Changing Character of War Centre at Oxford University while writing his book, Anatomy of a Campaign. The British Fiasco in Norway, Citation1940 (2017).
