Military strategy in the 21st century

ABSTRACT

This special issue explores military strategy in the twenty-first century. The articles scrutinise strategy from three perspectives: the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; new areas for strategic theory, i.e., areas where the development of war has made strategy become more important, such as peacekeeping operations and cyberspace; and the makers of strategy, more specifically why states choses suboptimal strategies and how wars in the twenty-first century influence strategy makers.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategy
• Strategic Studies
• strategic theory
• strategy makers
• new wars

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost its Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2011); Alastair Finlan, Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror: US and UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001–2012 (London: Bloomsbury Academic 2014); Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War’, Survival 52/5 (2010), 157–182.

² The number of introductory books in Strategic Studies has, for example, increased over the last 10–15 years. See, for example, John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002); Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy (London: Routledge 2012); Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge 2008); Elinor C. Sloan, Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction (London: Routledge 2017).

³ For an overview of several definitions, see John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), 1–14, 4.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michel Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), 177.

⁵ Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy in Theory; Strategy in Practice’, this issue.

⁶ Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security, 25/2 (2000), 5–50, 6.

⁷ Jeffrey W. Meiser, ‘Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy’, Parameters 46/4 (2016/2017), 81–91; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1984).

⁸ Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, 6.

⁹ Quoted in Baylis and Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, 4.

¹⁰ Quotes from Edward Mead Earle, ‘Introduction’ in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944), vii–xi, viii.

¹¹ Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing 1973), 452.

¹² Brodie, War and Politics, 474–475. For an overview of the development of Strategic Studies, see Richard K. Betts, ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive?’, World Politics 50 (1997), 7–33.

¹³ Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, 7–8. See also Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1993); Joseph S. Nye, ‘Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy’, Political Psychology 29/4 (2008), 593–603.

¹⁴ Earle, ‘Introduction’, viii.

¹⁵ Strachan, ‘Strategy in Theory’.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See, for example, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press 2004); Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1991); Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press 1998); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1961).

¹⁹ Strategic Studies has indeed often been accused of being state centric, not including non-state actors, transnational groups and international organisations. See, for example, Baylis and Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, 11; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 37; Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James E. Worrall, ‘Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (2017), 347–357, 349; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: Routledge 1997), 33–59. See Pascal Vennesson for a refutation. Pascal Vennesson, ‘Is Strategic Studies Narrow? Critical Security and the Misunderstood Scope of Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (2017), 358–391, 368–372.

²⁰ Notable exceptions are, Alexander J. Bellamy, ‘Lessons Unlearned: Why Coercive Diplomacy Failed at Rambouillet’, International Peacekeeping 7/2 (2000), 95–114; Ken Ohnishi, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and Peace Operations: Intervention in East Timor’, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 13 (2012), 53–77. For a special focus on the protection of civilians, see Arthur J. Boutellis, ‘From Crisis to Reform: Peacekeeping Strategies for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2/3 (2013), 1–11; Stian Kjeksrud, ‘The Utility of Force for Protecting Civilians’, in Haidi Willmot, Ralph Mamiya, Scott Scheeran and Marc Weller (eds.), Protection of Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016), 329–349; Paul D. Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2010).

²¹ Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: An Unholy Alliance?’, this issue.

²² See, for example, the roundtable in Timothy J. Junio, ‘How Probable Is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back in to the Cyber Conflict Debate’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36/1 (2013), 125–33.

²³ Jon R. Lindsay, and Erik Gartzke, ‘Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited’, in Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (eds.), Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 179–203.

²⁴ Adam Liff, ‘Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (2012), 401–428; Thomas Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (2012), 5–32; Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C Maness, ‘The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists’, Journal of Peace Research 51/3 (2014), 347–360. See also Timothy J. Junio, ‘How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/1 (2013), 125–133, as well as the rest of the roundtable in the same issue of Journal of Strategic Studies.

²⁵ Ilai Saltzman, ‘Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance’, Contemporary Security Policy 34/1 (2013), 40–63; Rebecca Slayton, ‘What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment’, International Security 41/3 (2016/2017), 72–109.

²⁶ See, for example, Brian M. Mazanec and Bradley A. Thayer, Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2015); Travis Sharp, ‘Theorizing Cyber Coercion: The 2014 North Korean Operation against Sony’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/7 (2017), 898–926; Uri Tor, ‘“Cumulative Deterrence” as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017), 92–117.

²⁷ Sharp, ‘Theorizing Cyber Coercion’.

²⁸ Michael Fischerkeller, ‘Incorporating Offensive Cyber Operations into Conventional Deterrence Strategies’, Survival 59/1 (2017), 103–134.

²⁹ Some exceptions are, Rid, Thomas, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013); Sharp, ‘Theorizing Cyber Coercion’; Valeriano and Maness, ‘The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists’; Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015).

³⁰ Ben Jensen, Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist’, this issue.

³¹ See, for example, Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1997); John A. Nagl, Eating Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005); Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1984).

³² Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008).

³³ John Kiszely, ‘The Political-Military Dynamic in the Conduct of Strategy’, this issue.

³⁴ On the ‘strategic corporal’, see, for example, Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine (January 1999); Chiara Ruffa, Christopher Dandeker and Pascal Vennesson, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics? The Influence of Tactics in Civil-Military Relations’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 24/2 (2013), 322–334.

³⁵ This is supported by Nye, ‘Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy’, 600.

³⁶ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 239–240. Fravel argues that for less developed states, it is rather changes in the conduct of warfare in the international system that influence the strategic choices of states. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy’, International Security 42/3 (2017/2018), 37–83.

³⁷ Jonathan D. Cavalery, ‘The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam’, International Security 34/3 (2009/2010), 119–157.

³⁸ Michael Mayer, ‘Trigger Happy: The Foundations of US Military Interventions’, this issue.

³⁹ Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1966); Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Baltimore, MD: Penguin 1965); Barry R. Posen, Inadvert Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 2008); Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1977).

⁴⁰ Jan Angstrom and Magnus Petersson, ‘Weak Party Escalation: An Underestimated Strategy for Small States’, this issue.

⁴¹ Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 38–39.

⁴² Angstrom and Petersson, ‘Weak Party Escalation’.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Bernard Brodie, ‘Strategy as a Science’, World Politics 1/4 (1949), 467–488, 468.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kersti Larsdotter

Kersti Larsdotter is Associate Professor of Military Strategy at the Norwegian Defence University College, Norway, as well as Associate Professor of War Studies at the Swedish Defence University, Sweden. Her research interests include the dynamics, nature and conduct of war, specifically civil wars and different forms of military interventions, such as peacekeeping, stability and counterinsurgency operations. She has published in journals such as Journal of Strategic Studies, Small Wars & Insurgencies and Parameters.