Notes
1 See also Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, ‘MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 1–2 (February 2018): 208–233.
2 See also Thomas P. Cavanna, ‘Geopolitics over Proliferation: The Origins of U.S. Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 4 (June 2018): 576–603; Huw Dylan, ‘Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (August 2015): 704–728; Clive Jones, ‘Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint: The Case of Iran, 2009–2013,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 1–2 (February 2018): 160–180; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, 1–2 (February 2015): 38–73; and Rabinowitz and Jayita Sarkar, ‘’It Isn’t Over Until the Fuel Cell Sings’: A Reassessment of the U.S. and French Pledges of Nuclear Assistance in the 1970s,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 1–2 (February 2018): 275–300.
3 See also Hoo Tiang Boon, ‘Hardening the Hard, Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (August 2017): 639–662.