Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations.

KEYWORDS:

• Afghanistan
• quagmire
• strategy
• counterinsurgency
• war winning
• war termination

Acknowledgements

With sincere appreciation to Chiara Libiseller and Caroline Bechtel for their research and editorial support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ The major interventions in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Iraq reveal similar errors. In all three conflicts, the United States withdrew without securing a durable peace, and handed over an unstable situation to a deeply compromised host-nation partner. Christopher D. Kolenda, ‘End-Game: Why American Interventions Become Quagmires, Doctoral Thesis (King’s College London 2017).

² Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: PUP 1984), 92, 95, 99.

³ Kolenda, ‘End-Game,’ 21–22.

⁴ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Washington DC: RAND 2013), 18.

⁵ Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 149.

⁶ Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road: Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 1/1 (2012), 4–19.

⁷ Thomas Ruttig, ‘The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban: History and Prospects for the Future’, New America Foundation (2011), 3.

⁸ Anders Fänge, ‘The Emergency Loya Jirga’, in Martine van Bijlert and Sari Kouvo (eds.), Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance (2001–2011) (Afghan Analysts Network 2012), 2–4.

⁹ Fänge, ‘The Emergency Loya Jirga’, 13–17.

¹⁰ Thomas Ruttig, ‘Flash to the Past: Power play before the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga’, (Afghan Analysts Network, 27 April 2012).

¹¹ Brian Knowlton, ‘Rumsfeld Rejects Plan To Allow Mullah Omar “To Live in Dignity”: Taliban Fighters Agree to Surrender Kandahar’, The New York Times, 7 December 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/news/rumsfeld-rejects-planto-allow-mullah-omar-to-live-in-dignity-taliban.html.

¹² Thom Shanker, ‘Rumsfeld Pays Call on Troops and Afghans’, New York Times, 17 December 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/17/world/a-nation-challenged-the-secretary-rumsfeld-pays-call-on-troops-and-afghans.html.

¹³ Pamela Constable, ‘U.S. Hopes to Attract Moderates in Taliban’, The Washington Post (17 October 2001), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-476553.html.

¹⁴ James Dobbins and Carter Malkasian, ‘Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan: How to Talk to the Taliban’, Foreign Affairs 94/4 (July–August 2015), 53–64.

¹⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs 86/1 (Jan/Feb 2007), 58.

¹⁶ Lakhdar Brahimi, ‘State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries’, 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government, Vienna, Austria, 26–29 June 2007, 13.

¹⁷ Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Random House 2011), 96, 148; Donald H. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel 2011), 398; Woodward, State of Denial, 192–5, 220, 237.

¹⁸ The White House, ‘Joint Statement on New Partnership Between U.S. and Afghanistan’ (28 January 2002).

¹⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror (New York: Oxford University Press 2013), 311–2.

²⁰ Kolenda, ‘End-Game’, 188–96.

²¹ Mark Sedra, ‘Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview’, Paper presented at the Bonn e-conference on Afghanistan: ‘Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform’, 4–11 June 2003, 34.

²² Antonio Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution (London: Hurst 2016), 125–132; Paul O’Brien and Paul Baker, ‘Old Questions Needing New Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Afghanistan’, Paper presented at the Bonn e-conference on Afghanistan: ‘Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform’, 4–11 June 2003.

²³ Perito, Robert M, ‘Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform’, United States Institute of Peace, August (2009).

²⁴ Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W.W. Norton 2015), 20–38.

²⁵ Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes (New York: Metropolitan Books 2014).

²⁶ For an in-depth study on how civilian harm affected the war see Christopher D. Kolenda, Rachel Reid and Christopher Rogers, The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm: Applying Lessons from Afghanistan to Current and Future Conflicts (Open Society Foundations June 2016), 17–28.

²⁷ Human Rights Watch, Violent Response: The U.S. Army in al-Falluja (16 June 2003).

²⁸ Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Changing Nature of the Insurgency,” in ISAF Strategic Assessment Capability Final Workshop, 10–12 December 2014, Ver. 0.1, January 2015, 31.

²⁹ Khalilzad, Zalmay, The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2016 kindle edition), 2618 of 7203.

³⁰ The Rumsfeld Papers, ‘Rumsfeld to Abizaid, “Karzai’s Strategy on Warlordism”’ (15 September 2003).

³¹ U.S. Embassy Brussels Cable, ‘Coordinator for Afghanistan Quinn Meetings with European Commission, Council’ (21 January 2005); Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service (28 December 2004), 14–16.

³² Carlotta Gall, ‘Protests Against U.S. Spread Across Afghanistan’, The New York Times, 13 May 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/13/world/asia/protests-against-us-spread-across-afghanistan.html; Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda of Silence (New York: Seven Stories 2006), 117–68.

³³ Andrew Wilder, ‘A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections’ (Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2005); Interview with Barnett R. Rubin.

³⁴ Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs 87/6 (November/December 2008), 37–38.

³⁵ Interviewee Y.

³⁶ Liz Sly, ‘Rumsfeld, Karzai Declare Taliban no Longer a Threat’, Baltimore Sun (27 February 2004), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-02-27/news/0402270304_1_taliban-kabul-afghanistan.

³⁷ For example, U.S. Department of State, ‘President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror’, (15 February 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/80548.htm; NATO, Progress in Afghanistan, Bucharest Summit (2–4 April 2008).

³⁸ Barry R. McCaffrey, Academic Report: Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan (United States Military Academy, Department of Social Sciences 3 June 2006).

³⁹ SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (2017), 38–68.

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State, ‘President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan’.

⁴¹ The White House, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Press Release (1 December 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

⁴² For a discussion of the crossover point see Octavian Manea and John A. Nagl, ‘COIN is not Dead: An Interview with John Nagl’, Small Wars Journal (6 February 2012).

⁴³ For skeptical views in the ISAF staff see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Vintage 2012), 245–6.

⁴⁴ Fred W. Baker III, ‘Petraeus Parallels Iraq, Afghanistan Strategies’, American Forces Press Services (28 April 2009), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54107.

⁴⁵ Interviewees H, J, L, M, N, P, X.

⁴⁶ Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan, 277, 285, 337, 339–342; Christopher D. Kolenda, ‘Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level’, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 56, (1st Quarter 2010), 25–31.

⁴⁷ Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (30 August 2009), 2–6 to 2–8; Taliban, ‘Code of Conduct (Layha)’, Taliban 2009 Rules and Regulations Booklet (seized by Coalition Forces on 15 July 2009 IVO Sangin Valley 2009).

⁴⁸ Transparency International, 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results.

⁴⁹ Interview with Douglas E. Lute.

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Bumiller, ‘Intelligence Reports Offer Dim View of Afghan War’, The New York Times, 14 December 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/15/world/asia/15policy.html.

⁵¹ Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Anchor Books 2013), 26, 56–7.

⁵² Karen Parrish, ‘Gates: Afghanistan Progress Exceeds Expectations’, Armed Forces Press Service (16 December 2010), http://archive.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=62132.

⁵³ Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, 26–7.

⁵⁴ Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2014), 385; Interviewees H, M, and P, who were involved in the review; my personal recollections as the Department of Defense lead strategist for the policy review.

⁵⁵ The White House, ‘Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review’ (16 December 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/overview-afghanistan-and-pakistan-annual-review.

⁵⁶ Interviewee M.

⁵⁷ As DoD’s senior advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan, I was of the view that a negotiated outcome was the most realistic way of gaining a favorable and durable outcome.

⁵⁸ Transparency International, 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results.

⁵⁹ Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Karzai Says Foreigners Are Responsible for Corruption’, The New York Times, 11 December 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/world/asia/karzai-demands-us-hand-over-afghan-banker.html.

⁶⁰ Chayes, Thieves of State, 149–54.

⁶¹ Nicholas Schmidle, ‘Getting Bin Laden: What happened that night in Abbottabad’, The New Yorker, 8 August 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden.

⁶² Salman Masood and Eric Schmitt, ‘Tensions Flare Between U.S. and Pakistan After Strike’, The New York Times, 26 November 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/asia/pakistan-says-nato-helicopters-kill-dozens-of-soldiers.html.

⁶³ Interviewees L, M, N, P, Q, W, X.

⁶⁴ See the Senate Armed Services Committee, testimonies by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen (22 September 2011).

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, ‘Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, 1230 Report to Congress (October 2014), 8.

⁶⁶ Interviewees L, M, N, P, Q, W, X.

⁶⁷ NSC meetings are chaired by the President. Principals meetings are chaired by either the Vice President or the National Security Adviser.

⁶⁸ Interviewees L, M, W.

⁶⁹ James D. Fearon, ‘Iraq’s Civil War’, Foreign Affairs 86/2 (March/April 2007), 2–15.

⁷⁰ Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 16–21.

⁷¹ Fearon, ‘Iraq’s Civil War’, 2–15.

⁷² Barbara Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization 51/3 (Summer 1997), 335–364.

⁷³ Dobbins and Malkasian, ‘Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan’, 53–64.

⁷⁴ See for instance, Rubin and Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain’, 30–44; Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Thwarting Afghanistan’s insurgency: a pragmatic approach towards peace and reconciliation, US Institute of Peace special report (September 2008); Adam Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival 51/1 (February–March 2009), 29–60.

⁷⁵ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Interview: McChrystal Says Solution in Afghanistan Is Developing Governance’ (30 August 2009), https://www.rferl.org/a/Interview_US_Commander_In_Afghanistan_Says_Real_Solution_Is_Developing_Governance/1765881.html.

⁷⁶ For example, Sarah Chayes, ‘What Vali Nasr gets wrong’, Foreign Policy (12 March 2013).

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of State, ‘Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses’ (18 February 2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/156815.htm.

⁷⁸ For ripeness theory see I. William Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1/1 (September 2001), 8–18.

⁷⁹ Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Books, 2018), 513–85. (I served as the Secretary of Defense’s representative).

⁸⁰ Deirdre Walsh and Ted Barrett, ‘Congressional leaders initially pushed back on Bergdahl swap’, CNN (4 June 2014), https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/03/politics/berdahl-congress-consultation/index.html.

⁸¹ The letter’s key assurances were confirmed by a White House official to The New York Times. Alissa J. Rubin and Rod Nordlund, ‘U.S. Scrambles to Save Taliban Talks After Afghan Backlash’, The New York Times, 19 June 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/asia/taliban-kill-4-americans-after-seeking-peace-talks.html.

⁸² Karen DeYoung, Tim Craig and Ernesto Londoño, ‘Despite Karzai’s ire, U.S. confident that talks with Taliban will be held’, The Washington Post, 19 June 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/taliban-says-it-killed-4-us-troops/2013/06/19/512291f0-d8a2-11e2-b418-9dfa095e125d_story.html?utm_term=.43bfc3010b68.

⁸³ Interview with Vikram Singh.

⁸⁴ Mark Grossman, ‘Talking to the Taliban 2010–2011: A Reflection’, Prism 4/4 (2013), 21–37; Dobbins and Malkasian, ‘Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan’, 53–64.

⁸⁵ Interview with Douglas E. Lute.

⁸⁶ Kolenda, End-Game.

⁸⁷ Kolenda, End-Game, 27; Paul et al., Paths to Victory, xxi – xxvii, 18.

⁸⁸ Interview with General David H. Petraeus.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christopher D. Kolenda

Christopher D. Kolenda Ph.D., commanded a U.S. army task force in Afghanistan, 2007-8. His unit was the only one to have motivated a large insurgent group to stop fighting and eventually join the government. He was subsequently appointed as Senior Adviser to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle A. Flournoy during the Obama administration’s 2009 strategy review, then served as Senior Adviser to Generals McChrystal, Petraeus, and Dunford. He was selected to be the Secretary of Defense’s representative in the exploratory talks with the Taliban, 2011-2012. He holds a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College, London.