The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms: contributing to China’s joint warfighting, deterrence and MOOTW Posture

ABSTRACT

After ‘below the neck’ reforms of operational units in 2017, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army remains the PLA’s largest service as China seeks to develop forces with increased joint capabilities in the maritime, air, and space/cyber domains. The Army is expanding its ‘new-type combat forces,’ such as Special Operations, helicopter, long-range rocket, and electronic warfare units, to contribute to maritime operations as well as to land missions. It has standardised the structure of group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and battalions. Reform has affected nearly every Army unit resulting in a short-term decline in large-scale training and operational readiness as newly organised units focus on individual and small unit functional training. Senior PLA leaders acknowledge numerous shortcomings in Chinese military capabilities and are cautious about initiating combat operations, preferring instead to achieve China’s objectives through deterrence or actions below the threshold of lethal military force.

KEYWORDS:

• Army
• Organisation
• Leadership
• Training
• Doctrine
• Shortcomings
• Problems

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松] (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社] 2013), 100. Warfighting (作战/战争), military deterrence (军事威慑), and MOOTW (非战争军事行动) are called the ‘three basic ways to use military power.’ Of the three, ‘warfighting is the core’ (战争为核心).

² ‘China’s National Defense in 2008’, Jan. 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778231.htm. The first milestone, 2010, was vaguely defined as laying ‘a solid foundation’ for modernisation. On 1 August 2017, Xi Jinping declared that the 2020 milestone had been completed when he stated, ‘The PLA has basically completed mechanization and is moving rapidly toward “strong” informationized armed forces.’ See ‘China Focus: “Be ready to win wars,” China’s Xi orders reshaped PLA’, PLA Daily, 2 Aug. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-08/02/content_7699926.htm. Previously, the 2006 White Paper had defined the ‘three-step development strategy’ with the same set of dates: 2010, 2020, and mid-century, but the final goal was described as ‘building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century’ (到21世纪中叶基本实现建设信息化军队、打赢信息化战争的战略目标). The final goal was refined in the 2008 White Paper.

³ ‘决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利’, PLA Daily, 19 Oct. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/19/content_189964.htm. The term ‘world-class military’ is vague and open to interpretation. Certainly, the U.S. military currently is a world-class military and a superpower, but it is arguable that, despite their sizes, the UK, German, and Israeli militaries are ‘world-class’ in the capabilities they have. The Russian military is a different subset of a ‘world-class military’ because of the size of its nuclear arsenal and its recent efforts to rebuild, reform, and actually use its forces.

⁴ Information Office of the State Council, ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’, 16 Apr. 2013, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-07/13/content_7153397_2.htm.

⁵ ‘China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force,’ PLA Daily, 1 January 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/01/content_6839967.htm.

⁶ ‘China’s New Central Military Commission organ established’, PLA Daily, 11 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/11/content_6852723.htm and ‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm.

⁷ ‘President Xi Announces Establishment of PLA Theater Commands’, PLA Daily, 1 Feb. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/01/content_6884069.htm.

⁸ ‘China Establishes Joint Logistic Support Force’, PLA Daily, 13 Sep. 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-09/13/content_4730336.htm.

⁹ ‘Xi urges Breakthroughs In Military Structural Reform’, Xinhua, 26 Nov. 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.

¹⁰ Yang, Zi, ‘Restructure, Then Purge: How Sheriff Xi’s PLA Clean-Up Works’, Asia Times, 2 Sep. 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/restructure-purge-sheriff-xis-pla-clean-works/.

¹¹ ‘’陆军使命-2018ʹ专项集训提升首长机关指挥能力’ [‘Army Mission-2018ʹ Specialised Training Enhances Headquarters Command Ability], PLA Daily, 29 Aug. 2018, http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-08/29/content_9266548.htm.

¹² ‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm; ‘北京卫戍区已由原北京军区转隶陆军’, [Beijing Garrison Has Been Transferred from the Former Beijing MR to the Army] The Paper, 16 Aug. 2016, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1514876.

¹³ Rocket Force launch brigades are organised into bases (基地), which report directly to Rocket Force headquarters in Beijing. In time of war, conventional Rocket Force units are expected to be assigned temporarily to TC headquarters to provide long-range fire support.

¹⁴ ‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm.

¹⁵ Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Military Strategy’, May 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm.

¹⁶ ‘China’s Three Naval Fleets Have New Commanders’, PLA Daily, 23 Jan. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-01/23/content_7464479.htm; ‘明星将领乙晓光空军上将转岗中部战区’ [Star Air Force General Yi Xiaoguang Transferred to Central TC], Caixin, 20 Oct. 2017, http://china.caixin.com/2017-10-20/101158984.html.

¹⁷ ‘Xi Reviews Troops in Field For First Time’, Xinhua, 30 Jul. 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-07/30/content_4787294.htm; ‘Reform to Downsize PLA Army, Boost Navy Numbers’, PLA Daily, 12 Jul. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-07/12/content_7672557.htm. Note that the number of personnel in the Air Force was not included on the list to be increased.

¹⁸ ‘推进新型作战力量融入联合作战’ [Promote the Integration of New-Type Combat Forces into Joint Operations], PLA Daily, 31 Jul. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/31/content_152147.htm.

¹⁹ ‘学习习近平总书记关于强军目标的重要论述’ [Study General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Exposition on the Goal of Strengthening the Military], People’s Daily, 22 Jul. 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0722/c40531-22275029.html, which states, ‘目前,我军现代化水平与国家安全需求相比差距还很大,与世界先进军事水平相比差距还很大’.

²⁰ ‘破解一支军队所向披靡的脉动密码’ [Crack an Army’s Password], PLA Daily, 28 Jul. 2014, http://www.81.cn/2014-content_18620/2014-07/28/content_6173099.htm, which states ‘在党和人民需要的时候，军队能不能始终坚持党的绝对领导，能不能拉得上去、打胜仗，各级指挥员能不能带兵打仗、指挥打仗？’

²¹ ‘学习习近平总书记关于强军目标的重要论述’ [Study General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Exposition on the Goal of Strengthening the Military], People’s Daily, 22 Jul. 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0722/c40531-22275029.html, which states ‘军队打现代化战争能力不够,各级干部指挥现代战争能力不够’.

²² ‘破解“五个不会”难题要从源头入手’ [Start with the Source to Crack the ‘Five Incapables’ Problem], PLA Daily, 13 Oct. 2015,

²³ ‘推进新型作战力量融入联合作战’ [Promote the Integration of New-Type Combat Forces into Joint Operations], PLA Daily, 31 Jul. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/31/content_152147.htm, which states, ‘许多指挥员对新型作战力量往往“不敢用、不愿用、不会用”，“手中有宝不当宝”，把新型作战力量当作“配属部队支援兵种、保障力量” …’.

²⁴ ‘担当首任职责，跑好手中第一棒’ [Take the First Responsibility, Running with the First Baton], PLA Daily, 21 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/21/content_188516.htm and ‘陆战新锐乘风起航 – – 从陆军某空中突击旅看我军新质作战力量’ [New Winds Set Land War – See the New Quality Combat Force from the Army’s Air Assault Brigade], PLA Daily, 2 Octo. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/02/content_189166.htm.

²⁵ Something like a TC Army command probably would have been set up on a temporary basis when a former MR transitioned to a Theatre headquarters in time of war or emergency.

²⁶ ‘强化战区陆军主战主建的创新意识’ [Strengthen the Theatre Army Operations and Construction Innovative Consciousness], PLA Daily, 10 May 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/10/content_144076.htm.

²⁷ ‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,’ PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm.

²⁸ ‘鸡西军分区边防部队官兵转隶交前倾情捐资助学(1/4)’ [Aid Donations Before the Officers and Men of the Border Defence Units in the Jixi Military Sub-district Were Transferred (1/4)], Guangming Pictorial, 28 Dec. 2016, http://pic.gmw.cn/channelplay/12052/5300867/0/0.html. This transfer of responsibility is also seen in the manner by which border and coastal defence units are identified in the Chinese military media: ‘战区陆军某边防旅’ or ‘战区陆军某海防旅,’ except in Xinjiang and Tibet.

²⁹ ‘省軍區四變化 削減領導職務,’ [Four Changes and Leadership Position Cuts in the Provincial Military Districts], Takungpao, 24 Apri. 2017, http://news.takungpao.com.hk/paper/q/2017/0424/3443954.html.

³⁰ ‘空军少将周利调任河南省军区司令员，接替卢长健少将’, [Air Force Major General Zhou Li Transferred to be Henan Military District Commander Replace Major General Lu Changjian], The Paper, 12 Apri. 2017, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1660971.

³¹ As deputy-theatre grade organisations, these three headquarters normally could not be commanded by other deputy-theatre grade organisations, such as the TC Army headquarters or the CMC National Defence Mobilisation Department. Thus, they fall under the ‘Army’s management’ (北京卫戍区和新疆军区、西藏军区一起划归陆军管理), see ‘北京卫戍区已由原北京军区转隶陆军,’ [Beijing Garrison Has Been Transferred from the Former Beijing MR to the Army], The Paper, 16 Aug. 2016, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1514876.

³² Author’s database derived from Chinese media reporting.

³³ ‘Regular Press Conference of Ministry of National Defense on April 27’, PLA Daily, 28 Apr. 2017, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-04/28/content_7582014.htm. The English-language PLA Daily used the term ‘combined corps’ in 2017, but in 2018 appears to have shifted to the term ‘group army.’

³⁴ ‘Facts and Figures on China’s military reform’, Xinhua, 19 Dec. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/19/c_136837189.htm.

³⁵ ‘中国陆军2017年大事记’ [Major Events in 2017 for the Chinese Army], Chinese Military Net 8–1 Television, 2 Jan. 2018, http://tv.81.cn/jlwyx/2018-01/02/content_7892906.htm.

³⁶ ‘PLA stresses combat readiness, reassigns officers based on battle requirements’, PLA Daily, 11 Dec. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-12/11/content_7861974.htm.

³⁷ ‘数字化雄师决胜沙场’ [Digitised Heroic Division is Decisive on the Battlefield], Xinhua, 27 Aug. 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/27/c_1121548720.htm.

³⁸ ‘“半边天”深情励丈夫’ [‘Half the Sky’ Deeply Affectionate Husband,] PLA Daily, 23 Feb. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/23/content_200125.htm; ‘借土培苗，争当“老西藏精神”新传人’ [Borrowing Soil Training Seedlings, Strive to Become the New Descendants of the ‘Old Tibetan Spirit’], PLA Daily, 16 Apri. 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/16/content_231744.htm.

³⁹ China has not provided official information of the number of personnel assigned to the newly structured group armies, brigades, and battalions, so all personnel numbers included in this discussion are the author’s estimates.

⁴⁰ The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996), 180.

⁴¹ ‘中国将军向外国武官披露陆军航空兵家底’ [Chinese General Discloses the Army Aviation Family Home to Foreign Military Attachés], ChinaNews.com, 4 Jul. 2008, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2008/07-04/1302838.shtml.

⁴² Order of battle information in this chapter updates initial analysis found at Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 9 Jun. 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/.

⁴³ The Military Balance 2019, (London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies 2019), 258. By comparison, the U.S. Army operates over 3,800 helicopters, The Military Balance 2019, 50.

⁴⁴ ‘How about the performance of China’s Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter?’ PLA Daily, 24 Feb. 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-02/24/content_7950952.htm.

⁴⁵ Blasko, ‘Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force.’

⁴⁶ 从空中打赢地面战争 [Winning Ground Wars From the Air], PLA Daily, 12 Jul. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-07/12/content_210771.htm.

⁴⁷ Dennis J. Blasko, ‘PLA Special Operations Forces: Organizations, Missions, and Training’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 1 May 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-special-operations-forces-organizations-missions-and-training/#.VUZJ7kvd4Ts.

⁴⁸ ‘营将作为解放军基础战术单元独立执行作战任务’ [Battalion Will Become the PLA’s Basic Tactical Unit Capable of Performing Independent Combat Missions], Xinhua, 25 Apr. 2008, and ‘合成营由“接受指令型”向“独立作战型”转变’ [Combined Arms Battalions Transform from ‘Taking Orders’ to ‘Independent Operations’ Style], PLA Daily, 9 Sep. 2016, http://www.81.cn/lj/2016-09/09/content_7249484.htm.

⁴⁹ ‘合成步兵营有了“中军帐”’ [Combined Infantry Battalion as a ‘Command Tent’], PLA Daily, 27 May 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-05/27/content_6508696.htm; for the new chief of staff terminology, see ‘一场对抗演习“打痛”指挥机构’ [Confrontation Exercise ‘Pains’ Leadership Structure], PLA Daily, 20 Apr. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-04/20/content_204240.htm.

⁵⁰ ‘Military Report’, CCTV-7, 1 Jun. 2018, http://tv.cctv.com/2018/06/01/VIDE7b6fxYqvaGdsx5Q1wlTJ180601.shtml. If this simple structural change occurs in all tank units, it will affect small unit leadership, personnel manning and equipment levels, doctrine, training, and logistics.

⁵¹ ‘China’s PHL03, Advanced Multiple Launch Rocket System,’ PLA Daily, 7 Sept. 2015, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-09/07/content_6669734.htm.

⁵² ‘“跨界新锐”打响转型突围战’ [‘Cutting Edge Cross-Border’ Starts Transformation Breakout], PLA Daily, 5 Oct. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/05/content_189220.htm.

⁵³ ‘身边榜样助力新兵成长进步’ [Role Models Help New Soldiers Advance], PLA Daily, 30 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/30/content_189134.htm.

⁵⁴ Untitled television report, Qingdao Television-1, broadcast in February 2018, http://web.qtvnews.com/qddst_html/qd/115957.shtml.

⁵⁵ ‘走访慰问部队武警官兵’ [Visit to Units and Armed Police], Anxi, Fujian Government website, 1 Aug. 2017, http://www.fjax.gov.cn/szyw/27985.jhtml; ‘我市组织开展’八一”建军节拥军优属慰问活动” [The City Organises ‘Army Day’ Congratulations Activities], Jieyang News, 17 Aug. 2018, http://www.jynews.net/contents/8/2018/07/28/19944.html.

⁵⁶ ‘揭秘中国海军陆战队“蛟龙突击队” 队员均具四栖作战和海上反恐能力’ [The Secret Chinese Navy Marine ‘Dragon Commando’ Personnel Have Amphibious and Maritime Anti-Terrorist Capabilities], China Central Television, 12 Dec. 2017, http://m.news.cctv.com/2017/12/20/ARTIln7zgYcODwIAyosJZEup171220.shtml; Weibo, 27 Jan. 2018, https://www.weibo.com/1740979351/G0lq8wYI2?from=embedded_weibo&type=comment#_rnd1534689727432.

⁵⁷ ‘图片’ [Photo], PLA Daily, 13 Aug. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/13/content_185391.htm.

⁵⁸ ‘驰骋千里海疆，他们却身着陆军军装’ [Riding the Sea, They Wear Army Uniforms], PLA Daily, 1 Mar. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jwsj/2017-03/01/content_7509024.htm; ‘锻造国家灾害应急救援突击队’ [Forging a National Disaster Emergency Rescue Commando], PLA Daily, 13 Apr. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-04/13/content_174831.htm. At least one transport craft unit is assigned to the Wuxi Joint Logistic Support Centre of the Joint Logistics Support Force and a transport craft unit for amphibious operations training likely remains stationed on Dongshan Island.

⁵⁹ ‘副营长何东明的奋进之路,’ [Deputy Battalion Commander He Dongming’s Endeavour], PLA Daily, 22 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/22/content_188582.htm; ‘基层官兵办事不再“走弯路”’ [Grassroots Officers and Men No Longer ‘Take Detours’], PLA Daily, 28 June 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-06/28/content_209626.htm; ‘Military Report’, CCTV-7, 20 Aug. 2018, http://tv.cctv.com/2018/08/20/VIDEFzwEfBZnnzcG0t7z651S180820.shtml.

⁶⁰ ‘到位三周，转隶官兵胜任边防执勤’, [In Three Weeks, Officers and Men Qualified to Serve on the Border], PLA Daily, 6 Aug. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/06/content_184060.htm.

⁶¹ ‘300公里160道弯，通向“雪海孤岛”的路这么难’, [300 Kilometres, 160 Turns, the Road to ‘Snow Island’ is So Difficult], PLA Daily, 27 May 2017, http://www.81.cn/lj/2017-05/27/content_7620987.htm and ‘边防探亲：千里万里我追寻着你’, [Relatives Visiting the Border, A Thousand Miles I Look for You], PLA Daily, 4 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/04/content_187180.htm.

⁶² ‘China Starts Border Disarmament Inspections With Four Neighbor Countries’, PLA Daily, 31 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/31/content_9268832.htm.

⁶³ The Military Balance 2019, 257. One border group is also listed.

⁶⁴ ‘强军先强将 练兵先练官’ [For a Strong Army First Train Generals, In Training Soldiers First Train Officers], PLA Daily, 17 Jan. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-01/17/content_135485.htm; ‘紧盯打胜仗练兵先练将’ [Concentrate on Winning Battles Training Soldiers First Train Generals], PLA Daily, 30 Jun. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-06/30/content_209742.htm.

⁶⁵ ‘合成营长上岗先考 “资格证”’ [Before Taking up Post Combined Arms Battalion Commander Must Obtain ‘Certificate of Qualification’], PLA Daily, 27 Sep. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/27/content_157597.htm.

⁶⁶ Ten brief descriptions of elements of brigades and divisions conducting training to build individual unit functional proficiencies in the summer of 2018 are found at ‘陆军部队积极练兵备战加速推进转型建设’ [Army Units Actively Train and Prepare for War Accelerating Transformation and Construction], PLA Daily, 2 Sep. 2018, http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-09/02/content_9270015.htm. Other reports of the similar training include ‘Attack Helicopters Fire Missiles At Aerial Targets’, PLA Daily, 29 August 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/29/content_9266501.htm; ‘Multi-Type Helicopters Participate In Flight Training’, PLA Daily, 29 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/29/content_9266494_3.htm; ‘Multiple Rocket Launchers Fire Rockets’, PLA Daily, 28 August 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/28/content_9265103.htm; ‘Armored Recovery Vehicle Tows Damaged Type-88 MBT During Training’, PLA Daily, 23 August 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/23/content_9261771.htm; ‘Live-Fire Test Near Kunlun Mountains’, PLA Daily, 20 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/20/content_9257724.htm; ‘Armored Vehicles Wade Ashore From Landing Ships At Beachhead’, PLA Daily, 17 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/17/content_9256144.htm.

⁶⁷ A few examples include ‘“Joint Action-2015 C” military exercise enters real confrontation phase’, PLA Daily, 24 Aug. 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-08/24/content_6646339.htm; ‘A live-fire military drill kicks off in E. China’, PLA Daily, 11 Aug. 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-08/11/content_6625393.htm; ‘Stride-2009’, PLA Daily, undated, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/node_40395.htm.

⁶⁸ ‘在转型中积极破解跨区演习难题’ [During Transformation Actively Solve Transregional Exercises’ Difficult Problems], PLA Daily, 6 Sep. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-09/06/content_215252.htm.

⁶⁹ Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (1 August 2016).

⁷⁰ ‘习主席和中央军委领导推进军队战斗力建设’ [Chairman Xi and CMC Leaders Promote Building Unit Combat Effectiveness], PLA Daily, 25 Sept. 2016, http://www.81.cn/sydbt/2016-09/25/content_7275504_3.htm; ‘今日阅兵，为何选择朱日和？’ [Today’s Parade, Why Select Zhurihe?], CCTV, 30 Jul. 2017, http://tv.cctv.com/2017/07/30/ARTIxlECtLJLnCv4bth2nUx0170730.shtml.

⁷¹ ‘探秘陆军库尔勒某合同训练基地’ [Exploring the Army’s Korla Combined Training Base], Xinhua, 5 Aug. 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/05/c_129926749.htm; ‘“火力 – 2015·青铜峡”系列演习凸显六大亮点’ [Six Highlights of the ‘Firepower-2015 Qingtongxia Exercise Series’], People’s Daily, 18 Sept. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0918/c1011-27602415.html.

⁷² The 29 exercises in 2015 consisted of 15 Stride exercises for infantry and armoured brigades and seven Firepower exercises each for artillery and air defence brigades. Units from every MR participated at roughly equal levels. See ‘解放军今年重大实战化演习一场接一场’ [This Year’s PLA Major Large Live Training Exercises], People’s Daily, 30 Dec. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1230/c1011-27995904.html; ‘中国陆军怎样走过“军改元年”’ [How the Chinese Army Went Through the ‘First Year of Reform’], Xinhua, 5 Jan. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-01/05/c_129433633.htm; ‘2017年陆军部队基地化训练拉开战幕’ [2017 Army Base Training Begins], PLA Daily, 24 Aug. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-08/24/content_7730097.htm. Even though initial reporting spoke of nine trans-regional exercises, the author could find media descriptions of only five such exercises in 2017.

⁷³ ‘PLA Army Starts Annual Base Training Exercise’, PLA Daily, 25 Aug. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-08/25/content_7730977.htm.

⁷⁴ ‘利刃 – 2017·确山丨渗透破袭红蓝特种兵部队短兵相接’ [Sharp Blade-2017 Queshan, Short-term Infiltration of Red and Blue Special Operations Units], PLA Daily, 20 Sep. 2017, http://tv.81.cn/jshjj/2017-09/20/content_7763701.htm.

⁷⁵ ‘联战联训, 我们该如何发力’ [Joint Warfare, Joint Training, How We Can Exert Force], Renmin Haijun, 12 Jan. 2018, p 3.

⁷⁶ ‘“淬火·洛阳-2018A”演练电磁战场红蓝双方激烈对抗’ [‘Quenching Luoyang 2018A’ Red–Blue Electromagnetic Confrontation Exercise], CCTV-13, 15 May 2018, http://tv.cctv.com/2018/05/15/VIDEheJJzk4C6ynaOgeupyps180515.shtml.

⁷⁷ ‘战塞北砺精兵’ [Battle North of the Great Wall Hones Elite Soldiers], PLA Daily, 16 Aug. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-08/16/content_213558.htm.

⁷⁸ As of early June 2019, none of the previously named trans-regional exercises have been announced officially.

⁷⁹ Dennis J. Blasko, ‘People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises With Foreign Forces, 2002–2009’, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai (eds.), The PLA at Home and Abroad (Andrew Scobell, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College June 2010).

⁸⁰ ‘中国军队２０１７： 打造实战化训练“升级版”’ [China’s Military in 2017: Building an ‘Upgrade’ of Realistic Combat Training], Xinhua, 27 Dec. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/27/c_1122176158.htm.

⁸¹ ‘About 700 Chinese troops, 100 weapon systems to take part in Peace Mission-2018 drills,’ PLA Daily, 17 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/17/content_9256158.htm.

⁸² ‘Chinese Troops To Take Part In “Vostok-2018” Strategic Drills in Russia,’ PLA Daily, 21 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/21/content_9259467.htm; ‘Putin to visit Vostok-2018 military drills,’ Tass, 6 Sep. 2018, http://tass.com/politics/1020161. A smaller force from Mongolia also participated.

⁸³ ‘鏖战楚戈尔，“东方-2018”战略演习进入高潮’ [The Battle of Tsugol, ‘East-2018’ Strategic Exercise Enters Climactic Phase], Ministry of National Defence, 14 Sep. 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2018-09/14/content_4824917.htm.

⁸⁴ ‘Sino-Russian drill Set To Guard Regional Peace’, PLA Daily, 31 Aug. 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/31/content_9268304.htm.

⁸⁵ ‘17 PLA Army Teams to Int’l Army Games 2016 Arrive In Competition Areas’, PLA Daily, 25 Jul. 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-07/25/content_7172707.htm; ‘International Army Games China 2017’ webpage, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2017special/97384.htm; ‘International Army Games China 2018’ available at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/International%20Army%20Games2018/102191.htm.

⁸⁶ ‘PLA Army holds “Ingenious Soldiers” military skills competition’, PLA Daily, 9 Jul. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-07/09/content_8084257.htm; ‘战斗又双叒打响！东部战区陆军首次电子对抗比武鸣锣开战！’ [The Battle Starts Again! The Eastern TC Army’s First Electronic Countermeasures Competition Begins], Renmin Qianxian, 26 Aug. 2018, http://m.lnnew.com/15871/20180826A0WRJM00.html, for a video of the competition see http://tv.81.cn/jlwyx/2018-07/17/content_8091589.htm.

⁸⁷ ‘30余年探索今定锤！陆军新兵训练时间由3个月延长至6个月’ [30 Years of Exploration Fixes the Hammer! Army New Solider Training Time Extended from 3 to 6 Months], PLA Daily, 13 Sep. 2018, http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-09/13/content_9280979.htm.

⁸⁸ ‘Active defence,’ based on the precept of ‘striking only after the enemy has struck,’ is a fundamental tenet of PLA doctrine. However, as explained in The Science of Military Strategy: ‘Under high-tech conditions, for the defensive side, the strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting passively for the enemy … The strategy holds up the principle of “not firing the first shot.” It does not mean giving up the ‘advantageous chances in campaign or tactical operations, for “the first shot” on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from “the first shot” on the plane of tactics … If any country or organisation violates the other country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to “fire the first shot” on the plane of tactics. The military counterattacks may be taken by the following options: to drive the invaders out of the territory; or to launch the same attacks on the enemy’s homeland; or to attack the enemy’s foreign military bases, targets at sea or in the air.’ Emphasis added. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.), The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House 2001) (Chinese edition), 2005 (English edition), 426.

Additional information

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Dennis J. Blasko

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (retired), served 23 years as a militarintelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. Mr Blasko was an army attaché in Beijing from 1992 to 1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995 to 1996. He also served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Headquarters Department of the Army (Office of Special Operations), and the National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. Mr Blasko is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military and defense industries and is the author of The Chinese Army To day: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (2nd edn, Routledge, 2012). Email: [email protected]