From the editors

The articles in this first issue of volume 43 of the Journal of Strategic Studies engage a range of issues including technology, irregular warfare, civil–military relations, great power competition, and reconsidering history.

The impact and strategic effectiveness of drone technology was demonstrated recently in an attack on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure.¹ In ‘Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion’, Amy Zegart of Stanford University argues that contrary to the expectations of some analysts, drones appear to be a remarkably useful potential tool for coercion in long-term conflicts. Utilising a unique survey of over 250 foreign military officers, Zegart reconsiders the relative strengths and weaknesses of drones as coercive weapons, identifying particular advantages relative to existing systems.²

Despite the recent emphasis on great power competition, irregular warfare and its practitioners remain a significant concern in both global and regional security.³ Max Abrahms, Northeastern University, observes in ‘Denying to win: How image-savvy militant leaders respond when operatives harm civilians’ that effective terrorist leaders find ways to manage the negative outcomes of attacks on innocent civilians. He posits that two management strategies – Denial of Organisational Involvement and Denial of Principal Intent – help explain the ability of some organisations to restore their image and support after mass casualty attacks. Abrahms also points to the deliberate decision of ISIS not to attempt to restore its image as a likely explanation for its rapid decline.⁴

The role of militaries in both domestic politics and policy formulation remains a concern in South Asia.⁵ In ‘Pakistan’s military elite’, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago), Adnan Naseemullah (King’s College) and Ahsan Butt (George Mason University) examine the career paths of key officers in the Pakistani Army – corps commanders, and director generals of the Inter-Service Intelligence agency – in an effort to understand that institution’s unique role in Pakistani politics and society. They note that the combination of predictable promotion paths and assured post-retirement employment creates strong group cohesion. This, in turn, assures the military of a unified voice and strong impact on Pakistani policy, and constrains factionalism and incentives for retired officers to campaign for elected office. As a result, the Army remains virtually impervious to civilian control even after periods of failed military rule, while continuing to exercise enormous influence over Pakistani policy.⁶

The decline of ISIS and the reduced role of the US in Syria and the Levant has increased Russia’s prominence and influence.⁷ Dima Adamsky of the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya examines recent Russian behaviour from the perspective of strategic culture in ‘Russian campaign in Syria – change and continuity in strategic culture’.⁸ Adamsky identifies more evidence of continuity than change in the Russian operations, but does suggest that at the tactical and operational levels Russian military activity may be demonstrating some movement towards a ‘mission command’ model. This adaptation has implications both for the study of Russian policy and strategy and for analysis of strategic culture and military innovation.

The last two submissions examine the lessons of the Vietnam War and their relevance to current US COIN and irregular warfare efforts.⁹ In ‘The client gets a vote: counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954–1965’, Jacqueline Hazelton of the U.S. Naval War College examines the reports of U.S. military advisors on the war in South Vietnam, 1954–1965. These advisors repeatedly urged their South Vietnamese allies to make necessary liberalising and democratising reforms to ensure domestic support for the regime, but South Vietnamese elites resisted these reforms for important political and economic reasons. These findings not only suggest the limits of arguments blaming American failure on an inability to recognise the need for reform, but also highlight the importance and agency of political elites when great powers intervene in insurgencies in client states.¹⁰

In addition, this issue includes a review essay of The Vietnam War, a documentary by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick. The reviewer, while praising the enormous effort put into the eighteen-hour documentary and the attempt to use it to spark a new nationwide discussion of the war, in the end, is compelled to argue¹¹

… that Burns and Novick’s superficial telling of the history of the war fails to get to grips with the deeper ideas and structures of belief that led the USA into the Vietnam debacle in the first place–and which, if not tackled, threaten to lead it down similarly unwise paths in the future.

Notes

¹ Recent publications on drones and other forms of unmanned aerial vehicles include Jacqueline L. Hazelton, ‘Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017), 68–91; Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability in Peacetime, Crisis, and War’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 727–35; and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019) 764–88.

² Amy Zegart, ‘Cheap Fight, Credible Threats: The Future of Armed Drones and Coercion’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (January 2020).

³ Other considerations of the use of strategy by terrorist leaders and organisations include Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 10/4 (1987), 13–31; and Gilber A. Ramsay and Sarah V. Marsden, ‘Leaderless Global Jihadism: The Paradox of Discriminate Violence’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 579–601.

⁴ Max Abrahms, ‘Denying to Win: How Image-Savvy Militant Leaders Respond When Operatives Harm Civilians’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (January 2020).

⁵ Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz,‘The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 34/1 (2011), 63–94; C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler and William Miller, ‘Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on US Drone Attacks’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 852–72; Evan Braden Montgomery and Eric S. Adelman, ‘Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (2015), 159–82; Sumit Ganguly, ‘A Tale of Two Trajectories: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and India’ (Review Essay), The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/1 (2016), 142–57; Anit Mukherjee, ‘Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017), 6–34; Stephen Tankel, ‘Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/4 (2018), 545–75; Vipal Dutta, ‘The “Indian” staff college: Politics and practices of military institution-building in Twentieth century India’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/5 (2019), 600–25.

⁶ Paul Staniland, Adnan Naseemullah, and Ahsan Butt, ‘Pakistan’s Military Elite’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (January 2020).

⁷ Recent work on Russia’s evolving military capabilities and expanded global presence includes Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky,‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Strategic Culture and Deterrence Theory’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 33–60; Tor Bukkvolli, ‘Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 602–25; Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, ‘Russia’s Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/6 (2017), 773–816; Luigi Scazzieri, ‘Europe, Russia and The Ukraine Crisis: The Dynamics of Coercion’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (2017), 392–416; Andrew S. Bowen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and The Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/3–4 (2019) 312–43.

⁸ Dmitri (Dima) Adamsky, ‘Russian Campaign in Syria – Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (January 2020).

⁹ Recent work on counterinsurgency includes Kristen A. Harkness and Michael Hunzeker, ‘Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and The Politics of Failure’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 777–800; Jorge E. Delgado, ‘Colombian Military Thinking and The Fight Against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014ʹ, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 826–51; David H. Ucko, ‘Counterinsurgency as Armed Reform: The Political History of the Malayan Emergency’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/3–4 (2019), 448–79.

¹⁰ Jacqueline Hazelton, ‘The Client gets A Vote: Counterinsurgency Warfare and The U.S. Military Advisory Mission in South Vietnam, 1954–1965ʹ, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (January 2020).

¹¹ Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘Ken Burns, The Vietnam War, and The Purpose of History’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/1 (2020).