Ongoing organizational reforms of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force

ABSTRACT

Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission launched a major reorganization of the entire People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in early 2016, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has followed up with its own reforms at all levels. In February 2016, the changes entailed ‘above the neck’ reforms at PLAAF Headquarters and reduced the number of Military Region Air Force Headquarters from 7 to 5, renaming them Theatre Command Air Forces. Changes in 2017 focused on ‘below the neck’ reforms by creating a ‘base-brigade’ structure by reforming several command posts into bases; abolishing fighter, fighter-bomber, and ground attack aircraft air divisions; replacing air regiments with brigades; as well as changing the name of its former 15th Airborne Corps to Airborne Corps. Whilst the PLA leadership has moved ahead with pushing the PLAAF towards becoming a modern air force with enhanced aerial power alongside greater interoperability with the other PLA services, the reconstitution of its organizations has nevertheless led to a fallout due to policy changes concerning its rank-and-file.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• PLA Air Force
• organizational structure
• reforms
• policy

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ ‘China vows military reform by 2020, with plans for new anti-corruption watchdog in PLA’, South China Morning Post, 26 November 2015, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1883606/china-vows-breakthrough-long-awaited-military-reform.

² ‘Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform’, Xinhuanet, 26 November 2015, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.

³ The PLA does not have a formal term for ‘headquarters’ as in PLAAF Headquarters; instead, it just uses ‘Air Force’ (空军) and the meaning is taken from the context of whether it relates to the PLAAF HQ or the PLAAF in general. The PLA does use the term ‘zhihui bu’ (指挥部) for ‘command headquarters’ but only applies it on certain types of organizations such as an engineering unit.

⁴ Yao Wei, (ed.), China Air Force Encyclopedia Vol.1 [Zhongguo kongjun baike quanshu; 中国空军百科全书] (Beijing: Aviation Industry Press November 2005), 57.

⁵ For more details, see Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, ‘China’s Search for a “Strategic Air Force”’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/1 (2015), 4–28; and Zhu Hui, (ed.), Strategic Air Force [战略空军] (Beijing: Lantian Press July 2009).

⁶ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015.

⁷ See Jana Allen and Kenneth Allen, The PLA Air Force’s Four Key Training Brands (China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 2018).

⁸ See Lawrence ‘Sid’ Trevethan, ‘Brigadization’ of the PLA Air Force (China Aerospace Studies Institute, 17 June 2018), 22, available at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Brigadization_of_the_PLA_Air_Force.pdf.

⁹ The PLA uses the term ‘Base’ and ‘Command Post’ to denote an actual command organization as opposed to a physical location. For the purposes of this paper, when the term ‘Base’ and ‘Command Post’ are capitalised, it refers to an organizational structure; where it is not capitalised, it refers to a physical location.

¹⁰ See Academy of Military Science (AMS), World Military Yearbook 1991 [世界军事年鉴 1991] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press), 65. Since the early 1980s, the AMS has published this annually, although there have been occasional publications that cover two years, such as 1993–1994 and 1995–1996. On the other hand, China’s defense white papers had been published biennially from 1998 to 2010 by the PRC State Council’s Information Office, although the 2002 version also did not include a radar branch.

¹¹ According to World Military Yearbook 2013 (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press), the protocol order is: aviation, ground-air defense, radar, airborne, and electronic counter-measures.

¹² Trevethan, ‘Brigadization’ of the PLA Air Force.

¹³ ‘The newly formed air defense base makes debut during drill and will become the main combat unit of the PLAAF in future,’ The Paper, available at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1903253.

¹⁴ For more details about the shift from air corps to command posts and bases, see Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2002, 9 Dec. 2002, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm; Kenneth Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organization’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2002); Kenneth Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’, in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as Organization v2.0 (Defense Group Inc., 2012); and Kenneth Allen, ‘The Organizational Structure of the PLA Air Force’, in Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Philip C. Saunders (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington DC: National Defense University August 2012); and National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010 (Dayton, OH: 1 August 2010).

¹⁵ Although the PLA’s Naval Aviation is also shifting to a brigade structure for its fighters and attack aircraft, it has not created any corps deputy leader-grade bases, i.e. the latter are still directly subordinate to the TCN Naval Aviation HQ.

¹⁶ Allen and Allen, The PLA Air Force’s Four Key Training Brands.

¹⁷ China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces (2nd ed.) (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) 29 July 2019), available at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/1925883/a-primer-on-pla-aerospace-forces-2nd-ed/.

¹⁸ Ding Laihang was promoted to full general on 31 July 2019.

¹⁹ National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010.

²⁰ Xiong Weiwei, ‘The 12th Party Congress of the PLAAF Holds Preparatory Meeting, Meeting of the Committee to Examine the Qualifications of Representatives, and the 1^st Meeting of the Presidium’, Kongjun Bao 16 Jun. 2014, p. 1.

²¹ He Weirong, (ed.), Science of Air Force Training [空军训练学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press 2006), 202–07.

²² ‘PLAAF Holds Semi-annual Training VTC Meeting’, Kongjun Bao, 6 Jul. 2018, p. 1.

²³ Pollpeter and Allen, The PLA as Organization v2.0; and Hu Guangzheng, (ed.), Contemporary Military Organizational Reform Research [当代军事体制变革研究] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House October 2007).

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency March 2018).

²⁵ Interviews with PLA officers in Washington DC in early 2018.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) March 2018); U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018; and China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces.

²⁹ The Military Balance 2018.

³⁰ They were most likely retained in those positions due to their overall experience and probably, also to let them reach their mandatory retirement age based on their grade – rather than be demobilised.

³¹ In 2018, two articles in China Air Force Magazine concerning the Northern TCAF and Central TCAF Support Departments which, based on what has occurred at the corps- and below-levels, imply that their logistics and equipment departments have been merged. The same may also have occurred throughout the five TCAFs. See Liu Jianhui and Tong Jianwei, ‘Central TCAF Support Unit Organizes Drill Involving Exploration of Military–Civilian Integrated Support Model Created to Satisfy Military Needs’, 246 (July 2018), 10; and Kang, et al., ‘A Northern TCAF Support Unit Organized a Theater-wide Fuel Support Personnel Competition in August 2018’, 247 (August 2018), 9.

³² Ibid.

³³ Whilst the 2015 Defense White Paper uses the term ‘force building’, the term is sometimes also translated as ‘development’ or ‘construction’. See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, 27 May 2015, available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

³⁴ The Military Balance 2018.

³⁵ The PLA uses the term jiguan (机关) or bumen (部门) for the four functional and administrative departments, which are often merely translated as ‘organs’. Even though the PLA uses second- and third-level ‘departments’, this is a generic term because some of them are technically bureaus (at the second level) and divisions (at the third level). For major changes between 2000 and 2012, see Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012.’

³⁶ Under the PLAAF, the former Headquarters Department is now the Staff Department, whereas the former Political Department is now the Political Work Department. Also see U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

³⁷ See Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’ for detailed information on the role of the former Headquarters Department.

³⁸ ‘Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform’.

³⁹ Also see, Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’.

⁴⁰ Jiang Fangran, (ed.), An Introduction to Headquarters Department Work [司令部工作概论] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Publishing House 2000), 98–9.

⁴¹ See Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’ and U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁴² ‘The Organizational Structure of the PLA Air Force’, in Hallion et al. (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities; and National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010.

⁴³ Wei, (ed.), China Air Force Encyclopedia Vol.1, 217. Previously, it was also responsible for party discipline, although that responsibility has most likely been transferred to the PLAAF DIC.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁴⁵ ‘Editorial: Questions on Air Force Political Work Department Enlisted Soldier and Civilian Personnel Bureau Responsible for Comrades Shifting from Civilian Cadre to Civilian Personnel’, Kongjun Bao, 12 Jan. 2018, p. 1. Still, reference to the PLAAF Political Work Department’s Enlisted Soldier and Civilian Personnel Bureau [政治工作部兵文局] first emerged in 2017, see ‘The Leaders of the Air Force Political Work Department’s Enlisted Soldier and Civilian Personnel Bureau Visited Our School to Study the Training of Non-commissioned Officers [空军政治工作部兵文局领导莅临我校调研士官生培养工作],’ available at: http://www.hamc.edu.cn/info/1092/4492.htm. Also see U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁴⁶ Wei, (ed.), China Air ForceEncyclopedia Vol.1, 217. See also ‘The Organizational Structure of the PLA Air Force,’ in Hallion et al. (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities; National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010; and ‘Service’ [勤务], in PLA Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press December 2011), 67.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁴⁸ Ibid. See also ‘The Organizational Structure of the PLA Air Force,’ in Hallion et al., (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities; National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010; and U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Allen, People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army Air Force (Washington, D.C. Defense Intelligence Agency DIC-1300-445-91 May 1991).

⁵⁰ Wei, (ed.), China Air Force Encyclopedia Vol.1, 218.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁵² Ibid. See also ‘The Organizational Structure of the PLA Air Force,’ in Hallion et al. (eds.), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities; National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010; and U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁵³ Trevethan, ‘Brigadization’ of the PLA Air Force. See also Andreas Rupprecht, Modern Chinese Warplanes: Chinese Air Force – Aircraft and Units, Harpia Publishing L.L.C., 2018.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, 16 May 2018.

⁵⁵ The Military Balance 2018, London. See also U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁵⁶ Trevethan, ‘Brigadization’ of the PLA Air Force.

⁵⁷ ‘Air Force Major General Wang Kangping Becomes Commander of Air Force Base,’ 6 February 2018, available at: http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1991905.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ World Military Yearbook 2013, 48.

⁶⁰ National Air and Space Intelligence Agency (NASIC), People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010. At present, no brigades are subordinate to a division and neither are any regiments subordinate to a brigade. Some regiments are also independent regiments that are not subordinate to any division.

⁶¹ Chen Tao, ‘Eastern TCAF SAM Brigade Support to Newly Transferred Unit Combat Methods Research Verification’, Kongjun Bao, 21 Jun. 2017, p. 2.

⁶² Wei Liping and Chi Yuguang, ‘The Transition of a Blade Unit’, China Air Force Magazine 219 (2016), 34–35.

⁶³ Tian Dasong, ‘Because of Loyalty, There Is Obedience’, Kongjun Bao, 10 Mar. 2017, p.1.

⁶⁴ Zhu Xiaobing and Ding Yibo, ‘An Eastern TCAF Base Established Effective Service Mechanism to Assist Grassroots Units – Fast Response towards Grassroots Difficulties’, Kongjun Bao, 7 Dec. 2017, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Zhang Wei and Shi Qiang, ‘Airborne Force Battalion Reforms’, Kongjun Bao, 21 Apr. 2017, p. 2.

⁶⁶ The Military Balance 2018, London; and U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁶⁷ The three are namely: 43rd Airborne Division (Kaifeng, Henan province), 44th Airborne Division (Guangshui, Hubei province) and 45th Airborne Division (Wuhan, Hubei province).

⁶⁸ He Zhiqin, ‘Heroes Live Forever in the Fire’, Kongjun Bao, 8 Mar. 2018, p. 1. This is likely an anomaly since regiments are usually not subordinate to brigades.

⁶⁹ Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’.

⁷⁰ Yan Jibin, ‘Training Does Not Stop, Missions Are Not Reduced, and Preparation Is Not Decreased’, Air Force News, 22 Feb. 2012, p. 3.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018. It is not clear if the former Flight Training Base (飞行训练基地) was renamed, or if it still exists alongside the new Basic Trainer Training Base.

⁷² Interview with PLAAF officers in Washington DC in April 2018.

⁷³ The consolidation of the logistics and equipment departments into a support department is likely to be the next step in an evolutionary change first began in the 1990s. On the flight line, the ground crew has always been composed of personnel from the equipment department (who oversee maintenance) and the logistics department. Now that they are under a single organization, the reforms appear to be making its way up the organizational chain to reflect realities on the ground.

⁷⁴ “List of 43 military academies and distribution areas announced after the military reform, [军改后43所军队院校名单及分布区公布], 30 December 2017, available at: https://www.toutiao.com/i6505153224301871629/. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, Directory of PRC Military Personalities 2018.

⁷⁵ Based on multiple China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) articles, it appears that the official English name is Air Force Logistics College even though the name best translates as Air Force Service College; see Xiong Liping, et al., ‘Tribological study of N-containing borate derivatives and their synergistic antioxidation effects with T531’, Friction 7/5 (2019), 417–31. In addition, an entry for ‘Air Force Duty College’ was found in the PLA’s Dictionary of Modern Military Education, although this does not appear to be correct; see Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming (eds.), ‘Air Force Duty College [空军勤务学院]’, in Dictionary of Modern Military Education [现代军校教育辞典] (2nd ed.) (Beijing: National Defense University Press 2011), 480. Of note, the PLAA and PLAN use similar Chinese terms, but their institutions appear to be translated as the Army Logistic University and the Naval Service Academy.

⁷⁶ Although the PLA, in general, translates xuexiao as ‘school’, it has made an exception for this institution and translated it as an ‘academy’; see Feng D et al., ‘ERP: An Elastic Resource Provisioning Approach for Cloud Applications’, PloS One 14/4 (26 April 2019), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31026264. A photo with the official English name on a building can be found at: https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309351000774080801477171249.

⁷⁷ Interview with PLAAF officers in Washington DC in April 2018. See also, Li Chunzhao, (ed.), The Introduction on Air Force Academies Education [空军院校教育概论] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press September 2017), 149–150.

⁷⁸ Based on the authors’ analysis, each of these will most likely remain as division leader-grade organizations.

⁷⁹ Lü Gang, ‘Equipment Academy of Air Force,’ in Yao Wei, (ed.), China Air Force Encyclopedia Vol. 2 (Beijing: Aviation Industry Press November 2005), 1252; and Allen, ‘PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012’.

⁸⁰ Yang Qing, ‘Ceremony Held in Beijing to Inaugurate New Reform Organizations: Air Force Research Academy, Engineering University and Medical College’, Kongjun Bao, 24 Jul. 2017, p. 1.

⁸¹ Zhou Hong, ‘Air Force Research Academy Identifies Mission and Organizational Structure’, Kongjun Bao, 15 Nov. 2017, p. 1.

⁸² ‘Concerning 2017 Air Force Outstanding Division and Brigade Level Party Committee Personnel Awards’, Kongjun Bao, 14 Feb. 2018, p. 1.

⁸³ Kenneth Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, John F. Corbett, Jr., ‘The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation Part 1’, China Brief 16/3 (4 February 2016); and Kenneth Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, John F. Corbett, Jr., ‘The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation Part 2’, China Brief 16/4 (23 February 2016).

⁸⁴ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, 2012, available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2016-07/13/content_4768293.htm.

⁸⁵ Choi Chi-yuk and Catherine Wong Jun Mai, ‘China to appoint new air force commander, sources say’, South China Morning Post, 23 August 2017, available at: www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2108010/china-appoint-new-air-force-commander-sources-say.

⁸⁶ The PLA offers five career tracks, one of which is actually known as the ‘military officer’ track. Under this track, officers are expected to lead or command an organization or staff officers in a Headquarters/Staff Department. This is in contrast to the other four tracks: ‘political’, ‘equipment’, ‘logistics’, and ‘special technical’.

⁸⁷ A ‘regular aviator’ in the PLA system means that a pilot is removed from the military officer track – almost always for the remainder of his career – and is relegated to those duties involving flight. These pilots will retain this status until they reach their ‘停飞’ (ting fei), i.e. ‘cessation of flying’ age, after which they can only serve as staff officers until their mandatory retirement age. See Zhang Youqing, ‘“Seasoned Pilot” Attacks New Problems,’ Kongjun Bao, 8 Feb. 2018, p. 3. Unlike in the U.S. military, ‘regular aviators’ are not assigned a regular desk job.

⁸⁸ Wang Li, ‘The Air Force Provides Economic Assistance to 181 Special Hardship Officers and Soldiers’, Kongjun Bao, 1 Jan. 2017, p. 1.

⁸⁹ The information in this subsection is taken primarily from China’s College/University Student Conscription (Recruitment) Information Network [大学生征兵信息网], available at: www.0730hao.cn/index.html.

⁹⁰ China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 67–8.

⁹¹ ‘China Changes Military Recruitment Period,’ Xinhuanet, 14 June 2013. ‘China’s Conscription/Recruitment is Changing from a Winter Period to a Summer Period,’ PLA Daily, 15 June 2013, available at: http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-12/20/content_5150136.htm.

⁹² Yao Li, ‘Airborne Driver Training Group Training Skilled NCOs’, Kongjun Bao, 20 Feb. 2017, p. 2; and Xing Ketian and Sun Xianju, ‘Northern TCAF Radar Brigade Personnel Issues’, Kongjun Bao, 28 Sep. 2017, p. 2.

⁹³ In spite of the progress achieved, considerable institutional inertia remains. Whilst the five TC HQs have become joint organizations, the 15 CMC organizations are still dominated by Army officers. Of these, only two PLAAF officers hold any leadership billets; they are namely Lieutenant General An Zhaoqing, political commissar of the CMC Equipment Development Department; and Lieutenant General Chang Dingqiu, one of the deputy chiefs of the CMC Joint Staff Department (CMC JSD; formerly known as the General Staff Department). Noteworthily, whilst PLAAF officers who had served as one of the deputy chiefs of the CMC JSD stood a chance of holding the MR Leader grade long enough before eventually becoming PLAAF commander and gaining CMC membership, that practice was discontinued when General Yi Xiaoguang became commander of the Central TC in August 2017 – the first instance of a top PLAAF leader failing to gain membership in the CMC.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kenneth W. Allen

Kenneth W. Allen is was previously the Research Director for the US Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), Air University, Montgomery, AL. For the past 27 years, his primary focus has been on China’s military organizational structure, personnel, education, training, and foreign relations with particular emphasis on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force. During 21 years in the U.S. Air Force (1971–1992), he served as an enlisted Chinese and Russian linguist and intelligence officer with tours in Taiwan, Berlin, Japan, China, Washington DC and Pacific Air Force (PACAF) Headquarters. From 1987–1989, he served as the Assistant Air Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. He was inducted into the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Defense Attaché Hall of Fame in 1997. He has B.A. degrees from the University of California at Davis and the University of Maryland and an M.A. degree from Boston University. He has written multiple books, monographs, chapters, journal articles, and online articles on the PLA.

Brendan S. Mulvaney

Brendan S. Mulvaney is the Director of the China Aerospace Studies Institute. Dr. Mulvaney served as a Marine for a quarter of a century, where he flew more than 2000 hours as a AH-1W Cobra pilot, and was an Olmsted Scholar in Shanghai, China. He served at Camp Pendleton, CA; in China as an Olmsted Scholar at Fudan University, where he earned his Ph.D. in International Relations; in Iraq; in Washington D.C. as the inaugural Director of the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Red Team, and most recently at U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis where he was the Associate Chair for Languages and Cultures and taught Chinese language and culture.

James Char

James Char is Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is the principal editor of ‘A New Direction in the People’s Liberation Army’s Emergent Strategic Thinking, Roles and Missions,’ China Quarterly (December 2017) and also the editor of Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA’s Roles and Missions in the Xi Jinping Era (Routledge, 2019). His research interests centre on the domestic politics and civil–military relations of contemporary China as well as the history of warfare in modern China.