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ABSTRACT
Whole-of-government coordination has produced meagre results if measured against declared aims. However, an assessment of such coordination efforts should include also unstated aims. Based on an in-depth study of the primary high-level coordination body for Norway’s Afghanistan engagement, this article finds that the body was successful in pursuing symbolic politics. Showcasing was an underlying but non-declared aim of the body in question. These findings are significant because they provide an explanation why governments continue to pursue this kind of coordination efforts despite their apparent lack of success. Improved coordination was achieved mostly in terms of information sharing.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper the author would like to thank her PhD-project supervisors Professor Morten Egeberg and Associate Professor Torunn Laugen Haaland, participants at the SCANCOR Friday Seminar, Stanford University (2016) and the ‘International Public Policy’ panel at the Norwegian Political Science Conference in Stavanger (2017). The author would also like to thank Paal S. Hilde, Sven G. Holtsmark and Sigurd C. Sørlie for valuable comments, the reviewers of this journal and the informants who generously shared their time and insights.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Jan Willem Honig, ‘The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy: Small (and Large) States in a Double Bind’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/2 (2016), 273.
2 This can certainly also be the case in other policy fields: ‘In several cases, it appears to have been quite hard to achieve the main intended goals of a new coordination arrangement’. Külli Sarapuu et al., ‘Lessons Learned and Policy Implications’, in Per Lægreid et al. (eds.), Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector: Practices and Lessons from 12 European Countries (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian 2014), 265.
3 See Muiris MacCarthaigh and Astrid Molenveld, ‘Coordination in Europe’, in Edoardo Ongaro and Sandra van Thiel (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2018), 655.
4 Sarapuu et al., ‘Lessons Learned and Policy Implications’, 265.
5 The Ministry of Justice and the Police was renamed the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in November 2011. In this article, the Ministry will be referred to as the Ministry of Justice, for the sake of simplification.
6 Office of the Prime Minister, ‘Flertallsregjeringens statusrapport: Soria Moria Erklæringen – to år etter [Status Report of the Majority Government: The Soria Moria Declaration – Two Years After]’, (Oslo: Statsministerens Kontor 2007), 39.
7 Lene Ekhaugen, ‘Coordination as Showcasing: The Establishment of Norway’s Afghanistan Forum’, Defence Studies 19/3 (2019).
8 Research has e.g. demonstrated that ‘compared with 16 other European countries, Norwegian top civil servants score significantly higher than average on internal coordination quality both vertically within own policy area and horizontally across policy areas’. Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, ‘Coordination Quality in Central Government – The Case of Norway’, Public Organization Review 20/1 (2020), 155.
9 Grete Faremo, ‘Home and Abroad – An Army for the Complex Challenges of the Present Day’, speech at the Army Summit (6 November 2009).
10 ‘Comprehensive approaches’ can be seen as an umbrella term comprising such terms and approaches as the UN’s ‘Integrated Missions’ and ‘Integrated Approach’, the Dutch and Canadian ‘3D approach’ (defence, diplomacy, development) and the German ‘Networked Security’.
11 Sten Rynning, ‘When Virtue is Deceptive: A Critical Look at NATO’s Comprehensive Approach’, in Andrew A. Michta and Paal S. Hilde (eds.), The Future of NATO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2014), 130.
12 See Rynning, ‘When Virtue is Deceptive’, 120–121, and Philipp Rotmann, ‘Built on Shaky Ground: The Comprehensive Approach in practice’, Research Paper 63 (2010), 2.
13 See, for instance, Sven Bernhard Gareis, ‘Conclusive Concept or Catchword? On the Pretence and Practice of Germany’s Networked Security in Afghanistan’, in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Sven Gareis and Charles Pentland (eds.), Afghanistan in the Balance: Counterinsurgency, Comprehensive Approach, and Political Order (Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2012).
14 See, for instance, Arne Petersen Friis et al. ‘Implementing NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Complex Operations’, in Gulnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore (eds.), NATO in Search of a Vision (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2010), 75–98.
15 Maya Dafinova, ‘Keeping the Inter-Agency Peace? A Comparative Study of Swedish, German, and British Whole-of-Government Approaches in Afghanistan’, PhD thesis, Carleton University (2018), 14.
16 Christopher Pollitt and Peter Hupe, ‘Talking About Government’, Public Management Review 13/5 (2011), 643.
17 Dag I. Jacobsen, ‘“Sammen er vi dynamitt” – om koordinering mellom organisasjoner [“Together We are Dynamite” – On Inter-Organisational Coordination]’, Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift 9/2 (1993), 88.
18 The literature also furnishes studies of what appeared to be more successful whole-of-government approaches. For instance, the Canadian efforts have been cited as successful compared to that of other countries, largely owing to institutional innovations. Stephen M. Saideman, Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada’s War in Afghanistan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2016), 82.
19 Other examples include Gareis, ‘Conclusive Concept or Catchword?’
20 The Inquiry on Sweden’s Engagement in Afghanistan 2002–2014, ‘Summary of the Report of the Inquiry on Sweden’s Engagement in Afghanistan 2002–2014’, (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence 2017), 11.
21 NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014’, Official Norwegian Reports (2018), 36. The Norwegian version of the report remains the authoritative version, but this article refers to the English version for the sake of simplicity.
22 Timo Noetzel, ‘Germany’s Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning Amid Politico-Strategic Inertia’, Contemporary Security Policy 31/3 (2010), 499.
23 Mats Berdal and Astri Suhrke, ‘A Good Ally – Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001–2014’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1-2 (2018), 77.
24 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy 2007), 7, in Berdal and Suhrke, ‘A Good Ally’, 77.
25 Berdal and Suhrke, ‘A Good Ally’, 16–17.
26 John Kiszely, ‘The Political-Military Dynamic in the Conduct of Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/2 (2019), 11.
27 Todd Greentree, ‘Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/3 (2013), 326.
28 Ibid., 351.
29 Andrea B. Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Cultures? The Challenge of Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Stabilisation Operations’, The RUSI Journal 153/6 (2008), 72, see also Andrea B. Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Cultures? A Comparative Analysis of American and British Approaches to the Coordination of Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Stability Operations, 2001–2010’, PhD thesis, Oxford University (2012).
30 Murray Jacob Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press 1985), 38–39.
31 B. Guy Peters, Pursuing Horizontal Management: The Politics of Public Sector Coordination (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2015), 40.
32 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology 83/2 (1977).
33 Some of the archival data were exempt from public disclosure (including the minutes) or classified. The article has been declassified by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No changes were made in the original manuscript.
34 The author translated all quotations from Norwegian to English. The interviewees read and approved the quotations.
35 To collect evidence from observations, this author requested permission to observe an early 2011 meeting in the Afghanistan Forum, but the request was eventually declined on the grounds that the author’s presence could affect the deliberations.
36 NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally’, 26.
37 Ida Maria Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing in Allied Operations Abroad. The Case of Norway in Isaf’, PhD thesis, University of Oslo (2015), 88.
38 Ibid.
39 NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally’, 36–39.
40 Ibid., 40–41.
41 Ibid., 35.
42 Ibid., 220.
43 Author’s interview with Stig Traavik, Afghanistan coordinator with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006–07, Oslo, 3 January 2017.
44 Author’s interview with Kåre Aas, Norway’s ambassador to Afghanistan 2008–10, political director with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010–13, Oslo, 8 February 2011.
45 Author’s interview with Morten Wetland, Labour Party state secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, 2005–08, Oslo, 4 July 2016.
46 Traavik, January 2017.
47 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) archives, [06/8980-1], ‘Afghanistanforum på statssekretærnivå’, 15 August 2006.
48 Author’s interview with Anne M. Fagertun Stenhammer, Socialist Left Party state secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – International Development Affairs, 2005–07, Fauske, 20 July 2016.
49 Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen, ‘Aktuell norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk – fra Kabul til Nordområdene [Current Norwegian Defense and Security Policy – from Kabul to the High North]’, address to the annual meeting of the Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) People and Defence (2007), author’s translation.
50 Here, a participant is a civil servant, whilst a member is a state secretary who also officially belongs to the forum.
51 Traavik, January 2017.
52 Author’s interview with Else Mette Næss, senior adviser with the Ministry of Justice, Oslo, 1 September 2016.
53 Traavik, January 2017.
54 Author’s interview with Bård Vegar Solhjell, Socialist Left Party state secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, 2005–07, Oslo, 20 June 2016.
55 MFA archives, ‘Afghanistanforum på statssekretærnivå’, 15 August 2006.
56 Traavik, January 2017.
57 Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing’, 85.
58 Stenhammer, July 2016.
59 See Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing’, 90–102.
60 Ibid., 97.
61 Ibid., 96.
62 Solhjell, June 2016.
63 Solhjell, June 2016.
64 Draft government security committee (RSU)-memorandum from the Afghanistan Forum concerning Norwegian military contributions to ISAF, cited in Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing’, 98.
65 Halvor Elvik, ‘Rødt kort i Kabul? [Red Card in Kabul?]’, Dagbladet, 14 March 2007, author’s translation. One of the state secretaries from the Socialist Left Party who joined this trip claimed not to recall this initiative (Stenhammer, July 2016).
66 Halvor Elvik, ‘Rødgrønn Afghanistan-tur for å løse regjeringskonflikt [Red-green Trip to Afghanistan to Resolve Cabinet Conflict]’, Dagbladet, 25 November 2006.
67 See Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing’, 150.
68 Wetland, July 2016.
69 MFA archives, [06/8980-16] ‘Afghanistan. Møte i statssekretærutvalget Afghanistanforum, Utenriksdepartementet 08. november 2007’, 19 November 2007.
70 NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally’, 221.
71 Gunnar Zachrisen, ‘Sier nei til militarisert bistand’ [Says No To Militarised Aid], Bistandsaktuelt 6 (September 2010), 8–9.
72 Ibid.
73 See, for instance, Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (2016).
74 MFA archives, ‘Afghanistan. Møte i statssekretærutvalget Afghanistanforum, Utenriksdepartementet 08. november 2007’, 19 November 2007.
75 Norwegian Ministry of Justice (MoJ) archives, [06/8508-33], ‘Statssekretærutvalg Afghanistanforum 1/08’, 14 February 2008.
76 MoJ archives, ‘Statssekretærutvalg Afghanistanforum 1/08’, 14 February 2008.
77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice and the Police, ‘A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan’, (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police 2009).
78 MoJ archives, [06/8508-42], ‘Oppsummering fra møte i Statssekretærutvalget – Afghanistan 15. September 2008’.
79 MoJ archives, [06/8508-47], ‘Fremdriftsrapport for utarbeidelse av helhetlig strategi for norsk sivil og militær innsats i Faryab-provinsen i Afghanistan’, 29 January 2009.
80 MoJ archives, [06/8508-50], ‘Referat fra møte i Statssekretærutvalget Afghanistanforum 5.mars 2009’.
81 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice and the Police, ‘A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan’, 4.
82 Ine M. Eriksen Søreide, ‘En samlet strategi [A Comprehensive Strategy]’, Aftenposten, 24 July 2010, author’s translation.
83 NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally’, 132.
84 MoJ archives, [06/8508-69], ‘Møte i statssekretærutvalget Afghanistanforum’, 18 September 2009.
85 NOU 2007: 15, ‘Et styrket forsvar [A Strengthened Defence]’, (Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning 2007), 49, NOU 2008: 14, ‘Coherent for Development? How Coherent Norwegian Policies Can Assist Development in Poor Countries’ (Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning 2008), 168.
86 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier [A Defence for the Protection of Norway’s Security, Interests and Values]’, Proposition to the Storting No. 48 (2007–2008), 65.
87 See, for instance, Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘Nato 60 år. En allianse for vår tid [Nato at 60. An Alliance for Our Time]’, speech at Oslo Militære Samfund (23 March 2009).
88 The Norwegian terms ‘koordinering’ and ‘samordning’ were used interchangeably and synonymously and are both included in the following count.
89 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Address to the Storting, ‘Norges Engasjement i Afghanistan og Irak [Norway’s Engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq]’, (9 November 2005).
90 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Address to the Storting, ‘En samordnet plan for Norges bidrag i Afghanistan [A Comprehensive Plan for Norway’s Engagement in Afghanistan]’, (5 February 2008).
91 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Address to the Storting, ‘Utviklingen i Afghanistan og Norges sivile og militære engasjement i landet [Developments in Afghanistan and Norway’s Civil and Military Engagement]’, (9 February 2010).
92 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Address to the Storting, ‘Utviklingen i Afghanistan samt norsk sivilt og militært engasjement [Developments in Afghanistan and Norway’s Civil and Military Engagement]’, (26 April 2011).
93 MFA archives, [09/6482-2], ‘Møte i statssekretærutvalget for Afghanistan 5.2.2010’, 16 February 2010.
94 MoJ archives, [10/2562-3] ‘Gjennomgang av den norske innsatsen i Afghanistan’, 26 January 2010.
95 Author’s e-mail correspondence with Roger Ingebrigtsen, Labour Party state secretary, Ministry of Defence, 2009–12, 15 February 2016.
96 MFA archives, [11/12093], ‘Statssekretærutvalet for Afghanistan’, 7 November 2013.
97 Ibid.
98 Solhjell, June 2016.
99 See also Kristoffer Kolltveit, ‘Strengthening of the Executive Centre: Looking Beyond NPM as the Explanation for Change’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 81/1 (2015), 30.
100 Espen Barth Eide et al., Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommandations, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (2005).
101 Minister of Foreign Affairs’ and Minister of Defence’s Address to the Storting on Afghanistan, stortinget.no, (10 January 2017).
102 Stenhammer, July 2016.
103 Næss, September 2016.
104 SOU 2017:16, ‘Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014’, (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence 2017), 184 and 85.
105 This was also the case with information from other sources, such as from the intelligence community. See Berdal and Suhrke, ‘A Good Ally’, 75.
106 In line with NOU 2016: 8, ‘A Good Ally’, Official Norwegian Reports (2018).
107 Solhjell, June 2016.
108 Morten Thomsen, ‘Forsker: Samtænkning er i et stort, sort hul [Researcher: The Comprehensive Approach Is in a Large, Black Hole]’, Danske Officerer 21/6 (2012), 18–21, author’s translation.
109 Mats Berdal, Building Peace after War (Abingdon: Routledge 2017), 26.
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Lene Ekhaugen
Lene Ekhaugen is Research Fellow at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), Norwegian Defence University College. She is a PhD Candidate at the University of Oslo.