The People’s Liberation Army in its Tenth Decade: Assessing ‘Below the Neck’ Reforms in China’s Military Modernization

ABSTRACT

A slew of structural changes to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat capabilities, deterrence as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) were enacted following the announcement to streamline China’s armed forces in September 2015. Primarily driven by the Chinese military leadership’s desire to resolve longstanding shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations, unprecedented changes in the form of so-called ‘below the neck’ reforms gathered pace since the end of 2016. By focusing on those changes to the PLA’s established service branches as well as ‘new types’ of forces, this brief introduction will provide a summary of the prospects and problems as the Chinese military embarks on its latest endeavour to modernize itself.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• People’s Liberation Army
• reform
• joint operations
• services

Introduction

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has come a long way since its humble beginnings as a largely guerilla outfit in 1927. Under its current commander-in-chief, unprecedented changes have also been implemented in the last few years.¹ If there had initially been doubts in late-2015 that Xi Jinping would be able to push through the latest iteration of military reforms in the People’s Republic of China, developments in the period hitherto have seen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) trump the gridlock of vested interest groups within the military establishment. First announced in September 2015, the restructuring of the PLA command and control spanning its hierarchy has since extended to the PLA’s highest decision-making body, the country’s regional military commands, as well as the respective services of the Chinese armed forces. Regarding the latter, it was revealed on the first day of 2016 that the PLA had ushered in a new service-level command for its Army, as well as upgraded the former Second Artillery Force into a full service – since renamed the Rocket Force. With a view towards enhancing the PLA’s informationized warfare capability, a new Strategic Support Force was inaugurated at the same time.² Later in September that same year, the Joint Logistics Support Force was also established.³

Although there have been no lack of media attention and academic analysis of these ongoing changes to the CCP’s armed wing, one key aspect regarding China’s military reforms – that of contiguity i.e., the distinct phases entailed in realising the overall goal of the PLA’s transformation⁴ – has been one aspect that is often overlooked.⁵ Indeed, with the so-called ‘above the neck’ restructuring of the PLA leadership and command system out of the way by the end of 2016, deeper ‘below the neck’ changes to its force structure and operations were introduced more recently.⁶ Even if it is a well-known fact that the present phase focuses on transforming operational and tactical units from the army-level to that of the brigade- and battalion-level – with the latter thereafter constituting the PLA’s ‘basic combat unit’⁷ – finer details about the PLA’s joint operations training accompanying the ‘brigadization’ process are less readily available in reportage outside of China. Taking into account those substantial changes to have materialised in the interim period – and in light of the objectives set out by its commander-in-chief at the 19^th Party Congress⁸ – there could not have come a more opportune moment to take stock of the current progress of China’s military transformation.⁹

The above context offers a point of departure from which to determine and decipher the trajectory of this latest iteration of the PLA’s modernization. By placing some of its service branches under scrutiny, the articles in this special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies seek to document the PLA’s major reorganizations since late-2016 with respect to the stated objectives of the Chinese high command. First presented at the conference ‘The People’s Liberation Army in Its Tenth Decade: Assessing the Prospects of China’s Military Transformation under Xi Jinping’ organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in August 2018, these contributions offer an updated account of the general outlines, processes and drivers of military change in China. Overall, the discussion of the PLA’s services places the focus on the reorganization of its force structure; the development and deployment of its current capabilities; and the probable operationalisation of those units across its services. Put together, the papers provide insight into some of the key changes to PLA doctrine, training and operations that have occurred since the reforms were rolled out.

In ‘The PLA Army after “Below the Neck” Reforms: Contributing to China’s Joint Warfighting, Deterrence and MOOTW Posture’, Dennis Blasko observes the shift of the PLA’s largest service towards a more modernized and capable corps and elucidates on what those changes mean for Chinese military operations in the foreseeable future. In keeping with the Chinese political leadership’s stated desire for Beijing to become a maritime power, Blasko highlights that even as the PLA Army (PLAA) has built on its competency in land missions, it has also reconfigured its force structure by expanding its ‘new-type combat forces’. In that regard, he notes that the PLAA has received a tremendous boost in its number of army aviation and special forces – both in terms of personnel and equipment – whilst its long-range artillery, electronic warfare and cyber capabilities have also grown considerably. Of greater significance perhaps, is that the PLAA has also standardised the structure of its group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and battalions. Inevitably, these consequential changes accompanying the ‘brigadization’ of the PLAA and the PLA’s drive towards jointness also means that operational readiness has been compromised – in the short-term at least. Especially given continuing shortcomings in its combat capabilities, Blasko reasons that the PLA will in all likelihood persist with achieving the strategic objectives of its political master through military operations at the level below the threshold of war.¹⁰

The next article by Kenneth Allen, Brendan Mulvaney and James Char examines the ‘below the neck’ changes to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) since 2017. In ‘Ongoing Organizational Reforms of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’,¹¹ the authors point out that the structure of the Chinese air force now takes on a ‘base-brigade’ configuration. Specifically, a number of PLAAF regiments (including airborne units) have been upgraded to brigades – just as division headquarters are being abolished. Concomitantly, PLAAF bases have been reconfigured from former air command posts which now oversee the bulk of the aviation, surface-to-air missile, artillery, and radar units under their areas of responsibility. Indicative of the overall effort to make the Chinese military more ‘joint’, these bases also coordinate their activities with their counterparts from the other PLA services. But as is the case with the PLAA, Allen et al. detect an interim disconcertion within PLAAF ranks. In particular, the authors conclude that the new ‘base-brigade’ structure has had adverse effects on the morale of PLAAF personnel since the now-defunct divisions suggests that some air force officers can no longer advance up the career ladder in a straightforward manner.¹² Consequently, it also stands to reason that the next phase of the current tranche of PLA reforms immediately following the ‘below the neck’ changes will likely entail extensive changes to its extant personnel management and recruitment policies,¹³ and perhaps, further improvements in its treatment of veterans.¹⁴

Elsa Kania and John Costello round off this collection of papers with their exposition on the entity most likely to play a leading role in contributing to the PLA’s ability to fight and win informationized war. In ‘Seizing the Commanding Heights: The PLA Strategic Support Force in Chinese Military Power’, they describe how the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) could potentially leverage synergies and the integration of China’s asymmetric capabilities across cyber, electronic and space domains to gain mastery over its adversaries.¹⁵ On this, two missions come to mind. First, the PLASSF would provide intelligence information support via the PLA’s space systems to the newly established Theatre Commands (TCs); second, strategic information operations would also be carried out by PLASSF cyber and electronic warfare units to target and disable an enemy’s system of systems. Though similar to the two previous articles in that Kania and Costello also uncover a number of recent training activities between the PLASSF and the other services, they postulate that the establishment of this new force effectively heralds a new era for Chinese military power and further consolidates the PLA’s status as a force to be reckoned with. If and when it is called to arms, the PLASSF’s command of critical intelligence would render it an integral enabler of decision-making for the CMC Joint Staff Department, whilst also directly providing crucial information support to the TCs as well as the various services to conduct joint operations.

Notwithstanding the ‘recentness’ of the present reforms, it would be more accurate however to depict the latest changes as part of a longer-term process to modernize the PLA, and especially its joint operations capabilities.¹⁶ Indeed, as evinced from its earlier defence documents,¹⁷ the Chinese military leadership has long-standing concerns over the lack of intensity in joint training, alongside what it had previously observed was an unbalanced PLA force structure. Therefore, the series of measures promulgated by Xi Jinping to streamline the CCP’s coercive forces – expected to be completed by 2020¹⁸ – are long overdue. Where the ‘below the neck’ changes are concerned, many more years and multiple training cycles will be required before the PLA can hope to finetune its operations. Thus, the CMC chairman’s 2035 target for the Chinese corps to become a ‘modern’ military and a ‘world-class’ force by 2050 are no arbitrary timelines. Alongside improvements to its extant mechanisms of national defence mobilisation, the defence ecosystem in China would likewise have to undergo transformative change to enhance indigenous innovation before effective civil-military integration can occur.¹⁹ The next ten to fifteen years of the PLA’s development thus will be crucial.

With the ‘below the neck’ reforms having had a detrimental (albeit temporary) effect on most PLA units and their operational readiness, it will therefore be of interest to discern how the respective Chinese military services have been tackling ‘jointness’ either in the form of single-service operations,²⁰ or the more complex task of integrated joint operations – both between themselves within a singular theatre,²¹ or across a few theatres. At the same time, an analysis of the top-down relations between PLA units and their higher headquarters – both service headquarters and TC headquarters – will also uncover useful information about the reforms and offer a preliminary assessment of the continuing evolution of Asia’s latest military power. Complementing the appraisal of the important changes to the individual PLA services, the papers in this volume end by offering near- to medium-term prognostications of what China’s military transformation could mean in the event of potential flashpoints both within its borders and further afield.²² In keeping with the CCP’s own schedule (i.e., that the modernization of China’s national defence and armed forces ‘basically’ be completed by 2035), this volume thus seeks to provide readers with a better understanding of the thinking behind those objectives and a better appreciation of the problems and prospects the PLA faces, as it marches into its tenth decade.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and in particular, Ralf Emmers and Joseph Chinyong Liow for their unstinting encouragement in organizing the conference “The People’s Liberation Army in Its Tenth Decade: Assessing the Prospects of China’s Military Transformations under Xi Jinping” in August 2018 in Singapore. He is further indebted to Li Mingjiang for his guidance and to Zi Yang for his camaraderie during each phase of the project. Much appreciation also extends to the chairpersons, presenters, discussants and participants for their incalculable contributions to the proceedings, which were ably supported by the fine administrators at RSIS. He also wishes to express his gratitude to Dennis Blasko and Andrew Scobell for their kind counsel in helping to shape the direction of this special issue. Lastly, he is grateful to Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo of the Journal of Strategic Studies as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on the articles.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Char

James Char is Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He has written extensively on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and his articles have appeared in peer-reviewed journals including Asian Security, the China Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies. He is the principal editor of ‘A New Direction in the People’s Liberation Army’s Emergent Strategic Thinking, Roles and Missions’, China Quarterly (December 2017) and ‘Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army since the 18^th Party Congress: Politics, Policymaking and Professionalism’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2016). He is also the editor of Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA’s Roles and Missions in the Xi Jinping Era (Routledge, 2019). His research interests centre on the domestic politics and civil–military relations of contemporary China as well as the history of warfare in modern China.

Notes

¹ ‘China Headlines: Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform’, Xinhuanet, 27 November 2015, available at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-11/26/content_6787704.htm.

² ‘Chinese military launches two new wings for space and cyberspace’, South China Morning Post, 1 January 2016, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1897356/chinese-military-launches-two-new-wings-space-and-cyber.

³ ‘China establishes joint logistics support force’, China Military Online, 13 September 2016, available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-09/13/content_4730336.htm.

⁴ Notwithstanding the contiguous relationship, the ‘above the neck’ and ‘below the neck’ reforms have also been described as parts of ‘an organic whole’, with one PLA Daily commentary comparing the former to ‘strengthening the brain’ whereas the latter is seen as being akin to ‘strengthening the bones and muscles’; ‘[Huishi, jun gai xiang “bo zi yixia” tingjin [Command an Army: PLA Reforms Progressing to “Below the Neck”]’, 11 August 2017, available at: http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/11/content_185250.htm. Without spelling out the processes explicitly, China’s recently released defence white paper also categorises the reforms in a few stages, of which the second pertains to optimising ‘size, structure and force composition’; see China’s National Defence In The New Era (1^st Edition), The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019.

⁵ Of those few exceptions, two notable contributions stand out: Phillip Saunders, et al. (Eds.), Chairman Xi Remakes The PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019) And You Ji, ‘Xi Jinping And PLA Transformation Through Reforms’, RSIS Working Paper, No. 313, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 21 May 2018.

⁶ ‘Zhongyang junwei jundui guimo jiegou he liliang bian cheng gaige gongzuo huiyi [CMC Reform Work Conference on Reorganizing Force Structure and Power]’, PLA Daily, 4 December 2016, available at:http://www.mod.gov.cn/jmsd/2016-12/04/content_4765548.htm. In what appears to be an attempt by CCP propagandists to place Xi Jinping on par with Mao Zedong, the 3-stage progression of the reforms initiated by the incumbent leader has even been referenced as being analogous to Mao’s exploits in the Three Key Campaigns during the decisive phase of the Chinese Civil War; see ‘Zhonggong zhengzhi ju jiti xuexi juji jun gai zuihou yi xiang yiti [The CCP Politburo collectively learns: The last issue of the military reforms]’, Duowei News, 31 July 2019, available at: http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-07-31/60143437.html.

⁷ ‘Ying jiang zuowei jiefangjun jichu zhanshu danyuan duli zhixing zuozhan renwu [The battalion will serve as the PLA’s basic tactical unit capable of performing independent combat missions]’, Xinhuanet, 25 April 2008, available at: http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2008-04-25/0632497096.html; and ‘Hecheng ying you “jieshou zhiling xing” xiang “duli zuozhan xing” Zhuanbian [Combined arms battalions transforming from “Receiving Orders” to “Independent Operations”]’, PLA Daily, 9 September 2016, http://www.81.cn/lj/2016-09/09/content_7249484.htm.

⁸ ‘PLA to be world-class force by 2050’, China Daily, 27 November 2017, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/27/content_33756453.htm.

⁹ Indeed, the papers in the present volume build on earlier discussions of the preliminary phase of the present round of PLA reforms documented in James Char and Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army since the 18th Party Congress: Politics, Policymaking, and Professionalism’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 39/5–6 (2016), 599–607.

¹⁰ As the latest example of its recurrent contributions to China’s non-traditional security needs, the PLA was deployed to Wuhan to contain the fallout in the virus-stricken city. See ‘PLA medical personnel to run new Wuhan hospital’, China Daily, 2 February, available at: https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/119878.

¹¹ For another recent study, see Michael S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, ‘China’s search for a “Strategic Air Force”’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 39/1 (2016), 4–28.

¹² Under this new structure, division-leader grade officers may no longer enjoy a ‘standard’ career progression with promotions in grade every few years.

¹³ In July 2019, Xi Jinping convened a CCP Politburo collective study focusing on reforming the PLA policy system, citing the effort as ‘an institutional reconstruction of the Party’s military and a requisite for the establishment of a world-class military’; see ‘The CCP Politburo collectively learns: The last issue of the military reforms’, Duowei News, 31 July 2019. Noteworthily also, the third sub-section under ‘Section IV. Reform in China’s National Defense and Armed Forces’ in China’s latest defense white paper likewise relates to changes to PLA policies and institutions; see China’s National Defense In The New Era (1^st Edition).

¹⁴ Despite recent enhancements in those policies concerning the management of former PLA soldiers, problems are expected to persist; see Neil J. Diamant, ‘China’s insecure security men’, East Asia Forum, 30 July 2018, available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/07/30/chinas-insecure-security-men/.

¹⁵ For a noteworthy treatise on the PLA’s space capabilities, see Kevin Pollpeter, ‘Space, the new domain: space operations and Chinese military reforms’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 39/5–6 (2016), 709–727.

¹⁶ For an up-to-date account of the development of the PLA’s ‘jointness’ in this journal, see Joel Wuthnow, ‘A brave new world for Chinese joint operations’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 40/1–2 (2017), 169–195.

¹⁷ See, for example, China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/; and also, Section IV. Building and development of China’s armed forces in China’s Military Strategy, 27 May 2015, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

¹⁸ In fact, it was clarified early on that the major structural reforms would only be the first stage in a 5-year process; see ‘Zhongyang junwei guanyu shenhua guofang he jundui gaige de yijian [CMC Opinions on Deepening Reforms on National Defence and Armed Forces]’, Xinhuanet, 1 January 2016, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm.

¹⁹ This issue has grown particularly pertinent in the wake of the ongoing Sino-U.S. trade war and American sanctions on the PLA as well as on Chinese technology companies; see ‘U.S. sanctions China for buying Russian fighter jets, Missiles’, Reuters, 21 September 2018, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions/u-s-sanctions-china-for-buying-russian-fighter-jets-missiles-iduskcn1m02tp. See also, ‘China’s navy is being forced to rethink its spending plans as cost of trade war rises’, South China Morning Post, 26 May 2019, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3011872/chinas-navy-being-forced-rethink-its-spending-plans-cost-trade. Nevertheless, one should also be alert to the possibility that such pessimistic portrayals serve as a Chinese ploy to downplay the trajectory of its actual military build-up.

²⁰ These include of course, the PLA Navy (PLAN) as well as the PLA’s missile forces. For an assessment in this journal detailing those developments in the PLAN, see Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Rising tide, dispersing waves: opportunities and challenges for Chinese seapower development’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 37/3 (2014), 372–402.

²¹ Michael S. Chase, Andrew Erickson And Christopher Yeaw, ‘Chinese theatre and strategic missile force modernization and its implications for the United States’, Journal Of Strategic Studies, 32/1 (2009), 67–114.

²² The discussion of these potential flashpoints in no way advocate war nor seek to stoke tensions; rather, the authors aim to pinpoint those achievements since empowered by the reforms, as well as identify outstanding deficiencies in the PLA’s operations.