A tale of three French interventions: Intervention entrepreneurs and institutional intervention choices

ABSTRACT

What factors explain the institutional shape of military interventions spearheaded by France? This article suggests that Intervention Entrepreneurs are the deciding agents. To secure the viability of their intervention proposal, they select an intervention venue based on pragmatic grounds. Most importantly, they carefully study possible domestic and international opposition to their intervention plans and conceive institutional intervention choices accordingly. The result is an ad hoc selection of intervention venues with little impact of political ideology, norms, organisational interests, or historical learning. Moreover, on many occasions, little attention is paid to which intervention format would most benefit the peace and prosperity in the conflict theatre in the medium to long term. The article illustrates this argument by tracing French institutional decision-making for interventions in Chad/CAR, Mali, and Libya.

KEYWORDS:

• Military intervention
• France
• Libya
• Mali
• Chad
• Central African Republic

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ The attacks of 9/11 are generally viewed as a game-changing moment in international security affairs. As a result, it is appropriate to distinguish French intervention policy pre- and post-9/11. This article focuses on the latter time period. France also played a role in other security crises notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania, though its involvement was arguably much smaller in military terms than in the operational theatres mentioned above. See e.g., Gegout, Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security Prestige and the Legacy of Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 148–153.

² On the concept of pivotal state, please refer to Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

³ On the Côte d’Ivoire intervention, see Stefano Recchia, ‘A legitimate sphere of influence: Understanding France’s turn to multilateralism in Africa’, Journal of Strategic Studies, this special issue.

⁴ EUFOR Chad-CAR was conceived as a bridging mission. A UN mission, MINURCAT, deployed to Chad-CAR from 2009 to 2010.

⁵ France did, however, secure a political endorsement from ECOWAS before intervening. See Dominik Erforth, ‘Multilateralism as a tool: Exploring French military cooperation in the Sahel’, Journal of Strategic Studies, this special issue.

⁶ See e.g., Stefano Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: US Civil-Military Relations and Multilateral Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2015). Sarah Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience:United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). Katharina Coleman, ‘The Legitimacy Audience Shapes the Coalition: Lessons from Afghanistan, 2001’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11/3 (July 2017, 339–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1353752. Michael Tierney, ‘Multilateralism: America’s Insurance Policy against Loss’, European Journal of International Relations 17/4 (December 2011), 655–678. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354066110372433.

⁷ Marina Henke, ‘Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23/3 (July 2017), 307–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2017.1352004.

⁸ See e.g., Martin Austvoll Nome, ‘Transnational Ethnic Ties and Military Intervention: Taking Sides in Civil Conflicts in Europe, Asia and North Africa, 1944–99, European Journal of International Relations 19/4 (February 2012), 747–771. doi: 10.1177/1354066111425260. Maria Koinova, ‘Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK’, Foreign Policy Analysis 9/4 (October 2013). doi: 10.1111/j.1743–8594.2012.00194.x. Dana M. Moss, ‘Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization, and the Case of the Arab Spring’, Social Problems 63/4 (November 2016). doi: 10.1093/socpro/spw019.

⁹ Henke, ‘Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs’.

¹⁰ Because of the delicate information exchanged, many of these interviews were conducted ‘on background,’ i.e., my interview partners granted me permission to use the information, but they asked not to be identified by name in this article.

¹¹ E.g., Tierney, ‘Multilateralism: America’s Insurance Policy against Loss’. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2003). Kenneth Schultz, ‘Tying Hands and Washing Hands: US Congress and Multilateral Humanitarian Interventions’, in Dan Drezner (ed.), Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2003). Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience.

¹² E.g., Martha Finnemore, ‘The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force.’ Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). doi: 10.7591/9780801467073-002.

¹³ David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, Force and Legitimacy in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005), 71. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511622021.

¹⁴ e.g., Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Victory Has Many Friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005’, International Security 30/1 (July 2005), 140–177. doi:10.1162/0162288054894616. Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, International Studies Quarterly 36/1 (March 1992), 49. doi: 10.2307/2600916. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, ‘Still Pretty Prudent Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/4 (August 1998), 395–417. doi: 10.1177/0022002798042004001. Grieco et al., ‘Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War’, International Studies Quarterly 55/2 (June 2011), 563–583. doi: 10.1111/j.1468–2478.2011.00660.x.

¹⁵ E.g., James A. Baker, and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York, NY: Putnam, 1995), 332. Schultz, ‘Tying Hands and Washing Hands’, 105–109. doi:10.3998/mpub.16945. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf 2014), 375 & 477. doi: 10.5787/44-2-1197. Stefano Recchia, ‘Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention’, Security Studies 24/2 (2015), 255. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2015.1036626.

¹⁶ E.g., William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995), 56. doi: 10.1515/9781400821785. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York, NY: Putnam 1995), 279.

¹⁷ Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Institutions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (February 1998). doi: 10.1177/0022002798042001001. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience, 33–35. doi: j.1538-165x.2012.tb02252.x. Marina Henke, ‘Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building’, International Security 43/4 (April 2019). doi:10.1162/isec_a_00345.

¹⁸ Katharina P. Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement:The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007). doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491290. See also Alexander Thompson, Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and US Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2009). doi:10.7591/9780801459375.

¹⁹ Katharina P. Coleman, The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation (New York, NY: International Peace Institute 2014).

²⁰ E.g., Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment Revisited’, The National Interest, 70 (2002).

²¹ E.g. Barry R. Posen, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security 28/1 (2003). doi:10.1162/016228803322427965. William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, ibid.24 (1999). doi:10.1162/016228899560031.

²² Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, 6.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ On the military as a force for multilateralism in the context of French interventions, see Tony Chafer, Gordon Cumming, Roel van der Velde, ‘France’s Interventions in Mali and the Sahel: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective’ Journal of Strategic Studies, this special issue.

²⁵ Gegout, Why Europe Intervenes in Africa, 43–44.

²⁶ For similar lobbying techniques outside of the defence realms see e.g., Baumgartner, Frank et al., Lobbying and policy change: Who wins, who loses, and why (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2009). David A. Snow et al. ‘Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation’, American Sociological Review (1986), 464–81. doi: 10.2307/2095581; Goffman, Erving, and Adams, E. M., Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1979) doi: 10.2307/2106908; William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986).

²⁷ For details on these dynamics see e.g., Kevin M. Esterling, ‘Buying expertise: Campaign contributions and attention to policy analysis in congressional committees’, American Political Science Review 101/1 (2007), 93–109, DOI: 10.1017/s0003055407070116; Lucig H. Danielian, and Benjamin Page, ‘The heavenly chorus: Interest group voices on TV news’, American Journal of Political Science 38/4 (1994), 1056–78. doi: 10.2307/2111732.

²⁸ Intervention entrepreneurs have thus a monopoly when it comes to ‘issue-framing.’ Cf. Baumgartner et al. 2009, Lobbying and policy change.

²⁹ Collier, Brady, and Seawright, ‘Outdated Views of Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On’, Political Analysis (2010), 506. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq022.

³⁰ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007). Available at www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1778%282007%29/page_2 (last accessed 10 February 2010).

³¹ France single-handedly wrote all UN draft resolutions pertaining to Chad-CAR and prodded numerous Security Council members to support the resolutions. France also planned for the EU-UN transition, see Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation.

³² Mattelaer, The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – the Case of Eufor Tchad/RCA (Brussels: IES 2008), 14.

³³ For geopolitical reasons, key French government officials deemed it necessary to keep Chadian president Déby in power. See Marchal, ‘Understanding French Policy towards Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task Part 1–3.’ Available at http://africanarguments.org/2009/06/06/understanding-french-policy-towards-chadsudan-a-difficult-task-3/(last accessed 8 August 2018).

³⁴ Guillaume Etienne, ‘L’opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Succès Et Limites D’une Initiative Européenne’ (Paris: Terra Nova 2009), 9–10.

³⁵ As quoted in Mattelaer, ‘The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – the Case of Eufor Tchad/RCA’, The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations (March 2010), 15. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1577775.

³⁶ These officials reckoned that the operation had a taste of France using the UN to advance its own political agenda in Chad. See e.g., Bjoern H. Seibert, African Adventure? Assessing the European Union’s Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic (Cambridge, MA: MIT Security Studies Working Paper 2010), 10. Alexandra Novosselof, and Richard Gowan, Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic, 2006–2010 (New York, NY: New York University Center on International Cooperation 2012), 11. Author’s interview with Victor da Silva, UN Special Representative for MINURCAT, Brussels, February 2011.

³⁷ In essence, Sarkozy considered the numerous French military bases and operations in Africa a waste of money.

³⁸ James Traub, ‘A Statesman without Borders’, New York Times, 3 February 2008.

³⁹ Eglantine Staunton, France, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2020).

⁴⁰ Novosselof and Gowan, Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations, 40.

⁴¹ James Traub, ‘A Statesman without Borders.’

⁴² Since the refugee camps were also on the North-Eastern CAR side of the border, France included CAR in the operational plans.

⁴³ Novosselof and Gowan, Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations, 40. Seibert, ‘African Adventure?’, 48–49. In 2004, the EU had set up the Athena Mechanism – a permanent mechanism to administer the financing of common costs of EU military operations.

⁴⁴ Author’s interview with Bernard Thorette, Chief of Staff of the French Army, Paris, February 2011.

⁴⁵ Sarkozy wanted to demonstrate to the French citizens that whatever their political orientation, they would be able to identify with his new administration. See e.g., Marchal, ‘Understanding French Policy towards Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task Part 1-3.

⁴⁶ Author’s interview with Bernard Kouchner, French Foreign Minister, Paris, February 2011.

⁴⁷ Arfi, Fabrice and Laske, Karl, Avec Les Compliments Du Guide (Paris: Fayard, 2017). The brokers of the deal from the French side appear to have been Brice Hortefeux, Claude Gueant, and a Lebanese intermediary called Ziad Takieddine.

⁴⁸ As Moftah Missouri, Gaddafi’s translator, testified. See http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180323-info-rfi-affaire-libyenne-interprete-kadhafi-moftah-missouri-sarkozy. See also Karl Laske, Fabrice Arfi, ‘Les juges percent les secrets de la fuite du bras droit de Kadhafi’, Médiapart, 23 juillet 2015, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/230715/les-juges-percent-les-secrets-de-la-fuite-du-bras-droit-de-kadhafi.

⁴⁹ Piel, Tilouine, and Goar, ‘Financement Libyen: Le Spectre D’une Affaire D’etat,’ Le Monde, 23 March 2018.

⁵⁰ Arfi and Laske, Avec Les Compliments Du Guide, 231.

⁵¹ Jean-Christophe Notin, La Vérité Sur Notre Guerre En Libye (Paris: Fayard 2012), 53. Author’s interview with French intelligence official, Paris, June 2018. See also Weighill, Rob and Gaub, Florence, The Cauldron: Nato’s Campaign in Libya (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 49. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190916220.001.0001.

⁵² Vincent Hugeaux, ‘Les vérités de l’ancien chef du protocole de Kadhafi’, L’Express.fr, 2 Mar. 2011.

⁵³ Author’s interview with French intelligence official, Paris, June 2018.

⁵⁴ Notin, La Vérité Sur Notre Guerre En Libye, 76 & 81.

⁵⁵ Bernard Henri Lévy, La Guerre Sans L’aimer: Journal D’un Écrivain Au Coeur Du Printemps Libyen (Paris: Grasset 2011), 106.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 107.

⁵⁷ Alice Pannier, ‘Understanding the Workings of Interstate Cooperation in Defence: An Exploration into Franco-British Cooperation after the Signing of the Lancaster House Treaty’, European Security 22/4 (December 2013), 549–550. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2013.833908. Interview with British military officer, London, June 2018.

⁵⁸ Michael A. Ashcroft, Call Me Dave: The Unauthorised Biography of David Cameron (London: Biteback Publishing 2015), 428.

⁵⁹ Notin, La Vérité Sur Notre Guerre En Libye, 191. David Richards, Taking Command (London: Hachette UK 2014), 336.

⁶⁰ Weighill and Gaub, The Cauldron, 57–58.

⁶¹ Notin, La Vérité Sur Notre Guerre En Libye, 191–192; Nougayrede, ‘Comment La France a-T-Elle Decide D’intervenir En Libye?’,Le Monde, 9 April 2011.

⁶² Weighill and Gaub, The Cauldron, 45.

⁶³ Ibid., 76.

⁶⁴ Isabelle Lasserre, and Thierry Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali. Les Nouvelles Menaces Contre La France (Paris: Fayard 2013), 53.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 191. Lénaïg Bredoux, Clément Fayol, ‘L’Afrique de Hollande donne le premier rôle aux militaires’, Médiapart, 11 janvier 2016.

⁶⁶ Jean-Christophe Notin, La Guerre De La France Au Mali (Paris: Tallandier 2014), 179–180. doi:10.14375/np.9791021004566.

⁶⁷ Philippe Chapleau, ‘Mali: On peut donner un appui matériel, on peut former, mais la France n’interviendra pas’. (François Hollande)’ [archive], Ouest-France, 11 October 2012. See also Chivvis, Christopher S., The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015), 36. doi:10.1017/cbo9781316343388.

⁶⁸ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 15.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 27. Mathias, Grégor, Les Guerres Africaines De François Hollande (Paris: Editions de l’Aube 2014).

⁷⁰ General Benoît Puga, whose official title is the Chief of the Military Staff of the President of the Republic, reportedly had been pushing President Sarkozy to intervene in Mali. But Sarkozy refused. Puga and Sarkozy had a remarkably close relationship. Hollande kept Puga as his chief military adviser, but the relationship was decidedly less close. See e.g., David Revault d’Allonnes and Nathalie Guibert, ‘Enquête sur Benoît Puga, le général des présidents français’, Le Monde, 6 July 2016.

⁷¹ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 23. Revault d’Allonnes and Guibert, ‘Enquête sur Benoît Puga, le général des présidents français’.

⁷² Ibid., 28.

⁷³ Notin, La Guerre De La France Au Mali, 84.

⁷⁴ Author’s interview with Admiral Edouard Guillaud, Chief of the French Defence Staff, St Cloud, August 2016.

⁷⁵ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 21–22,27 & 48-49. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa, 76. Elischer, ‘After Mali Comes Niger’, Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2013 2013. Boeke, Sergei and Schuurman, Bart, ‘Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 806–807. doi:10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494.

⁷⁶ Author’s interview with French official, Paris, August 2016.

⁷⁷ Thomas Hofnung, ‘Un chef d’état-major très particulier’, Libération, 12 juillet 2014. Jean Guisnel, ‘Remaniement: Jean-Yves Le Drian, le réformateur tranquille’, Le Point.fr Défense ouverte, 2 avril 2014.

⁷⁸ Notin, La Guerre De La France Au Mali, 145. Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 182. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa, 98.

⁷⁹ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 183.

⁸⁰ During France’s Libya intervention, most important operational decisions were taken at the Elysée not the Ministry of Defence.

⁸¹ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 28.

⁸² Ibid., 30.

⁸³ As quoted in ibid., 26.

⁸⁴ As quoted in ibid. See also Notin, La Guerre De La France Au Mali, 106.

⁸⁵ La Guerre De La France Au Mali, 128. Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 31.

⁸⁶ Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 30. The day before the official decision was taken to intervene in Mali, these units were flown to the airport in Sévaré. On 11 January 2013, these units played a crucial role in launching the intervention. Boeke and Schuurman, ‘Operation ‘Serval’’, 814.

⁸⁷ Author’s interview with French intelligence official, Paris, August 2016.

⁸⁸ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 30.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 32.

⁹⁰ At the time, French diplomats had been very busy organising a force under ECOWAS command: AFISMA. Its deployment had been authorised by UNSC resolution 2085, adopted unanimously on 20 December 2012.

⁹¹ Lasserre and Oberle, Notre Guerre Secrete Au Mali, 26. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa, 41.

⁹² Author’s interview with French defence official, Paris, August 2016.

⁹³ Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa, 97.

⁹⁴ Nougayrede, ‘Mali: Les Faucons De François Hollande’, Le Monde, 29 January 2013. Lénaïg Bredoux, Clément Fayol, ‘L’Afrique de Hollande donne le premier rôle aux militaires’, Médiapart, 11 janvier 2016.

⁹⁵ Rachel Utley, ‘The New French Interventionism’, Civil Wars 1/2 (1998). doi:10.1057/9780230595644_10. ‘The Sacred Union? French Intervention in Lebanon and Chad under François Mitterrand’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 10,3 (1999). doi:10.1080/09592319908423248.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Northwestern University Farrell Fund.

Notes on contributors

Marina E. Henke

Marina E. Henke is professor of international relations at Northwestern University and the Hertie School. She specializes in military interventions, peacekeeping and European security and defense policy.