Seizing the commanding heights: the PLA Strategic Support Force in Chinese military power

ABSTRACT

The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) will enhance the Chinese military’s future deterrence and war-fighting capabilities. Established in December 2015, this new force is poised to leverage synergies and the integration of critical capabilities across space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLASSF will support joint operations and provide new strategic capabilities to complement the PLA’s existing arsenal. In any future conflict scenarios, the PLASSF will play an integral role in the PLA’s quest to ‘fight and win’ wars. Looking forward, the PLASSF may also become a critical force for innovation as the PLA prepares for future warfare.

KEYWORDS:

• Chinese military reforms
• strategic Support Force
• information operations
• cyber warfare

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ This paper builds upon prior writings on and analyses of the Strategic Support Force, including the following: John Costello and Joe McReynolds, ‘The Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era,’ National Defense University, 2 October 2018, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1651760/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-a-new-era/; Elsa Kania and John Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations,’ Cyber Defense Review, Spring 2018, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/CDR%20Journal%20Articles/The%20Strategic%20Support%20Force_Kania_Costello.pdf?ver=2018-07-31-093713-580; Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, ‘The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations,’ RAND, 2017, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2058/RAND_RR2058.pdf; Elsa Kania, ‘The Strategic Support Force: The ‘Information Umbrella for China’s Military,’ The Diplomat, 1 April 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/pla-strategic-support-force-the-information-umbrella-for-chinas-military/; and Elsa Kania, ‘The Strategic Support Force – A Force for Innovation?’ The Diplomat, 23 February 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-innovation/.

² The authors relied upon a range of Chinese language open sources available online for this analysis. These include but are not limited to official reportage in PLA media, technical publications, social media postings, and procurement notices. The authors’ knowledge of Military Unit Cover Designations (MUCDs) and the affiliations of key individuals are also integral to this analytical effort. Those sources not explicitly included in the footnotes are available from the authors upon request.

³ See the new national defense white paper that China recently released, which provides an official update on the reforms: ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era,’ Xinhua, 24 July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. ‘Full text of “China’s National Defense in the New Era”’ [《新时代的中国国防》白皮书全文], Xinhua, 24 July 2019, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jmywyl/2019-07/24/content_9567592_5.htm.

⁴ The concept (tixi ronghe) could be also translated as ‘system of systems fusion.’ Zhang Zilian [张自廉] and Ma Daiwu [马代武], ‘What kind of concept of integration should be used in informatized warfare’ [信息化战争应有怎样的融合观], China Military Online, 10 December 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-12/10/content_249559.htm.

⁵ For context, see: Chase, Michael S., and Arthur Chan. China’s Evolving Approach to ‘Integrated Strategic Deterrence’. Rand Corporation, 2016.

⁶ See ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era.’

⁷ For an excellent analysis of the PLA human capital ecosystem for cyber/network warfare, see research by Joe McReynolds and Leigh-Ann Ragland Luce that is forthcoming.

⁸ ‘Xi Jinping: Striving to Realize the Party’s Powerful Military Objective in a New Era’ [习近平：为实现党在新时代的强军目标], Xinhua, 26 October 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/26/c_1121862632.htm.

⁹ ‘Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist Party 19^th National Congress’ [习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告], Xinhua, 27 October 2017, http://www.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm

¹⁰ See ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era,’ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm.

¹¹ Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮] eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015, 388.

¹² John Costello and Joe McReynolds, ‘The Strategic Support Force.’

¹³ On the question of Xi Jinping’s power over the PLA, see: James Mulvenon, ‘The Yuan Stops Here: Xi Jinping and the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,”’ China Leadership Monitor 47, 14 July 2015, https://www.hoover.org/research/yuan-stops-here-xi-jinping-and-cmc-chairman-responsibility-system; and For further context on Chinese civil-military relations, see: David Finkelstein & Kristen Gunness (eds.), Swimming in a New Sea: Civil-Military Issues in Today’s China, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, pp. 146–70.

¹⁴ For more on the reforms and the implications for PLA joint operations, see Joel Wunthrow, ‘A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 40 (Issue 1–2), 2017. A more detailed analysis of these reforms is also available in Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications,’ China Strategic Perspectives, NDU Press, March 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430.

¹⁵ ‘The Whole Military Starts Training; Please Ask the Chairman to Review’ [全军开训，请主席校阅！], Military Observer Net [中国军视网], 5 January 2018, http://www.xjbs.com.cn/news/2018-01/05/cms2036730article.shtml.

¹⁶ See ‘China Grounds “Space Force” Talk,’ People’s Daily Online, 6 November 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/6805305.html.

¹⁷ Born in 1959, Gao Jin became the youngest commandant of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science. See also ‘Gao Jin Becomes Strategic Support Force Commander’ [高津任战略支援部队司令员], Sina, 1 January 2016, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sz/2016-01-01/doc-ifxneept3519173.shtml; and Directory of PRC Military Personalities.

¹⁸ ‘Academy of Military Science President: Reforms Must Resolve the Restraints Upon Systematic Assurance for a Powerful Military’ [军事科学院院长:改革要解决羁绊强军的体制性障碍], PLA Daily, 2 November 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/11-02/7600724.shtml.

¹⁹ The original phrasing is: ‘要着力解决长期困扰我军、羁绊强军兴军的体制性障碍、结构性矛盾和政策性问题’ [Steadfastly solve the long-term organizational barriers that hold us back from becoming a strong military as well as structural contradictions and policy problems.

²⁰ For a more detailed assessment of the factors that have influenced changes in China’s military strategic guidelines over time, see M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy,’ International Security 42/3 (2018), 37–83.

²¹ For a more detailed analysis, see: Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, ‘Chinese Lessons From Other People’s Wars,’ Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1090.pdf.

²² Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Joe McReynolds, Leigh Ann Ragland, and Gary L. Thomas, ‘Enabling Information-Based System of System Operations: The Research, Development, and Acquisition Process for the Integrated Command Platform,’ SITC Research Briefs, January 2014, available at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6f26w11mf.

²³ For the context on these developments, see: Joe McReynolds and James Mulvenon, ‘The Role of Informatization in the People’s Liberation Army under Hu Jintao,’ in Kamphausen, Lai, and Tanner, Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (2014), 207–256.

²⁴ Elsa B. Kania, ‘Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence,’ Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/chinese-military-innovation-in-artificial-intelligence.

²⁵ Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防部], ‘China’s Military Strategy’ [中国的军事战略], State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室], 26 May 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2015-05/26/content_4586723.htm.

²⁶ For an expansive discussion of this concept, see Zhou Bisong [周碧松], Strategic Frontiers [战略边疆] (National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社] 2016).

²⁷ ‘Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare Will Break the Battlefield Balance’ [‘网电一体战’将打破战场天平], China Military Online, 3 January 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-01/03/content_165836.htm.

²⁸ The existence of some organizations can be assessed based on the overall structure but have yet to be fully confirmed. For instance, a reference to Maj. Gen. Li Baocheng (李保成) as director of the Logistics Department confirms the existence of this organization, but only limited details are available at this point in time.

²⁹ In addition to those units that previously came under the General Armaments Department, there appear to have been at least two new bases created in the course of the reforms, known as the 35th Base (Unit 32020) and the 37th Base. See the initial references to these organizations: ‘Join hands with Wuhan Donghu New Technology Development Zone’ [与武汉东湖新技术开发区携手共进], 22 September 2017, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:XYQBwftEhckJ:www.lmars.whu.edu.cn/index.php/kydt/2029.html±&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; and See also: ‘Near-Earth Telescope Quarterly Report’ [近地天体望远镜季报], 9 July 2018, http://www.cneost.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/%E8%BF%91%E5%9C%B0%E5%A4%A9%E4%BD%93%E6%9C%9B%E8%BF%9C%E9%95%9C%E8%A7%82%E6%B5%8B%E7%AE%80%E6%8A%A511.pdf.

³⁰ Jiang Lianju (姜连举) (ed.), Lectures on the Science of Space Operations [空间作战学教程], Military Science Publishing House, 2014.

³¹ For a detailed assessment of advances in China’s space capabilities, see: Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang, China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, p. 94–95.

³² Ibid. See also: Lianju (姜连举) (ed.), Lectures on the Science of Space Operations [空间作战学教程].

³³ ‘China’s PLA eyes future in space, air: air force commander,’ CCTV, 2 November 2009, http://english.cctv.com/20091102/101024.shtml.

³⁴ For an apparent official Chinese denial of this possibility, see ‘China Grounds “Space Force” Talk,’ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/6805305.html.

³⁵ Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防部], ‘China’s Military Strategy’ [中国的军事战略], http://www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2015-05/26/content_4586723.htm.

³⁶ Ye Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science of Information Operations [信息作战科学教程] (Military Science Press [军事科学出版社] 2013).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Dai Qingmin, ‘On Seizing Information Supremacy,’ Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 20 April 2003. qtd. in Larry M. Wortzel, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare,’ Strategic Studies Institute, March 2014.

³⁹ The majority of the recent intrusions appear to be linked to the Ministry of State Security, which has taken on a more prominent position in Chinese cyber espionage, including.

⁴⁰ See the definition provided in this official textbook: All-Military Military Terminology Management Committee [全军军事术语管理委员会], People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Military Science Press [军事科学出版社] 2011).

⁴¹ However, certain of these research institutes have since been transferred to the Academy of Military Science pursuant to the ongoing reorganization of the PLA’s military scientific and research enterprise.

⁴² These units include an electronic countermeasure brigade at Langfang and an air defense electronic countermeasure brigade at Beidaihe, detachments in both Shanghai and Yingtan, as well as satellite stations in Beijing and Sanya.

⁴³ ‘This Squad Leader is a Little “Zhou” – The Journal of Grade Three Sergeant Zhou Yunxiao of a Certain Strategic Support Force Brigade’ [这个班长有点”轴” – – 战略支援部队某旅三级军士长赵云霄记事], Xinhua 4 June 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-06/04/c_1121083630.htm; and See also: Zeng Shijing [曾世京], Huang Qiyuan [黄琪渊], and Li Wen [李雯], ‘What are the Highlights for the Military Services Symposium?’ [为军服务座谈会都有啥看点?], China Military Online, 16 May 2017, http://www.81.cn/zghjy/2017-05/16/content_7603928.htm.

⁴⁴ The status of units and responsibilities for offensive cyber operations associated with the former 4PLA is less certain, nor is it clear how the Network-Electronic Countermeasures dadui (大队) and the Network Systems Department will coordinate or de-conflict targeting and operations. Note also that there is no standard English translation for dadui. This determination is on the basis of addresses and military unit cover designators (MUCDs).

⁴⁵ For a reference to one of these units, see: ‘China Mobile 5 G Network UAV World Debut’ [中国移动5 G网联无人机全球首发], 24 April 2019, http://www.aibbt.com/a/103738.html.

⁴⁶ Office of the United States trade representative, executive office of the president, ‘Findings of the investigation into China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under Section 301 of the trade act of 1974,’ 22 March 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.

⁴⁷ ‘APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,’ Mandiant, 19 February 2013, https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf.

⁴⁸ ‘U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,’ Department of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, 19 May 2014,

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.

⁴⁹ Hao Yeli (郝叶力), ‘Prospective Thinking on the Construction of China’s Cyber/Net Army Against the Backdrop of Global Co-Governance [of] Cyber Security’ [全球共治网络安全背景下中国网军建设的前瞻思考], People’s Daily, 2 February 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0202/c386965-28104957.html.

⁵⁰ Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science[信息作战科学教程].

⁵¹ These assessments of grade have been made based on the grade of the leaders in these positions. It is possible that there could be changes in the grade of various components as the construction of the PLASSF progresses.

⁵² ‘CCTV screen leakage of personnel adjustment’ [央视画面泄密人事调整], Duowei, 15 May 2019, http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-05-15/60133898.html; and For the original video of footage from the May 2019, see: ‘Xi Jinping at the All-Nation Public Security Work Conference Emphasized’ [习近平在全国公安工作会议上强调], CCTV, 8 May 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ7ytxpinT4&feature=youtu.be&t=507.

⁵³ ‘Central Theater Command Leadership Team Collectively Unveiled’ [中部战区领导班子集体亮相], Caixin, 4 February 2016, http://china.caixin.com/2016-02-04/100907511.html; and See also: ‘Succeeding Gao Jin, Lt. Gen. Li Fengbiao Will Become Commander of Strategic Support Force’ [接班高津 李凤彪中将任战略支援部队司令员], Caixin Network [财新网], 11 November 2019, http://china.caixin.com/2019-11-11/101481992.html.

⁵⁴ ‘Li Fengbiao, deputy commander and chief of staff of the Central Theater Command, has been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general’ [中部战区副司令员兼参谋长李凤彪已晋升中将军衔], The Paper, 24 January 2017, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1607050. In this capacity, Lt. Gen. Li was selected as a member for the CCP Central Committee as of CCP’s 19^th Party Congress: ‘19th Party Congress authorized to issue: list of members of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’ [十九大受权发布：中国共产党第十九届中央委员会委员名单], Xinhua, 24 October 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/24/c_1121848878.htm.

⁵⁵ ‘The Central Military Commission held a ceremony to promote the rank of general’ [中央军委举行晋升上将军衔仪式], China Military Online, 13 December 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-12/13/content_249837.htm.

⁵⁶ For instance, see his comments as a military representative to the 2016 ‘Two Sessions,’ in which he emphasized the challenges of joint training and command, including talent ‘2020, what is the Chinese military? The military representatives are hotly discussing the deepening of national defense and military reform’ [２０２０，中国军队什么样 – – 军队代表委员热议深化国防和军队改革], Xinhua, 11 March 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-03/11/c_128792893.htm.

⁵⁷ For Li Fengbiao’s prior writings on issues of joint operations, see ‘What are the steps to become an excellent joint operations officer?’ [成为优秀的联合作战参谋共分几步？], China Military Online, 19 April 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-04/19/content_7012135_3.htm.

⁵⁸ Li Fengbiao [李凤彪], ‘Comprehensively deepening reforms: the road to a strong military with Chinese characteristics’ [全面深化改革：中国特色强军之路], 1 March 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0301/c352498-28161701.html.

⁵⁹ See: Li Fengbiao [李凤彪] and Zhou Feng [周峰], ‘Long-range direct assault: “One Move to Dominate the Enemy” seeks strategic effectiveness’[远程直达突击：‘一招制敌’求战略实效], PLA Daily, 26 November 2014, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014-11/26/content_6242212.htm.

⁶⁰ For instance, with the former PLAAF commander Gen. Xu Qiliang currently serving as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, potentially the selection of a PLAAF officer – presumably under Xu’s watch – to lead the PLASSF reflected a compromise or intended progression of the PLASSF to become more of a joint organization. The once-powerful former General Departments of which the PLASSF is composed had previously been dominated by Army officers, so the selection of a PLAAF officer to lead it could reflect a recognition of the imperative of greater jointness.

⁶¹ General Zheng Weiping replaced General Liu Fulian (刘福连), the latter having served as PLASSF Political Commissar from December 2015 to March 2017, see ‘National People’s Congress Representative, 65-year-old General Liu Fulian, No Longer Serves as Political Commissar of the Strategic Support Force’ [军队人大代表、65岁上将刘福连不再担任战略支援部队政委], The Paper, 11 March 2017, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1636941.

⁶² ‘Former Director of the General Staff Operations Department, Rao Kaixun, Serves as Deputy Commander of the Strategic Support Force’ [原总参作战部部长饶开勋任战略支援部队副司令员], The Paper, 11 March 2016, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1417427.

⁶³ ‘Two CCP deputy commanders were investigated and deprived of their National People’s Congress representative qualifications’ [中共两副司令员遭查 被剥夺人大代表资格], Epoch Times, 27 October 2019, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/19/10/26/n11614067.htm.

⁶⁴ Zheng Junjie was identified as a member of the PLASSF and as having been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general as of March 2018, following his promotion to major general in 2011. His apparent selection as director of the Network Systems Department implies that he was promoted to deputy theater command grade around or after December 2015, and his promotion in rank could have occurred prior to this confirmation. Although there has never been entirely authoritative information that identifies him as director of the Network Systems Department, he is widely rumoured (on Chinese military forums, etc.) and assessed to be serving in that capacity given his prior position as deputy director and then director of 3PLA. Zheng had served as deputy director of 3PLA from 2010 to 2013. Zheng Junjie had been the deputy director of the former GSD Third Department (3PLA) between 2010 and 2013, prior to serving as Commandant of the Information Engineering University (2013–2015).

⁶⁵ ‘These 11 Generals Attending the “Two Sessions,” Among 294 Military Representatives, Have Been Promoted’ [出席两会的294位军方代表中 这11位将军升级了], Netease, 6 March 2018, http://news.163.com/18/0306/09/DC72438M0001875N.html; and ‘General Staff Personnel Change: Wang Huiqing is the Director of the Strategic Planning Department; Zheng Junjie as the Director of 3PLA’ [总参人事变动 王辉青任战略规划部部长 郑俊杰任三部部长], 1 November 2015, http://archive.is/NyTsE#selection-1633.0-1633.27.

⁶⁶ Indeed, the directors of the PLASSF Equipment Department and Logistics Department remain unknown at present.

⁶⁷ Since Li Shangfu has since been selected as director of the CMC Equipment Development Department (CMC EDD), it is unlikely that he continues to serve in that capacity, though he may remain involved in China’s manned space programme in this new capacity.

⁶⁸ ‘PLASSF elected 15 Representatives for the 19th Party Congress’ (战略支援部队选举产生15名出席党的十九大代表), Zhejiang News, 18 June 2017, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7mh7iY3GNG0J:https://zj.zjol.com.cn/news.html%3Fid%3D674292±&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

⁶⁹ ‘Strategic Support Force promotes deep integration of thematic education and various construction’ [战略支援部队推动主题教育与各项建设深度融合], PLA Daily, 8 July 2019 http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-07/08/content_4845342.htm.

⁷⁰ Ibid. For a more detailed discussion of the involvement of party committees in the construction of the PLASSF, see also ‘Commentary on Strategic Support Force Grassroots Construction Work’ [战略支援部队基层建设工作述评], Xinhua, 27 September 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-09/27/c_129713342.htm.

⁷¹ Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [中国人民解放军军语].

⁷² See, for instance, the information support team composed of PLASSF troops that was displayed during the PLA’s 2017 parade: ‘Information Support Team: A New Combat Force to Maintain National Security’ [信息支援方队：维护国家安全的新型作战力量], People’s Network [人民网], 30 July 2017, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0730/c1011-29437309.html.

⁷³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Department of Defense, p. 14.

⁷⁴ How effectively the PLA will be able to share, integrate, and coordinate intelligence collection across these organizations remains to be seen, however.

⁷⁵ Liu Wei (刘伟) (ed.), Theater Command Joint Operations Command (战区联合作战指挥) (National Defense University Press (国防大学出版社) 2016).

⁷⁶ For another analysis of the potential implications of these reforms in the context of overall changes in China’s approach to intelligence, see Peter Mattis and Samantha Hoffman, ‘Chinese legislation points to new intelligence coordinating system,’ Jane’s, November 2017, https://www.janes.com/images/assets/183/74183/Chinese_legislation_points_to_new_intelligence_co-ordinating_system.pdf.

⁷⁷ ‘Xi Jinping: Strive to Construct a Powerful and Modern Strategic Support Force’ [习近平：努力建设一支强大的现代化战略支援部队], Xinhua, 29 August 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-08/29/c_1119474761.htm.

⁷⁸ ‘Inaugural Meeting of the Army’s Leading Organs, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force Was Convened in Beijing’ [陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行], Xinhua, 1 January 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/01/c_1117646667.htm.

⁷⁹ Ni Guanghui [倪光辉], ‘Secrets of Our First Strategic Support Force’ [揭秘我军首支战略支援部队], People’s Daily [人民日报], 24 January 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0124/c1011-28079245.html.

⁸⁰ State Council Information Office, ‘China’s Military Strategy (full text),’ Xinhua, 27 May 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

⁸¹ See, for instance, these two papers that have been funded by the PLASSF: Huang Wei [黄鹍] Sun Yan [孙岩], and Zhou Meng [周萌, ‘Data chain integration application service system construction’ [数据链集成应用服务体系构建], Command Information System and Technology [指挥信息系统与技术] 6 (2017), 12. 6 (2017), 12; and Fan Xianlin [樊县林] and Sun Jian [孙健], ‘Developing Data Link and Cooperative Operations Capability’ [发展的数据链与协同作战能力], Command Information System and Technology [指挥信息系统与技术] 6 (2017): 3.

⁸² ‘What Kind of Force is The Strategic Support Force that Xi Jinping had Inspected?’ [习近平视察的战略支援部队是一支怎样的力量？], CCTV, 30 August 2016, http://news.cctv.com/2016/08/30/ARTI2Xi1zgynCfj6TYsecOcb160830.shtml.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ ‘PLASSF: Forging the Iron Fist of New-Type of Combat Forces’ [战略支援部队：锻造新型作战力量的尖刀铁拳], Xinhua, 5 June 2017, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0605/c1011-29317562.html.

⁸⁶ Ibid. See also ‘Information Support Team: New-Type Combat Forces Protecting National Security’ [信息支援方队：维护国家安全的新型作战力量], 30 July 2017.

⁸⁷ For an excellent analysis of the status of these missions prior to the reforms, see Mark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests, U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 26 April 2012, 4–5.

⁸⁸ At present, it is more difficult to confirm the status of development for and authorities for potential operation of Chinese military counterspace capabilities.

⁸⁹ Academician Li Deren: On the military-civilian fusion of the integrated air-space information real-time intelligent service system [李德仁院士：论军民深度融合的通导遥一体化空天信息实时智能服务系统], People’s Network, 20 February 2019, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0220/c40531-30807893.html. This article was initially published in the journal Cyber (Security) and Informatization Military-Civil Fusion (网信军民融合) in its December 2018 issue.

⁹⁰ For instance, PLA astronauts (中国航天员大队) are technically also members of the PLASSF, and the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center (Unit 32039), responsible for command and control of China’s manned space flight program, is under the Space Systems Department.

⁹¹ ‘The First Space Technology and Applications, Standardization Technologies Festival’ [第一届空间技术及应用标准技术节成功举办], CQVIP, 6 October 2017, http://www.cqvip.com/qk/92334x/201710/673549562.html; and See also, ‘Networked and Intelligentized Aerospace Science and Technology High-End Seminar Convened in Beijing’ [网络化与智能化航天科技高端研讨会在北京召开], July 3, 3018, http://xcb.stdu.edu.cn/2009-05-05-02-26-33/28606-2018-07-03-10-24-54.html; and http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lRPhU6NpSfoJ:www.cast512.com/cn/news_detail.asp%3FID%3D399±&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

⁹² For this estimate, see: Union of Concerned Scientists, ‘UCS Satellite Database,’ https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.XE6li89Kg_U.

⁹³ Traditionally, the former 2PLA’s Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau had taken on a leading role in its development. As of April 2016, it is confirmed that the former Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau Chief Zhou Zhixin (周志鑫) was transferred to the PLASSF to lead a ‘certain bureau’ (某局), a good indicator that the bureau has been placed under the PLASSF and, given its mission, reassigned to the Space Systems Department. See also, ‘Chinese Academy of Sciences Academician Zhou Zhixin to Become the Bureau Chief of a Certain Bureau in the Strategic Support Force’ [中科院院士周志鑫出任战略支援部队某局局长], The Paper, 9 April 2016, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1454253. For more on the Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau’s mission, see Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang, ‘The General Armament Department,’ in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., PLA as Organization 2.0, Defense Group Inc., 2015, pp. 145–148.

⁹⁴ ‘China to launch 60 high-resolution EO satellites by 2020,’ Geospatial World, 29 January 2018, https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/china-launch-60-high-resolution-video-satellites-2020/.

⁹⁵ ‘Status and development of China High-Resolution Earth Observation System and application,’ IEEE, July 2016, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7729969/; ‘Our Nation’s High-Endurance UAV Remote Sensing System Research and Development Successful’ [我国超长航时无人机遥感系统研制成功], National Remote Sensing Center, 16 July 2014, http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/wrj/xwdt/201407/t20140716_32813.html.

⁹⁶ Andrew Jones, ‘China launches two Yaogan-32 series reconnaissance satellites from Gobi Desert,’ 9 October 2018, https://gbtimes.com/china-launches-two-yaogan-32-series-reconnaissance-satellites-from-gobi-desert.

⁹⁷ Rui C. Barbosa ‘Long March 2 C lofts Yaogan-30 Group 05 satellites,’ 25 July 2019 https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2019/07/long-march-2c-yaogan-30-group-05-satellites/.

⁹⁸ ‘China launches new Earth observation satellite,’ Xinua, 3 November 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/03/c_138525378.htm.

⁹⁹ Devin Coldewey, ‘China shows off its newest satellite’s high-resolution 3D imagery,’ TechCrunch, 11 December 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/11/china-shows-off-its-newest-satellites-high-resolution-3d-imagery/.

¹⁰⁰ The Jilin-1 was developed by Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd., which is under the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP).

¹⁰¹ ‘China to launch 60 high-resolution EO satellites by 2020,’ https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/china-launch-60-high-resolution-video-satellites-2020/; and ‘Jilin-1: China’s first commercial remote sensing satellites aim to fill the void,’ Xinhua, 27 January 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/27/c_136929344.htm.

¹⁰² ‘China Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station: Already Received Ten Million Views of “Space Movies”’ [中国遥感卫星地面站:已接收上千万景‘太空大片’], China outh Network [中国青年报], 21 December 2019, https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2019-12-31/doc-iihnzahk1028685.shtml.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ ‘China Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station Achieved Gaofen 1, 2, 3, 4 Satellite Data Receipt’ [中国遥感卫星地面站实现高分一号02、03、04卫星数据接收], Xinhua, 4 April 2018, http://news.cctv.com/2018/04/04/ARTIbukP04rsv3oMuLB2FUF6180404.shtml.

¹⁰⁵ ‘China’s First Overseas Land Satellite Receiving Station Put into Operation,’ Chinese Academy of Sciences, 16 December 2016, http://english.cas.cn/newsroom/news/201612/t20161215_172471.shtml. China’s overseas remote sensing satellite station starts operation,” China Daily, 16 December 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-12/16/content_27687937.htm.

¹⁰⁶ It is also referred to in English as the China Satellite Launch & Tracking Control General Department (CLTC).

¹⁰⁷ These include multiple locations throughout China, such as Miyun (Beijing), Sanya (Hainan), Kashgar (Xinjiang) and Kunming (Yunnan), estimated to receive satellite signals encompassing about 70 percent of Asia.

¹⁰⁸ Concurrently, its reach has started to expand globally. The China Launch and Tracking Control Department, known for its ‘deep space network,’ also operating stations and/or appears to have established some presence in locations that include Karachi, Pakistan; Swakopmund, Namibia, Malindi, Kenya; Dongara, Australia; Santiago, Chile; Alcantara, Brazil; Neuquen, Argentina; and Kiruna, Sweden。 ‘Swakopmund, Namibia,’ Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/swakopmund.htm; and ‘Namibia and China sign an employment agreement,’ Ministry of Education, 29 March 2012, http://www.moe.gov.na/news_article.php?type=pressrelease&id=60&title=Namibia. Ernesto Londoño, ‘From a Space Station in Argentina, China Expands Its Reach in Latin America,’ New York Times, 28 July 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/americas/china-latin-america.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. ‘China launches its first fully owned overseas satellite ground station near North Pole,’ South China Morning Post, 16 December 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2055224/china-launches-its-first-fully-owned-overseas-satellite.

¹⁰⁹ ‘China ‘has Australia space tracking station,’ Phys.org, 6 November 2011, https://phys.org/news/2011-11-china-australia-space-tracking-station.html.

¹¹⁰ Yuanwang No. 5 and Yuanwang No. 7 sailed at the same time to perform maritime measurement and control tasks”

[远望5号船与远望7号船同时出航执行海上测控任务], Xinhua, 10 November 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-11/10/c_1125214192.htm; and ‘This unit is responsible for water maritime support tasks throughout the year’ [这支部队常年担负水上勤务保障任务], PLA Pictorial, 22 November 2017, http://photo.81.cn/pla/2017-11/22/content_7836185_6.htm.

¹¹¹ For instance, Liu Jianbo (刘建波) from the Chinese Academy of Sciences has argued that, ‘[i]n the future, [China] will strengthen cooperation with countries along the “Belt and Road” … to build remote sensing satellite ground stations …’ ‘CAS Remote Sensing Global Institute’ [中科院遥感地球所], Science News, 25 December 2017, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/12/398077.shtm.

¹¹² ‘China and Finland signed a cooperation agreement for the Arctic Space Observation Joint Research Center,’ Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, 17 April 2018, http://www.radi.ac.cn/dtxw/rdxw/201804/t20180417_4997963.html.

¹¹³ Coco Feng, ‘China completes core network of GPS rival Beidou with latest satellite launch,’ South China Morning Post, 17 December 2019, https://www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/3042416/china-completes-core-network-gps-rival-beidou-latest.

¹¹⁴ ‘China launches new twin BeiDou-3 navigation satellites,’ Xinhua, 29 July 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/29/c_137355568.htm.

¹¹⁵ ‘China opens first overseas center for BeiDou navigation satellite system in Tunisia,’ Xinhua, 11 April 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/11/c_137103570.htm.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ ‘China’s atomic clock in space improving navigation system,’ Asia Times, 27 July 2018, http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-atomic-clock-in-space-improving-navigation-system/.

¹¹⁸ ‘Zhongdian Jinjiang Intends to Join Hands with the 35th Base to Create a Grand New Era “Weather”’ [中电锦江拟携手35基地开创新时代宏伟‘气象’], 15 January 2018, http://www.jec784.com/news_detail/newsId=134.html.

¹¹⁹ ‘The National Economics Association Beidou Application Innovation Committee settled in Jingxi’ [国土经济学会北斗应用创新专委会落户京西], 19 October 2016, http://www.jinribeidou.com/news/detail/f2576ef0576545270157dd00096a5ea3.

¹²⁰ For a recent launch, see ‘Zhongxing-9A Comsat lifts off atop Chinese Long March 3B, Launch Outcome Unclear,’ Spaceflight, 18 June 2017, http://spaceflight101.com/long-march-3b-zhongxing-9a-launch/.

¹²¹ ‘China’s fourth launch of November puts 4th Tianlian-1 tracking and relay satellite in orbit,’ GBTimes, 22 November 2016, https://gbtimes.com/chinas-fourth-launch-november-puts-4th-tianlian-1-tracking-and-relay-sat-orbit.

¹²² ‘China launches relay satellite to explore Moon’s far side,’ Xinhua, 21 May 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/21/c_137194776.htm.

¹²³ For a more comprehensive analysis of the former Third Department’s Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus, see Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,’ Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011, https://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf.

¹²⁴ According to the influential PLA strategist, Ye Zheng, ‘Information operations use the “information flow” to control “the flow of material” and “the flow of energy,” to strip the enemy of its information superiority, and to maintain one’s own information superiority, forcing the enemy to abandon its desire for confrontation by ultimately attacking the enemy’s understanding and beliefs, and thus putting an end to the confrontation and ending the war, achieving the combat effect of winning a war without coming to blows … ’.

¹²⁵ On writings by influential strategists such as Ye Zheng concerning the military struggle in the cyber domain, see Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department [军事科学院军事战略研究部] (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 2013.

¹²⁶ Ye Zheng [叶征], ‘Ye Zheng: The “Seven Weapons” In the Strategic Game of Cyberspace’ [叶征：网络空间战略博弈的”七种武器], China Youth Daily, 8 August 2014, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0808/c40531-25427203.html.

¹²⁷ Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮] eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2015, p. 388.

¹²⁸ Zhang Peigao [张培高], Lectures on the Command of Joint Campaigns [联合战役指挥教程] (Military Science Press 2013), 218–222.

¹²⁹ John Costello and Peter Mattis, ‘Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,’ in Joe McReynolds, eds., China’s Evolving Military Strategy, The Jamestown Foundation, April 2016, 161–163.

¹³⁰ Ibid. See also, Dai Qingmin, ‘On Seizing Information Supremacy’.

¹³¹ John Costello, ‘Bridging the Air Gap: The Coming Third Offset,’ War on the Rocks, 17 February 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/02/bridging-the-air-gap-the-coming-third-offset/.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ ‘Focusing on the network era, working hard to promote the innovation and development of political work’ [着眼过好网络关时代关 努力推动政治工作创新发展], Life of the Military Party [军队党的生活], 30 October 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-01/23/c_1210038961.htm.

¹³⁴ ‘Exposition on the PLASSF’s grassroots construction’ [战略支援部队基层建设工作述评], Military Workers, 24 September 2017, http://military.workercn.cn/268/201709/24/170924102952875.shtml.

¹³⁵ See Wang Jinsong [王劲松], Wang Nanxing [王南星], and Ha Junxian [哈军贤], ‘Research on Cyberspace Operational Systems’ [网络空间作战指挥体系研究], Journal of Academy of Armored Force Engineering [装甲兵工程学院学报] 30/5, October 2016.

¹³⁶ Fan Yong-tao [樊永涛], Wang Jin-song [王劲松] and Li Shi-kai [李世楷], ‘Problems and Solutions to Cyberspace Operational Command Patterns’ [网络空间作战指挥方式面临的问题及对策], Journal of Academy of Armored Force Engineering [装甲兵工程学院学报] 31/5, October 2017.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Chen could well be a PLASSF engineer given he has been profiled frequently in PLASSF media, although there is also a possibility that he and his unit are technically subordinated to the CMC EDD, rather than the Space Systems Department.

¹³⁹ ‘China Taps Antisatellite Weapon for Missile Defense: Cable,’ Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10 March 2011, https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/china-taps-antisatellite-weapon-for-missile-defense-cable/.

¹⁴⁰ For some context and a discussion of the test at the time, see: Zachary Keck, ‘China Conducts Third Anti-Missile Test,’ The Diplomat, 24 July 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-conducts-third-anti-missile-test/.

¹⁴¹ Minnie Chan, ‘Why did China release rare videos of its successful anti-missile system tests?’ South China Morning Post, 29 July 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1996388/why-did-china-release-rare-videos-its-successful-anti.

¹⁴² ‘Expert Says the PLASSF Independently Becomes a Military Concept Ahead of the U.S. Military’ [专家称战略支援部队独立成军 理念领先于美军], Sina, 8 January 2016,.

¹⁴³ ‘Is China deploying its own missile defense system?’ China Military Online, 22 August 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-08/22/content_7218923.htm.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Bill Gertz, ‘China Carries Out Flight Test of Anti-Satellite Missile,’ Washington Free Beacon, 2 August 2017, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-carries-flight-test-anti-satellite-missile/. Even as early as May 2013, a test of the DN–2 had revealed Chinese capabilities in reaching nearly geosynchronous Earth orbit for targeting.

¹⁴⁶ Ankit Panda, ‘Revealed: The Details of China’s Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test,’ The Diplomat, 21 February 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revealed-the-details-of-chinas-latest-hit-to-kill-interceptor-test/.

¹⁴⁷ According to some claims, the SY-7 satellite has a robotic arm with the capability to grapple on to target satellites for inspection and maintenance. For a discussion of the satellite’s capabilities, see Robert Beckhusen, ‘China’s Mystery Satellite Could Be a Dangerous New Weapon,’ War Is Boring, 22 August 2013, https://warisboring.com/china-s-mystery-satellite-could-be-a-dangerous-new-weapon/.

¹⁴⁸ Stephen Chen, ‘How China’s scavenger satellites are being used to develop AI weapons, drones and robots,’ South China Morning Post, 23 April 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3007186/how-chinas-scavenger-satellites-are-being-used-develop-ai.

¹⁴⁹ Richard D. Fisher and Sean O’Connor, ‘Space Invaders – China’s Space Warfare Capabilities,’ IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, http://www.janes360.com/images/assets/557/40557/Space_invaders.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ The 2013 Science of Military Strategy urges, ‘At present, the construction and development of the nuclear forces should be centered on raising the informatization level of the nuclear forces, strengthening command and control as well as the construction of strategic early warning and rapid response capability.’

¹⁵¹ Gregory Kulacki, ‘China’s Military Calls for Putting its Nuclear Forces on Alert,’ Union of Concerned Scientists,

January 2016, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/China-Hair-Trigger-full-report.pdf; and see also ‘Air Force Strategic Issues Research’ [空军战略问题研究], Blue Sky Publishing House, 2014.

¹⁵² ‘Communication technology experimental satellite 5 successfully launched’ [通信技术试验卫星五号发射成功], S&T Daily [科技日报], 9 January 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2020-01/09/c_1125437843.htm.

‘China launches communication technology test satellite,’ Xinhua, 13 September 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/13/c_134619813.htm. For one assessment, see ‘Chinese Ballistic Missile Early Warning,’ Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/warning.htm. See also ‘China Successfully Launched Communications Technologies Experimental satellite #2’ [中国成功发射通信技术试验卫星二号], China Military Network [中国军网], 6 January 2017, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/01-06/8115315.shtml.

¹⁵³ Rui C. Barbosa, ‘Long March 3B conducts another secretive launch,’ Spaceflight, 12 September 2015, https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2015/09/long-march-3b-conducts-another-secretive-launch/.

¹⁵⁴ ‘Xi Jinping: Resolutely construct a powerful and modern PLASSF’ [习近平：努力建设一支强大的现代化战略支援部队], Xinhua, 29 August 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-08/29/c_1119474761.htm.

¹⁵⁵ ‘Academy of Military Science President: Reforms must resolve the constraints on systematic assurance for a powerful military’ [军事科学院院长:改革要解决羁绊强军的体制性障碍], PLA Daily, 2 November 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/11-02/7600724.shtml.

¹⁵⁶ ‘All Military Actual Combat Military Training Forum Delegates Deliver a Speech’ [全军实战化军事训练座谈会代表发 言摘登], PLA Daily, 7 August 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0807/c1011-28616977.html.

¹⁵⁷ ‘How Can the PLASSF Forge New Quality Weapons’ [战略支援部队如何锻造新质利器], PLA Daily, 11 March 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/03-11/7792939.shtml.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science[信息作战科学教程].

¹⁶⁰ Notice on Calling for the Science and Technology Achievements Exhibition Project of ‘Frontier Science and Technology Into the Military Camp – Entering the Strategic Support Force Information and Communication Base’ [关于征集‘前沿科技进军营 – 走进战略支援部队信息通信基地’科技成果展项目的通知], Chinese Institute for Command and Control, 11 March 2019, http://www.sohu.com/a/300466797_358040.

¹⁶¹ ‘Academy of Military Science President: Reforms must resolve the constraints on systematic assurance for a powerful military’ [军事科学院院长:改革要解决羁绊强军的体制性障碍], http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/11-02/7600724.shtml.

¹⁶² ‘How Can the PLASSF Forge New Quality Weapons’ [战略支援部队如何锻造新质利器], http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/03-11/7792939.shtml.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ These would include drones optimized for electronic warfare as well as directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers and high-powered microwave weapons. Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science [信息作战科学教程].

¹⁶⁵ Regarding the 56th Research Institute, see ‘Network Systems Department 56th Research Institute National Postgraduates Enrollment Examination Subject Catalogue’ [网络系统部第五十六研究所2017考研专业目录], Examination Training Camp [考研集训营], 22 November 2016, http://www.kyjxy.com/yuanxiao/zhuanye/33616.html. On the 57th Research Institute, see ‘Shengxi Elementary School 2017 Spring Games Grand Opening Ceremonies’ [胜西小学2017春季运动会隆重开幕], wenji8.com, 4 April 2017, https://www.wenji8.com/p/8cbbE3F.html. On the 58th Research Institute, refer to ‘PLASSF 58th Research Institute’ [战略支援部队第五十八研究所], Researcher Recruitment Network [研招网], http://yz.chsi.com.cn/sch/schoolInfo–schId-367828.dhtml.

¹⁶⁶ For instance, the Aerospace Research and Development Center (航天研发中心) and the Project Design Research Center (工程设计研究所) also appear to be part of the PLASSF. Of course, the rest of the former General Armaments Department has been transformed into the new CMC Equipment Development Department.

¹⁶⁷ Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Joe McReynolds, Leigh Ann Ragland, and Gary L. Thomas, ‘Enabling Information-Based System of System Operations,’ http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6f26w11m; and Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang, China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States.

¹⁶⁸ For a prior analysis, see: Elsa Kania and John Costello, ‘China’s Quest for Informatization Drives PLA Reforms,’ The Diplomat, 4 March 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-quest-for-informatization-drives-pla-reforms/.

¹⁶⁹ Although this paper concentrates primarily on the PLASSF, a study of the reforms to related elements of the former GSD – or what is now the CMC JSD – will also be crucial to understanding the PLASSF in the context of the PLA’s overall reorganization.

¹⁷⁰ Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping,’ http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430.

¹⁷¹ CMC Joint Staff Department [中央军委联合参谋部], “Accelerate the Construction of a Joint Operations Command System with Our Nation’s Characteristics – Thoroughly Study Chairman Xi’s Important Sayings When Inspecting the CMC Joint Operations Command Center [加快构建具有我军特色的联合作战指挥体系 – – 深入学习贯彻习主席视察军委联指中心时的重要讲话], Qiushi, 15 August 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-08/15/c_1119374690.htm.

¹⁷² For an assessment of the significance of Xi Jinping’s emergence as ‘Commander-in-Chief,’ see: James Mulvenon, Xi Jinping Has a Cool New Nickname: ‘Commander-in-Chief,’ China Leadership Monitor, no. 51, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm51jm.pdf.

¹⁷³ At the same time, the elements of the former GSD Informatization Department that were more oriented towards research and development, such as the 61st and 63rd Research Institutes, have been shifted to the new CMC Equipment Development Department. See also, ‘After a Year of Military Reform, Review of “New Institution Time” in the Military Newspaper’s Published Articles’ [军改一周年 军报刊文回眸”新体制时间”之变], PLA Daily, 2 December 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1202/c1011-28919716.html.

¹⁷⁴ Dong Xiaobo was described as having completed a three-month ‘duty mission’ (值班任务) with the CMC. During this time, his attention was focused primarily on ensuring that ‘the strategic command network remained assured of fully connected, real-time, and end-to-end communications’ (战略指挥确保网络全程通、实时通、末端通) for key CMC officers (军委首长).

¹⁷⁵ ‘After a Year of Military Reform, Reviewing “New Institution Time” in the Military Newspaper’s Published Articles’ [军改一周年 军报刊文回眸‘新体制时间’之变], PLA Daily, 2 December 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1202/c1011-28919716.html. See also, ‘The First Anniversary of Deepening National Defense and Military Reform: What Has Changed?’ [深化国防和军队改革一周年：都发生了什么变化？], Xinhua Monthly, 14 April 2017, http://www.xinhuayuebao.com/2017/0414/1648.shtml.

¹⁷⁶ For instance, the JSD-ICB is reportedly responsible for responding to any interruption of communications at an information node or any disturbance on command links. See also, “Remove the ‘Leadership Model – CMC Organs How to Act Well as Pioneers’ [去掉‘领导范’ 军委机关如何当好‘排头兵’], PLA Daily, 31 May 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/05-31/7888676.shtml.

¹⁷⁷ Note that the translation ‘information assurance,’ rather than information support, for the phrase 信息保障 is chosen deliberately by the authors to provide a clearer distinction between the concepts of information assurance (信息保障) and information support (信息支援). In some cases, 信息保障 has also been rendered ‘information security,’ and the Information Assurance Base was initially believed to be a PLA counterpart to U.S. Cyber Command. However, it has since become evident, based on reporting on the base and its function, that it concentrates primarily on enabling and assuring military command and communications. This function appears to include issues of cyber/network security (网络安全) and information security (信息安全).

¹⁷⁸ ‘PLA’s First Strategic Information Assurance forces Established’ [解放军首支战略信息支援保障力量建成], PLA Daily, 20 July 2010 http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-07/20/content_13886022.htm.

¹⁷⁹ Currently, the Information Assurance Base is under the leadership of Senior Colonel Wang Tan (王坦). Wang was preceded by Senior Colonel Zeng Weihua (曾卫华).

¹⁸⁰ ‘After a Year of Military Reform, Reviewing “New Institution Time” in the Military Newspaper’s Published Articles’ [军改一周年 军报刊文回眸‘新体制时间’之变], http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1202/c1011-28919716.html.

¹⁸¹ Zhang Qiang [张强], Qiao Xuewei [乔学伟], and Zhang Kunping [张坤平], ‘Who Makes the “Command Nerve” Be More Sensitive’ [谁让”指挥神经”更灵敏?], Science and Technology Daily, 31 July 2017, http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2017-07/31/content_374917.htm.

¹⁸² While exact references for these bureaus within every theater command cannot yet be verified, there exists substantial evidence to assume that such a structure is consistent across the regional commands. For instance, the Eastern TC Joint Staff Department Information Assurance Bureau signed an agreement for strategic cooperation with China Telecom focusing on the development of battlefield information infrastructure and military emergency communications, see ‘Eastern Theater Command and China Telecom Strategic Cooperation’ [东部战区与中国电信战略合作], 22 April 2018, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TkpX95WS41oJ:m.sohu.com/n/490077337/±&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. See also ‘Sichuan Province held a survey meeting on surveying and mapping geographic information’ [四川省召开测绘地理信息工作会议], Xianji Network [贤集网], 10 April 2018, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:I-1-3WlFFhkJ:https://www.xianjichina.com/special/detail_320907.html±&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; and.

¹⁸³ The unit in question describes itself as responsible for a number of military optical cable trunk protection missions and for communications assurance to the CMC, the various joint services (联各军兵种), as well as TC units. See also, ‘A letter of thanks to the Langfang Thermal Power Corporation’ [致廊坊市热力总公司的一封感谢信], 6 March 2018, http://www.lfsjs.gov.cn/wmfw/grfw/hyxw/201803/20180306/j_2018030610175200018629.html.

¹⁸⁴ Potentially, the PLASSF exercises authority over cyber/information operations within the PLA as a whole, which would involve coordination among elements of the PLA’s cyber and electronic warfare units across the different services and theater commands.

¹⁸⁵ Several references to the center’s PLA officers have become available: Xu Jinhua (徐金华) and Liu Xingren (刘兴仁) both served previously as deputy directors of the Joint Operations Command Center (联合作战指挥中心) then under the Joint Staff Department, before simultaneously becoming directors of the Information Operations Bureau (联合作战指挥中心副主任兼信息作战局局长). Also see ‘Calligraphy of Major General Liu Xingren’ [刘兴仁少将书法作品], Chinajunyi.org, 29 October 2014, http://www.chinajunyi.org.cn/show.asp?id=1198.

¹⁸⁶ CMC Joint Staff Department [中央军委联合参谋部], “Accelerate the Construction of a Joint Operations Command System with Our Nation’s Characteristics – Thoroughly Study Chairman Xi’s Important Sayings When Inspecting the CMC Joint Operations Command Center [加快构建具有我军特色的联合作战指挥体系 – – 深入学习贯彻习主席视察军委联指中心时的重要讲话], Qiushi, 15 August 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-08/15/c_1119374690.htm.

¹⁸⁷ As of June 2018, there is one reference in the PLA Daily that indicates the Information Assurance Base as being subordinate to the PLASSF, though this may be an anomaly given that there have been multiple references regarding the IAB being placed under the CMC JSD. It is possible that the IAB could have been shifted from the CMC JSD to the PLASSF or that there could be a dual command relationship of some sort. See, for instance: Ye Qinglin [叶清琳], ‘Analysis of the Strategic Prospect of the U.S. Guam Base’ [美关岛基地战略前景分析], National Defense Science and Technology [国防科技], May 2017, https://www.xueshu.com/gfkj/201705/30476888.html; the author is listed as being affiliated with the CMC JSD Information Assurance Base. Also see, ‘A Certain Military Region Information Assurance Forces Command Systems’ [某军区信息保障部队指挥系统], 19 October 2015, http://www.netmay.com/newsitem/277136680.

¹⁸⁸ The unit is located in Wuhan. See ‘Historic, Proud, Responsible: Zhongdian Jinjiang Intends to Join Hands 35th Base to Create a Grand New Era “Weather”’ [有历史、有自豪、有担当 – – 中电锦江拟携手35基地开创新时代宏伟‘气象’], 15 January 2018, http://www.jec784.com/news_detail/newsId=134.html.

¹⁸⁹ ‘Nanjing University’s 2nd “Together Building a Strong Military Dream” Theme Party and National Defense Student 2018 New Year’s Party Evening’ [南京大学第二届‘同心共筑强军梦’主题晚会暨国防生2018年元旦晚会落幕], 29 December 2017, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BZhPA8Z4TscJ:www.xinxisea.com/dxnews/7716.html±&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; and

‘PLASSF Eastern Base leaders came to our institute to inspect and train non-commissioned officers’ [战略支援部队东部基地领导来我院调研定向培养士官工作], 9 August 2018, http://www.wspc.edu.cn/info/1002/8532.htm.

¹⁹⁰ ‘Notice about 37 students from our school, including Wu Xiaochuan, who joined the military’ [关于我校吴闽川等37名学生参军入伍的通知], 25 September 2018, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VD4lQXKVFj0J:www.575207.com/d/file/xxcmysxy/xwdt/tzgg/2018-09-25/de2d0a8925e7c8f912e9889ee8cb0876.docx±&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

¹⁹¹ Although not all of these bases can be confirmed, the existence of several regional bases implies that there is likely a base that corresponds with each of the theater commands, given the PLA’s tendency towards relative consistency and parallelism in terms of structure.

¹⁹² See “Notice on Calling for the Science and Technology Achievements Exhibition Project of ‘Frontier Science and Technology Into the Military Camp – Entering the Strategic Support Force Information and Communication Base’

[关于征集‘前沿科技进军营 – 走进战略支援部队信息通信基地’科技成果展项目的通知], Chinese Institute for Command and Control, 11 March 2019, http://www.sohu.com/a/300466797_358040. Separately, there have also been references to a PLASSF Information and Communications Base (信息通讯基地) that could reflect an inaccurate rendering of the name or a different organization: ‘Coordinated development of towns and streets; Fengtai Changxindian area establishes a “community” of regionalized party building’ [镇街协同发展 丰台长辛店地区建立区域化党建‘共同体’], People’s Network, 26 June 2018, http://bj.people.com.cn/n2/2018/0626/c82838-31746138.html.

¹⁹³ ‘Thoughts on the Construction of a Faculty Team for the PLASSF Training and Training Organizations,’ CQVIP, http://www.cqvip.com/qk/82375x/201707/672679681.html.

¹⁹⁴ For instance, as of February 2017, one PLASSF department was engaged in 28 projects for the construction of training conditions, including new venues, equipment, materials, and simulation facilities. See: ‘A certain department of the PLASSF’ [战略支援部队某部], Xinhua, 8 February 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-02/08/c_1120433411.htm.

¹⁹⁵ ‘PLASSF: Forging the Iron Fist of New-Type of Combat Forces’ [战略支援部队：锻造新型作战力量的尖刀铁拳], http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0605/c1011-29317562.html.

¹⁹⁶ See the new national defense white paper that China has released, which provides an official update on the reforms: ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era,’ Xinhua, 24 July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm.

¹⁹⁷ Liang Jiancai (梁建才) and Ma Fei (马飞), ‘PLARF, PLASSF carry out readiness training during Lunar New Year’ (火箭军、战略支援部队等军种春节联合战备), PLA Daily, 10 February 2016, at http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-02/10/content_6903114.htm.

¹⁹⁸ ‘Army’s “Stride-2016·Zhurihe” Series Exercises about to Start’ [陆军‘跨越－2016·朱日和’系列演习即将拉开战幕], Xinhua, 14 July 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-07/14/c_1119219033.htm.

¹⁹⁹ ‘Stride-2017 – Zhurihe’ [‘跨越－2017·朱日和’], Xinhua, 7 September 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/07/c_1121625327.htm.

²⁰⁰ ‘The Whole Military Starts Training; Please Ask the Chairman to Review!’ [全军开训，请主席校阅！], http://www.xjbs.com.cn/news/2018-01/05/cms2036730article.shtml.

²⁰¹ ‘A certain department of the PLAAF starts joint field exercises’ [战略支援部队某部开展野外联合演训], China Military Network, 4 May 2018, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_FjAmMOubisJ:www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-05/04/content_4812383.htm±&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

²⁰² ‘Intense confrontation in the electromagnetic space’ [电磁空间激烈对抗], CCTV, 17 May 2018, http://military.cctv.com/2018/05/17/ARTIjjonCY3EwBqyLfOvJ1fn180517.shtml.

²⁰³ Minnie Chan, ‘China’s new combat units prepare for electronic warfare,’ South China Morning Post, 11 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2154550/welcome-modern-military-chinas-new-combat-units-prepare.

²⁰⁴ ‘A certain brigade of the Central Army’s Army and a certain base of the Strategic Support Force conduct a confrontation drill’ [中部战区陆军某旅与战略支援部队某基地开展对抗演练], PLA Daily, 14 October 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-10/14/content_4826663.htm.

²⁰⁵ ‘Southern Theater Command Navy Far Seas Joint Training Formation Actual Combat Drilling’ [南部战区海军远海联合训练编队实战化练兵], PLA Daily, 26 February 2019, http://epaper.oceanol.com/content/201902/26/c9399.html.

²⁰⁶ ‘How Can the PLASSF Forge New Quality Weapons’ [战略支援部队如何锻造新质利器], http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/03-11/7792939.shtml; and PLA Daily, 11 March 2016, http://www.81.cn/2016wycz/2016-03/11/content_7221308.htm.

²⁰⁷ ‘PLASSF: Forging the Iron Fist of New-Type of Combat Forces’ [战略支援部队：锻造新型作战力量的尖刀铁拳], http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0605/c1011-29317562.html.

²⁰⁸ ‘School Introduction’ [学校简介], PLA Information Engineering University Admissions Information Network [解放军信息工程大学招生信息网], http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/contents/249/508.html.

²⁰⁹ ‘This Class is Not Ordinary’ [这个班，不一般], Hunan Online, 23 July 2018, http://hunan.voc.com.cn/article/201807/201807230758081923.html.

²¹⁰ ‘Directly recruiting non-commissioned officers starts today in Beijing’ [直招士官今日开始 北京今年], Beijing News Network, 5 June 2018, http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2018/06/05/489810.html.

²¹¹ ‘First National Middle School Cyber Security Competition’ [首届全国中学生网络安全竞赛], China Daily, 23 July 2018, http://shx.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-07/23/content_36624643.htm.

²¹² ‘Aerospace Engineering University’ [航天工程大学], Ministry of National Defense, 15 June 2017, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yIT6kT31FQkJ:www.mod.gov.cn/services/2017-06/15/content_4783023.htm±&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

²¹³ ‘PLASSF cooperates with 9 local units to train high-end talents for new combat forces’ [战略支援部队与地方９个单位合作培养新型作战力量高端人才], Xinhua, 12 July 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-07/12/c_129653824.htm.

²¹⁴ ‘Characteristics of Undergraduate Employment in Xi’an Jiaotong University in 2019’ [西安交通大学2019年本科生就业特点：扎根西部 服务国家], 22 June 2019, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VJREjOiLk4AJ:www.sxdaily.com.cn/n/2019/0622/c145-6500353.html+&cd=54&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

²¹⁵ ‘Strategic Support Force direct recruitment of non-commissioned officers, exploring two-way selection mode’ [战略支援部队直招士官分配探索双向选择模式], PLA Daily, 10 December 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-12/10/content_4831654.htm.

²¹⁶ Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Department [军事科学院军事战略研究部] (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 2013, p. 320.

²¹⁷ See the new national defense white paper that China has released, which provides an official update on the reforms: ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era,’ Xinhua, 24 July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elsa B. Kania

Elsa B. Kania is a PhD student in Harvard University's Department of Government. Her research concentrates on Chinese military innovation and the implications of emerging technologies for international security. Ms. Kania is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, where she contributes to the Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Initiative. She is also a co-founder and director of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute. Her views are her own.

John Costello

John Costello is a co-founder and director of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute. Currently, Mr. Costello is serving as a senior director with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Previously, he served as Congressional Innovation Fellow at the U.S House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. As a member of the U.S. Navy, he served in various positions within the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. His views are his own.