A nuclear education: the origins of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group

ABSTRACT

This articles examines the debate, and sometimes lack of debate, over nuclear issues in NATO from the beginning of the alliance to the mid-1960s and reveals how American officials changed their approach to deal with NATO’s nuclear issues. In the 1950s, US officials released only limited information about nuclear weapons that were a part of NATO’s war plans. Gradually, they determined that some of NATO’s major tensions stemmed from their allies’ lack of information about the extent of the US nuclear arsenal and its intended uses. After several halting steps, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided that US interests could be best met by offering the allies a nuclear education.

KEYWORDS:

• NATO
• nuclear weapons
• United States
• Robert S. McNamara
• Nuclear Planning Group

Acknowledgements

I owe many thanks: This article has been made possible by the work of declassification units at several NARA facilities and Library and Archives Canada. The research was conducted with grants from the Eisenhower Foundation, the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, the LBJ Foundation, and the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. Thanks also to Angus Lee and Kenneth Wong, and to two anonymous – and most helpful - reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas boasts the papers of three former SACEURs: Alfred Gruenther, Lauris Norstad, and of course Eisenhower himself.

² For two books that offer excellent discussion of US thinking about nuclear weapons, including the NATO aspect, see Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2020).

³ The most important collections of NPG-related records are currently the Papers of Melvin Laird at the Gerald Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence records at the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew, the NPG files of the Department of External Affairs held at Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Canada, and newly released records at the NATO Archives in Brussels. I am grateful to Susan Colbourn for mentioning the latter new releases to me.

⁴ For an account of the MLF to NPG transition, see Andrew Priest, ‘From Hardware to Software: The End of the MLF and the Rise of the Nuclear Planning Group’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (ed.), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2007).The NPG has been considered in relation to other subjects, such as theatre nuclear forces. See especially Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practise of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). An early study of the NPG is Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For a critique of Buteux’s general approach to the NPG, see Memorandum, 9 October 1975, RG25, 27-4-NATO-1-16, volume 23, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa [hereafter LAC]. The NPG’s importance to the INF discussion is also noted in Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey H. Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Fourth edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 372–73.

⁵ The single most useful account of NATO strategy remains Gregory W Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969, 1997, https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf.In addition to the other books cited in this article, there is an enormous literature on NATO and nuclear weapons. It would be impossible to list all books and articles here, but foundational books include Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’S Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). More recent accounts of NATO’s nuclear history are included in Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019); Freedman and Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The footnotes to these books also include notes to the extensive literature on individual allies and nuclear weapons.

⁶ ‘Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)’, 13 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, doc. 4.

⁷ On the evolution of NATO thinking about war, see Jeffrey H. Michaels, ‘Visions of the next War or Reliving the Last One? Early Alliance Views of War with the Soviet Bloc’, Journal of Strategic Studies (7 May 2020): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1759554.

⁸ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 590. Throughout the 1950s, Deputy SACEUR Montgomery thought ‘there was too much “United States Eyes Only” in the headquarters.’ Bernard Law Montgomery Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958), 515.

⁹ Memorandum by Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 September 1952, Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER) 18, 718.

¹⁰ ‘Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council to Secretary of State for External Affairs’, 6 December 1954, DCER 20, 368.

¹¹ Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 35–37.

¹² The New Approach: 1953–1956. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) History, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20121126_SHAPE_HISTORY_-_THE_NEW_APPROACH_1953_-_1956.pdf, 44–45.

¹³ On the strategic changes and developments in this era, see Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert Allen Wampler, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948–1957’ (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, 1991).

¹⁴ Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and after: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012).

¹⁵ ‘Disclosure of Weapons Effect Information’, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, 10 December 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 5, doc 232. See discussion in Robert Allen Wampler, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948–1957’, 521.

¹⁶ ‘Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries’, NSC 151/2, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt 2, doc 125.

¹⁷ Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 113–43.

¹⁸ The study, ‘Capabilities Plan, Allied Command Europe 1957’, SHAPE/330/54, 1 July 1954, is available online at https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20121128_19540701_NU_SHAPE-330-54_Capabilities_Plan_1957.pdf See also The New Approach. On NATO’s ‘nuclearization’ see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 153–68. On the evolution of NATO’s early strategy and MC 48, see Robert Wampler, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain, and the Foundation of NATO Strategy, 1948–1957’ (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 1991). See the important discussion, that includes the French perspective, in Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After.

¹⁹ L. D. Wilgress [Canadian Permanent Representative] to R. A. MacKay, 15 June 1955, Record Group 25 [hereafter RG25], 50333–40 (part 2.1), LAC.

²⁰ It was not only the Americans who sought to keep debate over nuclear issues out of the North Atlantic Council. In 1952, the British had wanted to avoid a discussion of atomic issues in the NAC, for fear of a public rupture in the alliance. Instead, the debates over nuclear strategy tended to occur on a bilateral basis. In 1953, the Americans pressured NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Ismay, not to raise some complex atomic questions in Council. Robert Allen Wampler, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948–1957’, 462 and 529.

²¹ See the text of a British telegram attached to ‘Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council’, 11 December 1954, DCER 20, 372.

²² ‘Future Pattern of Military Strength’, Memorandum by SSEA, 16 December 1954, DCER 20, 379.

²³ ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council’, 21 December 1954 FRUS, 1952–1954, V, Part 1, doc. 294.

²⁴ The New Approach, 106.

²⁵ External to London, DL-16, 30 July 1959, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

²⁶ These sites were planned for Norway, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, though Norway, Denmark and France did not end up stockpiling weapons.

²⁷ Specifically: The storage facilities provided for Honest John, Corporal, Redstone, Matador, nuclear depth charges, air force weapons, rockets, and 20 NIKE battalions. Mace would later replace Matador.

²⁸ ‘House of Commons Committee on External Affairs, NATO – NUCLEAR WEAPONS’, 15 February 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

²⁹ Memorandum of Conversation between General Paul Stehlin, Deputy Chief of Staff, French Armed Forces and Stoessel. 31 August 1959. NACNA, Records of the NATO Advisor, Box 1, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC [hereafter NARA].

³⁰ Wolf to Timmons, 28 October 1958. NACNA, Records of the NATO Advisor, Box 1.

³¹ External to London, DL-16, 30 July 1959. State officials knew there was ‘no such arrangement in NATO’ and were surprised that ‘such basic facts of life are unknown to the strategic planners in the Pentagon.’ ‘Paper for JCS on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy’, Tuthill to Merchant and Kohler, 2 December 1959, NATO Advisor, box 1, ‘NACNA.’. The debate continued in 1960: General Heusinger, on 30 June 1960 ‘stated that SACEUR could not authorize the use of nuclear warheads unless he had the unanimous approval of the North Atlantic Council.’ Strauss claimed ‘SACEUR can authorize the use of nuclear warheads either with the unanimous approval of the North Atlantic Council or on the authority of the President of the USA’, but admitted ‘the whole question of nuclear warheads in Europe had deliberately been left somewhat vague.’^⁠ Bonn to External 322, 6 July 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

³² Defence Liaison (1) Division to the Under-Secretary, ‘M. Spaak’s Aide-Memoire on France and NATO.’ 10 September 1959, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

³³ Nolting to Fessenden, 30 November 1959. NACNA, Records of the NATO Advisor, Box 1.

³⁴ For a more detailed account of Norstad’s thinking and plans for the MRBM force, see Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander: Airman, Strategist, Diplomat (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000).

³⁵ NATOParis to External 196, 27 January 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

³⁶ ‘EXTRACT FROM SPEECH OF GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, at the THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS, SPONSORED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA, ON 6 December 1959’, attached to Foulkes to Robertson, 4 January 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

³⁷ External to London, DL-16, 30 July 1959, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC

³⁸ Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, FRUS 1958–1960 VII P.1, doc 254, footnote 5.

³⁹ NATO Paris to External 1029, 6 April 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴⁰ NATO Paris to External 66, 12 January 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴¹ NATO Paris to External 1029.

⁴² NATO Paris to External 1191, 25 April 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴³ Michael Geyer, ‘Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons’, in Hanna Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁴⁴ NATO Paris to External 1084, 12 April 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴⁵ NATO Paris to External 1084.

⁴⁶ Numbered Letter 171, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs [USSEA] from the NATODel, ‘NATO Nuclear Policy – Land-Based MRBM System.’ 31 January 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴⁷ Norstad claimed that French officials urged him to develop such a force so they could ‘cease production of their own nuclear weapons.’ NATO Paris to External 945, 15 April 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴⁸ NATO Paris to External 3179, 1 December 3179, 1960, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁴⁹ NATO Paris to External 196, 27 January 1961.

⁵⁰ Numbered Letter 171, to the USSEA from the NATODel, ‘NATO Nuclear Policy – Land-Based MRBM System.’ 31 January 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁵¹ NATO Paris to External 945, 15 April 1961.

⁵² Numbered Letter M-142, to the USSEA from the NATODel, ‘NATO Nuclear Policy – SACEUR’s Control.’ 31 January 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁵³ See the confusion on this point in ‘U.S.-U.K. Talk on NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 17 March 1961’, 18 March 1961.

⁵⁴ NATOParis to External 196, 27 January 1961. Note that Norstad would later tell an interviewer that in case of war he would not have gone to Council but spoken bilaterally with countries concerned. Norstad, OH-558, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, [hereafter DDEL], 164

⁵⁵ NATOParis to External 196, 27 January 1961.

⁵⁶ Norstad, OH-558, DDEL, 164

⁵⁷ NATOParis to External 196, 27 January 1961.

⁵⁸ Trtachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 311.

⁵⁹ NATO Paris to External 455, 22 February 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁶⁰ Washington DC to External 259, 30 January 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC.

⁶¹ There is an enormous literature on the MLF and its cousin, the British proposed ANF. The best account of the US policy process remains John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis, Revised ed. edition (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). See the recent account in Sayle, Enduring Alliance.

⁶² Memorandum for Schlesinger from Kaysen, 4 July 1963, Schlesinger Papers, box WH-41, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1961–1963, John F. Kennedy Library [hereafter JFKL]. McNamaraism and nuclear information sharing, then, was more nuanced than a difficult battle fought by the Europeans for more information. See also Beatrice Heuser, ‘Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence’, in Vojtech Mastny, Andreas Wenger, and Sven G. Holtsmark (ed.), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 203.

⁶³ NATO Paris to External 998, 19 April 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁶⁴ This argument – that the Kennedy administration sought a conventional build-up, partly in response to the doctrine of ‘flexible response’, is not inconsistent with Francis J. Gavin, ‘The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s’, The International History Review 23/4 (2001), 847–75. As readers will see below, while McNamara sought a conventional force build up, his views on deterrence were not a major break with previous US thinking.

⁶⁵ NATO Paris to External 1054, 26 April 1961.

⁶⁶ NATO Paris to External 1061, 26 April 1961.

⁶⁷ NATO Paris to External 1054.

⁶⁸ When Acheson had suggested this promise in his March 1961 report, someone had scribbled on Kennedy’s copy: ‘for how long? Are we bound to this by Allies’ feelings even after [a] Polaris [commitment]?’ See ‘A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future’, March 1961, in NATO, General, 1961: January-April, President’s Office Files, JFKL. Available online at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/103/JFKPOF-103-016.

⁶⁹ The draft had suggested these guidelines be prepared in a ‘small committee’, but – no doubt because of the recent flaps over tripartitism in the late Eisenhower years – this phrase was deleted. Untitled. [Version of Ambassador Finletter’s statements to NAC re NATO defense posture], undated, Papers of Lauris Norstad [hereafter NP], box 113, US REP. NATO (1), DDEL. For a study that puts the suggestions for guidelines in larger perspective, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces 1945–1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), 147–200.

⁷⁰ Paris POLTO 766 (Section 1 of 2) to SecState, 7 December 1961, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL. See the description in Freedman and Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.

⁷¹ See Norstad’s descriptions of these plans as they stood until implementation of the Forward Strategy. NATO Paris to External 518, 26 February 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC.

⁷² ‘Meeting with Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss, 10 May 1961’, 1 June 1961, NSF, Kissinger, box 320, Staff Memoranda, Henry Kissinger, 6/61-7/61, JFKL.

⁷³ USNMR SHAPE MESSAGE 4632 to SecState, 27 April 1961, NP, box 100, DOWLING, WALTER, American Ambassador to Germany (2), DDEL. See also the analysis in Tyler to Millar, 4 January 1960, EUR, OAPMA, Subject Files, box 17, Germany. vol. 1., NARA.

⁷⁴ Bonn to External 206, 21 April 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁷⁵ Translation of German document, attached to ‘Memo for SACEUR’, from P. Von Butler to Norstad, undated [March-April, 1961], NP, box 49, Germany 1961–1962 (5), DDEL; Stoessel to Fessenden, 28 December 1961, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY 1961 (1), DDEL. See also Bonn to External 155, 21 March 1961, RG25, 5,219-AL-2-40, LAC. The Germans later submitted their plan to the Secretary General, who distributed it to the NATO allies as an official NATO document.^⁠ Excerpt from PO(61)573 quoted in NATO Paris to External 19 July 1882, 1961. RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁷⁶ ‘NATO Defense Problems’, Memorandum of Conversation, 10 May 1961, NP, box 87, GERMANY – Problems (2), DDEL.

⁷⁷ Stikker had weighted the countries in his formula so that ‘one other nuclear power (US or UK) as well as Germany and France would be required to vote for use.’ The idea was deeply unpopular. Paris Airgram 409 to SecState, 10 November 1961, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY 1961 (1), DDEL. See also Numbered Letter N-671 from NATODel to USSEA, 5 May 1961, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

⁷⁸ ‘Control of Nuclear Weapons’, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, NDP/62/2, 23 January 1962, NSF, box 225A, NATO, Weapons, Cables, France, JFKL.

⁷⁹ Note that some NATO officials, including the Canadian Secretary of State for External Relations, continued to believe that any nuclear decision would be taken by the NAC. Paul Martin, A Very Public Life, 2: So Many Worlds, 386, footnote 2, also 461.

⁸⁰ Paris POLTO 1003 to SecState, Section 1 of 2, 2 February 1962, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL.

⁸¹ Paris 654 to SecState, 14 November 1961, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY 1961 (1), DDEL.

⁸² ‘Control of Nuclear Weapons’, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, NDP/62/2, 23 January 1962.

⁸³ Paris POLTO 1003 to SecState, Section 2 of 2, 2 February 1962, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL.

⁸⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, 26 April 1962, NSF, box 226, NATO, Weapons, Cables, France, JFKL.

⁸⁵ Paris POLTO 1003 to SecState, Section 2 of 2, 2 February 1962.

⁸⁶ Washington D.C. to External 395, 9 February 1962. 14 February 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC. See also ‘NATO’s Nuclear Role’, memorandum of conversation, 7 February 1962, Declassified Document Reference System [hereafter DDRS], CK3100112824.

⁸⁷ ‘NATO Nuclear Questions’, memorandum of conversation, 5 February 1962, DDRS, CK3100323996. This memorandum is reiterated with different phrasing, in SecState TOPOL 1142 to Paris, 7 February 1962, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL. On the Strauss-Stikker conversation, see below and Fessenden to Norstad, 7 February 1962 and Stikker, Men of Responsibility, 333–34.

⁸⁸ ‘NATO’s Nuclear Role: Stikker Visit’, 8 February 1962, NSF, Kissinger, box 462, Background Briefing Material for H. A. Kissinger on 2/13 + 14/62, Folder 1 of 2, JFKL.

⁸⁹ ‘On the plane going to and from Omaha’, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 March 1963, NSF, box 221, NATO, General, JFKL.

⁹⁰ NATO Paris to External 485, 22 February 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC; Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, from Bundy, 14 July 1961, NSF, box 220A, NATO, General, JFKL; ‘Nuclear Capability of Forces Committed to NATO’, Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 July 1961, NSF, box 220A, NATO, JFKL.

⁹¹ Fessenden to Norstad, 7 February 1962.

⁹² Memorandum for the Record, 3 February 1962, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY ’62 (4), DDEL. See also Memorandum from Wolf to Stoessel, 26 January 1962, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY ’62 (4), DDEL.

⁹³ ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 31 August 1959, NATO Advisor, box 1, NACNA. See also De Rose’s comments in Memorandum of Conversation, 17 April 1961, NSF, box 220, NATO, General, JFKL.

⁹⁴ Memorandum from Kranich to Fessenden, 11 April 1962, EUR, RPM, NATO Affairs, 1959–1966, box 7, Defense Affairs NATO 1962-. DEF 12 Nuclear France,” NARA.

⁹⁵ See de Rose’s comments in ‘NATO and Nuclear Relationships’, memorandum of conversation, 11 April 1961, NSF, box 221, NATO, General, Rostow, JFKL.

⁹⁶ For an overview of the diverse policies, plans and issues involved in nuclear targeting, see the essays on national policy in Part II of Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).

⁹⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, 15 December 1961, NSF, Kaysen, box 375, NATO – Subjects: Nuclear Deployment, JFKL.

⁹⁸ ‘Note on Franco-German Relations’ by Henry Kissinger, 20 February 1962, NSF, Kaysen, box 375, NATO – Subjects: Nuclear Deployment, JFKL.

⁹⁹ Bonn no. 1934 to SecSTate, 17 February 1962, President’s Office Files, Department and Agencies; State, 1962: January – March, JFKL. Available online at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-088-006.aspx.

¹⁰⁰ NATO Paris to External 858, 31 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹⁰¹ NATO Paris to External 485, 22 February 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC.

¹⁰² London to External 1083, 2 March 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹⁰³ NATO Paris to External 664, 9 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹⁰⁴ London to External 1083.

¹⁰⁵ The 144b negotiations were delicate, and difficult to implement; host countries felt compelled to detail their ‘most qualified personnel to training, operation and maintenance of nuclear-capable weapons systems.’ Despatch no. 77 from American Embassy, Paris to, Department of State, Washington, 21 July 1961, DDEL NP box 91, ‘US Support of NATO 1961.’ See also Burr, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954–1962’, National Security Archive, 16 July 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-07-21/us-nuclear-presence-western-europe-1954-1962.

¹⁰⁶ Paris POLTO 1274 to SecState, 27 March 1962, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL. See also NATO Paris to External 764, 22 March 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC. The plan is in NDP/62/3. The British had initially suggested a committee with a ‘consultative’ function. See NATO Paris to External 453, 20 February 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC; London to External 671, 26 February 1962. RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC; ‘Letter and Note from U.K. Delegation on the NATO Nuclear Committee’, 31 July 1962, NSF, box 223, NATO, General, Defense Policy Conference, 10/11/62, JFKL; ‘UK Proposal for Additional NATO Nuclear Consultation’, 11 October 1962, NSF, box 223, NATO, General, Defense Policy Conference, 10/11/62, JFKL.

¹⁰⁷ NATO Paris to External 764, 22 March 1962.

¹⁰⁸ SecState TOPOL 1508 to Paris, 6 April 1962, NP, box 85, ATOM – NUCL POLICY ’62 (2), DDEL.

¹⁰⁹ NATO Paris to External 716, 16 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹¹⁰ NATO Paris to External 764, 22 March 1962; Washington DC to External 878, 21 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹¹¹ London to External 1083, 2 March 1962.

¹¹² A number of the issues regarding use are discussed in Paris POLTO 1209 to SecState, 15 March 1962, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL.

¹¹³ For British views on the general problem see NATO Paris to External 704, 14 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC; for Canadian views, stressing communications equipment, see NATO Paris to External 555, 26 February 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-40, LAC. Note that in 1962, NATO was developing its ‘FAST-CAT’ system for quicker communication in Allied Command Europe.

¹¹⁴ See German concerns in Paris POLTO 1209 to SecState, 15 March 1962; Paris POLTO 1255 to SecState, 22 March 1962, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL. On Taylor visit, see Memorandum from Fessenden to Kohler, 30 March 1962, NSF, Kaysen, box 375, Carl Kaysen, NATO, Nuclear Deployment, JFKL.

¹¹⁵ NATO Paris to External 859, 31 March 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹¹⁶ NATO Paris to External 26 April 1070, 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹¹⁷ Paris to External 585, 17 April 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC

¹¹⁸ Paris No. 4886 to SecState, 17 April 1962, NSF, box 222, NATO, General, Cables, JFKL.

¹¹⁹ ‘Memorandum of Conversation at Mr. Durbrow’s Residence’, 20 March 1962, NSF, Kaysen, box 375, Carl Kaysen, NATO, Nuclear Deployment, JFKL.

¹²⁰ ‘NATO Nuclear Role’, memorandum by Robert H. Kranich, 21 March 1962, NSF, Kaysen, box 375, Carl Kaysen, NATO, Nuclear Deployment, JFKL.

¹²¹ Memorandum to the Under-Secretary from DL(1) Division, ‘NATO Defence Policy: Comments on Mr. McNamara Statement’, 29 May 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹²² ‘Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens’, C-M(62)55, 5 May 1962, available online from the National Security Archive at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb236/background%20doc%202.pdf; ‘NATO Defence Policy – Statement by Secretary of Defence Mr. McNamara’, DL(1) to USSEA, 14 May 1962, RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC; Memorandum for the Minister from E.L.M. Burns, ‘’Fire-power’ of Polaris-carrying Submarines’, 11 May 1961. RG25, 50219-AL-2-40, LAC.

¹²³ ‘Nuclear Weapons Policy’, Memorandum of Conversation, 12 July 1962, EUR, RPM, NATO Affairs, 1959–1966, box 7, Defense Affairs NATO 1962–1963. DEF 12 Nuclear France, NARA.

¹²⁴ ‘Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens’, C-M(62)55, 5 May 1962.

¹²⁵ 'Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens.'

¹²⁶ ‘Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens.’

¹²⁷ ‘Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens.’

¹²⁸ Norstad had resisted the detailed technical briefings. Botti, Timothy J. Ace in the Hole: Why the United States did not use Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, 176.

¹²⁹ ‘Memorandum for files’, 6 May 1962, EUR, RPM, NATO Affairs, 1959–1966, box 2, NATO Athens – 1962, NARA.

¹³⁰ Handwritten note by Fessenden, undated [May 1962]. ”Defense Affairs. NDDP – CABAL. DEF 10 Exchange of Military Information,” EUR/RPM, Records Relating to NATO Affairs, 1959–1966. Box 7. See also Owen to Bundy, 28 August 1962. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, Weapons, General, 1961. Box 224. The British, however, urged the Americans to put the brakes on information sharing, especially regarding nuclear targeting policy. MemCon, ‘Provision of Nuclear Information to NATO’, 11 May 1962. NARA, ”Defense Affairs. NDDP – CABAL. DEF 10 Exchange of Military Information,” EUR/RPM, Records Relating to NATO Affairs, 1959–1966. Box 7. NARA.

¹³¹ Gerald Smith, by dictaphone in Paris, to Henry Owen. 23 October 1962 (dictated 18 October 1962). NARA, ‘NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) 10/25/62’ Executive Secretariat. Records of Robert W. Komer. Box 2.

¹³² Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, from Bundy, 14 July 1961. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Box 220A.

¹³³ Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. ‘Nuclear Capability of Forces Committed to NATO.’ 22 July 1961. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Box 220A.

¹³⁴ See marginalia on Seaborg to Bundy, 4 October 1962. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹³⁵ Department of State Circular 681, 18 October 1962. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹³⁶ Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from McNamara. ‘NATO Defense Data Program’, 3 December 1962. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221. On the development of the briefing material, see the records in the ‘Nuclear Data Defense Program’ folder described above, and also in NARA, ‘Defense Affairs. NDDP – CABAL. DEF 10 Exchange of Military Information’, EUR/RPM, Records Relating to NATO Affairs, 1959–1966. Box 7.

¹³⁷ Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Reaction of Military Representatives, MC/PS, to NDDP Briefings, 7–8 February 1963.’ 11 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹³⁸ Airgram A-2067 from Paris to Department of STate, ‘Briefing of French Officials on NATO Defense Data Program’, 20 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹³⁹ Bonn to SecState, No. 2188. 23 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹⁴⁰ MemCon, ‘U.S. Nuclear Capabilities’, 22 February 1963. NARA, ”Germany I,” EUR/RPM, Records Relating to NATO Affairs, 1959–1966. Box 8; Bonn to SecSTate, No. 2188. 23 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹⁴¹ Department of State to Paris, POLTO 931. 7 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹⁴² Bonn to SecSTate, No. 2188. 23 February 1963. JFKL, NSF Files, NATO, General, Nuclear Data Defense Program. Box 221.

¹⁴³ See the carefully hedged offer in Department of State TOPOL 1922 to Paris, [To Ambassador Finletter from the President], 14 June 1962, Neustadt Papers, box 19, Government Consulting – Skybolt/NATO/Atlantic Affairs – NATO Research, 1961/2, JFKL.

¹⁴⁴ Washington DC to External 12 November 3351, 1962, RG25, vol. 5959, 50219-AL-2-40 (5.2), LAC.

¹⁴⁵ “Post-Nassau Strategy, JFKL, NSF, Box 376, ‘NATO – Subjects European Nuclear Force – Nassau Agreement, 12/62; ‘NATO Nuclear Forces’, draft, 11 February 1963, JFK, NSF, 375, ‘Carl Kaysen.’

¹⁴⁶ Bonn 4985 to SecState, 23 June 1965, NSF, Country File, box 185, ‘Germany, Volume 8’ Lyndon Baines Johnson Library [hereafter LBJL]. See also Priest, ‘From Hardware to Software: The End of the MLF and the Rise of the Nuclear Planning Group.’

¹⁴⁷ ‘Draft Discussion Paper: Nuclear Consultation’, by Ronald Speiers, 17 November 1964, RG59, OES, MLF Documents, 1960–1065, box 1, ‘The MLF – ANF (August 1960 – December 1964) Vol. 1’, NARA.

¹⁴⁸ ‘Draft Discussion Paper: Nuclear Consultation’, By Ronald Speiers, (EUR/RPM), 17 November 1964. ‘The MLF – ANF (August 1960 – December 1964) Vol. 1.’ Office of the Executive Secretariat. Multilateral Force Documents, 1960–1965. Box 1, NARA.

¹⁴⁹ ‘U.S. NATO Ambassadors’ Conference in The Hague’, memorandum for the record, 27 October 1965, NSF, Agency File, box 35, NATO General, Volume 2, LBJL.

¹⁵⁰ ‘Hillenbrand Study of Nuclear Problems of the Alliance: INFORMATION MEMORANDUM’, Memorandum from Leddy to the Under Secretary, 23 September 1965, RG59, EUR, RPM, Trilateral Records. Box 1, ‘Collective Nuclear Arrangements (Papers from Mr. Leddy’s File’, NARA.

¹⁵¹ Memorandum for Ball from owen. ‘First Things First.’ 7 December 1964. ”MLF #4”, Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961–1966. Box 27, NARA.

¹⁵² On American-Anglo-German tripartite cooperation, see Sayle, Enduring Alliance, 119–146.

¹⁵³ The relevant NATO documents that reestablished discussion of a nuclear committee after McNamara’s suggestion are ‘Resumption of Discussion of Nuclear Questions’, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, PO(65)360, 29 June 1965, and ‘Nuclear Problems’, Secretary General to Permanent Representatives, PO(65)411, 21 July 1965, both in NATO  Archives, Brussels.

¹⁵⁴ Text of a Paris POLTO 832 to State, ‘Primary Objective Special Committee of Defense Ministers.’ 21 November 1965, NSF, Agency File, box 39, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, NARA. On the challenges of membership in the Special Committee and then the early days of the Nuclear Planning Group, see Timothy Andrews Sayle, ‘We Do Not Wish to Be Obstructionist: How Canada Took and Kept a Seat on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group’, in Susan Colbourn and Timothy Andrews Sayle (ed.), The Nuclear North: Histories of Canada in the Atomic Age (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2020).

¹⁵⁵ Paris POLTO Circular 18 to SecState, 27 November 1965, NSF, Agency File, box 39, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, LBJL.

¹⁵⁶ Text of a Paris POLTO 832 to State, ‘Primary Objective Special Committee of Defense Ministers.’ 21 November 1965. LBJL, NSF, Agency File, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, Box 39.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Initial Statement of the SecDef’, 20 November 1965, NSF, Agency File, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, Box 39, LBJL.

¹⁵⁸ Draft State-Defense Message to Cleveland, 15 November 1965, LBJL, NSF, Agency File, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, Box 39.

¹⁵⁹ ‘Various Nuclear Matters’, memorandum of conversation, 11 October 1965, RG59, EUR, DAS, Schaetzel Files, box 1, ‘Britain’, NARA; ‘German Veto on Nuclear Weapons Use on Their Soil by US or Other Troops’, 13 December 1965, Bator Papers, box 29, “MLF/ANF (Multilateral Force/Atlantic Force), LBJL.

¹⁶⁰ ‘France and NATO’, memorandum of conversation, 8 October 1965, FRUS, 1963–1968, XIII, doc. 106.

¹⁶¹ ‘Suggested Talking Points for Secretary McNamara’s Press Backgrounder in Paris November 27’, [November 1965], LBJL, NSF, Agency File, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, Box 39.

¹⁶² ‘Suggested Talking Points for Secretary McNamara’s Press Backgrounder in Paris November 27. See also ‘Initial Statement of the SecDef’, 20 November 1965. LBJL, NSF, Agency File, ‘NATO, Special Committee of Defense Ministers in Paris (Sec. McNamara)’, Box 39.

¹⁶³ ‘Meeting with the President, 1:15 p.m., Thursday, June 23. Talking Points’, 23 June 1966, Bator Papers, Box 28, LBJL.

¹⁶⁴ Bator to Bill Moyers, 12 April 1966, Bator Papers, Box 28, LBJL.

¹⁶⁵ Record of Meeting with President Johnson. 17 December 1966, FRUS, 1963–1968, XIII, doc. 106, 231.

¹⁶⁶ ‘Interview – Mr. Robert McNamara. Thursday February 27th, 1970’, Nunnerley Papers, box 1, Transcripts – John – Norstad, JFKL. See similar contemporary description in Memorandum of Conversation, 15 December 1966. ‘Conversation Bet. Gen. Wheeler & Mr. McCloy. 10/25/66’, EUR/RPM, Records Relating to NATO Trilateral Discussion, 1965–1968. Box 1. See also Oral history transcript, Robert S. McNamara, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1975, by Elspeth D. Rostow, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/oh-mcnamarar-19750108-1-90-4

¹⁶⁷ McNamara mentions the ‘bluff’ in both Oral history transcript, Robert S. McNamara, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1975, by Elspeth D. Rostow and ‘Interview – Mr. Robert McNamara. Thursday February 27th, 1970.’ JFKL, Nunnerley Papers, Transcripts – John – Norstad, Box 1.

¹⁶⁸ ‘Interview – Mr. Robert McNamara. Thursday February 27th, 1970.’.

¹⁶⁹ Oral history transcript, Robert S. McNamara, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1975, by Elspeth D. Rostow.

¹⁷⁰ Oral history transcript, Robert S. McNamara, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1975, by Elspeth D. Rostow.

¹⁷¹ The NPG was the forum for development on NATO nuclear policy going forward; Daalder’s excellent account of NATO’s post-1968 nuclear strategy begins, in some ways, where this account leaves off. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response.

¹⁷² The best source for the NPG’s early agendas is LAC, RG25, 27–24-NATO-1-16.

¹⁷³ Rostow, as interviewer in Oral history transcript, Robert S. McNamara, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1975, by Elspeth D. Rostow.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Interview – Mr. Robert McNamara. Thursday February 27th, 1970.’

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Notes on contributors

Timothy Andrews Sayle

Timothy Andrews Sayle is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Cornell, 2019) and editor, with Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands, and William Inboden of The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq (Cornell, 2019).