Are they reading Schelling in Beijing? The dimensions, drivers, and risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement in China

ABSTRACT

Experts increasingly highlight the dangers of nuclear-conventional entanglement, particularly in the U.S.-China context. This article develops a framework for assessing entanglement and its risks. Applying that framework to China, it finds that Beijing’s missiles are not as entangled as is sometimes feared, but ongoing trends may increase future entanglement. It also presents evidence that, counter to the prevailing wisdom, Chinese entanglement has not emerged as a strategic policy choice but, rather, as the byproduct of more parochial organizational dynamics. Strategic signaling and perception management will be key to controlling escalation risks stemming from nuclear-conventional entanglement in China.

KEYWORDS:

• US-China relations
• nuclear strategy
• escalation risks
• deterrence theory
• crisis management

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments and support, I thank Justin Anderson, Ari C. Anisfeld, Philip Atkinson, Gerald C. Brown, John Chen, Thomas J. Christensen, Christopher F. Chyba, Fiona S. Cunningham, Aaron Friedberg, Sarah Gamberini, Hans M. Kristensen, Scott LaFoy, Lynn Lee, Phillip C. Saunders, Eric Snyder, Mark Stokes, Joel Wuthnow, Tong Zhao, members of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, and participants in the Princeton University Security Studies Graduate Research Seminar. Research for this article was conducted, in part, while the author was an expert consultant with the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any of the below funders.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

² Philip E. Tetlock, Charles B. McGuire, and Gregory Mitchell, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence’, Annual Review of Psychology 42/1 (1991), 239–276.

³ Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2013); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995); and Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin 2013).

⁴ Throughout the analysis, I define ‘escalation’ as meaning the first use of a nuclear weapon.

⁵ See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 447–487; and James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017); Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41/4 (Spring 2017), 50–92.

⁶ In this respect, I adopt a somewhat narrower definition of entanglement than other scholars who sometimes define the term to also include the possibility of using conventional forces to execute a disarming first strike against an adversary’s nuclear deterrent. See, for example, Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, James M. Acton, (ed.), 1; and James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (Summer 2018), 56–99.

⁷ For some discussion, see Amy F. Woolf, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 24 Feb. 2016; and U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, 2008).

⁸ Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’; Joshua Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696–730; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability’, International Security 40/2 (Fall 2015), 40–45; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5 (Sep./Oct. 2012), 60–62; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’; and Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report (Monterey, CA: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2013), 10; and Saalman, Lora, ‘China: Lines Blur Between Nuclear and Conventional Warfighting,’ The Interpreter, 19 Dec. 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/19/China-Lines-blur-between-nuclear-and-conventional-warfighting.aspx.

⁹ Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 199–200.

¹⁰ Here, I borrow the terminology of Talmadge, who also highlights the importance of ‘perceptual variables.’ See Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’

¹¹ Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms’, Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3^rd Quarter, Jul. 2016), 68–75; and David C. Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces’, Joint Force Quarterly 83 (Oct. 2016), 57–62.

¹² Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187–203; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 92–125.

¹³ Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 193.

¹⁴ Schelling, Arms and Influence, 109–116.

¹⁵ Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 12–23.

¹⁶ Ibid., 13–14. For Jervis’s original formulation, see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978), 167–214.

¹⁷ Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 16–19. For explanations of the offensive orientation of military institutions, see Jack Snyder, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984’, International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984), 118–122.

¹⁸ Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 19–23.

¹⁹ Both Schelling and Posen discuss forms of autonomous risk which could encourage nuclear use though, for Schelling, that risk is deliberately introduced by one party and, for Posen, the risk emerges inadvertently through a combination of organizational proclivities and perceptual factors.

²⁰ Barry R. Posen, ‘Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank’, International Security 7/2 (Fall 1982), 28–54.

²¹ Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement.’

²² The term ‘functionally-related observable differences’ is typically used in the context of arms control agreements to refer to those characteristics which clearly distinguish weapons systems limited by an agreement from similar ones not limited by the agreement or subject to different limitations.

²³ Here, the line between operational and technological entanglement may blur, depending on the technical necessity of certain operational practices and support elements. If operational practices and support elements are inextricably tied to the system’s armament (either nuclear or conventional) they may best be thought of as technological entanglement. However, if the presence of certain operational practices or support elements is not necessary, but rather a choice, they may be thought of as a form of operational entanglement. I thank Fiona S. Cunningham for this observation.

²⁴ James M. Acton, Tong Zhao, and Li Bin, ‘Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 Sep. 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236.

²⁵ On Conventional Trident Modification, see Woolf, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles.’ For concerns about the potential risks stemming from the new cruise missile, see William J. Perry and Andy Weber, ‘Mr. President, Kill the New Cruise Missile’, The Washington Post, 15 Oct. 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruise-missile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html?utm_term=.7b826f39569a.

²⁶ A state which does not deploy nuclear weapons might also be said to exhibit a condition of total disentanglement.

²⁷ China also possessed putative air- and sea-based nuclear forces with its H-6 bombers and its single Xia-class SSBN, though neither of these ever truly matured.

²⁸ The extent to which earlier nuclear and conventional forces may have shared command and control arrangements is unknown. A set of regulations issued in 1967 by the Central Military Commission that placed the newly established Second Artillery directly under its command, as opposed to the forces of the other military services, which were instead commanded through the Military Regions. However, the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution delayed the implementation of these regulations so that the Second Artillery was not seen as enjoying the ability to launch nuclear weapons independent of other components until 1984. For discussion and sources, see Fiona Cunningham, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 18 Jul. 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

²⁹ Here, I borrow from the terminology of experts exploring similar risks in the U.S.’s conventional prompt global strike program. See M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?’ INSS Strategic Forum 263 (Feb. 2011); and James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

³⁰ The ‘entangled state’ refers to the state which has entangled its nuclear and conventional weapons systems while the ‘adversary’ refers to the other state in a crisis or conflict. In the U.S.-China context, the entangled state refers to China while the adversary refers to the United States. At times, I also use ‘target state’ to refer to the entangled state.

³¹ Posen, Inadvertent Escalation.

³² This pathway is analogous to what Bunn and Manzo describe as ‘destination ambiguity’ risks in which ‘a state correctly or incorrectly concludes that the United States is attacking it with a CPGS weapon but does not know whether the strike is directed against its nuclear forces, conventional forces, or command and control centers.’ Bunn and Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike,’ 16–17.

³³ James M. Acton, Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).

³⁴ Throughout the paper, ‘dual-use’ is used to describe systems which are able to carry both conventional and nuclear armaments, such as the DF-26. In addition, there may be conventional or nuclear variants of the same underlying missile, such as the DF-21.

³⁵ This would grant the adversary a degree of de facto sanctuary. Such sanctuary may not be appealing to the entangled state if it makes it easier to hold its nuclear forces at risk. Conversely, the adversary of the entangled state may be disinclined to providing sanctuary if the adversary believes the entangled state might exploit that sanctuary to shelter its conventional assets.

³⁶ I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this point. See, for example, Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), chapter 2; and Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’, American Political Science Review 83/2 (1989), 503–519. Indeed, once deterrence has failed, as marked by the first nuclear strike, the deterrent value of one’s own nuclear arsenal has eroded. See John Steinbruner, ‘Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions’, World Politics 28/2 (1976), 223–245; and Harold A. Feiveson, ‘The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons’, World Politics 33/2 (1981), 282–298. For some relevant discussion in the U.S.-China context, see Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ 58–59.

³⁷ Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’; and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Robert Powell, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence’, Political Science Quarterly 100/1 (Spring 1985), 75–96.

³⁸ Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 701–702 and 704–705.

³⁹ Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 19–23; and Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 143–146.

⁴⁰ For some relevant discussion in the U.S.-China context, see Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 699–701. Also see Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Schlosser, Command and Control; and Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security 18/4 (1994), 66–107.

⁴¹ Rose McDermott, Anthony C Lopez, and Peter K Hatemi, ‘“Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It”: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence’, Texas National Security Review 1/1 (2017), 68–88, especially 71; and Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, ‘Revenge in International Politics’, Security Studies 17/4 (2008), 685.

⁴² Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe’, 696–730.

⁴³ Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ 62–64.

⁴⁴ Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement.’

⁴⁵ Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 53–80.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁷ Schelling, Arms and Influence, chapter 2; James D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 68–90; and Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 231–233.

⁴⁸ See examples in James M. Acton, ‘Reclaiming Strategic Stability’, in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson (ed.), Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 123–128.

⁴⁹ See, for example, Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ 50–92; Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe’, 696–730; Cunningham and Fravel ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 40–45; Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, 60–62; Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations’, International Security 37/4 (Spring 2013), 49–89; and Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution.’

⁵⁰ Tong Zhao and Li Bin, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective’, in James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017), 47–75.

⁵¹ For example, one of Rovner’s escalation variables is whether or not China can distinguish between attacks targeting its conventional forces and those targeting its nuclear forces but not how the attacking state can distinguish between those same targets. Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe’, 719–721.

⁵² For the sake of space, I only address entanglement within China’s land-based missile forces, though the same analytical framework introduced above could be used to assess other areas of the PLA.

⁵³ ‘The Obama Nuclear Deterrent Modernization Plan and Schedule’, Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 Jul. 2016, p. 3; ‘China’s Offensive Missile Forces,’ Transcript of Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, 1 Apr. 2015.

⁵⁴ Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75/4 (2019), 172; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2020: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 85. Kristensen and Korda estimate roughly 290 total nuclear warheads, of which 220 are assigned to the PLARF. The 2020 DOD report writes that ‘China’s nuclear warhead stockpile [is] currently estimated to be in the low-200s….’ For conventional SRBM estimate, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2017: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2017), 31.

⁵⁵ Phillip C. Saunders and David C. Logan, ‘China’s Regional Nuclear Capability, Non-Nuclear Strategic Systems, and Integration of Concepts and Operations’, in James Smith and Paul Bolt, (ed.), China’s Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press forthcoming).

⁵⁶ The Second Artillery underwent two major changes at the beginning of 2016 as part of a sweeping set of military reforms. First, it was renamed to the PLA Rocket Force. Second, its formal institutional status was elevated form that of an independent branch to that of a full-fledged military service. Despite these superficial changes, the force structure, administrative organization, and command and control of the force remained intact. For more information on the continuity between the former Second Artillery and the new Rocket Force, see Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces.’

⁵⁷ Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (ed.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2002), 517–518.

⁵⁸ For more on the Second Artillery’s conventional missions and capabilities, see Michael Chase and Andrew Erickson, ‘The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting’, Asian Security 8/2, 115–137; and Ron Christman, ‘Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps’, Comparative Strategy 30/3 (2011), 198–228.

⁵⁹ Kristensen and Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016’, 2; and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs’, in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, (ed.), The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Stimson Center 2016), 105.

⁶⁰ Saunders and Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols?’ 68–75.

⁶¹ Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces’, 57–62.

⁶² Mark Stokes, ‘PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference’, Project 2049 Institute, 9 Apr. 2018.

⁶³ Stokes, ‘PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference’, 2–12; Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 40–45; Jeffrey G. Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 116; and Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.’

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ This deployment pattern exhibits a logic similar to the Third Front Movement, when China located defense factories in the interior to protect them from attack. Barry Naughton, ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior’, The China Quarterly 115 (Sep. 1988), 351–386.

⁶⁶ Trans-regional mobility operations are believed to require approval from the CMC.

⁶⁷ Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Mission Action 2010: Three Complex, Transregional, Integrated Joint Operations’, China Brief 10/22 (2010), 6–9.

⁶⁸ ‘Second Artillery Has Successfully Initiated Large-Scale Nuclear Missile Trans-Regional Encampment Training [二炮部队曾成功实施大型核导弹跨区驻训],’ Science and Technology Daily [科技日报], 6 Jul. 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-07-06/1116655572.html.

⁶⁹ Though the article did not identify the brigade or its armament, open-source evidence permits the deduction that it was nuclear. Based on information from the time, only two launch brigades were believed to be based in northeast China, the nuclear-armed 810^th Brigade stationed at Dalian, Liaoning and the nuclear-armed 816^th Brigade located at Tonghua, Jilin. Here, I use the Second Artillery unit designations from the time. See ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in −30°C Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30°C寒区锤炼实战能力]’, China National Radio Military Affairs [央广军事], 10 Feb. 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/pic/2015-02/10/content_4569718.htm.

⁷⁰ ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in −30°C Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30°C寒区锤炼实战能力].’

⁷¹ ‘The Eve of the Graduation of Second Artillery Officer Cadets Has Many Missile Types Participate in Trans-Regional Exercises [二炮学员毕业前夕携带多型导弹参加跨区演习]’, PLA Daily [解放军报], 14 Jun. 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-06-14/0419651810.html. The source refers to an exercise by a training brigade, not a deployed brigade. Though the exercise is likely representative of the kinds of actions brigades will undertake in a conflict.

⁷² ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in −30°C Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30°C寒区锤炼实战能力].’

⁷³ Liu Qiang [刘强], Zhang Zhenxing [张振兴], and Cheng Cheng [程成], ‘High Definition: PLA Artillery Brigade Trans-Regional Movement, Military Vehicles Camouflaged as Postal Trucks [高清:解放军炮兵旅跨区机动 军车伪装成邮车]’, People Online [人民网], 8 Jul. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0708/c1011-27270466.html.

⁷⁴ At the time, the Tonghua-based launch brigade was over 300 kilometers from the next Military Region and the Dalian-based launch brigade was over 500 kilometers away. See discussion in note 69 above.

⁷⁵ Wang Yongxiao [王永孝], Cai Ruijin [蔡瑞金], Li Yongfei [李永飞], and Yang Yonggang [杨永刚], ‘Review of the Combat Capability of China’s Strategic Missile Units [中国战略导弹部队战力扫描]’, PLA Daily [解放军报], 1 Jan. 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/2016-01/16/content_6859464.htm; and ‘PLARF Conducts Live-Fire Drill in the Gobi Desert [火箭军 西北大漠 开展实弹发射演练],’ CCTV [央视网], 28 Jan. 2019, http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C10616/e65c9f10f0004ae8b5620866c83fcf1d. These include live-fire drills.

⁷⁶ Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Chinese DF-26 Missile Launchers Deploy to New Missile Training Area’, Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 21 Jan. 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/01/df-26/.

⁷⁷ For more on launch sites, see Sean O’Connor, ‘PLA Second Artillery Corps’, Air Power Australia, 27 Jan. 2014, https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists, 2006), 59–70; and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Area Discovered in Central China’, Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 15 May 2008, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-area-discovered-in-central-china/.

⁷⁸ Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Pentagon Report and Chinese Nuclear Forces’, Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 18 May 2016, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/05/chinareport2016/.

⁷⁹ Cunningham and Fravel ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 40–45.

⁸⁰ David C. Logan, ‘Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell Us’, Asian Security 14/1 (2018), 1–19.

⁸¹ Ibid., 9–11.

⁸² See, for example, ‘The Rocket Force Focuses on Actual Combat, Organizes a Missile Brigade and Regiment Competition [火箭军聚焦实战, 组织导弹旅团长比武]’, People’s Daily [人民日报], 15 Jan. 2019, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0115/c1011-30537459.html; and ‘Missile Brigade and Regiment Leaders Get a Taste of Actual Combat at Competition, [实战化比武，导弹旅团长们尝到了啥滋味]’, China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 17 Jan. 2019, http://sn.people.com.cn/n2/2019/0117/c378304-32540247.html.

⁸³ Recent reporting quotes battalion commanders explicitly referencing control of both nuclear and conventional forces and some of the accounts used language which may refer to lower command levels.

⁸⁴ ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队]’, China Daily [中国日报], 22 Jul. 2017, http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-07/22/content_30212137.htm.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ See, for example, U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, New Mobile Solid-Propellant MRBM Under Development, China (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency Nov. 1983), 2, 8; and U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, New-Generation CSS-2 IRBM Ground Support Equipment PRC (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency Oct. 1979), 1, 5.

⁸⁷ David C. Logan, ‘Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, (ed.), Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC: NDU Press 2019), 403–404; and Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21^st Century, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 106.

⁸⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019), 119

⁸⁹ Henry Boyd, ‘2019 Pentagon Report: China’s Rocket Force Trajectory’, Military Balance Blog (blog), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 15 May 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/pla-rocket-force-trajectory; and Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 107.

⁹⁰ Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 107.

⁹¹ James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, (ed.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002), 207–208.

⁹² Wang Weidong [王卫东] and Sun Fenghao [孙丰皓], ‘Bravely Serving in the Vanguard of Promoting the Good and Eradicating the Bad [破弊立新勇当先]’, PLA Daily [解放军报], 14 Feb. 2019, p. 1.

⁹³ ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’

⁹⁴ Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], (ed.), The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing, National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社] 2006), 618. American researchers have noted that ‘To the best of our knowledge, these are the most authoritative publicly available sources on Chinese military thinking about the campaign.’ See Michael S. Chase, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2015), 4–5.

⁹⁵ Cunningham, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China’; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 42–45.

⁹⁶ Yu Jixun [于际训], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社] 2004), 161. For some discussion in English, see Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 44–45.

⁹⁷ Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 161.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 160. This text was published prior to the 2015–2016 military reforms but there are no clear indications that this concept has changed.

⁹⁹ Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VIII Report (Monterey, CA: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School Nov. 2014), 10.

¹⁰⁰ For a review of this early evidence, see Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces’, 57–62.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Logan, ‘Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces.’

¹⁰² ‘A Certain Base for the First Time Undertakes Cluster Command “Winning Iron Fist” [某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 “制胜铁拳”]’, Rocket Force News [火箭军报], 25 Nov. 2017, p. 1.

¹⁰³ ‘Combat Readiness, Sword Pointed at New Heights [备战, 剑指新高地]’, People’s Navy [人民海军], 21 Oct. 2017, p. 4; and ‘A Panoramic View of Chinese Military’s New Year Training: Preparing for War from a New Starting Point [中国军队新年开训全景大扫描: 备战踏上新起点]’, Xinhua [新华网], 6 Jan. 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/06/c_1122220447.htm.

¹⁰⁴ ‘A Certain Base for the First Time Undertakes Cluster Command “Winning Iron Fist” [某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 “制胜铁拳”]’, 1; and ‘Command Academy Focuses Intently on Requirements of Winning, Reforms Military Education to Reflect Actual Combat [指挥学院紧盯打赢需要大抓实战化教学改革]’, Rocket Force News [火箭军报], 8 Jul. 2017, 1a; and Guo Yuandan [郭媛丹], ‘How China’s Theater Commands Conduct Operations: By Truly Joining Systems and Fusing Command and Control Entities [中国战区如何打仗:体系深度联合、指挥一体融合]’, Huanqiu Wang [环球网], 8 Oct. 2017; and ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’

¹⁰⁵ ‘Concentrate on Sharpening the Sword, the More the Strategic Iron Fist Is Used, the Harder It Becomes [潜心砺剑, 战略铁拳越练越硬]’, PLA Daily [解放军报], 6 Feb. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/06/content_198875.htm.

¹⁰⁶ Roderick Lee, ‘Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations’, China Brief 20/14 (2020), 24–31.

¹⁰⁷ I thank Scott LaFoy for valuable feedback on this section and Table 2.

¹⁰⁸ Some estimates have concluded that the DF-11 and DF-15 may have nuclear capable variants, though there is little evidence that China has actually deployed these nuclear variants. See Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, 51; and Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015ʹ, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71/4 (2015), 80. For estimates of Chinese nuclear deployments, see Lewis, Paper Tigers, 104; Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 43; and Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.’

¹⁰⁹ I thank Zhao Tong for emphasizing this point.

¹¹⁰ For some examples, see Li Bin, ‘Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles’, Science and Global Security 15/1 (2007), 1–30; and Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1-2 (2015), 38–73.

¹¹¹ Whether a missile is powered by solid or liquid fuel can affect both its external design features and the supporting infrastructure it requires. Liquid-fueled missiles may be identified by the presence on the missile frame of certain piping or vents. Similarly, liquid-fueled missiles, which generally cannot be stored or transported fueled, must be accompanied with a fleet of fueling trucks.

¹¹² I use the term TEL to refer to any of the vehicles which transport and launch mobile missiles. For a more detailed examination of these vehicles, see Scott LaFoy, ‘TELs and MELs and TEs! Oh My!’ Arms Control Wonk (blog), 1 Jun. 2017, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203304/tels-and-mels-and-tes-oh-my/.

¹¹³ Here, DF-31 refers to all variants of that system, including the DF-31A and DF-31AG.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.’

¹¹⁵ Chase and Erickson, ‘The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force’, 128–129.

¹¹⁶ Although if there is an inadvertent strike against a nuclear force, China may be less likely to view it as inadvertent. I thank Phillip C. Saunders for this point.

¹¹⁷ Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社] 2017), 380.

¹¹⁸ ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’

¹¹⁹ ‘The Rocket Force for the First Time Accepts “Battlefield Troops” [火箭军首次接受’沙场点兵’]’, CCTV, 31 Jul. 2017, http://news.cctv.com/2017/07/31/ARTIfsgZw5mWvVF5XQyk5KpZ170731.shtml.

¹²⁰ For example, some brigade garrisons under Base 65 may be within 10 kilometers of one another, though the exact locations remain to be determined. See Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.’ I thank Gerald C. Brown for raising this point.

¹²¹ Huo Xiaoyong [霍小勇], Strategics of the Services [军种战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社] 2007), 303.

¹²² Xiao [肖], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 380–381.

¹²³ Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science [军事科学出版社] 2013), 152.

¹²⁴ For more on China’s views of and developments in these areas, see Lora Saalman, ‘China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15 Aug. 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide; Lora Saalman, Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Apr. 2014); and Joshua H. Pollack, ‘Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability’, Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 155–164. Based on a review of Chinese technical writings on hypersonic-related technology, Saalman (2017) concludes that ‘This suggests that the future uses of China’s hypersonic glide vehicles will extend well beyond a conventional payload and a regional conflict.’

¹²⁵ This is not to suggest that China’s no-first-use policy is fraudulent, but, rather, that it may not withstand certain pressures. See, for example, David C. Logan, ‘The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons’, War On The Rocks, 18 Sep. 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-dangerous-myths-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation.’

¹²⁶ On the obstacles to a Chinese warfighting capability, see David C. Logan, ‘Hard Constraints on a Chinese Nuclear Breakout’, The Nonproliferation Review 24/1-2 (2017), 13–30.

¹²⁷ Scott L. Kastner, ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flashpoint? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan’, International Security 40/3 (Winter 2015/16), 54–92.

¹²⁸ Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy’, Journal of Contemporary China 28/119, 679–695.

¹²⁹ Lewis and Xue ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, 62.

¹³⁰ Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019, 66; personal communications with U.S. officials 2016 and 2019.

¹³¹ Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019, 66.

¹³² Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VIII Report, 10; personal communications with U.S. officials, 2016 and 2019. Also see P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu, ‘China’s Ambiguous Missile Strategy Is Risky’, Eastern Arsenal (blog), Popular Science, 11 May 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles/; and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control’, Foreign Affairs 97/6 (Nov./Dec. 2018).

¹³³ For an argument that Beijing’s behavior in the maritime domain represents an effort to deliberately manipulate risk, see Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012).

¹³⁴ Though there is some evidence that some Chinese strategists may have come to appreciate the risks of entanglement and its residual deterrent benefits in part as a result of repeated American concerns.

¹³⁵ Zhao Tong [赵通], ‘China and the Evolution of the International Nuclear Order [中国与国际核秩序的演化]’, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy [清华－卡内基全球政策中心], 13 Mar. 2016, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/03/13/zh-63020/iv4d.

¹³⁶ Interviews with Chinese experts, 2019; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, 51–54. Perhaps ironically, the few open source Chinese-language discussions of the risks of entanglement analyze the risks in the context of possible U.S. deployments of dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles or so-called hypersonic systems. See, for example, Zou Zhibo [邹治波], ‘Implications and Impacts of U.S.’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [美国退出《中导条约》的当代含意与影响]’, International Economic Review [国际经济评论] 1 (2020), 34; Hu Dongdong [胡冬冬], Song Feng[宋锋], and Ye Lei [叶蕾], ‘Analysis of the Development and Impact of Hypersonic Weapon Nuclear Weaponization[高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响分析]’, Aerodynamic Missile Journal [飞航导弹] 1 (2020), 54; and Hu, Dongdong [胡冬冬] and Ye Lei [叶蕾], Development and Impact of the Nuclear Weaponization of Hypersonic Weapons: Making the Mechanisms of War More Complicated and More Dangerous [高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响，让战争机制更复杂而危险], 1 Apr. 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1662763034867300903&wfr=spider&for=pc. Zou is Research Fellow and Deputy Director of Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Hu and Ye are affiliated with China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation.

¹³⁷ Liu Chong, ‘The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts’, in Li Bin and Tong Zhao, (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2016), 149–169. Interviews with Chinese experts, 2018.

¹³⁸ Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 96. This reasoning is echoed by Chinese sources claiming that the transfer was made ‘because the Second Artillery Force is highly dependent on base support units. A Second Artillery base can support multiple missile brigades, while the Army’s two missile brigades needed to independently develop support forces requiring extensive manpower and resources. The entire time [the missile brigades were with the Army], saw many thorny problems, from personnel training to the command system.’ See Huang Ao [黄翱], ‘Sword Casting｜The Rocket Force’s Assassin’s Mace Dream: Dongfeng-11 Series Tactical Ballistic Missiles [铸剑｜火箭军的杀手锏之梦: 东风-11系列战术弹道导弹]’, The Paper [澎湃], 7 Jan. 2016, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1417910#p=32.

¹³⁹ Sun Kuaiji [孙快吉], ‘The World Looks Upon the Construction of the Rocket Force [放眼世界看火箭军建设]’, PLA Daily [解放军报], 3 May 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/2016-05/03/content_7032475.htm.

¹⁴⁰ Wang Zhangqin [王长]勤and Fang Guangming [方光明], ‘Why We Had to Develop the Dongfeng-26 Ballistic Missile [我们为什么要发展东风-26弹道导弹]’, China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 23 Nov. 2015, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-11/23/nw.D110000zgqnb_20151123_1-09.htm.

¹⁴¹ Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, 52.

¹⁴² Ge Dongsheng [葛东升], ‘The Birth of a New-Type Missile Force [一支新型导弹部队的诞生]’, in The Second Artillery Political Department [第二炮兵政治部] (ed.), A Glorious Era: Looking Back on the Second Artillery’s Development and Advances in the Period of Reform and Opening [辉煌年代:回顾在改革开放中发展前进的第二炮兵] (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House [中央文献出版社], 2008), 295.

¹⁴³ Saunders and Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols?’ 68–75.

¹⁴⁴ Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces.’

¹⁴⁵ The Strategic Support Force may also have both responsibilities. I thank Phillip C. Saunders for highlighting this.

¹⁴⁶ As discussed, there is still considerable uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the command and control arrangements of Rocket Force conventional units, especially in joint operations. However, the language of doctrinal guidance provided to conventional units and certain structural features of the relationships between the services suggests that such units would remain under the control of Rocket Force commanders who would then coordinate with Theater Command leadership. Also see Lee, ‘Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations.’

¹⁴⁷ Tu Chenxin [屠晨昕], ‘Why the Second Artillery Is Being Elevated to the Rocket Force, the Fourth Major Military Service [二炮为何要升格为第四大军种火箭军]’, Qianjiang Evening News [钱江晚报], 7 Jan. 2016, http://qjwb.zjol.com.cn/html/2016-01/07/content_3252453.htm?div=−1.

¹⁴⁸ Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019), 61–109.

¹⁴⁹ See, for instance, Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 282–296; Cao Zhengrong [曹正荣], Wu Runbo [吴润波], and Sun Jianjun[孙建军], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2008), 260. For some English-language discussion of the risks of certain forms of Chinese signaling, see Michael S. Chase, ‘China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States’, Asia Policy 16 (Jul. 2013), 98–101; Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, ‘The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy’, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (ed.), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Georgetown University Press, 2012), 72–75; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 37–38.

¹⁵⁰ Cao [曹], Wu [吴], and Sun [孙], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], 259–260.

¹⁵¹ Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 402.

¹⁵² Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, 71.

¹⁵³ Logan, ‘The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons.’

¹⁵⁴ Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019, 66; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defens, 2018), 32.

¹⁵⁵ Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, 483.

¹⁵⁶ For more on transparency in China’s nuclear practices, see Wu Riqiang, ‘How China Practices and Thinks About Nuclear Transparency’, in Li Bin and Tong Zhao (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2016), 219–243; and Lora Saalman, China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 15–19.

¹⁵⁷ See, for example, Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 225–227; Shou [寿], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 173.

¹⁵⁸ Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 225.

¹⁵⁹ Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy’, International Security 30/4 (Spring 2006), 7–44; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent’, China Security (Winter 2007), 66–89.

¹⁶⁰ Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 15–23; interviews with Chinese experts, 2018 and 2019.

¹⁶¹ Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China’, International Security 41/1 (Summer 2016), 49–98.

¹⁶² Yao Yunzhu, ‘China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy’, China-U.S. Focus, 22 Apr. 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy/; and Acton, ‘Silver Bullet,’ 29–31. Though Acton demonstrates that there is very little evidence that the U.S. is considering using conventional prompt global strike capabilities to target any nuclear forces, including those of China.

¹⁶³ See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders, ‘U.S.-China Relations and Chinese Military Modernization’, in Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle (ed.), Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press forthcoming); and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Defense, Military, and Security Issues as Drivers of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, in Evan Medeiros (ed.), Managing Strategic Competition: Rethinking U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press forthcoming).

¹⁶⁴ David C. Logan, ‘Drawing a Line Between Conventional and Nuclear Weapons in China’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 May 2015, http://thebulletin.org/drawing-line-between-conventional-and-nuclear-weapons-china8304.

¹⁶⁵ For provisions related to verifying restrictions on mobile missiles, see Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), 31 Jul. 1991, Articles III, VI, and X, as well as the Inspection Protocol for the Treaty. Text available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2493. For analysis and discussion of verifying arms control agreements in general and START I in particular, see Amy F. Woolf, ‘Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control’, Congressional Research Service, 23 Dec. 2011.

¹⁶⁶ Oriana Pawlyk, ‘START Lanced the B-1s Nukes, but the Bomber will still get new Bombs’, Military.com, 12 Jul. 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/07/12/start-lanced-the-b-1s-nukes-but-bomber-will-still-get-new-bombs.html. I thank Justin Anderson for highlighting this point.

¹⁶⁷ If Chinese entanglement is a byproduct of bureaucratic factors, senior political and military officials may not be best positioned to change tactical and operational practices which lead to entanglement, and it may be necessary to involve junior- and mid-level PLA officials. I thank Chris Chyba for this point.

¹⁶⁸ For a discussion of strategic restraint in the U.S.-China security context, see David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in the Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011).

¹⁶⁹ Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, 56–99.

¹⁷⁰ Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov, ‘Entanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective’, in James M. Acton (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017), 19–22.

¹⁷¹ Posen mentions the potential role of technology in bringing conventional and nuclear forces into collision, for example anti-submarine warfare forces able to attack both the adversary’s attack submarines and its ballistic missile submarines or aircraft that can be used to carry out both conventional and nuclear strikes. However, the role of technology is not formally developed and is not presented as a fundamental component of the model. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 16.

¹⁷² See, for example, Tong Zhao, ‘Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries?’ Science & Global Security 19/3 (2011), 195–222; Yevgeny Miasnikov, ‘The Counterforce Potential of Precision-Guided Munitions’, in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), 84–103; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The Nukes We Need,’ Foreign Affairs 88/6 (Nov./Dec. 2009), 39–51; Acton, ‘Silver Bullet?’ 120–126; and Ronald Kerber and Robert Stein, Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009), 81–84.

¹⁷³ States can also employ legacy systems in ways that blur the nuclear-conventional separation, for example by launching conventional weapons from delivery systems that had previously been associated exclusively with nuclear weapons. See, for example, Pavel Podvig, ‘Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons: Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72/3 (2016), 145–149.

¹⁷⁴ James M. Acton, ‘Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and Responses’, The Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 146–147.

Additional information

Funding

Research for the article was supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Center for International Security Studies, and the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program.

Notes on contributors

David C. Logan

David C. Logan is a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.