Not so disruptive after all: The 4IR, navies and the search for sea control

ABSTRACT

Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and their applicability at sea now dominate debates about the future of naval operations. This article examines the extent to which such technologies, including autonomous and unmanned weapon systems and artificial intelligence, will disrupt naval warfare. Using two case studies, the South China Sea and the Baltic Sea, this article finds that in the key operational output of attaining sea control these technologies will not disrupt naval warfare. While they may intensify the competition between the operational attributes of detection, stealth, range and lethality, they will ultimately sustain existing understandings of seapower and its strategic effects.

KEYWORDS:

• 4IR
• unmanned systems
• sea control
• artificial intelligence
• navies
• Baltic Sea
• South China Sea
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ See: The State Council of The People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: Foreign Language Press 2019); US Department of Defense, Summary of the National Defense strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington D.C.: US Department of Defense 2018).

² Roger McDermott, ‘Russian Military Science Promotes Innovation in Future Warfare’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 27 (2020). https://jamestown.org/program/russian-military-science-promotes-innovation-in-future-warfare/; David Axe, ‘The Royal Navy wants Robotic Submarines (Here’s Why That Matters)’, The National Interest, 17 April 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navy-wants-robotic-submarines-heres-why-matters-52942; Nathan Gain, ‘French Navy Aiming for 1200 Unmanned Systems by 2030’, Naval News, 29 July 2019, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/07/french-navy-aiming-for-1200-unmanned-systems-by-2030/.

³ Michael O’Hanlon, Forecasting Change in Military Technology, 2020–2040 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 2018), 4; Peter Layton, Prototype Warfare, Innovation and the Fourth Industrial Age (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre 2018), 5–6.

⁴ See: Christian Brose, ‘The New Revolution in Military Affairs’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/new-revolution-military-affairs; Tyler Rogoway, ‘DARPA’s Unmanned Submarine Stalker Could Change Naval Warfare Forever’, JALOPNIK, 3 April 2015, https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/darpas-unmanned-submarine-stalker-could-change-naval-wa-1695566032; Kris Osborn, ‘The U.S. Navy Is Trying To Build What Could Be The Ultimate Weapon: A Swarm ‘Ghost Fleet’, The National Interest, 1 February 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-navy-trying-build-what-could-be-the-ultimate-weapon-19285?page=0%2C1; Hiroyuku Akita, ‘US Fears of China’s AI-Armed Military are Well-Founded’, Nikkei Asian Review, 10 April 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/US-fears-of-China-s-AI-armed-military-are-well-founded.

⁵ See: Laura Schousboe, ‘The Pitfalls of Writing About Revolutionary Defense Technology’, War on the Rocks, 15 July 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/the-pitfalls-of-writing-about-revolutionary-defense-technology/.

⁶ See: Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, ‘Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave’, Harvard Business Review (January-February 1995).

⁷ See: Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (OXON: Routledge 2004); Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial Implication of Network-Centric Warfare’, Naval War College Newport Papers 18 (2003), 14.

⁸ Klaus Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond’, World Economic Forum, 14 January 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/.

⁹ Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (London: Penguin Books 2017), 1.

¹⁰ Michael Raska, ‘Strategic Competition for Emerging Military Technologies: Comparing Paths and Patterns’, Prism 8/3 (2019), 66–67; T.X. Hammes, ‘Expeditionary Operations in the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, MCU Journal 9/1 (Spring 2017), 89.

¹¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, The National Interest (1 September 1994).

¹² Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London: Brassey’s 2004), 19.

¹³ Karl Lautenschläger, ‘Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare’, International Security 8/2 (1983), 50; Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century 2nd ed., (OXON: Routledge 2009), 136-137.

¹⁴ Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Assessing the State of Understanding of Defense Innovation’, STIC Research Briefs, Series 10 (2018–1), 3–4.

¹⁵ See: Eric Grove, ‘The Battleship is Dead: Long Live the Battleship. HMS Dreadnought and the Limits of Technological Innovation’, The Mariner’s Mirror 93/4 (2007), 415–427.

¹⁶ Andrew L. Ross, ‘On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework’, STIC Policy Brief no. 1 (2010).

¹⁷ C. Anthony Pfaff, ‘The Ethics of Acquiring Disruptive Technologies’, Texas National Security Review, 3/1 (Winter 2019/2020), 38.

¹⁸ Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken and Andrew L. Ross, Assessing the State of Understanding of Defense Innovation, 4–5.

¹⁹ Haico te Kulve and Wim A. Smit, ‘Novel Naval Technologies: Sustaining or Disrupting Naval Doctrine’, Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 77 (2010), 999–1013, 1006–1007.

²⁰ This theory has proven extremely popular to the point that the theory itself is falsely used to ‘describe any situation in which an industry is shaken up and previously successful incumbents stumble’. See: Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor and Rory McDonald, ‘What is Disruptive Innovation’, In Clayton M. Christensen (ed.), Selected Articles from the World’s Foremost Authority on Disruptive Innovation (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press 2015) 157–158.

²¹ Milan Vego, Modern Strategy and Sea Control (Oxon: Routledge 2016), 24.

²² Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas 2^nd edition (Oxon: Frank Cass 2003), 110–111.

²³ Milan Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations, 117.

²⁴ Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,193–194.

²⁵ Milan Vego, ‘The navy Must Not Neglect “Defensive” Warfighting’, Proceedings, 145/7/1397 (2019).

²⁶ Thomas A. Rowden, ’Sea Control First’, Proceedings 143 1/1367 (2017).

²⁷ See Robert C. Rubel, ‘Talking about Sea Control’, Naval War College Review 63/4 (2010), 38–47.

²⁸ See Andrew Metrick and Kathleen H. Hicks, Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe (Washington D.C.: CSIS 2018), 11–12.

²⁹ CSBA, Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare (Washington D.C.: CSBA, 2019), 62–65.

³⁰ See: US DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (Washington D.C.: US DOD 2018).

³¹ Jonathan Gates, ‘Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?’, RUSI Journal 161/6 (December, 2016), 29.

³² Heiko Borchert, Tim Kraemer and Daniel Mahon, ‘Waiting for Disruption! Undersea Autonomy and the Challenging Nature of Naval Innovation’, RSIS Working Paper No. 302, 2 February 2017, 2.

³³ See: Chiara Lodovisi, Pierpaolo Loreti, Lorenzo Bracciale and Silvello Betti, ‘Performance Analysis of Hybrid-Optical-Acoustic AUV Swarms for Marine Monitoring’, Future Internet 10/65 2018, 4.

³⁴ Bradley Martin et. al, Advancing Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2019), xi.

³⁵ Nick Bramhill, ‘Drones to Aid Ireland’s War on Illegal Fishing and Pollution’, Irish Central, 12 July 2018, https://www.irishcentral.com/news/irishvoice/drones-ireland-drugs-sea.

³⁶ ‘Multi-Purpose USV’, Raphael Advanced Defense Systems, http://www.rafael.co.il/5670-2676-EN/Marketing.aspx.

³⁷ ‘Venus Unmanned Surface Vehicle’, ST Engineering, https://www.stengg.com/en/electronics/companies-affiliates/st-electronics-large-scale-systems-group/venus-unmanned-surface-vehicle/.

³⁸ ‘Israel Scraps Programme for Maritime Patrols with USVS’, Maps and Conflict Database (27 April 2020), https://maps.southfront.org/israel-scraps-programme-for-maritime-patrols-with-usvs/.

³⁹ US DOD, ‘Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy’, US Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Estimates (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2020), 2-1 – 2-8.

⁴⁰ Zhen LIU, ‘China’s new killer robot ship goes through its first sea trial’, South China Morning Post 17 January 2020, https://scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3046601/chinas-newkiller-robot-ship-goes-through-its-first-sea-trial.

⁴¹ Massimo Annati, ‘Unmanned Naval Systems: Surface/Subsurface Vehicles: New Capabilities and Missions’, Military Technology, (Special Issue: 2013), 25–26.

⁴² Pete Small, ‘Navy Unmanned Systems: An Overview’, Undersea Warfare 67 (Spring 2019), 8.

⁴³ US DOD, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, 2–3.

⁴⁴ David B. Larter, ‘To Compete with China, an Internal Pentagon Study Looks to Pour Money into Robot Submarines’, Defense News (1 June 2020). https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/06/01/to-compete-with-china-an-internal-pentagon-study-looks-to-pour-money-into-robot-submarines/.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Competition Document: Developing the Royal Navy’s Autonomous Underwater Capability, 6 June 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/competition-developing-the-royal-navys-autonomous-underwater-capability/competition-document-developing-the-royal-navys-autonomous-underwater-capability.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Kyle Mizokami, ‘Russia Working on New ‘Cephalopod Underwater Attack Drone’, Popular Mechanics, 30 July 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a22593766/russia-working-on-new-cephalopod-underwater-attack-drone/.

⁴⁹ Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, ‘The Great Underwater Wall of Robots: Chinese Exhibit Shows Off Sea Drones’, Popular Science, 22 June 2016. https://www.popsci.com/great-underwater-wall-robots-chinese-exhibit-shows-off-sea-drones/

⁵⁰ Stephen Chen, ‘China military develops robotic submarines to launch a new era of sea power’, South China Morning Post, 23 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2156361/china-developing-unmanned-ai-submarines-launch-new-era-sea-power.

⁵¹ Monty Khanna, ‘Get ready for the next RMA at sea’, USNI Proceedings Vol. 146/1 (January 2020).

⁵² See: Schulz, Arne, Holger Schmaljohann, Kathrin Wilkens, Ivor Nissen, Christian Kubaczyk and Wolfgang Jans, Systems and Concepts for Networked ASW, Paper for Underwater Acoustics Measurements (UAM) 2011 (Kos, Greece, 2011): 1. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267841249_SYSTEMS_AND_CONCEPTS_FOR_NETWORKED_ASW.

⁵³ See: Jonathan Gates, Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable, 28–35; Norman Friedman, ‘Strategic Submarines and Strategic Stability: Looking Towards the 2030s’, in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Frühling and James Goldrick (eds.), The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Canberra: Australian National University 2020), 69–79.

⁵⁴ Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, ‘Conceal or Reveal? Managing Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition’, International Security 44/3 (Winter 2019/2020), 48–83.

⁵⁵ Sebastian Brixey-Williams, ‘Prospects for Game-Changers in Detection Technology’, in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephan Fruhling and James Goldrick (eds.), The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Canberra: Australian National University 2020), 83.

⁵⁶ Ocean2020 is the largest EU-funded defence project. See OCEAN2020 Fact Sheet, (Brussels, EDA, 21 November 2019), https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/factsheet-ocean2020.

⁵⁷ EDA, Largest EU funded defence research project tested in the Mediterranean Sea, 21 November 2019, https://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2019/11/21/largest-eu-funded-defence-research-project-tested-in-the-mediterranean-sea.

⁵⁸ Martin Banks, ‘4 Questions with NATO on its Unmanned Tech Test’, Defense News 28 October 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2019/10/28/4-questions-with-nato-on-its-unmanned-tech-test/; ‘Portugal Hosts Maritime Exercise in Support of NATO’s Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative’, NATO News 25 September 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_168925.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁵⁹ This article uses the NATO definition of hybrid threats: ‘Hybrid threats combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces.’ See: ‘NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats’, NATO, (8 August 2019). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm.

⁶⁰ Martin Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman and Gary Schaub Jr., Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region (Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies 2016), 9.

⁶¹ Martin Murphy, and Gary Schaub Jr. ‘“Sea of Peace” or Sea of War – Russian Maritime Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic Sea’, Naval War College Review 71/2, article 9 (2018).

⁶² See e.g.: C4ADS, Above Us Only Stars: Exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria (2019); Abaimov and Ingram, Hacking UK Trident; Andy Greenberg, ‘The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,’ Wired, 22 August 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/; Jukka Savolainen, Hybrid Threats and Vulnerabilities of Modern Critical Infrastructure – Weapons of Mass Disturbance (WMDi)? (Helsinki: Hybrid CoE 2019).

⁶³ Franklin D. Kramer and Magnus Nordenman, ‘A Maritime Framework for the Baltic Sea Region’, Issue Brief Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (March, 2016), 2–3.

⁶⁴ Nils-Ove Jannson, ‘The Baltic: A Sea of Contention,’ Naval War College Review 41/3 (1988), 2.

⁶⁵ Heinrich Lange et al., To the Seas Again: Maritime Defence and Deterrence in the Baltic Region (Tallinn: ICDS 2019), 6.

⁶⁶ Stavros Karlatiras, ‘The changing nature of naval conflicts in confined and shallow waters (CSW),’ in Joachim Krause and Sebastian Bruns (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security (London: Routledge 2016), 168.

⁶⁷ See: Anders Puck Nielsen, ‘Sømilitær Vurdering af Ruslands Østersøflåde og de Militære Implikationer for Danmark,’ Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2/1 (2019), 148–164.

⁶⁸ See: Stephan Frühling and Guilaume Lasconjarius, ‘NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge’, Survival 58/2 (2016), 95–116.

⁶⁹ See: Dalsjö, Robert, Christofer Berglund and Michael Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications (Stockholm: FOI 2019).

⁷⁰ See the discussion of water depth levels in Xinhua LIU 刘新华, 中国发展海权战略研究 (A Study on China’s Strategy of Development of Sea Power) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2015), 180–83; 310; and Wenmu ZHANG 张文木, 乌克兰事件的世界意义及其对中国的警示 (The Ukraine Crisis: What does it Mean to the World and China), 国际安全研究 (Journal of International Security Studies) 2014, (4): 1–26, http://www.guancha.cn/ZhangWenMu/2014_12_28_304621.shtml.

⁷¹ Mathieu Duchâtel and Eugenia Kazakova, ‘Tensions in the South China Sea: the nuclear dimension,’ SIPRI Commentary 27 August 2015, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2015/tensions-south-china-sea-nuclear-dimension.

⁷² See Lora Saalman, Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 2014), http://apcss.org/prompt-global-strike-china-and-the-spear/; Ningbo YUWEN 宇文静波 and Liwen TANG 唐立文, ‘美国“快速全球打击”计划探讨与启示 (Discussion and Inspirations About Prompt Global Strike of the US),’ in 装备指挥技术学院学报 (Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology) (Vol. 22 No. 3, June 2011), 58–61.

⁷³ Yunsheng XU 许云圣, ‘解放军不再留手, 南海岛礁需哪些防御装备? (What defensive equipment is needed on the South China Sea islands if the PLA leaves?)’, 凤凰新闻 Fenghuang xinwen (4 March 2017), https://share.iclient.ifeng.com/news/shareNews?forward=1&aid=119549750#backhead.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ AMTI, ‘Updated: China’s Big Three Near Completion,’(AMTI, CSIS, 29 June 2017), https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/.

⁷⁶ Renny Babiarz, ‘China’s Nuclear Submarine Force’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief 17/10 (2017). https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-nuclear-submarine-force.

⁷⁷ See Catherine Wong, ‘“Underwater Great Wall”: Chinese firm proposes building network of submarine detectors to boost nation’s defence’, South China Morning Post 19 May 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1947212/underwater-great-wall-chinese-firm-proposes-building.

⁷⁸ AMTI, ‘UPDATE: China’s Continuing Reclamation in the Paracels’ (AMTI, CSIS, 9 August 2017), https://amti.csis.org/paracels-beijings-other-buildup/.

⁷⁹ Babiarz, ‘China’s Nuclear Submarine Force’.

⁸⁰ Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, ‘The Great Underwater Wall of Robots’.

⁸¹ John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, ‘China’s security agenda transcends the South China Sea’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72/4 (2016), 212–221, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194056.

⁸² Wang et al., ‘海底观测网水下环境实时监控系统设计与实现’, 194.

⁸³ Silu GUO, ‘Hainan satellite constellation system provides shield for South China Sea,’ China Military Online, 3 January 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-01/03/content_7894167.htm.

⁸⁴ Stephen Chen, ‘The World’s Next Fastest Supercomputer Will Help Boost China’s Growing Sea Power’, South China Morning Post, 23 August 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2107796/worlds-next-fastest-supercomputer-will-help-boost-chinas-growing.

⁸⁵ For a Chinese technical journal article describing an undersea real-time monitoring network infrastructure under development in the SCS since at least 2016, see Jun WANG 王俊et al., ‘海底观测网水下环境实时监控系统设计与实现’ (Design and Realization of Underwater Environment Real-time Monitoring System for Ocean Observatory Network), in 浙江大学学报 （工学版） Journal of Zhejiang University (Engineering Science) (Vol. 50, No. 2, Feb. 2016), 193–200. For a newspaper article commenting on this system, see Wong, ‘Underwater Great Wall’.

⁸⁶ Cf. Eric Heginbotham et al, The U.S. – China Military Scorecard: Forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power 1996–2017 (Santa Monica: RAND 2015), 170–172.

⁸⁷ This dilemma has been well covered in the existing academic and policy literature. Indeed, the U.S. is already developing doctrines to overcome this advanced form of sea denial. See: Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia’, International Security 41/1 (2016): 7–48.

⁸⁸ Stanislov Abaimov and Paul Ingram, Hacking UK Trident: A Growing Threat (London: British American Security Information Council 2017), 34.

⁸⁹ See: T.X. Hammes, ‘Defending Europe: How Converging Technology Strengthens Small Powers’, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2/1 (2019), 20–29.

⁹⁰ Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (London: Penguin 2017), XVI.

⁹¹ A good example of this dynamic can be found in the race between quantum decryption and encryption. See: Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Surviving the Quantum Cryptocalypse’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 14/2 (2020), 49–73.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ian Bowers

Ian Bowers, is associate professor at the Centre for Joint Operations, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen. His research focuses on seapower, the future operating environment, Asian security and deterrence. His research has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Naval War College Review and the Korean Journal of Defence Analysis. His latest volume is Grey and White Hulls: An International Analysis of the Navy-Coastguard Nexus, co-edited with Collin Koh.

Sarah Kirchberger

Sarah Kirchberger, is the Head of Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and Vice President of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). She was previously an Assistant Professor of Sinology at the University of Hamburg and a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS. Her research focuses on China’s space and naval development, China's defence economy, Russian-Chinese-Ukrainian arms-industrial cooperation, and the South China Sea issue. Her latest monograph is Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications.