4IR technologies in the Israel Defence Forces: blurring traditional boundaries

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies obscure the traditional boundaries associated with the military realm. As the first examination of the conditions underlying the assimilation of 4IR technologies in Israel’s armed forces, this paper makes several contributions. It expands the knowledge on the military assimilation of 4IR technologies and describes the interaction between military doctrine and technology using current evidence. It also enriches the evolving discussion on the strategic effect of emerging technologies. Finally, it demonstrates how emerging technologies involve neither straightforward spinoff or spin-on processes but a reciprocal transfer of know-how between the military and civilian sectors.

KEYWORDS:

• Emerging technologies
• fourth industrial revolution (4IR)
• Israel military
• Israel Defence Forces (IDF)
• technology spin-on
• military innovation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ The term ‘military doctrine’ is dubbed ‘operational concept’ in Israel’s military terminology. In this paper these terms are used interchangeably when referring to Israel and the IDF. Similarly, 4IR technologies are occasionally referred to as emerging technologies and these two terms are used interchangeably as well.

² On the role of technology in military innovation see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1984), 35, 54–55; Andrew Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, The National Interest 37 (1994), 30–42; I. B. Holley, Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship (Maxwell: Air University Press 2004); Dmitry Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010), 7. For a different view, which assigns technological innovation a central place in military innovation, see Warren Chin, ‘Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future’, International Affairs 95/4 (2019), 765–83.

³ Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military Innovation,’ in Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might: a New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2014), 23.

⁴ Clement Wee Yong Nien, Tay Cheng Chuan, and Ho Jin Peng, ‘At the Leading Edge: the RSAF and the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 44/2 (2018), 2. See also Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business 2017), 8.

⁵ Recently, Tristan A. Volpe highlighted one particular form of this feature, the growing difficulty in distinguishing between civilian and military motives. Tristan A. Volpe, ‘Dual-use Distinguishability: How 3D-printing Shapes the Security Dilemma for Nuclear Programs’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 814–40.

⁶ Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, 50–61.

⁷ Michael Brzoska, ‘Trends in Global Military and Civilian Research and Development (R&D) and their Changing Interface’, Proceedings of the International Seminar on Defence Finance and Economics 19 (2006).

⁸ Michael Raska, ‘Strategic Competition for Emerging Military Technologies: Comparative Paths and Patterns’, Prism 8/3 (2019), 67; Marcus Schulzke, ‘Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use Technologies’, International Studies Review 21/3 (2019), 497–517; Volpe, ‘Dual-use Distinguishability’; Filippo Sevini et al., ‘Emerging Dual-Use Technologies and Global Supply Chain Compliance’, in IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna 2018; Ronald L. Sandler (ed.), Ethics and Emerging Technologies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), especially chs. 18–19.

⁹ Chin, ‘Technology, War and the State’, 770–71.

¹⁰ This concept was part of a set of principles and guidelines put together in the early 1950s by Israel’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, David Ben-Gurion, and served as the IDF’s operational concept through the late twentieth century. Israel Tal, Bitachon leumi: meatim mul rabim [National Security: The Few against the Many] (Tel Aviv: Dvir 1996), 11; Itamar Rabinovich and Itai Brun, Israel Facing a New Middle East: In Search of National Security Strategy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 2017), 2–3.

¹¹ Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 113–15. See also Amir Rapaport, ‘On the Superpowers’ Playing Field’, Israel Defense, 19 December 2011, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/superpowers%E2%80%99-playing-field.

¹² Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, The Weapon Wizards: How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2017).

¹³ Yagil Levy, ‘Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of the Development of Military-Society Relations in Israel in the Early 2000s’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 31/1 (2003), 76–80; Rabinovich and Brun, Israel Facing a New Middle East, 25–44; Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (New York: Routledge 2019), ch. 3.

¹⁴ See note 2.

¹⁵ The conceptualization of the 2015 document’s guidelines was the outcome of a decade-and-a-half-long effort following the realization that the existing operational concept no longer suited the existing political and strategic circumstances. Rabinovich and Brun, Israel Facing a New Middle East, 1–5, 109–111. See also Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2012), 27–60.

¹⁶ Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Estrategiat Tzahal [IDF Strategy] (April 2018), Clause 8, <https://www.idf.il/media/34416/strategy.pdf>.

¹⁷ Ibid, Clause 10.a; Rabinovich and Brun, Israel Facing a New Middle East, 113–15; Charles D. Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change (New York: Oxford University Press 2018), ch. 7; Raphael D. Marcus, Israel’s long war with Hezbollah: Military innovation and adaptation under fire (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2018), 143, 215–18.

¹⁸ IDF, Estrategiat Tzahal, Chapters B, E.

¹⁹ Ibid., Chapter B.

²⁰ Technion R&D Foundation Ltd., ‘IMOD DDR&D: Call for a Proposal for Research for the Defense Establishment’, <https://www.trdf.co.il/heb/kolkoreinfo.php?id=4332>; ‘Technologia besde hakrav ha’atidi’ [Technology in the future battlefield], Ma’arachot 477 (April 2018), 48–53; Hertzi Halevy, A. and Y. (full names unavailable), ‘Elionut modi’init beidan technologi’ [Intelligence superiority in a digital era], Ma’arachot 477 (April 2018), 26–31; ‘Hauniversita haivrit tivne madgim leumi letikshoret quantit’ [The Hebrew University will build a national demonstrator for quantic communication], TechTime, 12 June 2017,<https://techtime.co.il/2017/06/12/quantum-communications/>.

²¹ ‘IDF Technological Revolution Reaches Warrior on Field’, iHLS, 28 December 2017, <https://i-hls.com/archives/80503>. See also Elad Rotbaum, ‘Hatsayad Hamshudrag’ [The upgraded DGA], Bamahane, 19 September 2017.

²² Na’ama Zaltzman, ‘Mefakedet yehidat lotem: “anachnu lokhim et hameida vemvi’im oto lesde hakrav”’ [Lotem unit commander: ‘We take the information and bring it to the battlefield’], Bamahane, 28 November 2017.

²³ Tali Caspi-Shabbat and Or Glik, ‘Mahapechat hameida baolam hamivtsai harav-zroi betzahal’ [The information revolution in the IDF’s multi-arm operational world], Bein Haktavim 18 (2018), 38–47; Yossi Hatoni, ‘Kli haneshek haba shel tzahal: bina mlachutit’ [The IDF’s new weapon: artificial intelligence], Anashim Ve’mahshevim, 24 October 2017, <https://www.pc.co.il/news/251638/>.

²⁴ Amir Rapaport, The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 85 (Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University 2010), 49.

²⁵ For example, Yoav Zeitoun, ‘Hamishkefet hadigitalit hachadasha shel tsahal’ [The IDF’s new digital binoculars], YNET, 25 June 2019, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5533205,00.html>.

²⁶ Caspi-Shabbat and Glik, ‘Mahapechat hameida’, 32.

²⁷ ‘Haetgar hagadol hu mitzuy hayeda’ [Datamining is the big challenge], Israel Defense, 15 May 2013.

²⁸ IDF, Estrategiat Tzahal, Clause 8.A.5.

²⁹ For instance, ‘The Future of Artificial Intelligence in the IDF’, Israel Defense, 2 July 2017.

³⁰ In this paper, the term ‘defence industries’ refers to state-owned, private or public companies that develop and produce weapons, ammunition, and/or other equipment for purely military use. Companies that develop dual-use products or supply non-military products to military and other security organizations are not included in this category. As of 2019, there were three major defence industry corporations in Israel: IAI, Rafael and Elbit Systems.

³¹ ‘Government Industries Are Not Investing in Research’, Israel Defense, 16 February 2012; ‘Technologia besde hakrav ha’atidi’ [Technology in future battlefield], Ma’arachot 477 (April 2018), 53; ‘Ha’etgar hagadol hu mitzuy hayeda’.

³² ‘Ha’etgar hagadol hu mitzuy hayeda’.

³³ For the contribution of the veterans of IDF technology units to the development of Israel’s hi-tech sector, see Dan Breznitz, ‘The Military as a Public Space: The Role of the IDF in the Israeli Software Innovation System’, MIT Working Paper IPC-02-004 (April 2002); Benson Honig, Miri Lerner, and Yoel Raban, ‘Social Capital and the Linkages of High-Tech Companies to the Military Defense System: Is There a Signalling Mechanism?’ Small Business Economics 27/4-5 (2006), 420–21.

³⁴ Itzhak Yaakov, Adon klum baribua [The Memoires of Mr. Zero Squared] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth 2011), 274–75.

³⁵ Honig et al., ‘Social Capital’, 429.

³⁶ Gay Faglin, Merutz hachidush: Technologiot mishariot vetzvai’yot bee’mtzaei lehima – nekudat ha’izun hamatima [The Innovation Race: Commercial and Military Technologies in Military Systems – the Right Balance] (Haifa: Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy 2018), 35.

³⁷ Other sources claim that as of 2018, over 8,300 hi-tech companies were active in Israel, the great majority of them start-up companies. IVC Research Centre, ‘Israeli High-Tech Companies that Ceased Operations’, December 2018, <https://www.ivc-online.com/Portals/0/RC/Media/Ceased%20Operation%20-%20report%20FINAL%20241218.pdf?timestamp=1545809432251>.

³⁸ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Startup Ranking, <http://uis.unesco.org/apps/visualisations/research-and-development-spending/>; Israel Innovation Authority, <https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/>.

³⁹ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Revenue, exports and sales of R&D’, <https://old.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2019n/12_19_258t5.pdf >; John Ben-Zaken, ‘Mehkar IVC: 77% mehahashkaot bahi-tech haIsraeli – zarot’ [IVC research: about 77% of the investments in the Israeli hi-tech are foreign], Anashim Ve’Machshevim, 26 November 2018; Israel Innovation Authority, ‘Innovation in Israel’, <https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/contentpage/innovation-israel>.

⁴⁰ Tzila Hershko, ‘Haroman mithadesh?’ [Is the love affair starting over?], Ma’arachot 456 (2014), 37.

⁴¹ Gil Press, ‘230 Industry 4.0 Startups In Israel Playing A Leading Role In Data-Driven Digitized Production’, Forbes, 5 August 2019; Agmon David Porat, ‘Infographica: mapat hevrot hastartup betchum ta’asiya 4.0ʹ [Infographic: map of startup companies in the area of industry 4.0], Ta’asia 4.0, 13 June 2018, <http://www.smart-factory.co.il/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%92%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98-%D7%90%D7%A4-%D7%91%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%AA%D7%A2%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-4-0.html>.

⁴² Tal Shahaf, ‘Israeli Gov’t Allocates NIS 300 m for Quantum Computing’, Globes, 2 July 2008, <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-government-allocates-nis-300 m-for-quantum-computing-1001244244>.

⁴³ Nati Yefet, ‘Hevrot hi-tech alulot la’avor lehul shelo meshikulim technologiyim’ [Hi-tech companies may move out of the country for non-technological reasons], Globes, 12 May 2018, <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001235492>.

⁴⁴ Shahaf, ‘Israeli Gov’t Allocates’.

⁴⁵ Ibid.; Avi Blizovsky, ‘Hatochnit haleumit lehishuv quanti hiunit lekach sheIsrael tishaer bahazit’ [The national program for quantum computing is crucial for Israel’s position at the front], Hayadan, 5 June 2018, <https://www.hayadan.org.il/nadav-katz-on-quantum-computing-0606183>.

⁴⁶ Ori Swed and John S. Butler, ‘Military Capital in the Israeli Hi-tech Industry’, Armed Forces & Society 41/1 (2015), 127.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 133; Breznitz, ‘The Military’, 16–22.

⁴⁸ Breznitz, ‘The Military’, 28–34; Nophar Blit, ‘IAF Startup Accelerator’, Israeli Air Force, 1 November 2018, <http://www.iaf.org.il/4478-50651-en/IAF.aspx>.

⁴⁹ Ministry of Defence, ‘Mehkar ve’pituach tzva’i’ [Military R&D], <http://www.mod.gov.il/Defence-and-Security/Pages/research_and_development.aspx>.

⁵⁰ Ministry of Defence, ‘Technological Research and Infrastructure Unit’, <http://www.mod.gov.il/Defence-and-Security/Pages/science_research.aspx>.

⁵¹ Israel Innovation Authority, Endless Possibilities to Promote Innovation (2018), <https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/sites/default/files/Booklet_2018.pdf>.

⁵² Ibid., 20–21.

⁵³ Duncan Blake, ‘Military Strategic Use of Outer Space’, in H. Nasu, R. McLaughlin (eds), New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict (Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2014), 97–114; Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2001).

⁵⁴ Israel Innovation Authority, Endless Possibilities to Promote Innovation, 29.

⁵⁵ Uzi Eilam, Keshet Eilam: Hatechnologia hamitkademet [Eilam’s Arc: How Israel Became a Military Technology Powerhouse] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth 2011), 151.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 163.

⁵⁷ Tel Aviv University, The Social and Technological Forecasting Unit, <https://education.tau.ac.il/ictaf/odot>.

⁵⁸ An interview with Shaul Chorev, former head of the special measures division in the MOD and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Haifa, 10 January 2019.

⁵⁹ Ministry of Defence Online, <https://www.online.mod.gov.il/Online2016/pages/General/Info/start.aspx>.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Defence, ‘Tofes hatzhara: Hevra ba’alat shutafim zarim’ [Declaration form: a company with foreign partners], <https://www.online.mod.gov.il/Online2016/documents/general/rishum_sapak/hazhara.pdf>.

⁶¹ Ministry of Defence, ‘Nispach 93: tna’im klaliyim lehazmanat misrad habitachon’ [Annex 93: General terms of the Ministry of Defence’s order], Items 4. Ministry’s Knowhow (a), 9, <https://www.online.mod.gov.il/Online2016/Documents/General/Nispahim/nisB09301.pdf>.

⁶² Interview with a hi-tech company’s employee. Tel Aviv 7 December 2018.

⁶³ Faglin, Merutz hachidush, 70–77.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 70.

⁶⁵ These are just a few examples of the impact of 4IR technologies on military affairs. For a broader review, see Peter Layton, ‘Mobilising Defence in the “fourth industrial revolution”’, The Interpreter, 27 March 2019, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mobilising-defence-fourth-industrial-revolution>; Nah Liang Tuang, The Fourth Industrial Revolution’s Impact on Smaller Militaries: Boon or Bane? RSIS Working Paper no. 318 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 2018); Nien et al., ‘At the Leading Edge’.

⁶⁶ Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1998), 201–3; Benjamin O. Fordham, ‘A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to Use Force’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48/5 (2004), 632–56.

⁶⁷ Krishnadev Calamur, ‘The Battle between Israel and Iran Is Spreading’, The Atlantic, 10 May 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/israel-strikes-iran/560111/>; Carla E. Humud, Kenneth Katzman, and Jim Zanotti, ‘Iran and Israel: Tension over Syria’, In Focus, Congressional Research Service, 5 June 2019.

⁶⁸ Chin, ‘Technology, War and the State’, 771.

⁶⁹ Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability in Peacetime, Crisis, and War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 732.‏

⁷⁰ Ronald F. Lehman, ‘Future Technology and Strategic Stability’, in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson (eds.), Strategic stability: Contending interpretations (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Press 2013)‏, 147.

⁷¹ Fordham, ‘A Very Sharp Sword’, 636.

⁷² Rabinovich and Brun, Israel Facing a New Middle East, 95–102, 111–12; Freilich, Israeli National Security, 49–58.

⁷³ For example, see Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 1992), 5–7; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and influence (New Heaven; Yale University Press, 2008), 2–11.

⁷⁴ Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, ‘Israel’s Relations with The Gulf States: Toward the Emergence of a Tacit Security Regime?’ Contemporary Security Policy 38/3 (2017), 398–419.

⁷⁵ David D. Kirkpatrick and Azam Ahmed, ‘Hacking a Prince, an Emir and a Journalist to Impress a Client’, New Yok Times, 31 August 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/world/middleeast/hacking-united-arab-emirates-nso-group.html>.

⁷⁶ For example, ‘Unhappy with Israeli Strikes in Syria, Russia Outs Israel’s Other Operations’, The Arab Weekly, 22 November 2019, <https://thearabweekly.com/unhappy-israeli-strikes-syria-russia-outs-israels-other-operations>.

⁷⁷ IDF, Estrategiat Tzahal, Chapter D.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yoram Evron

Yoram Evron is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel. His current research focuses on civil-military relations, military procurement, and China’s military procurement, as well as China-Middle East relations and East-West Asia relations. Dr. Evron is the author of China’s Military Procurement in the Reform Era: The Setting of New Directions (Routledge, 2016). His recent articles include ‘China-Japan Interaction in the Middle East: A Battleground of Japan’s Remilitarization’ (The Pacific Review), and ‘The Enduring US-led Arms Embargo on China: An Objectives–Implementation Analysis’ (Journal of Contemporary China).