Why rebels rely on terrorists: The persistence of the Taliban-al-Qaeda battlefield coalition in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

Why do some rebels form persistent battlefield coalitions with terrorist groups? I argue three factors are likely to condition whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs: 1) potential rivalry among coalition members’ political agendas, 2) the military, organizational, and political value terrorists can bring to the collective, and 3) the degree to which local partnerships are institutionalized or reinforced through threats of intra-coalitional violence. Analyzing previously classified and captured primary source documents, I examine the Taliban’s persistence in forming battlefield coalitions with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (1979 – present) and find significant empirical support for the argument.

KEYWORDS:

• Terrorism
• battlefield coalitions
• Afghanistan
• rebel groups
• Taliban
• alliances
• terrorism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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³ Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), 41.

⁴ Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

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⁶ Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism’, International Studies Perspectives 11/1 (1 February 2010): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00389.x; S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia’, International Security 37/1 (2012), 111–41; Afshon Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War’, Security Studies 28/1 (1 January 2019), 159–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508862.

⁷ Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Evan N. Resnick, ‘Hang Together or Hang Separately? Evaluating Rival Theories of Wartime Alliance Cohesion’, Security Studies 22/4 (1 October 2013), 672–706, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844520; Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell University Press, 2014).

⁸ Michael C. Horowitz and Philip B. K. Potter, ‘Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/2 (1 March 2014): 199–225, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468726; Brian J Phillips, ‘Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity’, Journal of Peace Research 52/1 (1 January 2015): 62–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314550538; Tricia Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

⁹ One exception is Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss, ‘The Political Power of Proxies: Why Nonstate Actors Use Local Surrogates’, International Security 44/4 (1 April 2020), 119–57, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00377.

¹⁰ C. Christine Fair, ‘Pakistan Has All the Leverage Over Trump: Why Islamabad Isn’t Worried about Threats to Cut off U.S. Aid’, Foreign Policy, 3 January 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/03/Pakistan-has-all-the-leverage-over-trump/.

¹¹ Byman, Deadly Connections; Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’; David B. Carter, ‘A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups’, International Organization 66/1 (2012), 129–51; Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients.’

¹² Kapur and Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox’; Fair, ‘Pakistan Has All the Leverage Over Trump: Why Islamabad Isn’t Worried about Threats to Cut off U.S. Aid.’

¹³ Tyrone L. Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad Option, 1st edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019).

¹⁴ Byman, Deadly Connections, 4.

¹⁵ Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients’, 164; Kapur and Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox.’

¹⁶ Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients’, 162.

¹⁷ Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss, ‘The Political Power of Proxies: Why Nonstate Actors Use Local Surrogates’, International Security 44/4 (1 April 2020), 119–57, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00377.

¹⁸ U.S. Ambassador to the UN, ‘Somali FM Makes Urgent Plea for Aid to Amb. Rice’ (U.S. Department of State, 14 May 2009), 09USUNNEWYORK502.

¹⁹ U.N. Report Ties Somali Islamists to Hezbollah’, NPR.org, accessed 8 June 2021, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6493083.

²⁰ Kapur and Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox.’

²¹ Byman, Deadly Connections, 6.

²² Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars; Lee JM Seymour, Kristin M Bakke, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, ‘E Pluribus Unum, Ex Uno Plures: Competition, Violence, and Fragmentation in Ethnopolitical Movements’, Journal of Peace Research 53/1 (1 January 2016), 3–18, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315605571; Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, ‘A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics 10/2 (2012), 265–83; Ben Oppenheim et al., ‘True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 59/5 (1 August 2015), 794–823, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750; Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars’, Terrorism and Political Violence 32/3 (2 April 2020), 604–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1389726; Eric S Mosinger, ‘Brothers or Others in Arms? Civilian Constituencies and Rebel Fragmentation in Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 55/1 (1 January 2018), 62–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316675907; Emily Kalah Gade et al., ‘Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63/9 (1 October 2019), 2071–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719826234; Emily Kalah Gade, Mohammed M Hafez, and Michael Gabbay, ‘Fratricide in Rebel Movements: A Network Analysis of Syrian Militant Infighting’, Journal of Peace Research 56/3 (1 May 2019), 321–35, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318806940; Barbara F. Walter, ‘Explaining the Number of Rebel Groups in Civil Wars’, International Interactions 45/1 (2 January 2019), 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554573; Allard Duursma and Feike Fliervoet, ‘Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 65/4 (1 April 2021), 788–812, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720958062; Staniland, Networks of Rebellion.

²³ Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, 3.

²⁴ There are exceptions. The Islamic State (ISIS) for example is a global terrorist group that has also pursued local state building goals. As such, the theory presented here would predict different coalitional dynamics for local rebel groups allied with ISIS, as this competition to govern would lead to rival dynamics and balancing behaviors more closely resembling alliances among rebel groups.

²⁵ Phillips, ‘Enemies with Benefits?’; Horowitz and Potter, ‘Allying to Kill.’

²⁶ Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, ‘A Plague of Initials’, 265.

²⁷ Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, 9, 8; See also Phillips, ‘Enemies with Benefits?’

²⁸ Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars; Lee J.M. Seymour, ‘Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan’, International Security 39/2 (1 October 2014), 92–131, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00179; Desgrais, Guichaoua, and Lebovich, ‘Unity Is the Exception. Alliance Formation and de-Formation among Armed Actors in Northern Mali’; Sabine Otto, ‘The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 62/7 (1 August 2018), 1459–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717693047; Gade et al., ‘Networks of Cooperation.’

²⁹ Dexter Filkins, The Forever War, Reprint (Vintage, 2009), 50–51.

³⁰ Byman, Deadly Connections, 5.

³¹ U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, ‘Somalia – Al-Shabaab Takes Key Middle Shabelle Town: Possible Next Steps’ (U.S. Department of State, 18 May 2009), 09NAIROBI1010.

³² Horowitz and Potter, ‘Allying to Kill.’

³³ Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism’, International Organization 64/1 (2010), 33–64.

³⁴ U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, ‘Somalia – The TFG, Al-Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda’ (U.S. Department of State, 6 July 2009), 09NAIROBI1395.

³⁵ Mia Bloom, ‘Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting” in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40/7 (3 July 2017): 603–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237219.

³⁶ Harleen K. Gambhir, ‘Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State’ (Institute for the Study of War, 15 August 2014), 7, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Dabiq%20Backgrounder_Harleen%20Final_0.pdf.

³⁷ Ana Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/8 (1 December 2014): 1360, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714547904.

³⁸ Arjona, 1360.

³⁹ Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C. I. A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2019), 346.

⁴⁰ ‘Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001–2021, Figures.’

⁴¹ Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

⁴² Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 7.

⁴³ Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10.

⁴⁴ Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars.

⁴⁵ Doran, ‘The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda’; Byman, ‘Al-Qaeda as an Adversary.’

⁴⁶ ‘The Al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 24 November 2009), https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/al-qaeda-taliban-nexus; Vahid Brown, ‘The Facade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s Dubious Pledge to Mullah Omar’, CTC Sentinel 3/1 (1 January 2010), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA516602.

⁴⁷ Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘DIA [Excised] Analytical Product – (U) Afghanistan: Taliban Claim Attempted Assassination of U.S. Vice President’, 3.

⁴⁸ Anne Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 62.

⁴⁹ U.S. Central Command, ‘Exploitable Fissures between AQ Leadership and TB Leadership’, 1–2.

⁵⁰ bin Laden, ‘Portion of a Letter from Osama Bin Laden Regarding Motivation for Afghanistan to Confront America.’

⁵¹ Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 234.

⁵² Barbara Elias, ‘Know Thine Enemy’, Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/Pakistan/2009-11-02/know-thine-enemy.

⁵³ Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2015); Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

⁵⁴ ‘The Al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus.’

⁵⁵ Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, 23–31 and 128–48; Hamid and Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, 227.

⁵⁶ Stenersen, 133.

⁵⁷ Stenersen, 132.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Afghanistan: Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban’, 1 October 2001.

⁵⁹ Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, 23, 29–30.

⁶⁰ U.S. Central Command, ‘Al-Qaida 101 – Afghanistan/Pakistan Intelligence Center of Excellence’, 9.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Afghanistan: Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban’, 1 October 2001.

⁶² Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, 26.

⁶³ Stenersen, Chapter 5; ‘Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Collection’ (Conflict Records Research Center n.d.), https://conflictrecords.wordpress.com/collections/aqam/.

⁶⁴ ‘Advanced Draft of Al-Qaeda Bylaws, Including Fundamentals, Organizational Structure, Leadership, and Objectives.’

⁶⁵ Stenersen, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, 26.

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Afghanistan: Al-Qaida Military Contribution to the Taleban.’

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State, ‘Counterterrorism Activities (Neo-Taliban)’, 10 December 2009, 4; ‘Kandahari Taliban’ refer to the core members of the Taliban that are considered more traditional such as Mullah Omar. ‘non-Kandaharis’ are affiliated Taliban from other areas such as the Haqqanis. See Thomas Ruttig, ‘Have the Taliban Changed?’, CTC Sentinel 14/3 (22 March 2021), https://ctc.usma.edu/have-the-taliban-changed/.

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Islamabad, ‘Taliban’s Mullah Jalil’s July 2 Meeting with the Ambassador, 01ISLAMA3702.’

⁶⁹ Pakistan Intelligence Center for Excellence, U.S. Central Command, ‘J2 Special Report: INS Network Leadership Relations, Afghanistan.’

⁷⁰ International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF), ‘The Landing Zone: RC East OSINT Summary’, 4.

⁷¹ Dan De Luce, Ken Dilanian, and Mushtaq Yusufzai, ‘Taliban Keep Close Ties with Al Qaeda despite Promise to U.S.’, NBC News, 17 February 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/taliban-keep-close-ties-al-qaeda-despite-promise-u-s-n1258033; ‘Letter Dated 20 May 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 1 June 2021, 13, https://www.undocs.org/S/2021/486.

⁷² Lara Jakes and Michael Crowley, ‘Taliban Takeover Could Extinguish U.S. Influence in Kabul’, The New York Times, 15 August 2021, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/15/us/politics/biden-taliban-Afghanistan.html.

Additional information

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Barbara Elias

Barbara Elias is Associate Professor of Government at Bowdoin College specializing in international relations, insurgency warfare, U.S. foreign policy, national security, and Islam and politics. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in political science, and was the Director of the Afghanistan/Pakistan/Taliban Documentation Project at The National Security Archive in Washington D.C.