Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 On plausible deniability and covert action, see Cormac, ‘Coordinating Covert Action’, 692–717; Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist’, 212–34; Maher, ‘The Covert Campaign against Iran’s Nuclear Program’, 1014–1040; Wilner ‘The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence’, 410–437; and Scazzieri ‘Europe, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis’, 392–416.
2 On cyber war and emerging technological competition, see Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls’, 212–34; Junio, ‘How Probable Is Cyber War?’, 125–33; Liff, ‘Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”?’, 401–28, and ‘The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War, Redux’, 134–38; McGraw, ‘Cyber War Is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)’, 109–19; Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, 5–32; Smeets, ‘A Matter of Time’, 6–32; Stone, ‘Cyber War Will Take Place!’, 101–08; Tor, ‘“Cumulative Deterrence” as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, 92–117; Sechser, ‘Neil Narang & Caitlin Talmadge’,727–735; Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technology and Intra-war Escalation Risks’, 864–887, and ‘Travis Sharp Theorizing Cyber Coercion’, 898–926.
3 See Biddle, ‘Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, 3–46; Biddle and Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World’, 171–212; Zegart, ‘Cheap Fights, Credible Threats’, 6–46; and Broekhof, Kitzen and Osinga, ‘A Tale of Two Mosuls, The Resurrection of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Military Defeat of ISIS’, 96–118.
4 Malkasian, ‘Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah’, 423–52.
5 Bowen and Andrew, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas’, 312–43; Reiter, ‘Command and Military Effectiveness in Rebel and Hybrid Battlefield Coalitions’, 211–233; and Tankel, ‘Beyond the Double Game’,545–575.