Mobilizing patriotic consumers: China’s new strategy of economic coercion

ABSTRACT

This article develops the concept of ‘patriotic consumer mobilization’ to explain how China uses informal boycotts as economic coercion. Patriotic consumer mobilization employs citizens as the unit of action, facilitating manipulability, uncertainty, and plausible deniability. It manages public sentiment for domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals. Citizens are mobilized via propaganda that underscores national humiliation, frames boycotts as grassroots patriotism, and signals resolve to foreign countries. After outlining conditions for use and a case comparison with Taiwan, we draw on Chinese-language sources to examine Beijing’s coercion of South Korea over a missile defense system.

KEYWORDS:

• boycotts
• China
• economic coercion
• grand strategy
• nationalism
• South Korea
• statecraft
• Taiwan

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, we thank Meir Alkon, Andrew Chubb, Josh Shifrinson, and audiences at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program, Harvard-MIT Program on Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft, UCSD-Berkeley Geoeconomics working group, and ISA 2021. We also thank Stephen Schick for helpful research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For helpful comments, we thank Meir Alkon, Andrew Chubb, Josh Shifrinson, and audiences at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program, Harvard-MIT Program on Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft, UCSD-Berkeley Geoeconomics working group, and ISA 2021. We also thank Stephen Schick for helpful research assistance.

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³⁶ Yaping Wang, ‘The Dog that Barks: Understanding Propaganda Campaigns on Territorial Disputes’, doctoral dissertation, University of Virginia, 2018.

³⁷ See e.g., Bui 2017.

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⁴⁰ See e.g., Michael Poznansky, ‘Revisiting plausible deniability’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2020).

⁴¹ Ryan Martinson, ‘Catching sovereignty fish: Chinese fishers in the southern Spratlys’, Marine Policy, 125 (March 2021). Audrye Wong, ‘More than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy’, The China Quarterly 235 (2018), 735–757.

⁴² Weiss 2014.

⁴³ Viking Bohman and Hillevi Parup, ‘Purchasing with the Party: Chinese consumer boycotts of foreign companies, 2008–2021’, Swedish National China Centre, Report No. 2 (2022).

⁴⁴ Kristin Vekasi and Jiwon Nam, ‘Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash’, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 6/3 (2019).

⁴⁵ Boris Holzer, ‘Political consumerism between individual choice and collective action: social movements, role mobilization and signalling’, International Journal of Consumer Studies 30/5 (September 2006), 405–415; and Allison P. Anoll, ‘What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political Participation’, American Political Science Review 112/3 (2018), 494–508.

⁴⁶ Bui 2017; Weiss 2014, Conclusion; and Yinxian Zhang, Jiajun Liu, and Ji-Rong Wen, ‘Nationalism on Weibo: Towards a Multifaceted Understanding of Chinese Nationalism’, The China Quarterly, 235 (September 2018), 758–783.

⁴⁷ ‘China brushes off calls for Philippines boycott after South China Sea ruling’, Reuters, 19 July 2016.

⁴⁸ Bohman and Parup 2022.

⁴⁹ Bohman and Parup 2022.

⁵⁰ Murray Scot Tanner, ‘Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use’, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007.

⁵¹ Stan Hok-wui Wong and Nicole Wu, ‘Can Beijing Buy Taiwan? An Empirical Assessment of Beijing’s Agricultural Trade Concessions to Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 25/99 (2016), 353–371; and Christina Lai, ‘More than carrots and sticks: Economic statecraft and coercion in China-Taiwan relations from 2000–2019’, Politics 42/3 (2022).

⁵² Shu Keng, Jean Yu-Chen Tseng and Qiang Yu, ‘The Strengths of China’s Charm Offensive: Changes in the Political Landscape of a Southern Taiwan Town under Attack from Chinese Economic Power’, The China Quarterly 232, December (2017), 956–981.

⁵³ Norris 2016, Ch6.

⁵⁴ Kwei-bo Huang, ‘The Politics of Mainland China’s Economic Statecraft in Relation to Current Cross-Strait Relations’, in Mingjiang Li (ed.), China’s Economic Statecraft: Co-optation, Cooperation and Coercion (Singapore: World Scientific 2017), 3–35. The ‘1992 consensus’ is the diplomatically convenient understanding that there is only ‘one China’ including the Mainland and Taiwan, while both sides agree to interpret ‘one China’ in their own way. Taipei claims that ‘one China’ is represented by the Republic of China, but Beijing claims that ‘one China’ is represented by the People’s Republic of China.

⁵⁵ Zhang Shasha, ‘Taidangju zaikai “kongtou zhipiao” lvyouye nu: cheng budao natian le! (More lip-service from Taiwanese authorities; tourist industry fumes that it can’t last until that day)’, People’s Daily, 20 January 2020; ‘Zhuanjia: wu jiuer gonshi nanti luke futai yiyuan (Experts: Mainland Chinese Visitors are Reluctant to Visit Taiwan without the “1992 consensus”)’, Guanchazhe wang, 14 May 2018; Chai Yifei, ‘Liunian xindi! Taiwan de luke weihe shaole? (Lowest in six years! Why are there less visitors from Mainland China to Taiwan?)’, People’s Daily, 1 March 2019; Wu Chuqi and Ren Chengqi, ‘Luke ruijian handong laixi Taiwan lvyouye hequ hecong (How Taiwan’s tourist industry deals with the problem of sharply decreased numbers of Mainland Chinese visitors)’, People’s Daily, 25 August 2016.

⁵⁶ ‘Dalu xuesheng: wei shenme women bu yuanyi zaiqu Taiwan dushu (Mainland Chinese Students: Why We Aren’t Willing to Study in Taiwan Anymore)’, Global Times, 15 August 2017.

⁵⁷ Bohman and Parup 2022.

⁵⁸ Brenda Goh and Yimou Lee, ‘Taiwan bakery chain disappears from major Chinese food apps amid Tsai visit row’, Reuters, 16 August 2018.

⁵⁹ Manya Koetse, ‘CoCo Bubble Tea in Hot Water over Pro-Hong Kong Text on Receipts’, What’s on Weibo, 9 August 2019.

⁶⁰ Miles Ives and Zixu Wang, ‘Mostly Bluster: Why China Went Easy on Taiwan’s Economy’, New York Times, 12 August 2022.

⁶¹ Leif-Eric Easley, ‘Kaesong and THAAD: South Korea’s Decisions to Counter the North’, World Affairs 179/2 (2016), 21–27.

⁶² Robert C. Watts IV, ‘‘Rockets’ Red Glare”: Why Does China Oppose THAAD in South Korea, and What Does It Mean for U.S. Policy?’ Naval War College Review 71/2 (2018), 79–108.

⁶³ Author interviews with PRC policymakers and analysts, Beijing, summer 2016.

⁶⁴ Author interviews with ROK government officials, Seoul, spring 2016.

⁶⁵ Liu Xin, ‘Bushu sade hanguo qiewu peile letian you chaibin (Korea might Lose More Than Lotte Due to THAAD)’, China Radio International Online, 1 March 2017.

⁶⁶ Li Daming, ‘Letian yidian dou buyuan (Lotte Deserves it)’, Global Times, 2 March 2017.

⁶⁷ Zhou Chengyang, ‘Ni keyi bu dizhi letian, dan bugai yaoqiu bieren bu dizhi (You May Not Boycott Lotte, But You Should Not Ask Others Not to Boycott it)’, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

⁶⁸ ‘Dizhi hanhuo hanju, gongji letian wangzhan, zhongguo minzhong de yizhi youduo jianding? (How Strong is the Will of the Chinese People against Korean Products?)’, 4 March 2017, https://www.jianshu.com/p/894bc15c85b7.

⁶⁹ Yao Lijuan, ‘Waijiao bu huiying minzhong dizhi letian: zaihua waiqi shifou chenggong you zhongguo xiaofei zhe jueding (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Chinese Consumers Decide Whether or Not a Foreign Company is Successful in China)”, Global Times, 28 February 2017.

⁷⁰ Guo Yuanpeng, ‘Bumai letian shangpin yeshi yizhong jiaguo qinghuai (“Boycotting Lotte Products” is Also a Patriotic Feeling)’, Dongfang wang, 2 March 2017.

⁷¹ ‘Chuanzhong guangdian zongju huoshi jinhanling hanyiren zaihua qiantu kong shouzu (Rumor has it the Chinese National Radio and Television Administration might ban Korean performers; they might not make money in China easily)’, People’s Daily, 2 August 2016.

⁷² Nyshka Chandran, ‘China-Korea Feud over THAAD is Hurting K-pop in Mainland Market’, CNBC, 23 November 2016; Jennifer Cho, ‘Turning Out the Lights? The Impact of THAAD on Hallyu Exports to China’, Korea Economic Institute of America.

⁷³ Tom Hancock and Wang Xueqiao, ‘South Korean consumer groups bear brunt of China’s Thaad ire’, Financial Times, 20 August 2017.

⁷⁴ Bryan Harris and Charles Clover, ‘China takes aim at South Korea’s Lotte after missile move’, Financial Times, 8 December 2016; Adriana Diaz and Shuai Zhang, ‘Angered by U.S. Anti-missile System, China Takes Economic Revenge’, CBS News, 7 April 2017; and Laura Zhou, ‘Chinese authorities seize equipment from South Korean retail giant Lotte as tensions over missile defence shield continue’, South China Morning Post, 22 August 2017.

⁷⁵ Luo Yuan, ‘Fanzhi sade shice (Ten measures against THAAD)’, Global Times, 2 March 2017.

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⁷⁷ Darren J. Lim and Victor Ferguson, ‘Chinese Economic Coercion during the THAAD Dispute’, The Asan Forum, 28 December 2019.

⁷⁸ Ketian Vivian Zhang, ‘Chinese Non-military Coercion – Tactics and Rationale’, Brookings Institution, 22 January 2019.

⁷⁹ Interview, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (research institute affiliated with the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 6 December 2017.

⁸⁰ Bryan Harris, Song Jung-a, Sherry Fei Ju, and Tom Hancock, ‘China bans tour groups to South Korea as defence spat worsens’, Financial Times, 3 March 2017.

⁸¹ China has often used similar narratives of victimhood to justify its coercive responses. See e.g., Enrico V. Gloria, ‘Justifying economic coercion: the discourse of victimhood in China’s unilateral sanctions policy’, The Pacific Review (2021).

⁸² Li Jiacheng, ‘Letian weihu zuochang sade ruhan jiangshi hanguo zitun kuguo (Lotte as the accomplice to the tiger: THAAD will cause South Korea to swallow its own bitter pill)’, China Online, 1 March 2017; and Wang Xiaobo, ‘Fanzhi sade wenti yao dahao zuhequan (Need combined measures to counter THAAD issue)’, Global Times, 7 March 2017.

⁸³ Liu, CRIO, 1 March 2017; and Guo, Dongfang wang, 2 March 2017.

⁸⁴ Zhang Fengbo, ‘Letian yuanhe lunwei hanguo zhengzhi gongju (Why Is Lotte a Korean Political Tool?)’. China Online, 1 March 2017; Cheng Shijie, ‘Dizhi letian shi rang hanguo kandao zhongguoren de taidu (Boycott Lotte to Show Chinese People’s Attitude to Korea)’, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

⁸⁵ Liu, CRIO, 1 March 2017.

⁸⁶ Zhou, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

⁸⁷ Li Haidong, ‘Zhicai letian gen “daguo shawen zhuyi” zhide zhao ma (Sanctions against Lotte are not great power Chauvinism)’, Global Times, 1 March 2017.

⁸⁸ Wang, Global Times, 7 March 2017.

⁸⁹ Liu Lifeng, ‘Guojia anquan liyi burong “letian” tiaozhan (National security interests cannot tolerate Lotte’s challenge)’, China Online, 3 March 2017.

⁹⁰ Guo, Dongfang wang, 2 March 2017.

⁹¹ Cheng Shijie, ‘Dizhi letian shi rang hanguo kandao zhongguoren de taidu (Boycott Lotte to Show Chinese People’s Attitude to Korea)’, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

⁹² ‘Zhongguo youke shi “xingzou qianbao”? duoguo zhiding “huanying zhongguo” jihua (Are Chinese tourists “walking wallets”? Many countries implement “Welcome China” schemes)’, People’s Daily, 25 September 2017.

⁹³ Zhong Qingping, ‘Zhongqing bao: guojia liyi mianqian, women dui letian shuo bu (China Youth Daily: In light of national interests, we say “no” to Lotte)’, China Youth Daily, 1 March 2017.

⁹⁴ People’s Daily, 25 September 2017.

⁹⁵ He Yalin, ‘Letian weihuzuochang zhongguo bu huanying fenxiang (China Does Not Welcome Lotte as an Accomplice to the Tiger)’, Xinhua, 27 February 2017.

⁹⁶ Liu, China Online, 3 March 2017.

⁹⁷ Li, Global Times, 1 March 2017.

⁹⁸ Yao, Global Times, 28 February 2017.

⁹⁹ ‘Sade dui zhonghan jingmao shifou you yingxiang? Shangwubu huiying: biran hui (Will THAAD affect China-Korea trade? Ministry of Commerce: Definitely)’, People’s Daily, 14 September 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Li, Global Times, 1 March 2017.

¹⁰¹ Liu Yang, ‘Letian de jia “huiying” daochu de zhen wenti (Lotte’s Fake Response Reveals the True Problem)’, Global Times, 7 March 2017.

¹⁰² Zhou, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

¹⁰³ Li, Global Times, 2 March 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Liu, Global Times, 7 March 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Zhou, Weilai wang, 1 March 2017.

¹⁰⁶ People’s Daily, 25 September 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Liu, China Online, 3 March 2017.

¹⁰⁸ People’s Daily, 25 September 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Li, Global Times, 1 March 2017.

¹¹⁰ Liu, Global Times, 7 March 2017.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Zhong, China Youth Daily, 1 March 2017.

¹¹³ ‘Lotte Set to Lose Chinese Customers after Decision to Back THAAD’, People’s Daily Online, 2 March 2017; and Ma Jingjing, ‘S. Korea Embassy Confirms Request on Lotte’, Global Times, 31 March 2017.

¹¹⁴ ‘Chinese Tourists Cancel Trips to South Korea after THAAD’, Global Times, 1 August 2016; ‘Vietnam Sees Sharp Increase in Arrivals of Chinese Visitors via Northern Border Gate’, Xinhua, 21 March 2017.

¹¹⁵ ‘3,400 Chinese Cruise Passengers Snub Jeju Island as THAAD Anger Continues’, CNTV, 13 March 2017.

¹¹⁶ ‘China, SK Cut Flights to Each Other’s Country’, Global Times, 16 March 2017.

¹¹⁷ Tian Shi, ‘China Reportedly Tightens Control over Korean Shows Amid THAAD Controversy’, People’s Daily Online, 8 August 2016.

¹¹⁸ See e.g., ‘THAAD Deployment Adds Worry to Sagging S. Korean Economy’, Xinhua, 10 August 2016; Wan Yu, ‘THAAD Deployment to Severely Threaten ROK’s Tourism: Chinese Media’, People’s Daily, 9 March 2017; ‘South Korean Duty-free Shops Still Reeling from Drop in Chinese Tourists Following THAAD Dispute’, People’s Daily Online, 13 July 2017.

¹¹⁹ ‘Chinese Tourists Cancel Trips to South Korea after THAAD’, Global Times, 1 August 2016.

¹²⁰ ‘China-dependent S. Korean Firms Lose 10 bln Dollars in Stock Value over THAAD: Brokerage’, Xinhua, 8 August 2016.

¹²¹ ‘Contract on THAAD Deployment Site May Be Delayed: S. Korean Military’, Global Times, 16 January 2017.

¹²² Li Yan, ‘ROK Still Uneasy Despite China’s Denial of Korean Drama Restrictions’, People’s Daily Online, 23 November 2016; Li Yan, ‘Ambiguous THAAD Photos Cause Unease in China’, People’s Daily Online, 9 January 2017; China Says it Supports Normal Trade with S. Korea’, Global Times, 21 March 2017.

¹²³ ‘Foreign Companies in China Should Abide by Law: FM spokesman’, Xinhua, 1 March 2017; Hu Zexi, ‘China is Firm in its Resolve to Oppose THAAD Deployment: People’s Daily’, People’s Daily, 6 March 2017; ‘Media: South Korea Will Pay a Price if it Does not Give up THAAD Deployment’, People’s Daily Online, 15 August 2016; Deng Xiaoci, ‘Taobao, Alibaba Deny Rumors of K-pop Products Ban’, Global Times, 16 August 2016.

¹²⁴ ‘China Reaffirms Openness to Foreign Investment’, Xinhua, 8 February 2017; ‘Lotte outlets closed for violating fire codes’, Global Times, 7 March 2017; ‘SK Lawmakers Visit Beijing to Defuse Tension over THAAD’, Global Times, 5 January 2017.

¹²⁵ ‘China, ROK’s Cultural Exchanges Need Proper Popular Support: Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Reported Korean Dramas Ban’, People’s Daily Online, 1 March 2017.

¹²⁶ ‘China Values ROK Trade Ties, Reiterates THAAD Opposition’, Xinhua, 2 March 2017.

¹²⁷ ‘South Korean Media Claims Expansion of China’s Restrictions Due to THAAD Deployment’, People’s Daily Online, 22 January 2017.

¹²⁸ ‘Lotte’s Development in China Should Come to an End’, Global Times, 28 February 2017.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Jung, M, ‘Lotte Mart Decided to Withdraw from the Chinese Market’, Business Korea, 15 September 2017; and Herh, M, Lotte shopping to sell off 21 Lotte Mart stores in Beijing, BusinessKorea, 27 April 2018.

¹³¹ Lim and Ferguson 2021.

¹³² Gao, C., Amid THAAD Dispute, South Korean Brands Suffer in China. The Diplomat, 31 August 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/amid-thaad-dispute-south-korean-brands-suffer-in-china/; and Moon, Hee-chul, and Eun-soo Jin. ‘Hyundai Motor Tries U-Turn in China Strategy’. Korea JoongAng Daily, 20 January 2022. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/01/20/business/industry/hyundai-motor-kia-thaad/20220120184903805.html.

¹³³ Jae-heun Kim, ‘Lotte to pull out of China, focus on Southeast Asia’, Korea Times, 23 May 2022, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2022/05/419_329617.html.

¹³⁴ https://retailinasia.com/in-markets/lotte-expanding-into-southeast-asia-markets/.

¹³⁵ https://www.lotteshoppingir.com/eng/data/data_01.jsp.

¹³⁶ Lim and Ferguson 2021.

¹³⁷ Yang, F. W. T., Asymmetrical Interdependence and Sanction: China’s Economic Retaliation over South Korea’s THAAD Deployment. Issues & Studies, 55/4 (2019).

¹³⁸ Lim and Ferguson 2021.

¹³⁹ https://hmgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/The-full-report-PDF.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ Rachel Liang and Yuko Kobota, ‘H&M Closes Shanghai Flagship, Its First Store in China’, Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/h-m-closes-its-shanghai-flagship-its-first-store-in-china-11656080167.

¹⁴¹ Nike 2021 Annual Report, https://s1.q4cdn.com/806093406/files/doc_downloads/2021/08/Nike10k2021.pdf.

¹⁴² Leif-Eric Easley, ‘China’s Charm Offensive on South Korea is Starting to Work’, Foreign Policy, 13 November 2017.

¹⁴³ Author interviews with PRC policymakers and analysts in Beijing, fall 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Hyonhee Shin, ‘South Korea, China clash over U.S. missile shield, complicating conciliation’, Reuters, 11 August 2022.

¹⁴⁵ Sang-Hun Choe, ‘South Koreans now dislike China more than they dislike Japan’, New York Times, 20 August 2021.

¹⁴⁶ Tiffany May and Amy Chang-Chien, ‘BTS Honored Korean War Sacrifices. Some in China Detected an Insult’. New York Times, 12 October 2020.

¹⁴⁷ Bee Yun Jo, ‘Loosening or Tightening the Linchpin? The Effects of China’s Approach to US THAAD Deployment in South Korea’, Journal of International and Area Studies 29/1 (2022), 1–20.

¹⁴⁸ Andrew Yeo, ‘South Korean Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Era’, Brookings Institution Policy Brief, November 2022.

¹⁴⁹ Jaebeom Kwon, “Taming Neighbors: Exploring China’s Economic Statecraft to Change Neighboring Countries’ Policies and Their Effects”, Asian Perspective 44/1 (2020).

¹⁵⁰ Leif-Eric Easley, ‘South Korea’s “New Southern Policy”: Economic Diversification with Strategic and Social Dimensions’, Asia Insights 5 (December 2018).

¹⁵¹ Suk-yee Jung, ‘South Korean Government to Promote Reshoring for Less Dependence on China’, Business Korea, 21 February 2020.

¹⁵² Bohman and Parup 2022.

¹⁵³ Trefor Moss, ‘Neither coronavirus nor trade tensions can stop U.S. companies’ push into China’, Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2020; Joe McDonald, ‘Companies Prodded to Rely Less on China, But Few Respond’, Associated Press, 29 June 2020.

¹⁵⁴ See e.g., U.S.-China Business Council Member Survey, June 2022.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Audrye Wong

Audrye Wong is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California. Her research examines the use of economic statecraft and informational tools for geopolitical influence. She received her PhD in Security Studies from Princeton's School of Public and International Affairs.

Leif-Eric Easley

Leif-Eric Easley is an associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul where he teaches international security and political economics. He publishes in academic journals regarding U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea. He has degrees from UCLA and Harvard and is frequently quoted in the New York Times, Washington Post and elsewhere on diplomacy in Asia.

Hsin-wei Tang

Hsin-wei Tang is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. His research interests are in international security and Asian politics.