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ABSTRACT
This article examines Russia’s evolving information confrontation strategy in the Nordic region between 2022–2023. It assesses Russia’s approaches toward NATO members Norway, new member Finland, and prospective member Sweden. Despite decreased regional influence, the article finds that Russia persists with sub-threshold information confrontation tactics to bypass NATO deterrence. The strategy aims to shape NATO’s presence, undermine Western cohesion, and reduce support for Ukraine. These sub-threshold activities underscore the coercive utility of Russia’s information confrontation strategy in Russian strategic thinking. As tensions escalate due to the Ukraine conflict, Moscow will continue seeking to influence domestic debates in Nordic and European countries.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Finland officially became a member on 4 Apr. 2023. Sweden got the final approval by Hungary on 26 Feb. 2024, and became NATO’s 32nd member on 7 Mar. 2024.
2 Karen-Anna Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region: Tracing Continuity and Change’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/3 (2022).
3 Andrés Gannon, Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay, and Peter Schram, ‘The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2023).
4 But also in Estonia, Georgia, and eventually Syria, combined with heightened awareness of cyber-attacks and influence operations.
5 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58/4 (2016), 15.
6 Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, Ifri (Nov 2015).
7 Tobias Liebetrau, ‘Cyber Conflict Short of War: A European Strategic Vacuum’, European Security 31/4 (2022), 497–516; Stefan Soesanto and Max Smeets, ‘Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, And Future’, Ch. 20 in Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (eds.), Deterrence in the 21st Century – Insights from Theory and Practice (Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy 2021); Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, ‘The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace’, Security Studies 26/3 (2017), 452–81; Rebecca Slayton, ‘What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment’, International Security 41/3 (2016), 72–109; Lennart Maschmeyer, ‘A New and Better Quiet Option? Strategies of Subversion and Cyber Conflict’, Journal of Strategic Studies 46/3 (2023), 570–94; Herbert Lin and Jaclyn Kerr, ‘On Cyber-Enabled Information Warfare and Information Operations’, Ch. 16 in Paul Cornish (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security (Online edn: Oxford Academic 2021).
8 Denmark and Iceland are also founding NATO members. Norway was chosen due to its land border with Russia.
9 e.g. Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion’; Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke (eds), Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New York: Oxford UP 2019).
10 Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region’; Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, Cooperation and Conflict 1/4 (1966), 66–69.
11 Ibid.; Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Keep, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation 2019), 8.
12 The Norwegian Police Security Service, ‘National Threat Assessment’, Annual report (2023), https://www.pst.no/alle-artikler/trusselvurderinger/ntv-2023/ Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, ‘Foreign Intelligence and Influence Operations’, Annual report (2023), https://supo.fi/en/intelligence-and-influence-operations.
13 Gannon et al., ‘The Shadow of Deterrence’, 29, 33.
14 Valery Gerasimov, ‘The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and of Carrying Out Combat Operations’, (Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii: Novyye vyzovy trebuyut pereosmyslit’ formy i sposoby vedeniya boyevykh deystviy), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier 8 (2013); President of Russia, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly’ (10 May 2006); Robert Jervis, The Illogic Of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1984), 31; Michael Kofman, ‘Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy’, Stockholm Free World Forum, Briefing No. 6. (2019); Makhmut A. Gareev, ‘Strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye: problemy i resheniya’, 8 Oct. 2008, http://old.redstar.ru/2008/10/08_10/2_04.html.
15 Joe Cheravitch, ‘The Role of Russia’s Military in Information Confrontation’, CNA, Occasional Paper IOP-2021-U-030078-Final (Jun. 2021).
16 President of Russia, ‘Meeting of the State Council [Заседание Государственного Совета], 22 Oct. 2022, Speech, Retrieved from http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70169.
17 Juha Kukkola, The Military Strategic Effects of the Russian National Segment of the Internet (Helsinki: National Defence Univ., 2023).
18 V.B. Veprintsev, A.V. Manioli, A.I. Petrenko, and D.B. Frolov, Operations of Information-Psychological Warfare (Moscow: Goryachaya liniya 2019); Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion’, 27–28.
19 A. Raskin, and I. Tarasov, ‘Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo v sovremennoy voyne’, Informatsionnye voyny 4/32 (2014), 2–6; Jolanta Darczewska and Piotr Żochowski, ‘Active Measures – Russia’s Key Export’, Centre for Eastern Studies¸ Point of View (May 2017).
20 Uku Arold, ‘Peculiarities of Russian Information Operations’, Sõjateadlane 2 (2016), 26.
21 V.A. Lefebvre, ‘Reflexive Control in Socio-Economic Systems’, Information & Security 22 (2007), 28–32; Timothy Thomas, ‘Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and The Military’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 7 (2004), 237–56.
22 Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2020).
23 Igor Panarin, The First World Information War: The Dissolution of the USSR, (Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR) (Saint Petersburg: Piter 2010); Alexander Bartosh, ‘Information and Psychological Struggle Acquires a New Quality’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie 35 (2023); Gerasimov, ‘The Value of Science Is in the Foresight’.
24 Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘The Conceptual View of Activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space’, 1 Jan. 2011; Russian Security Council, ‘Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation’, 5 Dec. 2016.
25 See, e.g., Russian Security Council, ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’, (Strategiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 2 July 2021. The National Security Strategy is considered Russia’s key document for strategic planning.
26 Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Information Confrontation’, (Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’, undated c.; V.F. Prokofiev, Secret Weapons of Information War, ‘Taynoye oruzhiye informatsionnoy voyny’ (SINTEG 2003 2nd ed.).
27 V.F. Prokofiev, Secret Weapons of Information War.
28 Bartosh, ‘Information and Psychological Struggle Acquires a New Quality’; Ilya V. Sergeev, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare as a Form of Escalation of Inter-State Conflict’, Informatsionniye voyni 2/34 (2015), 38–41. (40)
29 Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, ‘Information Confrontation’, (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Terminology; Igor Panarin, ‘The system of information confrontation’, (Systema informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Voennoe-Promychlenny Kurier 41/257 (2008).
30 Ilya V. Sergeev, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare as a Form of Escalation of Inter-State Conflict’, (Informatsionno-psikhologicheskaya voyna kak forma eskalatsii mezhgosudarstvennykh konfliktov), Informatsionnyye voyny 2/34 (2015), 38–41. (40)
31 See e.g., K.A. Trotsenko, ‘Information Confrontation at the Operational-Tactical Level of Control’, Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) 8 (2016), 20.
32 Keir Giles, ‘Handbook of Russian Information Warfare’, NATO Defense College, Fellowship Monograph (2016); For a thorough discussion on Russian information-psychological confrontation, see Katri Pynnöniemi, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare in Russian Security Strategy’, in Robert Kanet (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Security Policy (London and New York: Routledge 2019), 214–26.
33 Lesley Kucharski, ‘Russian Multi-Domain Strategy Against NATO: Information Confrontation and U.S. Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Europe’, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (2018), 2.
34 Cheravitch, ‘The Role of Russia’s Military in Information Confrontation’, 7.
35 Pynnöniemi, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare in Russian Security Strategy’, 216.
36 Lata, Annenkov, and Moiseev (2019); Larisa V. Vorontsova and Dmitriy Frolov, Istoriya i sovremennost’ informatsionnogo protivoborstva (Moscow: Garyachaya linja 2019), 77.
37 Valery Gerasimov, ‘Vectors of Military Strategy Development’, (Vektory Razvitiya voyennoy strategii), Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov. 7 Mar. 2019.
38 Ibid.
39 Emil Arntzen, ‘Understanding Russian Information Confrontation’, Master’s thesis, Brunel University London, (2022), 17. This is also emphasised in the 2021 National Security Strategy.
40 Emilio J. Iasiello, ‘Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea’, Parameters 47/2 (2017); Lesley Kucharski, Mike Albertson, Marimar Calisto, and Brian Radzinsky, ‘Countering the “Information Confrontation” Strategies of Russia and China’, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Workshop Summary (2022), 5.
41 Dmitry Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 33.
42 Timothy Thomas, Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements (MITRE Corporation August 2019); I.N. Dylevskiy, V.O. Zapivakhiyn, S.A. Komov, S.V. Korotkov, and A.A. Krivchenko, ‘On the Dialectic of Deterrence and the Prevention of Military Conflicts in the Information Age’, Voennaya Mysl’ 7 (2016), 5; Ryszard Szpyra, ‘Russian Information Offensive in the International Relations’, Security and Defence Quarterly 30/3 (2020), 31.
43 See, Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace (Washington DC: Georgetown Press 2019), 120–22.
44 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven CT: Yale UP 1966).
45 Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/2 (2019), 212–34.
46 Vorontsova and Frolov, Istoriya i sovremennost’ informatsionnogo protivoborstva, 81.
47 Norway, Sweden, and Finland have all expelled and denied visas to Russian diplomats and alleged intelligence officers to reduce the growing intelligence pressure in their countries.
48 Prior to 2022, Sweden was the most criticised of the three Nordic countries, particularly for being ‘anti-Russian’ and ‘Russophobic’. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Policy and diplomatic activities of the Russian Federation in 2021 (Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu)’, Feb 2022, 51.
49 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question in Connection with Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden Publishing Materials on Russia’s Intelligence Activities’, 21 Apr. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1864875/ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activities of the Russian Federation in 2022 (Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu)’, 25 Mar. 2023.
50 The data consists primarily of written text and documents on various digital platforms. Standard search words related to Russia and the Nordic region are identified prior to the search. Incidents or new categories identified during the initial collection are explored further. The data also builds on anonymous background conversations with relevant Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian experts.
51 See Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.G. Titova s Poslom Shvetsii v Rossii M.Mard’, 18 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813802/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question in Connection with Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden Publishing Material Concerning Russia’s Intelligence Activities’; Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Press Release on the Regional Meeting of the Russian Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, Ireland, the North European and Baltic Countries’, 5 June 2023, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1874774/?lang=en.
52 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O regional’nom soveshchanii poslov Rossii v stranakh Severnoy Yevropy i Pribaltiki pod rukovodstvom pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.G.Titova’, 9 Sep. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1829157/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘EU Ban on Cars with Russian Licence Plates’, Press briefing, 4 Oct. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1907469/ RIA Novosti, ‘Lavrov nazval zayavleniya Finlyandii ob antirossiyskikh sanktsiyakh khamskimi’, 26 Sept 2023, https://ria.ru/20230926/sanktsii -1,898,717,236html?in=t Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommentariy ofitsial’nogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V.Zakharovoy v svyazi s prezentatsiyey Vneshnepoliticheskoy deklaratsii Pravitel’stva Shvetsi’, 16 June 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1818155/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche Pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V.G.Titova s Poslom Norvegii v Moskve R.Kvile’, 24 Oct. 2022 https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1834817/.
53 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions During a Joint News Conference with Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Carlos Faria’, 4 July 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1820504/?lang=en De Fresnes, Tulikukka, ‘Kansanedustajat ovat nyt Venäjän infovaikuttamisen kohde – Ano Turtiainen kertoi Venäjän tv:ssä “globalistien” vallankaappauksesta Suomessa’, Yle News, 6 May 2022, https://yle.fi/a/3–12,430,606 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O real’noy istorii podachi Finlyandiyey i Shvetsiyey zayavki v NATO’, 27 Aug. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1827550/.
54 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Statement on Russia’s Withdrawal from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council’, 18 Sept. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1904899/ Clas Svahn, ‘Ryska ambassadören: Sverige ett legitimt mål’, Dagens Nyheter, 29 Mar. 2023, https://www.dn.se/varlden/ryska-ambassadoren-sverige-ett-legitimt-mal/ RBK, ‘V Finlyandii priznali izderzhki ot vstupleniya v NATO i pomoshchi Ukraine’, 26 Sept. 2023, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/651271fe9a794782de7a2d2b.
55 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommentariy ofitsial’nogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V.Zakharovoy v svyazi s prezentatsiyey Vneshnepoliticheskoy deklaratsii Pravitel’stva Shvetsi’; Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Ministry Statement on Finland completing the process to join NATO’, 4 Apr. 2023, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1861613/?lang=en https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1809455/.
56 See e.g., Gleb Chugunov, ‘Finland Stopping African Aid is Europe’s Worst Colonial Policy: Russian Lawmaker’, Sputnik Africa, 20 June 2023, https://en.sputniknews.africa/20230620/finland-stopping-african-aid-is-europes-worst-colonial-policy-russian-lawmaker−1,060,053,533html.
57 RIA Novosti, ‘Rossiyskoye posol’stvo zayavilo o nepriyemlemykh vypadakh so storony Norvegii’, 2 Oct. 2023, https://ria.ru/20231002/vypady−1,900,035,521html.
58 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘The Foreign Ministry’s Statement on Sweden’s NATO Membership’, 16 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813545/?lang=en Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the Presentation of the Swedish Government’s Foreign Policy Declaration’, 16 June 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1818155/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Intervyu direktora Vtorogo Yevropeyskogo departamenta MID Rossii S.S.Belyayeva po populyarizatsii informatsionnomu agentstvu “Rossiya segodnya”’, 8 Sept. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1829007/ Ekaterina Blinova, ‘US-Nordic Summit Pushes NATO Agenda of Containing Russia in the North’, Sputnik, 13 July 2023, https://sputnikglobe.com/20230713/us-nordic-summit-pushes-nato-agenda-of-containing-russia-in-the-north−1,111,860,121html Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche Pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V.G.Titova s Poslom Norvegii v Moskve R.Kvile’.
59 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Intervyu direktora Vtorogo Yevropeyskogo departamenta MID Rossii S.S.Belyayeva po populyarizatsii informatsionnomu agentstvu “Rossiya segodnya”’; Al Jazeera, ‘Putin Tells Finnish President: Joining NATO would be “Mistake’’’, 14 May 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/14/russia-suspends-electricity-supply-to-finland-finnish-operator.
60 Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia Warns of Nuclear, Hypersonic Deployment if Sweden and Finland Join NATO’, Reuters, 14 Apr. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-baltic-nuclear-deployment-if-nato-admits-sweden-finland-2022-04-14/.
61 See e.g., Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Ob otvetnykh merakh v otnoshenii Finlyandii’, 17 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813662/.
62 Brendan Cole, ‘Russian State TV Host Names Western Countries It Would Be “Easy” To Bomb’, Newsweek, 1 Dec. 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/solovoyov-russia-tv-bomb-ukraine-russia-war−1,763,895.
63 Lasse Boehm and Alex Wilson, ‘EU Energy Security and the War in Ukraine: From Sprint to Marathon’, European Parliament, Briefing (Feb. 2023).
64 See e.g., The Moscow Times, ‘Kremlin Endorses Report on U.S. Involvement in Nord Stream Sabotage’, 9 Feb. 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/09/head-of-russias-tretyakov-gallery-replaced-after-culture-ministry-standoff-a80183.
65 See, Malte Humpert, ‘Fiber-Optic Submarine Cable Near Faroe and Shetland Islands Damaged; Mediterranean Cables also Cut’, High North News, 24 Oct. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cable-near-faroe-and-shetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut.
66 Reuters, ‘Norway Will Patrol its Oil and Gas Platforms with help from Allies, PM Says, PM says’, 30 Sept. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/norway-receive-help-uk-germany-france-boost-security-pm-says-2022-09-30/.
67 Sondre Moen Myhre and Sigrid Gausen, ‘Uidentifiserte droner kan drive spionasje i Norge. Men hva er det egentlig de er ute etter?’, Aftenposten, 19 Oct. 2022, https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/699VQ8/uidentifiserte-droner-kan-drive-spionasje-i-norge-men-hva-er-det-egentlig-de-er-ute-etter.
68 Andrew Metrick and Kathleen H. Hicks, ‘Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe’, CSIS, Report March (2018), 7.
69 See, Osman Kibar, ‘OPERASJON LAZAREV: Slår alarm om kartlegging av Norges kritiske infrastruktur’, Dagens Næringsliv, 22 Oct. 2021, https://www.dn.no/magasinet/teknologi/spionasje/russland/etterretningstjenesten/operasjon-lazarev-slar-alarm-om-kartlegging-av-norges-kritiske-infrastruktur/2-1-1,085,420 Benjamin Fredriksen, Beth Mørch Pettersen, Gyda Katrine Hesla, Inghild Eriksen, and Håvard Gulldahl, ‘Kabelmysteriene’, NRK, 26 June 2022, https://www.nrk.no/nordland/xl/russiske-tralere-krysset-kabler-i-vesteralen-og-svalbard-for-brudd-1.16007084.
70 Robert S. Mueller, ‘Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election’, US Department of Justice 1/2 (2019); Eugene Kondratov and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Interference Campaigns in France, Germany and the UK: A Challenge against Trust in Liberal Democracies?’, Geopolitics 28/5 (2023).
71 Yle News, ‘Russian Troll Factory Sets Sights on Finnish News Outlets, Editors’, 4 May 2022, https://yle.fi/a/3–12,431,006.
72 Radwarem, ‘Project DDOSIA Russia’s answer to disBalancer’, 13 Oct. 2022, https://www.radware.com/security/threat-advisories-and-attack-reports/project-ddosia-russias-answer-to-disbalancer/.
73 NoName057(16), ‘Message’, Telegram, 13 July 2023, https://t.me/noname05716/4087. Other attacks were perpetrated against the Norwegian National Security Authority, Gassco, The Norwegian Coastal Administration, Kongsberg, Kongsberg Maritime, and Statistics Norway. See, Kjell Persen, ‘Disse russiske hackerne knyttes til koranhevn-SMS’, TV2 Nyheter, 5 Aug. 2023, https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/utenriks/disse-russiske-hackerne-knyttes-til-koranhevn-sms/15938716/.
74 Yle News, ‘Pro-Russia Hacker Group Suspected of Targeting Finnish Parliament, Sanna Marin Websites with DoS Attack’, 4 Apr. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,025,824. See also, Helsinki Times, ‘Finnish Parliament’s Website Brought Down by Russian Hacker Group’, 10 Aug. 2022, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/22011-finnish-parliament-s-website-brought-down-by-russian-hacker-group.html Yle News, ‘Several Finnish Websites Report Cyber-Attacks’, 5 Oct. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,053,726.
75 SoCRadar, ‘An Ongoing DDoS Campaign Targeting Sweden’, 20 July 2023, https://socradar.io/an-ongoing-ddos-campaign-targeting-sweden/ Alicia Heimersson, ‘Nya hackerattacker mot Sverige – SOS måltavla’, 19 Feb. 2023, https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/nya-hackerattacker-mot-sverige-sos-maltavla-/ Mandiant Intelligence, ‘Hacktivists Collaborate with GRU-Sponsored APT28’, 23 Sept. 2022, https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/gru-rise-telegram-minions.
76 Jenni Jeskanen, ‘Kostamuslainen hotellivirkailija kertoo HS:lle, kuinka Venäjä ohjaa tulijoita rajalle – Pormestari vakuuttaa tilanteen olevan hallinnassa’, Helsingin Sanomat, 19 Nov. 2023, https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art−2,000,010,001,486html Kelly Greenhill, ‘Asymmetric Advantage: Weaponizing People as Nonmilitary Instruments of Cross-Domain Coercion’, Ch. 12 in Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke (eds), Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New York NY: Oxford UP 2019).
77 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Land Forces at Kola Reduced to One-Fifth, Norwegian Intelligence Says’, Barents Observer, 13 Feb. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/02/four-fifths-kola-land-forces-wiped-out.
78 Russian Defence Ministry, ‘Novosti’, 21 Dec. 2022, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id = 12449212@egNews.
79 Oscar Strøm Korsnes, ‘Russland med militærøvelser i Østersjøen: − Et signal til Vesten’, VG, 2 Aug. 2023, https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/mQd0vL/russland-med-militaeroevelser-i-oestersjoeen-et-signal-til-vesten.
80 Kristian Åtland, Thomas Nilsen, and Torbjørn Pedersen, ‘Military Muscle-Flexing as Interstate Communication: Russian NOTAM Warnings off the Coast of Norway, 2015–2021’, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 5/1 (2022).
81 Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region: Tracing Continuity and Change’.
82 Reuters, ‘Swedish Defence Minister Calls Russian Violation of Airspace “Unacceptable”’, 2 Mar. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedish-armed-forces-says-russian-fighter-jets-violated-swedish-airspace-2022-03-02/.
83 Statecraft, ‘Russian Fighter Jets Violate Finnish Airspace Amid Visa Ban Row’, 19 Aug. 2022, https://www.statecraft.co.in/article/russian-fighter-jets-violate-finnish-airspace-amid-visa-ban-row.
84 Runar Spansvoll, ‘Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway’, RUSI, 168/3 (2023), 84.
85 McLeary, ‘Russians Tried to Jam NATO Exercise; Swedes Say They’ve Seen This Before’.
86 The Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus 2023’, Annual report (2023), https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus, 21.
87 Anya Fink, ‘The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine’, French institute of international relations, Proliferation Papers, No. 65, 21 Aug. 2023.
88 RBK, ‘Kak skazhetsya na situatsii na Ukraine vkhozhdeniye Shvetsii i Finlyandii v NATO’, 17 May 2022, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/05/2022/6282529c9a794715621ecc12.
89 Synne Lykkebø Hafsaas and Synne Sørenes, ‘Millioner av job-tabletter på vei ut i tomme hyller – ber folk unngå hamstring’, NRK, 1 Mar. 2022, https://www.nrk.no/vestland/millioner-av-jod-tabletter-pa-vei-ut-i-tomme-hyller-_-ber-folk-unnga-hamstring-1.15873362.
90 The Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus 2023’, 21.
91 Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Epokha protivostoyaniya’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2 July 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiia.html.
92 Yle News, ‘Putin Advisor: Finnish Leadership Seeks Confrontation with Russia’, 1 Aug. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,043,287 VK Press, ‘Nochnyye drony na Pskov zapuskali iz Latvii, Finlyandii i Estonii: strany NATO atakuyut Rossiyu?’, 30 Aug. 2023, https://www.vkpress.ru/life/nochnye-drony-na-pskov-zapuskali-iz-latvii-finlyandii-i-estonii-strany-nato-atakuyut-rossiyu/?id = 165759 Tsargrad, ‘Finlyandya vyzyvayet Rossiyu na voynu: Pochemu medlit Putin’, 3 Sept. 2023, https://tsargrad.tv/articles/finljandija-vyzyvaet-rossiju-na-vojnu-pochemu-medlit-putin_858607.
93 Aleksei Zhuravlyov, ‘Message’, Telegram, 20 Sept. 2023, https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/7382.
94 Chugunov, ‘Finland Stopping African Aid is Europe’s Worst Colonial Policy’.
95 RT, ‘FSB Exposes NATO State’s “Spying Operation” Against Moscow’, 15 Aug. 2023, https://www.rt.com/russia/581318-russia-finland-intelligence-network/.
96 Ulrika By and William Hernvall, ‘Ministern: Påverkanskampanjer mot Sverige kopplas till Ryssland’, Dagens Nyheter, 26 July 2023, https://www.dn.se/sverige/ministern-paverkanskampanjer-mot-sverige-kopplas-till-ryssland/.
97 ABC News, ‘Turkey’s President Condemns Quran Burning in Sweden, Signals It’ll Obstruct NATO Membership’, 29 June 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/turkeys-president-condemns-quran-burning-sweden-signals-obstruct−100,490,476 Antje Tolpo and Tiina Lundell, ‘MOT Got Hold of a Secret Intelligence Report, According to which Russia was Planning to Interfere with the Accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO’, Yle, 4 Dec. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,063,067 Albin Lindström, ‘Ryssland rider på desinformationsvåg’, Svenska Dagbladet, 2 Aug. 2023, https://www.svd.se/a/4ogB39/ryssland-rider-pa-desinformationsvag-om-sverige.
98 Ulrika By and William Hernvall, ‘Ministern: Påverkanskampanjer mot Sverige kopplas till Ryssland’.
99 NoName057(16) is also affiliated with the Anzu Team platform. Elena Teslova, ‘Russia calls burning of Quran in Stockholm “another provocative act of Islamophobia”’, Anadolu Agency, 28 Jan. 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-calls-burning-of-quran-in-stockholm-another-provocative-act-of-islamophobia/2799814.
100 Russian Security Council, ‘Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, (Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii), 31 July 2022, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document34/.
101 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu’, 25 Sept. 2023.
102 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Bishop Iyakov, Who Backs Putin’s War, Raised Giant Cross at Svalbard without Norway’s Knowledge’, Barents Observer, 12 Aug. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/08/russia-worlds-arctic-power-said-war-blessing-bishop-who-week-raised-giant-patriotic Hallvar Norum et al., ‘Russisk hackergruppe skal ha startet angrep mot Norge’, NRK, 29 June 2022, https://www.nrk.no/norge/russisk-hackergruppe-skal-ha-startet-angrep-mot-norge-1.16020947 Persen, ‘Disse russiske hackerne knyttes til koranhevn-SMS’; Atle Staalesen, ‘Moscow Protests Norwegian Exploration in Svalbard Waters’, Barents Observer, 15 Mar. 2021, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2021/03/moscow-protests-norwegian-exploration-svalbard-waters Trine Jonassen, ‘Russia Accuses Norway of Increased Military Presence on Svalbard’, High North News, 7 Oct. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-accuses-norway-increased-military-presence-svalbard.
103 See e.g., Astri Edvartsen, ‘USA Demonstrated New Weapons System – Wanted To Deter Russia Without Escalating’, High North News, 11 Nov. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/usa-demonstrated-new-weapons-system-wanted-deter-russia-without-escalating.
104 Thomas Nilsen, ‘“High Time to Scrap Self-Imposed Restrictions”, Says Former Norwegian Commander. This Week’s Flight Map Shows Why’, Barents Observer, 23 Aug. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/08/high-time-scrap-self-imposed-restrictions-says-former-norwegian-commander-august-22.
105 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1984), 31
106 Gannon et al., ‘The Shadow of Deterrence’, 3, 29–32.
107 Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Orders’, War on the Rocks, 22 Dec. 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-order/.
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Karen-Anna Eggen
Karen-Anna Eggen is a PhD fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and is affiliated with the Centre for International Security. She is completing her PhD in political science at the University of Oslo, focusing on Russian information confrontation and information operations in the Nordic region. Her research interests include Russian strategy and security policy, influence operations, transatlantic relations and NATO, and security policy in Eastern Europe, focusing mainly on Ukraine and Belarus.