Bargaining with nuclear weapons: Thomas Schelling's ‘general’ concept of stability

Abstract

This article identifies a consistent approach to stability across a wide range of conflict situations at the heart of Thomas Schelling's strategic theory. It finds that there are two main aspects of this ‘general’ concept of stability. The first is the ability to strike a bargain at a mutually acceptable resting place as seen in the Korean War stalemate. The second is the ability to maintain a strategic bargain over the long term as in the stability of the balance of terror. This article finds that crucial assumptions which underpin Schelling's general concept, such as the existence of restraints on the degree of competition and the idea that nuclear weapons assist the bargaining process, hold up better in some cases than in others. Stability consequently seems more possible in a conventional conflict or crisis when nuclear weapons are a background influence than in a war where the nuclear threshold has already been crossed.