Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict

Abstract

The end of the Cold War led some commentators to question the relevance of Clausewitz's thought in a strategic environment where low-intensity conflict (LIC) would predominate. On the contrary, however, Clausewitz's understanding of the intensity of warfare, and its relationship with the political environment of any given time, makes his thinking compatible with changing historical circumstances. The current War on Terror, for example, can be comfortably accommodated within Clausewitz's concept of war. However, a move away from Clausewitz in US doctrine has been coupled with a rejection of LIC in favour of the erroneous notion of ‘operations other than war’. Consequently, such doctrine lacks the clarity required for its proper dissemination.

Notes

Stuart Kinross holds an M.Litt. in Strategic Studies and a PhD in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen. His thesis examined Clausewitz's influence upon US strategic thought between the Vietnam and Gulf wars. He is contributing an article on the application of Clausewitz to US Army doctrine during the 1980s to a forthcoming issue of the US Army journal, Military Review. He currently works as a senior defence analyst with the National Audit Office in London.

Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey's 1991). In the United States, this was published as the Transformation of War. Steven Metz, ‘Review Essay – A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century Warfare’, Parameters 24/4 (Winter 1994–95) pp.124–32. Edward Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 74/3 (May–June 1995) pp.109–22. As Metz's piece is a review essay, it does not warrant the same attention as the works of van Creveld and Luttwak.

Roy Godson, ‘Clancy is a better guide than von Clausewitz’, London Daily Telegraph, 13 Sept. 2001.

John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson 1993). Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Stanford UP 1999).

Audrey K. Cronin, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terror’, Survival 44/2 (Summer 2002) p.119. Unfortunately, Cronin does not define when the preceding era was.

Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Agitation’, in Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, trans. and ed. Daniel Moran and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1992) p.346.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 2nd edn., trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1984) pp.586, 589.

Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State – The Man, His Theories, and His Times, 2nd edn. (Princeton UP 1985) p.3.

The term was first used by General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army, whose book, Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping, was published in 1971.

This last point is well made by Harry G. Summers, ‘A War is War is a War is a War’, in Loren B. Thompson (ed.), Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989) pp.27–49. In his analysis of operations by the Imperial German Army in Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century, Trutz von Trotha has argued that pacification has a logic, ‘the violence of which asserts itself in connection with “the occidental war culture and [has] a tendency toward total war’. Trutz von Trotha: ‘“The Fellows Can Just Starve”: On Wars of “Pacification” in the African Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of “Total War”’, in Manfred F. Boemke, Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), Anticipating Total War. The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1999) p.427.

Some would go back even further. For example, Robin Corbett writes that the first documented reference to guerrilla warfare is contained in a Hittite parchment of the fifteenth century BC. Robin Corbett, Guerrilla Warfare: From 1939 to the Present Day (London: Guild Publishing 1986).

As shown by Peter Paret, ‘The Relationship between the American Revolutionary War and European Military Thought and Practice’, in Peter Paret, Understanding War – Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power (Princeton UP 1992) pp.26–38.

Werner Hahlweg, ‘Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare’, in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (London: Frank Cass 1986) p.128. Paret (note 7) p.190.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.479.

Ibid.

Ibid. pp.77, 78, 80 (emphasis in the original). The introduction of dialectical thinking into Clausewitz's work through the use of theses and antitheses, notably that of absolute war and real war, has been distorted somewhat by later theories of total war and limited war.

Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford UP 2001) pp.217–52. Paret (note 7) pp.331–55. Clausewitz (note 6), ‘Note of 10 July 1827’, p.69.

Ibid., pp.81, 89.

Ibid., p.610. Recent studies by Azar Gat and Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria II, US Army, suggest that an undated note by Clausewitz, which accompanies that of 1827 in the introduction to On War and which it has been assumed was written in 1830, is a crucial piece of evidence in trying to establish the parameters of Clausewitz's thought. Gat has convincingly argued that the undated note was in fact written prior to the note of 1827 and that consequently On War is more complete than is normally assumed. In the undated note, Clausewitz calls Book Six ‘only a sketch’, which he intended to rewrite entirely. In the note of 1827, he writes of the first six books of On War as requiring a thorough revision so as to clarify the two kinds of war. The undated note refers to a number of ‘propositions’ that Clausewitz believed could form the basis of a theory of war for what we would now call the operational level of war. None of the propositions make any distinction between conducting the two kinds of war nor do any have particular relevance to LIC. Clausewitz (note 6), ‘Unfinished [sic] Note, Presumably Written in 1830’, pp.70–71. Antulio J. Echevarria II, ‘Clausewitz: Toward A Theory of Applied Strategy’, Defense Analysis 11/3 (1995) pp.229–40. Gat (note 16) pp.257–65.

I am grateful to Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria II for this insight regarding Clausewitz's thinking. Antulio J. Echevarria II, e-mail to the author, 7 Aug. 2002.

Van Creveld informs us that On War has been translated into several languages ranging from Hebrew to Indonesian. Van Creveld (note 1) p.34. By 1989, the Howard and Paret translation had sold some 40,000 copies. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945 (NY: Oxford UP 1994).

Van Creveld (note 1) p.161. Emphasis in original.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.105. Bartov cited by McGregor Knox, ‘The Prussian idea of freedom and the “career open to talent”: Battlefield initiative and social ascent from Prussian reform to Nazi revolution, 1807 to 1944’, in McGregor Knox, Common Destiny – Dictatorship, Foreign-Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2000) pp.186–226.

Van Creveld (note 1) p.57. Van Creveld overlooks Clausewitz's allusion to the Tartars who more closely resembled a tribal organization than they did a proper state.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.89. This point is emphasized in Alan D. Beyerchen, ‘Chance and Complexity in the Real World: Clausewitz on the Nonlinear Nature of War’, International Security (Winter 1992–93) pp.59–90. Christopher Bassford's translation of wunderliche dreifaltigkeit as ‘fascinating trinity’ is more satisfactory than Howard and Paret's ‘paradoxical trinity’ as it better conveys the compatibility of the metaphor with the unpredictability of war. Christopher Bassford, ‘Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity’, Internet, < www.cl.com/CWZHOME/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm > , accessed 25 Nov. 2002.

Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, Parameters 25/3 (Autumn 1995) p.10. My emphasis. Harry S. Summers, On Strategy – A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio 1982).

Martin van Creveld, ‘The Transformation of War Revisited’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 13/2 (Summer 2002) p.8.

Luttwak (note 1).

Ibid. p.117.

Gat (note 16) p.672.

Luttwak (note 1) p.118.

The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of Sept. 2002 makes the doctrine of pre-emption explicit: ‘[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against … terrorists …’, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House Sept. 2002) p.6.

This includes a presentation of Clausewitz as the pitiless, ideological father of Total War, a narrow-minded officer bound by the restrictions of his regimental caste, who was both ‘unpromoted’ and ‘unhonoured’. Keegan (note 3) p.19. Anyone seeking the truth about Clausewitz, an extremely well-educated man, would do far better to read the interpretation of his life in Paret (note 7).

Michael L.R. Smith, ‘Guerrillas in the mist: reassessing strategy and low intensity warfare’, Review of International Studies 1 (2003) p.36. Keegan (note 3) pp.55–6.

Keegan (note 3) p.58.

Examples of such literature, written prior to the publication of Keegan's work, include Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford UP 1989), which has since been published as part of Gat, A History of Military Thought (note 16); Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford UP 1983); and Peter Paret, ‘Clausewitz: Life and Thought’, in Paret, Understanding War (note 11) pp.95–122. Earlier misinterpretations include the work of Basil H. Liddell Hart and J.J. Graham's 1908 English edition of On War, which Keegan cites in preference to the far more reliable edition by Howard and Paret (note 6).

Keegan (note 3) pp.16–17.

Ibid. p.17.

Van Creveld (note 26).

Kaldor (note 3) p.110.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.484 (emphasis in original).

Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Third World War?’ Survival 43/4 (Winter 2001) p.74. An excellent treatment of the connection between weak states and terrorism is Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvodsev, ‘Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?’ Washington Quarterly 25/3 (Summer 2002) pp.97–108.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.596. Clausewitz did advocate that, where feasible, the weight of the enemy's force should be reduced to as few centres of gravity as possible, ideally one. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Sept. 2002) pp.9–11.

Ibid., p.18. John Simpson, ‘Bin Laden search lets Afghanistan's war wounds heal’, London Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 2002.

Clausewitz (note 6) p.255. This citation is as perfect a summation of the contemporary notion of effects-based warfare as one could hope for.

John C. Buckley II, A Model of Insurgency: Reflections of Clausewitz's ‘Paradoxical Trinity’ – Lessons for Operational Planners Considering Conventional Forces in Unconventional Operations (School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas US Army Command and General Staff College May 1995) pp.10–11. Clausewitz (note 6) p.89.

Ibid., pp.567–9.

Ibid., p.570. The culminating point of the attack is discussed at p.528.

Daniel J. Schuster, Achieving Victory in Peace Operations: An Application for Clausewitz's Theory on Culmination (SAMS monograph, Dec. 1994) p.9.

Cited by CALL 90-4: Low-Intensity Conflict, Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth KS 1990) Internet, < http://call.army.mil/call/ctc_bull/90-4/90-4note.htm > , accessed 21 March 2000.

Rod Paschall, ‘Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine: Who Needs It?’, Parameters 15/3 (Autumn 1985) p.41. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (NY: Macmillan 1967) p.161. However, these authors overlook the wider ‘social’ significance of Clausewitz.

Cited by Harry G. Summers, ‘Principles of War and Low-Intensity Conflict’, Military Review 65/3 (March 1985) p.44.

Paschall (note 50) p.43.

Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver – Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio 1991) pp.228–9.

Smith (note 33) p.31.

Avi Kober, ‘Low-intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap Between Theory and Practice?’, Defense and Security Analysis 18/1 (2002) p.19. J. Tashjean, The Transatlantic Clausewitz (Carlisle, PA: US Army Military History Institute 1982).

Clausewitz cited by Departments of the Army and Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington DC, 5 Dec. 1990, Introduction.

John E. Shepherd, ‘‘On War’: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?’, Parameters 20/3 (Sept. 1990) p.86.

Steven Metz, ‘US Strategy and the Changing LIC Threat’, Military Review 71/6 (June 1991) p.26.

Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington DC: June 2001) pp.1–14, 1–15. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 Sept. 2001, p.I–3 (emphasis in original).

Ibid. The manual reads ‘those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing [the use of force] should remember Clausewitz's dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare’ (emphasis in original).

Clausewitz, On War (note 6) p.231.

Robert F. Baumann, ‘Historical Perspectives on Future War’, Military Review 77/2 (March–April 1997), Internet, < www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/marapr97/baumann.htm > , accessed 14 Feb. 2002.

Kober (note 55) pp.20–21.

Cited by Ahmed S. Hashim, ‘The World According to Usama bin Laden’, Naval War College Review 54/4 (Autumn 2001) p.26.

Gat (note 16) p.334.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stuart Kinross

Stuart Kinross holds an M.Litt. in Strategic Studies and a PhD in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen. His thesis examined Clausewitz's influence upon US strategic thought between the Vietnam and Gulf wars. He is contributing an article on the application of Clausewitz to US Army doctrine during the 1980s to a forthcoming issue of the US Army journal, Military Review. He currently works as a senior defence analyst with the National Audit Office in London.