Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush Administration's Post-September 11 Security Strategy

Abstract

The current Bush Administration considers ‘outlaw regimes’ and their terrorist clients acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the gravest danger to international security. Thus, arms control, proliferation and terrorism are inextricably linked. The administration also believes that arms control and non-proliferation, as traditionally practiced, do not provide effective tools for preventing WMD spread. As evidenced in Iraq, Washington subscribes to an interventionist policy of rolling back WMD programs it considers threatening. This article examines the logic that underpins US arms control and proliferation thinking and considers the implications of US policy for relations with other states deemed to be proliferation risks.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Dr Pete Lentini, Dr Andy Butfoy and Mr Raphael Della Ratta for comments on earlier versions of this article. The research was supported by a grant from the Monash Research Fund.

Notes

Andrew Newman gained his PhD from Monash University in 2001. His thesis examined the role of the US Congress in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with the former Soviet Union. Following this he spent three months working with the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council in Washington DC. He is currently a Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Global Terrorism Research Unit in Monash University's School of Political and Social Inquiry.

Jeffrey Larsen, ‘Introduction’, in Larsen (ed), Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) p.1.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, ‘Statement on the US – Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions’, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington DC, at < www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/11735pf.htm > (9 July 2002).

See, e.g., The Office of the President of the United States of America, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Feb. 2003.

Jonathan Holmes, ‘Four Corners: Interview with Douglas Feith’, at < http://abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030310_american_dreamers/int_feith.htm > (21 Feb. 2003).

The White House, ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address’, at < www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/01/20020129-11.html > (29 Jan. 2002).

‘The International Aspects of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Remarks of John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State to the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism: Mitigation and Response, Washington DC, at < http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2002/1101/epf502.htm > (1 Nov. 2002).

US Department of State Washington File, ‘Transcript – Interview: Under Secretary John Bolton on US Arms Control Policy’, at < http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/www01081501.html > (15 Aug. 2001).

Senator Richard Lugar, ‘Reducing the Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction and Building a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism’, speech delivered at the Moscow Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference, see at < http://lugar.senate.gov/052702.html > (27 May 2002).

The White House, ‘President Delivers State of the Union’, at < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01.20030128-19.html > (28 Jan. 2003).

Excluding Iraq, unless otherwise referenced, all information is taken from Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001, at < www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_woo3.htm > (Jan. 2003).

Unless otherwise referenced, all information on Iraq is taken from Director of Central Intelligence, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, at < www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm > (Oct. 2002).

Director of Central Intelligence (note 10).

‘Powell's Address, Presenting “Deeply Troubling” Evidence on Iraq’, at < www.nytimes.com > (6 Feb. 2003).

In his address to the United Nations Security Council on 3 Feb. 2003, documenting Iraq's violations of UN resolutions relating to WMD, Colin Powell referred to an UNSCOM estimate that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 litres of anthrax. Ibid.

Members of the Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team-Charlie found parts of three mobile biological weapons laboratories in Iraq. See CIA/DIA, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, at < www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html > (28 May 2003).

‘Powell's Address’ (note 13).

Ibid.

Powell cites UNMOVIC's finding that Iraq imported, despite sanctions, 380 rocket engines for possible use in the Al Samoud 2 missile. Ibid. See also Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr Hans Blix, The Security Council: An Update on Inspection, at < www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/B × 27.htm > (27 Jan. 2003).

Transactions whereby North Korea provided ballistic missile parts to Pakistan in return for gas centrifuges and other equipment necessary to enrich uranium is detailed in David Sanger, ‘In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter’, at < www.nytimes.com > (24 Nov. 2002).

Bill Gertz, ‘CIA shifts on North Korean nukes’, at < www.washingtontimes.com > (4 July 2003).

Larry Niksch, ‘North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program’, Congressional Research Service – Issue Brief for Congress, updated 22 Jan. 2003, p.6; This figure was reiterated by DCI George Tenet in Feb. 2003. ‘Tenet: North Korea has ballistic missile capable of hitting US’, at < www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/12.us.nkorea > (12 Feb. 2003).

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, p.11, at < www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf > (Jan. 2001). The CIA's analysis of North Korea does not include chemical weapons programs.

Ibid. pp.10–11. The CIA's analysis of North Korea does not include biological weapons programs.

National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, National Foreign Intelligence Board < www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.htm > (Dec. 2001). The NIC estimates that by using a third stage similar to that used on the Taepo Dong-1 in 1998, the Taepo Dong-2 range could be extended to 15,000km – ‘sufficient to strike all of North America’.

It has been estimated that India has produced enough fissile material for 45–95 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only 30–35. ‘Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945–2002’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58/6 (Nov.–Dec. 2002) p.103.

Proliferation (note 22) pp.24–25. The CIA's analysis does not include India's chemical and biological weapons programs.

Foreign Missile Developments (note 24); Federation of American Scientists, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction – Agni’, at < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/agni.htm > (20 April 2003).

Federation of American Scientists, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction – Sagarika/Dhanush’, at < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/sagarika.htm > (20 April 2003).

It has been estimated that Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30–52 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only 24–48. ‘Global nuclear stockpiles’ (note 25) p.103.

Proliferation (note 22) p.28. The CIA's analysis of Pakistan does not include chemical and biological weapons programs.

Missile ranges are taken from Federation of American Scientists, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction – Pakistan’ < www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/ > (20 April 2003). The FAS also reports that Pakistan has imported and tested the 1,500 km range North Korean Nodong missile under the designation ‘Ghauri’ and may be developing ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 4,000 km.

At that time, George H.W. Bush was Director of Central Intelligence, Donald Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense and Dick Cheney was Chief of Staff.

The Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee was established to provide the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy and Under Secretaries for Policy with ‘independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy’. Charter: Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, at < www.odam.osd.mil/omp/pdf/412.pdf > (3 Aug. 2001). Board members include Harold Brown, Newt Gingrich, Henry Kissinger, Dan Quayle, James Schlesinger, George Schultz, Brent Scowcroft and James Woolsey. Former Reagan Administration officials include Kenneth Adelman (ACDA director), Richard Allen (National Security Adviser), Fred Iklé (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) and Henry Rowen (Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee).

It was reported that in Dec. 2001, President Bush met with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. During a discussion of Saddam Hussein, Saleh quoted a Yemeni proverb, which cautioned that if you put a cat into cage, it can turn into a lion. Bush replied, ‘This cat has rabies. The only way to cure the cat is to cut off its head.’ Patrick Tyler, ‘Yemen, an Uneasy Ally, Proves Adept at Playing Off Old Rivals’ < www.nytimes.com > (19 Dec. 2002).

Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (NY: Random House 1985) p.xii. Elsewhere in the book, Talbott is more plain-spoken, observing that the Reagan Administration ‘came into office not really wanting to pursue arms control at all’. Ibid. p.7.

‘Moderate internationalist’ is taken from Joseph Cirincione, ‘How Will The Iraq War Change Global Nonproliferation Strategies?’, at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/cirincione_apr03.asp > (April 2003).

The apparent fate of the UN was greeted with enthusiasm and relief by Richard Perle. See his ‘Thank God for the death of the UN’, at < www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,918764,00.html > (21 March 2003).

John Isaacs, ‘Bush II or Reagan III?’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57/3 (May–June 2001) p.31.

United Nations, The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NY: UN Department of Public Information 1995) p.30.

Prepared Statement by Ambassador Robert Joseph, Director, Counterproliferation Center, National Defense University before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Armed Services Committee (Washington DC: United States Senate, 23 March 1999).

‘Expounding Bush's Approach To US Nuclear Security: An Interview With John R. Bolton’, at < http://armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.htm > (March 2002). See also comments by Donald Rumsfeld and Chief-of-Staff Andrew Card in Pamela Hess, ‘US unlikely to use nukes against Iraq’, at < www.washingtontimes.com > (13 Feb. 2003). It has been reported that, in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the Indian army's chief of staff drew a slightly different lesson: ‘Never fight the US without nuclear weapons’. Lewis Dunn, ‘New Nuclear Threats to US Security’, in Robert Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds.), New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for US Policy (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) p.41.

Stephen Cambone, ‘An Inherent Lesson in Arms Control’, The Washington Quarterly 23/2 (Spring 2000) p.210.

Ibid. p.218.

Douglas Feith, ‘Special Briefing on the Russian Visit’, US Department of Defense, News Transcript < www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fcb.html > (16 Jan. 2002).

Ibid. This was not completely novel thinking. The first Bush Administration grasped the inability of traditional arms control to meet the exigencies of the post-Cold War environment as evidenced by its decision to withdraw all theatre and tactical nuclear weapons, excluding air-delivered nuclear weapons in Europe, in Sept. 1991. These withdrawals occurred in both Europe and Korea – one of the most senior US officials to the consultations with South Korea on this issue was Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

National Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, Vol. 1, Executive Report (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, Jan. 2001) p.4.

Ibid. p.3.

Ibid. p.13.

Ibid. pp.15–16. Emphasis added.

Ibid. p.9.

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, A Report of the Project for the New American Century, pp.7–8, at < www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf > (Sept. 2000).

Under Secretary of State John Bolton, while not contributing directly to the Sept. 2000 report, serves as a director. Other members of The Project for the New American Century include Cheney, Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman.

William Kaufmann, a Pentagon consultant during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, disparagingly remarked: ‘It strikes me that the whole nuclear crowd was left to their own devices to write this report – the chaps from the weapons labs and the people involved with nuclear strategy – and they all got together and said, “Let's shoot the works. Let's see how much we can get within the wretched constraint of 1,700 warheads.”’ Fred Kaplan, ‘US see wider scope for nuclear arms’, at < www.boston.com/ > (17 March 2002).

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], at < www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm > (8 Jan. 2002).

US Department of Defense, News Transcript, ‘Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review’, at < www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html > (9 Jan. 2002).

Carnegie Endowment (note 54). According to the Federation of American Scientists, the objective of ‘agent defeat’ weapons is to destroy, disable or denying use of chemical and biological agent munition production facilities and stockpiles with minimal agent dispersion. < www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/adw.htm > (2 May 2003).

Charles Ferguson, ‘Issue Brief: Nuclear Posture Review’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies < www.nti.org/e_research/e3_15b.html > (Aug. 2002); DoD (note 55).

The Office of the President of the United States of America, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sept. 2002, p.6.

All information is taken from Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, at < www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm > (15 July 1998), and ‘Remarks of the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld’, Center for Security Policy, reprinted in The Rumsfeld Commission Report, US Senate, at < http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r105:3:./temp/∼r105166TjY:e0 > (14 Oct. 1998).

The Commission stated that the divergence between its findings and the more sanguine Intelligence Community estimates stemmed primarily from its use of a ‘more comprehensive methodology’, including the realization that missile and WMD programs in proliferation-risk countries no longer follow patterns set by the United States and USSR. This accusation – that the Intelligence Community was ‘mirror-imaging’, or attributing to other decision-makers behavior that would be expected of their US counterparts in comparable circumstances – was precisely the same charge levelled at the Intelligence Community by the members of ‘Team B’; three teams of conservative experts who conducted competitive analyses the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate in the areas of Soviet air defenses, missile accuracy and strategic objectives in 1976. Importantly, Paul Wolfowitz served on ‘Team B’. ‘Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View Report of Team B’ in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces 1950–1983 (Washington DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA 1996) p.366.

The Office of the President of the United States of America, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 2002, p.1.

National Security Strategy (note 58) p.14.

National Strategy (note 3) pp.9–10.

Richard Davis, Director, Office of Strategic Negotiations and Implementation, Bureau of Arms Control, US Department of State, ‘Nuclear Offensive Arms Reductions – Past And Present’, at < http://usinfo.state.gov/ > (22 July 2002).

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Washington, DC, 24 May 2002, Article I.

See Ken Luongo and Ian Davis, ‘Bush-Putin Summit Fails to Bury the Cold War’, BASIC Note 22, at < www.basicint.org/bushputin.htm > (May 2002). Indeed, the US wanted an informal agreement but agreed to make SORT legally binding as a ‘concession’ to Russia.

See Defense Threat Reduction Agency, ‘Russia: Fissile Material Storage Facility’, at < www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projrus/ctr_fissile_storage.html > (24 April 2003); Jon Wolfsthal, Cristina-Astrid Chuen and Emily Ewell Daughtry (eds.), Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, No. 6 (Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001) pp.60–62.

See comments of General-Colonel Yuriy Baluyevskiy, 1st Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, as reported in Merle Kellerhals Jnr, ‘US, Russian Defense Officials Conclude Early Arms Talks’, CDI Russia Weekly #189, at < www.cdi.org/russia/189-8.cfm > (17 Jan. 2002).

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Washington, DC, 24 May 2002.

See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President George Bush, ‘Missile Defense’, Remarks to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, at < www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/2873pf.htm > (1 May 2001); Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, ‘Remarks by the Representative of the US to the 57th Session of the United Nations First Committee’, New York, at < www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/14161pf.htm > (3 Oct. 2003); Powell (note 2).

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty’, at < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html > (13 Dec. 2001).

Bush, ‘Missile Defense’ (note 70).

Cambone (note 42) pp.209–10.

John Wolf, ‘American Policy: Future Priorities – Reinforcing Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation’ Remarks to Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Washington DC, at < www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/17379pf.htm > (29 Jan. 2003).

The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (US Department of Energy, 10 Jan. 2001) pp.iii–iv.

Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn, ‘Threat Reduction: Reform and Revitalization Required’, at < www.ransac.org/new-web-site/index.html > (25 March 2003); William Hoehn, ‘Impediments to Progress: US Political Support for Nonproliferation Programs’, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Joint Working Group, Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade, 14 Nov. 2002, p.41.

See David Ruppe, ‘US-Russia: Nunn, Lugar Say Nuclear Proliferation Should be US Top Priority’, Global Security Newswire, at < www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/3/13/5p.html > (13 March 2003).

Philipp Bleek, ‘Threat Reduction Boosted By Policy Review, Spending Bills’, at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/tredjanfeb02.asp > (Jan.–Feb. 2002).

William Hoehn, ‘Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests for US–Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation Programs’, at < www.ransac.org/new-web-site/related/congress/status/fy2003doe_0402.html > (April 2003).

Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph Biden in ‘Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat’, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate, 107th Congress 2nd Session, Hrg. 107-575, 6 March 2002, p.3.

All figures are taken from Hoehn (note 79).

All figures are taken from Office of Management and Budget, ‘Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004: Department of Energy’, at < www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/energy.html > (21 Aug. 2003).

Arms Control Association, ‘Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological Weapons Nonproliferation’, at < www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwissuebrief.asp > (Sept. 2002); Graham Pearson, Malcolm Dando and Nicholas Sims, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Paper No. 4 – The US Statement at the Fifth Review Conference: Compounding the Error in Rejecting the Composite Protocol (Bradford, UK: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), at < www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_4.pdf > (Jan. 2002).

US Department of State Washington File, ‘Transcript – Bolton Briefing on Biological Weapons Pact’, at < http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2001/1120/epf213.htm > (19 Nov. 2001).

Kerry Boyd, BWC Review Conference Meets, Avoids Verification Issues’, at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/bwc_dec02.asp > (Dec. 2002); Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zlinskas, ‘Assessing US Proposals to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention’, at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/tuczilapril02.asp > (April 2002).

‘Expounding Bush's Approach’ (note 41).

Stephen Hadley, Deputy Assistant to the President, National Security Affairs, Keynote Address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, at < www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conferences%202001/hadley.htm > (18 June 2001). Emphasis in original.

Ibid.

Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff (NY: Council on Foreign Relations 1997).

US Department of State, International Information Programs Washington File, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf, ‘Nonproliferation Policies and Initiatives’, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 19 March 2003.

Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly (Washington, DC: Brookings 2000), p.221; David Halberstam, War In A Time Of Peace (NY: Scribner 2001) pp.452, 462, 468–70; and Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars (NY: Viking 2003) p.641.

Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington DC, at < www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/toc.html > (1997).

US Department of State, International Information Programs Washington File, Veterans of Foreign Wars Remarks, United States Department of Defense Speech By Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington DC, 11 March 2003.

Preventatively striking a nuclear weapons program is not new. In April 1979, ‘unidentified’ saboteurs destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor core in France, ‘only hours before it was due to be shipped to Iraq’ and on 7 June 1981, Israeli F-16s, escorted by F-15s, destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor, in Tuwaitah (near Baghdad) before it could become operational. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (NY: Times Books 1981) pp.5–10. Israel's unilateral preventative strike as a superior alternative to an ineffective multilateral arms control regime has been noted approvingly by Richard Perle. See his ‘Good guys, bad guys and arms control’ in Ian Anthony and Adam Rotfeld (eds.), SIPRI, A Future Arms Control Agenda (Oxford: Oxford UP 2001) p.49.

US Department of State, International Information Programs, ‘Byliner: Under Secretary Bolton on North Korea, Iraq’ < http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/bolton.htm > (13 March 2003). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly expressed the same sentiment: ‘If North Korea gains from its violations, others may conclude that the violation route is cost free. Deterrence would be undermined and our nonproliferation efforts – more critical than ever – would be grossly jeopardized.’ US Department of State, International Information Programs, ‘Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula’, Prepared Statement of James Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 12 March 2003.

David E. Sanger, ‘Bush's Doctrine for War’, at < www.nytimes.com > (18 March 2003).

Ibid.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recently observed that the proliferation challenges of today and tomorrow demand new structures rather than relying on solutions of the past. It was the inability of the system currently in place to deal with nations who move beyond ‘certain milestones’ in developing WMD that led to the requirement for military intervention in Iraq. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Richard Armitage, ‘Iraq and the Global Challenge of Proliferation’, National Defense University, Washington, DC, at < www.usinfo.state.gov > (30 April 2003). I am indebted to Mr Raphael Della Ratta of RANSAC for bringing this speech to my attention.

Wolf (note 74). On 19 March 2003, Wolf told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US was ‘determined to do what it takes to push back’ the efforts of North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Wolf (note 90).

Tim Johnson, ‘US views Iran's nuclear program as serious threat’, at < www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5530886.htm > (1 April 2003).

REUTERS, ‘US Tells Iran, Syria, N. Korea “Learn from Iraq”’, at < www.nytimes.com > (9 April 2003).

During that speech, Dr El Baradei observed that the nuclear arms control regime was currently being challenged and was clearly under stress. IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, ‘Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors’, Vienna, at < www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n008.shtml > (17 March 2003); Paul Kerr, ‘IAEA “Taken Aback” By Speed Of Iran's Nuclear Program’, at < www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/iran_apr03.asp > (April 2003).

Director of Central Intelligence (note 10); Eric Schmitt, ‘2 US Officers Expect More North Korean “Provocations”’, at < www.nytimes.com > (13 March 2003).

‘IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea’, Media Advisory 2003/48, at < www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2003/med-advise_048.shtml > (12 Feb. 2003).

The term ‘coercive cooperation’ – ‘to pressure the target … to adjust internal or external policies’ – is taken from Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton UP 1992) p.4.

The Institute for Science and International Security has assessed that North Korea is likely capable of deploying nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan. David Albright, ISIS Issue Brief: North Korea's Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks, at < www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/currentandfutureweaponsstocks.html > (15 Jan. 2003).

Michael Levi has suggested that in the case of North Korea, military action “though unpalatable, was a genuine alternative” in 1994. The nuclear landscape has changed so dramatically since this time that such a solution is no loner a viable option. Michael Levi, ‘Off Target’, The New Republic, reprinted at < www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030324-newrep.htm > (24 March 2003).

Yossef Bodansky, ‘Iran’, What's Next? – Journal of Future Directions International (Claremont, WA, Australia) March 2003, p.6.

The US presence in Herat only reinforces Tehran's determination to act decisively. Ibid. p.7.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The day after Bush's admission, the Pentagon announced that 24 B-52 and B-1 bombers would be sent to Guam as an insurance policy against North Korean ‘opportunism’ if military action began in Iraq. David Sanger and Thom Shanker, ‘US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans’, at < www.nytimes.com > (5 March 2003).

James Dao, ‘Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea’, at < www.nytimes.com > (7 Feb. 2003).

Kelly (note 95).

Bob Woodward, Bush At War (NY: Simon & Schuster 2002) p.340.

James Dao, ‘US Planning Sanctions Against North Korea’, at < www.nytimes.com > (17 Feb. 2003).

DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing, ‘The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World’, at < www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02112003.html > (11 Feb. 2003).

George Perkovich has argued that the US possession of nuclear weapons, and their centrality to US national security, legitimizes these weapons and makes them attractive to other countries. ‘The proliferation threat thus stems from the existence and possession of nuclear weapons and theft-prone materials, not merely from the intentions of today's “axis of evil”’. Perkovich, ‘Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation’, Foreign Affairs 82/2 (March–April 2003) p.4.

‘Bolton Briefing’ (note 84)

Quoted in Jack Mendelsohn, ‘Is Arms Control Dead?’ Issues in Science and Technology, at < www.nap.edu/issues/17.3/mendelsohn/htm > (Spring 2001).

The Administration's focus has already squarely shifted to Syria and Iran. See Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, ‘Bush Demands “Cooperation” From Syrians’, at < www.nytimes.com > (14 April 2003); ‘Colin Powell's Terror Warning’, at < www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/31/attack/main546906.shtml > (31 March 2003).

See United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, at < www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf/ > (April 2003); Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002, at < www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm > (April 2003).

Richard Perle, ‘How the United States Can Best Deal with Terrorism’, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Washington DC, at < www.aei.org/news/newsID.16489/news_detail.asp > (16 April 2002).

A commission on US national security chaired by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman predicted in Feb. 2001 that America would become ‘increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack’ and that military superiority would not ‘entirely protect’ the homeland. The commission counselled that America could not ‘secure and advance its own interests in isolation’. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Washington DC, pp.2, 5, at < www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf > (15 Feb. 2001).

Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002), p.35.

Ibid. p.158.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrew Newman

Andrew Newman gained his PhD from Monash University in 2001. His thesis examined the role of the US Congress in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with the former Soviet Union. Following this he spent three months working with the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council in Washington DC. He is currently a Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Global Terrorism Research Unit in Monash University's School of Political and Social Inquiry.