Introduction: Information Resources and Military Performance

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Matthew Werstein provided research assistance. Andrew Knepinevich and Andew Ross provided valuable comments. Mr Andrew Marshall, Director, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Net Assessment) provided funds to support a workshop that resulted in this special issue.

Notes

Leon Goure and Michael Deane, ‘The Soviet Strategic View’, Strategic Review 12/3 (Summer 1984) pp.80–94.

Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1993); Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.30–42; Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March–April 1996) pp.37–54; Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, ‘America's Information Edge’, Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March–April 1996) pp.20–36; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’, Comparative Strategy 12/2 (1993) pp.141–65; National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense Report: National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel (Dec. 1997) pp.57–86.

Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy Carlisle Barracks, PA (US Army War College, Nov. 2002).

Kenneth E. Knight and Reuben R. McDaniel, Jr., Organizations: An Information Systems Perspective (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc. 1979) pp.19–34.

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)’ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001) pp.1–25. They point out on p.11 that new technologies, while enabling for organizational networking, are not absolutely necessary for it.

Michael O'Hanlon, ‘Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?’, Foreign Policy 113 (Winter 1998–99) pp.72–86; A.J. Bacevich, ‘Preserving the Well-Bred Horse’, The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.43–9; Stephen Biddle, ‘Assessing Theories of Future Warfare’, Security Studies 8/1 (Autumn 1998) pp.1–74; Brian R. Sullivan, ‘What Distinguishes a Revolution in Military affairs from a Military-Technical Revolution?’, paper presented at the Joint Center for International and Security Studies–Security Studies Conference on the Revolution in Military Affairs, Monterey, CA (26–29 Aug. 1996); Alex Roland, ‘Comparing Military Revolutions’, paper presented at the Joint Center for International and Security Studies–Security Studies Conference on the Revolution in Military Affairs, Monterey, CA (26–29 Aug. 1996); Colin S. Gray, ‘The Changing Nature of Warfare?’, Naval War College Review 49/2 (Spring 1996) pp.7–22.

Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, ‘Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare’, in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050 (Cambridge: CUP 2001) pp.1–14.

For the most convincing case that the information revolution does represent such a cataclysmic event, see Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volumes I, II and III (London: Blackwell 1996, 1997, 1998).

Many prominent RMA commentators, such as Colin S. Gray, Andrew Krepinevich and Michael O'Hanlon, argue a current RMA has not yet occurred, that many technologies are simply being used on existing platforms without changes in doctrine or organization.

Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000) pp.90–96.

Many causes are not by themselves necessary or sufficient for a particular outcome, but they are nonetheless causally related to at least some instances of a phenomenon. That is to say, cause A may be a necessary component of a conjunction of variables that produce the outcome, but there may be alternative conjunctions of variables of which A is not a part, that also produce the outcome.

Lambert argues that the introduction of the all big-gun battleship was not revolutionary. The Dreadnought represented an improved battleship design built to perform traditional functions more effectively.

Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science Review 64/4 (1970) pp.1033–53.

Richard Harknett and the JCISS Study Group, ‘The Risks of a Networked Military’, Orbis 44 (Winter 2000) pp.127–43.

See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn. (1st edn. 1962) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1970).

See Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1999).

One example might be the underdeveloped concept of network-centric warfare. See Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Naval Transformation: Prospects and Implications’, paper prepared for The Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, 29 Aug.–1 Sept. 2002.

Chris Demchak, ‘Watersheds in Perception and Knowledge’, draft paper 2000. For a considered discussion of the meaning of military effectiveness, see Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, ‘Fighting Power: The Causes and Consequences of Military Effectiveness’, draft, Aug. 2003

Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, ‘Military Organizations in the Information Age: Lessons from the World of Business’ in Zalmay Khalilzad, John P. White and Andrew W. Marshall, Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1999) pp.335–7.

Alan Beyerchen, ‘From Radar to Radio: Interwar Military Adaptation to Technological Change in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States’ in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: CUP 1996).

John J. Garstka ‘Network-Centric Warfare Offers Warfighting Advantage: Datalinks are the New Weapon of the Information Age’, Signal Forum: Network-Centric Warfare Pro & Con, < www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ncw/ncw-forum.htm > .

Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘The Unfinished Revolution in Military Affairs’, Issues in Science & Technology Online 19/4 (Summer 2003), < www.nap.edu/issues/19.4/krepinevich.html > .

Max Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’, Foreign Affairs 82/4 (July/Aug. 2003) pp.41–59.

Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002) p.150.

Harknett et. al. (note 14).

Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2000) p.66.

Ibid.

Martin C. Libicki, ‘Information and Nuclear RMAs Compared’, Strategic Forum 82 (July 1996) pp.3–4, < www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/forum82.htm > .

Denning (note 16).

Lambert argues that Jellicoe tried to reduce the information load and control the fleet not with wireless but with flag signals, in the belief that it was impossible to control a combined arms fleet with wireless.