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Abstract
This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist Footnote1 insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of ‘disaggregation’ that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad.Footnote2 Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war – a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.
Notes
1 In this article, the term ‘Islamist’ describes the extremist, radical form of political Islam practiced by some militant groups, as distinct from ‘Islamic’, which describes the religion of Islam, or ‘Muslim’, which describes those who follow the Islamic religion. In this article the term is used to refer primarily to Al Qaeda, its allies and affiliates.
2 This article uses the short form of the Islamic term jihad to mean ‘lesser jihad’ (armed struggle against unbelievers), rather than ‘greater jihad’ (jihad fi sabilillah), i.e. moral struggle for the righteousness of God.
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princetown, NJ: Princeton UP 1989) p.88.
4 Muslims disagree over precisely who can issue a fatwa. It is generally agreed, however, that only an Islamic cleric can issue such a religious ruling, and only the legitimate ruler of a Muslim state can issue a call to jihad. In this sense, by issuing a call to jihad in the form of a fatwa, bin Laden was claiming both religious and temporal authority. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 2003). See also Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2001).
5 See collected Al Qaeda statements available at <www.siteinstitute.org> for a variety of references to bin Laden as emir or sheikh in official Al Qaeda communiqués.
6 Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘Knights under the Prophet's Banner’, in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2 Dec. 2001.
7 See < http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications9504&Category=publications&Subcategory=0>.
8 The Qur'an is read and studied only in the original Arabic, and strict Islamic religious instruction worldwide is conducted in Arabic. Vernacular translations of the Qur'an are not considered to be genuine copies of the Book. Thus Arabic language is fundamental in the Muslim worldview.
9 Michael Vlahos, Terror's Mask: Insurgency within Islam (Laurel, MD: Occasional Paper, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 2002).
10 See Overseas Security Advisory Council, Chechen Female Suicide Bombers, at <www.ds-osac.org>.
11 For detailed open-source descriptions of Al Qaeda planning and operational methods see Bergen (note 1). See also Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qa'eda (NY: Columbia UP 2002) and Jane Corbin, The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror (London: Pocket Books 2003).
12 Pers. Comm. confidential source, May 2004.
13 For a listing of Islamist propaganda websites and produces, see <www.internet-haganah.com>.
14 See <www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs> for a series of extracts from Al Qaeda's operational manual. See <www.siteinstitute.org/terroristpublications.html> for a series of translated summaries of al-Battar.
15 For a detailed discussion of Hizbullah's global reach, see Ely Karmon, Fight on All Fronts: Hizballah, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2003).
16 See Karl Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1980).
17 Recent research on Al Qaeda operational patterns tends to support this view. See David Ronfeldt, ‘Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare?’, in First Monday 10/3 (March 2005), at <http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/index.html>.
18 This definition and that of terrorism, which follows, were developed specifically for this article. Both were derived through synthesising several definitions used in the Western intelligence and security communities.
19 See Thomas A. Marks, ‘Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold war Distortions?’, in Small Wars and Insurgencies 15/1 (Spring 2004) p.107.
20 As expressed in statements by bin Laden, particularly the World Islamic Front Declaration of War against Jews and Crusaders. See also comments in Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists’, in Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21 (2004) pp.3–15, 2004.
21 Ajai Sahni, ‘Social Science and Contemporary Conflicts: The Challenge of Research on Terrorism’ at South Asia Terrorism Portal <www.satp.org> accessed 10 Nov. 2004. See also F. Schorkopf, ‘Behavioural and Social Science Perspectives on Political Violence’ in C. Walter, S. Vöneky, V. Röben and F. Schorkopf (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag 2003).
22 Federation of Malaya, Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 3rd edn (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer 1958).
23 See Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2004), for a discussion of this concept in relation to counterinsurgency in Malaya and Cyprus.
24 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (NY: Knopf 2003). See also Robert Kagan, America and the World: The Crisis of Legitimacy, 21st Bonython Lecture, 9 Nov. 2004, at <www.cis.org.au>.
25 Pers.comm., senior US government official, Oct. 2004.
26 For a detailed discussion of these concerns see, Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2003).
27 For detailed discussion on the Phoenix Program and the broader CORDS system, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 1995). See also B.R. Brewington, ‘Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement’ at <www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Papers/brewington.pdf>; and S. Metz and R. Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century – Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2004).
28 A. Billingsley, ‘The Native Scene’ in The Diplomat, Aug./Sept. 2004, p.23.
29 Davis and Jenkins (note 20).
30 These insights are based on the author's experience as an advisor with Indonesian Special Forces in 1994–95 and as an instructor with East Timorese irregular troops in 2003. However, almost every military advisor, SF team leader and training team member whom the author has debriefed has raised the same points.
31 For example, in Sept. 2004 the author debriefed an intelligence officer serving in Baghdad, who indicated that local Iraqi security forces' insights into the origins of foreign fighters revolutionized that operator's approach to the problem. Local insights, combined with broader understanding of issues in the global jihad, create powerful synergies.