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Abstract
This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.
Notes
1 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, IL: Chicago UP 1982); Martin van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: Free Press 1989); even then there is considerable leeway in what is ‘material’: McNeill is attentive to the consequences of drill in terms of its effect on morale and cohesion in war; Creveld understates psychological and cognitive requisites or results.
2 See, for example, Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy (Washington, DC: US GPO 1984, originally published 1955); James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953 (Washington, DC: US GPO 1970, originally published 1966); David C. Ruthenberg and Jane S. Allen (eds), The Logistics of Waging War (Gunter Air Force Station, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center 1985); William Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press 1992); Congressional Budget Office, Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, DC: US Congress 1997); Norma Betaque et al., Naval Expeditionary Logistics (Washington, DC: National Research Council 1998).
3 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington, DC: US GPO 1990).
4 Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, Connecticut: Book Club Edition, Greenwood Press 1862, originally 1838), Jomini's sole definition, p.62; the chapter on logistics pp.230–53, but logistics proper restricted to pp.230–32. Jomini pre-empts the chapter on logistics in previous chapters, taking and removing activities from logistics as in pp.44–5, 78–9, pp.91–2; there is no summation.
5 For a broader appreciation of Jomini, see John Brinton, ‘Jomini’, in Edward M. Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1943) pp.77–92; John Shy, ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1986) pp.143–85; and Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (New York: Oxford UP 2001) pp.108–37.
6 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge UP 1977) esp. pp.1–3; Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (New York: Oxford UP 1987); Jones's own definition is inconstant; cf. p.1 with p.45, and pp.49–64 with pp.396–408.
7 George Thorpe, Pure Logistics (Washington, DC: NDU Press 1986, originally published 1917) pp.1–5, p.11, pp.65–7; for his final position, pp.74–85; Kenneth MacKsey, For Want of a Nail: the Impact of War on Logistics and Communications (London: Brassey's 1990) cf. pp.5–6 with pp.8–14, for his final amendment p.194; Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's 1991), esp. pp.3–8; but his final position is expressed in note 10 of Chap. 1, on p.194.
8 Donald Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkley, CA: University of California Press 1978), well summarized in pp.20–22; Jonathan Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Boston, MA: Brill Academic 1998), esp. pp.1–5, review of the literature and focus on supply; for conclusion that no generalization is possible, pp.332–3; Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press 2001), esp. pp.136–8, supply of victuals, see also pp.202 ff, planning.
9 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War (London: Elibron Classics, n.d., originally 1907); The Campaign of Trafalgar (London: AMS Press 1908, 1970); Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1988, originally 1911); Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History – Vols I–IV (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press 1990, originally 1923); T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom – the complete 1922 ‘Oxford’ text (Frodingbridge, J. and N. Wilson 2004, originally 1922).
10 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19th edn. Werner Halweg (ed.), (Troisdorf: Dümmler 1980); Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds), (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP 1976, quotes from 1984 edition). For an appreciation of Clausewitz, see Michael Howard, ‘The Influence of Clausewitz’, pp.27–44 and Bernard Brodie, ‘The Continuing Relevance of On War’, pp.45–58 of the Howard and Paret edition; H. Rothfels, ‘Clausewitz’, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1973, originally 1943), pp.93–113; Peter Paret, ‘Clausewitz’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1986), pp.186–213. See also von Caemmerer, The Development of Strategical Science during the 19th Century (London: Hugh Rees 1905); Michael I. Handel (ed.), Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (London: Frank Cass 1989); Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English (New York: Oxford UP 1994); Gert de Nooy (ed.), The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1997); Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Das Rätsel Clausewitz. Politische Theorie des Kriegs im Widerstreit (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 2001); Uwe Hartman, Carl von Clausewitz and the Making of Modern Strategy (Potsdam: miles-Verlag 2002); Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico 2002); Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
11 Eugenio Diniz, Clausewitz, o Balanço Ataque-Defesa e a Teoria das Relações Internacionais [Clausewitz, the Offense-Defense Balance and International Relations Theory] (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ 2002).
12 Eugenio Diniz and Domício Proença Júnior, ‘A Criterion for Resolving Inconsistencies in On War' (Rio de Janeiro: Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos 2004).
13 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (New York: Oxford UP 2001) pp.257–68.
14 Raymond Aron, Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz, vol 1: L'Âge Européenne (Paris: Gallimard 1976).
15 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York: Oxford UP 1976).
16 Diniz and Proença Júnior (note 12).
17 Clausewitz, On War (note 10); Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (note 10).
18 Howard and Paret chose ‘Warfare’ as the subject of this sentence. However, the original text is: ‘Es gehört also alles zur kriegerischen Tätigkeit, was sich auf die Streitkräfte bezieht, also alles, was zu ihrer Erzeugung, Erhaltung und Verwendung gehört’. [Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p.222] The passage reads: ‘As a result, it includes all that concerns activities in war, everything that has to do with the creation, maintenance and use of fighting forces’. This ‘it’ is precisely Clausewitz definition of the art of war, as shown above.
19 The term in German is Evolution the movement before the forces of the opponent in an engagement. Howard and Paret chose ‘deployment’ and annotated the matter. Clausewitz, On War, p.129.
20 Howard and Paret chose duel for the German word Zweikampf, which means the fight between any two. The issue here is that Zweikampf can be a desperate life-or-death struggle, a martial art competition, or a brawl; thus, the implicit expectations of rule and containment expressed in duel seem to mangle the full course of Clausewitz's point. The present authors chose brawl to divest this fight of any kind of rule. See also [OW I-1–3: 76] for Clausewitz's remarks on the effects of civilization or the lack of it on the destructiveness of war.