How to rethink war: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine1

I would like to thank Drs David H. Dunn, Theo Farrell and Robert Foley, Professor Geoff Till and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Abstract

This article examines the role of ideas in US Army innovation after the Vietnam War. It challenges the view that failure, changes in the strategic environment or technology are the sole drivers of military innovation and analyses the role of ideas and identity in the army's development of AirLand battle doctrine. It highlights how the reform in ideas led to a ‘re-conception’ of the strategic environment, the nature and dynamics of warfare and a change in self-understanding. The organisational reforms embodied these ideas and led to a new way of war practised in the first Gulf War.

Key Words :

• Innovation
• US Army
• AirLand Battle

Notes

I would like to thank Drs David H. Dunn, Theo Farrell and Robert Foley, Professor Geoff Till and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

For example, see the British Army's initial attempts to come to terms with its role in the new conflicts. See Rod Thornton, ‘The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army’, International Peacekeeping 7/2 (2000) pp.41–62.

Emily O. Goldman, ‘New Threats, New Identities, and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 24/2 (2001) pp.43–76. See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (London: Free Press 1991); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999); and Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict (London: Routledge 1997).

David Jablonsky, ‘Army Transformation: A Tale of Two Doctrines’, Parameters 31/3 (2001) p.57.

My forthcoming book US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation. From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2005) is far broader in scope. Historical accounts can be found: John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC 1984); Richard M. Swain, ‘AirLand Battle’, in George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry (eds), Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press 1999) pp.360–402; and Martin J. D'Amato, ‘Vigilant Warrior: General Donn A. Starry's AirLand Battle And How It Changed the Army’, Armor 109/3 (May – June 2000) pp.18–22, 45–6.

See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984) for the classic statement. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991) and Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927–1938 (London: Brassey's 1988) stress the role of the individual, while the cultural aspects are explored in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 2002).

Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War; French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1997) p.12.

For example; the attritional failure of the First World War is often seen as the source of innovation for restoring manoeuvre and mobility to the battlefield, especially with the development of Blitzkrieg by Germany. Rosen points out that failure can in fact lead not to innovation but to reinforcing more failure, especially as bureaucracies are designed not to change. Rosen, Winning The Next War (note 7) p.4. Andrew Krepinevich's The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) is really a study of this phenomena within the US Army during the Vietnam War.

Robert H. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (London: Brassey's 1994).

See, Theo Farrell, ‘Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine’, International Peacekeeping 2/ 2 (1995) pp.194–214.

Examples are: William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D.1000 (Oxford: Blackwell 1983) and J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armaments on History from the Dawn of Warfare to the Second World War (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1946); and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Da Capo 1984).

The US Army developed the MI Abrams tank; the M2/3 Bradley; the AH-64 Apache; the UH-60 Blackhawk; and the Patriot missile during this period. See Scales, Certain Victory (note 10) pp.19–20, and Fred C. Weyand, ‘Shaping the Army for the Future’, Strategic Review 3/2 (1975) p.8. For technologic criticism, see Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio 1991) p.138–55.

Scales, Certain Victory (note 10) p.36.

Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organizational Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1993).

The theme of emulation can be seen in Emily O. Goldman, ‘The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan’ and Theo Farrell, ‘World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922–1942, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) pp.41–68, 69–90. For the influence of US thinking on the British, see Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army's Way in Warfare 1945–95 (London: Brassey's 1996).

See Richard Lock-Pullan, ‘“An Inward Looking Time”; The US Army 1973–76’, Journal of Military History 67/2 (2003) pp.483–511.

For DePuy's account of the establishment of TRADOC and his time as its commander, see Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mulen III, Changing An Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired (Washington, DC: GPO n.d.) pp.175–98.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: GPO 1976). Hereafter referred to as FM 100-5.

Ibid., pp.3–6. See James Fallows, National Defence (New York: Random House 1981) p.32; and James Burton, Pentagon Wars (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1993) p.2, who uses it as an example of ‘dinosaur’ thinking of the 1960s and 1970s.

Huba Wass de Czege and L.D. Holder, ‘The New FM 100-5’ Military Review 62/7 (1982) pp.53–70. Clyde J. Tate and L.D. Holder, ‘New Doctrine for the Defense’, Military Review 61/3 (1981) p.4.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO 1982).

Wass de Czege, ‘How to Change an Army’, Military Review 64/11 (1984) pp.32–49.

Wass de Czege and Holder, ‘The New FM 100-5’ (note 21) p.55 and Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: GPO 1986) p.6.

Huba Wass de Czege, ‘Clausewitz: Historical Theories Remain Sound Compass References; The Catch Is Staying on Course’, Army (Sept. 1988) pp.37–43: FM 100-5, Operations 1982 (note 22). Appendix A lists: Ardant du Picq, Charles Jean Jacques Joseph, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern, trans. John N. Greeley and Robert C. Cotton (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co. 1947); Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1976); B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New York: Praeger 1954); Marshall de Saxe, ‘Reveries on the Art of War, in Thomas R. Phillips (ed.), Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company 1955) pp.177–300; Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’, in Thomas R. Phillips (ed.), Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company 1955) pp.13–66. Interestingly Jomini is not listed, though he is often seen as the real father of US Army strategic thinking.

See, for example, William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (London: Westview Press 1985); Edward N. Luttwak, ‘The Operational Level of War’, International Security 5/3 (1980) pp.61–79.

Richard Lock-Pullan, ‘Civilian Ideas and Military Innovation: Manoeuvre Warfare and Organisational Change in the US Army’, War and Society 20/1 (2002) pp.125–47.

The concept of ‘doctrine racing’ is taken from Zisk, Engaging the Enemy (note 15).

In particular Col. David M. Glantz has produced numerous works on Soviet operational thinking as has the UK's Soviet Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst. See, for example, David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass 1991).

V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View) (Washington, DC: US GPO/ USAF n.d.).

For example, Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii (London: Brassey's 1987).

William S. Lind, ‘Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army’, Military Review57/3 (1977) pp.54–65.

Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass 1997) p.271.

Donn A. Starry, ‘To Change An Army’, Military Review 63/3 (1983) p.25.

Donn A. Starry, ‘Extending the Battlefield’, Military Review 61/3 (1981) pp.31–50.

There was frustration, for example, with the fact that the choke points such as the Ho Chi Minh trail were not hit. See M. Nicklas-Carter, ‘Nato's Central Front’, in J.P. Harris and F.H. Toase (eds), Armoured Warfare (London: B T Batsford 1990) pp.205–29.

FM 100-5, 1976, pp.4–6.

Ibid.

FM 100-5, 1982, pp.2–2.

John S. Doerfel, ‘The Operational Art of the AirLand Battle’, Military Review 62/5 (1982) p.6.

Starry, ‘Extending the Battlefield’ (note 35) p.46.

FM100-5, 1982, p.2–2.

Ibid.

Starry, ‘Extending the Battlefield’ (note 35) p.32.

FM 100-5, 1986, p.2.

Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO 1993).

Starry, ‘Extending the Battlefield’ (note 35) p.32.

Donn A. Starry, ‘TRADOC's Analysis of the Yom Kippur War’, paper given at The Jaffee Center Military Doctrine Joint Conference: Casarea, Israel. 14–18 March 1999, p.4.

Paul F. Gorman, ‘Toward a Stronger Defense Establishment’, in Asa Clark IV et al. (eds), The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1984) p.292.

Nicklas-Carter, ‘Nato's Central Front’ (note 36) pp.205–29.

Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoft (eds), America's First Battles 1776–1965 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press 1986).

FM 100-5, 1982, p.1–5.

Starry, ‘TRADOC's Analysis of the Yom Kippur War’ (note 48) p.5.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–2.

Donn A Starry, ‘A Perspective on American Military Thought’ Military Review 69/7 (1989) pp.9–10.

Luttwak, ‘The Operational Level of War’ (note 26).

See, for example, FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–1.

FM 100-5, 1986, p.10.

Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (note 33) p.251.

Wass de Czege and Holder, ‘The New FM 100-5’ (note 21) p.55.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–1.

Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge 1990) especially pp.184–7.

John Erickson, ‘The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine; The Significance of Operational Art and the Emergence of Deep Battle’, in John Gooch (ed.), The Origins Of Contemporary Doctrine (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute 1997) p.106.

FM 100-5, 1986, p.10.

Ibid.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–4.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.9–1.

Boyd D. Sutton, John R Landry, Malcolm B. Armstrong, Howell M. Estes III and Wesley K. Clark, ‘Deep Attack Concepts and the Defense of Central Europe’, Survival 26/2 (1984) pp.50–70.

Bernard W. Rogers, ‘Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response’, Strategic Review11/2 (1983) pp.11–19. The FOFA concept was eventually overtaken by Soviet shifts in doctrine to address this difficulty, and they placed more emphasis on the decisive role of the first echelon: Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (London: Croom Helm 1987) p.180.

Bernard W. Rogers, ‘Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities’, NATO Review 32/6 (1984) p.6.

Ibid., pp.1–9.

Bernard W. Rogers, ‘ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Follow-On Forces’, Military Technology 83/5 (1983) p.40, and see pp.38–50.

Rogers, ‘Follow-On Forces Attack’ (note 70) p.1.

Ibid., p.2.

Especially: surveillance, target acquisition and intelligence means; survivable command, control and communications (C³) systems; and conventional weapons. See Rogers, ‘ACE Attack’ (note 72) pp.42–5.

FM 100-5, Operations, 1982.

Bernard W. Rogers, ‘Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response’, Strategic Review11/2 (1983) p.17. For further analysis see pp.11–19.

William R. Richardson, ‘FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986’, Military Review 66/3 (1986) pp.4–11.

NATO agreed this in May 1980. See Christopher Coker, US Military Power in the 1980s (London: Macmillan/RUSI 1983) pp.14–16.

Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations-1986 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC 1981).

Sutton et al., ‘Deep Attack Concepts and the Defense of Central Europe’ (note 68) pp.60–2.

Rogers, ‘Follow-On Forces Attack’ (note 70) p.7.

Wayne A. Downing, ‘Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver–US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond’, Military Review 77/1 (1997) p.146. This article was originally published in January 1981.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–2.

Ibid.

Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's 1985).

John Hackett, ‘Foreword’ to Bryan Perret, A History of Blitzkrieg (New York: Jove 1983) pp.11 and 15.

Nicklas-Carter, ‘Nato's Central Front (note 36) p.216.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.1–5.

FM 100-5, 1986, p.6.

A. Behagg, ‘Increasing Tempo on the Modern Battlefield’, in Brian Holden Reid (ed.), The Science of War: Back to First Principles (London: Routledge 1993) pp.110–30.

Donn A. Starry, ‘Command and Control: An Overview’, Military Review 61/11 (1981) p.2.

Ibid., p.3.

For example: Scott R. Gourley, ‘Tactical Intelligence is Key to the AirLand Battle Scenario’, Defense Electronics (Feb. 1988) pp.43–53.

Wass de Czege and Holder, ‘The New FM 100-5’ (note 21) p.56.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–7.

Ibid., p.2–1.

Ibid., p.2–3.

Ibid., p.2–3.

FM 110-5, 1986, p.17.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–1.

Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (note 33) p.13.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–6.

William S. Lind, Keith M. Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and G. I. Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Military Review 69/10 (1989) pp.2–11.

FM 100-5, 1982, p.2–6.

Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (note 33) pp.14–15.

FM 100-5, 1986. p.i.

Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations – 1986 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC 1981).

John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army For War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973–1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC 1993) p.59.

Department of the Army, FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Washington, DC. GPO 1992) p.1–1.

Romjue et al., Prepare the Army for War (note 109) pp.21–40.

See, Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Development of the National Training Center 1976–1984 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC 1992) pp.1–56.

Ibid., pp.37–41.

Ibid., p.141.

Romjue et al., Prepare the Army for War (note 109). A further training centre was established in Germany, at Hohenfels, called the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). Daniel P. Bolger, The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Novato, CA: Presidio 1997) p.10.

Chapman, National Training Center (note 112) p.142.

Robert J. Hamilton, Green and Blue in the Wild Blue: An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air UP 1993) p.2.

Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle (note 6) p.61.

See Hamilton, Green and Blue in the Wild Blue (note 117) p.22; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000).

See: Chapman, National Training Center (note 112) pp.57–128. Bolger, The Battle for Hunger Hill (note 115) p.11. This is an account of a battalion going through the JRTC training experience. Bolger, a Lieut. Col., wrote of his experiences at the NTC in Dragons at War: 2–34th Infantry in the Mojave. (Novato, CA: Presidio 1986).

Heller and Stoft (eds), America's First Battles 1776–1965 (note 51).

The cover of James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster 1995) says, ‘How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War’. A similar tone is found in Colin L. Powell, A Soldier's Way: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson 1995) and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (London: Bantam Press 1992).

Roger J. Spiller, ‘In The Shadow of The Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army after Vietnam’, RUSI Journal 142/6 (1997) p.53 n.12.

Rick Atkinson, Crusade: the Untold Story of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins 1994) p.2.

Michael J. Meese, ‘Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational Change’, in Hooker Richard D. Jr (ed.), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio 1993) p.207.

Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, updated edn (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 1992) p.130.

Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (note 121) p.24.

Romjue et al., Prepare the Army for War (note 109) p.125.

Starry, ‘TRADOC's Analysis of the Yom Kippur War’ (note 48) pp.7 and 8.

Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus (eds), The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: GPO 1995) pp.25–45, 233.

Spiller, ‘In the Shadow of the Dragon’ (note 123) p.52.

A.J. Bacevich, ‘Prospects for Military Reform’, Parameters 17/1 (1987) pp.29–42.

Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation’, International Security 13/1 (1988) p.141.

Donn A. Starry, ‘The Principles of War’, Military Review 61/9 (1981) p.10; Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (note 33) p.251.

Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1989) p.187.

Don Vandergriff, ‘The Culture Wars’, in Robert L. Bateman (ed.), Digital War: A View from the Front Lines (Novato, CA: Presidio 1999) pp.197–255.