Limiting arms, enforcing limits: International inspections and the challenges of compellance in Germany post-1919, Iraq post-1991

Abstract

This article compares efforts to curb German military power after 1919 with attempts to limit that of Iraq after 1991. It argues that incomplete defeat in each case, compounded by disputes among the victors (exploited by the Germans and Iraqis) undermined a long-term maintenance of each settlement. UNSCOM's problems in Iraq in the 1990s replicated much of what had hamstrung the IMCC in Germany in the 1920s. Crucial was the lack of autonomous intelligence and verification capabilities, enabling the targeted regimes to defy inspections, whilst challenging the impartiality and legitimacy of the enforcers. Facing devious and unrepentant adversaries, both inspection regimes survived barely seven years. In both cases a second war would ensue against the non-compliers – Germany in 1939, Iraq in 2003.

Key words:

• disarmament
• arms limitation
• arms enforcement

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Dr Stephen Badsey for sharing with us his considerable expertise on the Gulf War and for the numerous references he suggested in the course of our research.

Notes

¹Charles-Philippe David and Jean-Jacques Roche, Théories de la sécurité. Définitions, approches et concepts de la sécurité internationale (Paris: Montchrestien 2002), 20; and Raymond Aron, Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz.I – L'Age Européen. II – l'Age Planétaire (Paris: Gallimard 1976).

²F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations, its Life and Times (Leicester: LUP 1986), 10–11.

³David and Roche, Théories de la sécurité, 37.

⁴David Stevenson, 1914–18: The History of the First World War (London: Allen Lane 2004), 411.

⁵Joel Blatt review of Manfred Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (eds), The Treaty of Versailles. A Reassessment after Seventy-Five Years (Cambridge: CUP and the German Historical Institute 1998), at <http://www3.uakron.edu/hfrance/reviews/blatt.html> accessed 9 Jan. 2003.

⁶Sally Marks, The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World 1914–1945 (New York: OUP 2002), 82.

⁷Honourable exceptions are Lorna Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany. British Policy Towards Post-war German Disarmament, 1914–1919 (London: Allen and Unwin 1985) esp. Chs 3, 8 and 9; and, more briefly, but examining the issues through a wider lens, William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International History (New York: Oxford UP 1984), 112–3, 118–23, 126–7.

⁸See Michael Cox, Introduction to new edition of E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan 2001); and Keith M. Wilson, Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians Through Two World Wars (Providence, RI: Berghahn 1996).

⁹Quoted in Dr G.M. Bayliss, ‘Introduction’, in Brig.-Gen. Sir James Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918–1929 (London: HMSO 1987), 2.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹At the outset, the meetings in Paris during spring 1919 were envisaged as only one of two separate rounds of peacemaking – the first designed to settle issues of winning and losing the war, the second to address the construction of a new international order. But a combination of exhaustion, public and parliamentary impatience for the conclusion of treaties, and the fractiousness between the victors both at the Council of Ten and the Council of Four meetings, brought proceedings to an end in late summer 1919, with the second stage stillborn.

¹²Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 5; cf. Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford: OUP 2005), 606.

¹³Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 5.

¹⁴For more detailed examples of these German initiatives, see J.F.V. Keiger, Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge: CUP 1997), 193–201, 280–5. See also Wolfgang Mommsen, ‘Max Weber and the Peace Treaty of Versailles’, in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, 535–46; and Andrew Barros and Frédéric Guelton, ‘Les imprévus de l'histoire instrumentalisée: Le Livre Jaune de 1914 et les Documents Diplomatiques Français sur les origines de la Grande Guerre, 1914–1928’, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique (forthcoming).

¹⁵Sally Marks, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galérie des Glaces’, in Boemeke et al., The Treaty of Versailles, 337–70, at 369.

¹⁶Keiger, Poincaré, 282–3.

¹⁷See Michael Jabara Carley, ‘Down a Blind-Alley: Anglo-Franco-Soviet Relations, 1920–1939’, Canadian Journal of History 29/1 (April 1994), 147–72; Peter Krüger, ‘A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy’, in Carole Fink, Jürgen Heideking, Axel Frohn, David Lazar and Christof Mauch eds, Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge: CUP 2002), 49–64; Stephen White, The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921–1922 (Cambridge: CUP 2002), 165–8; and John Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik (Cambridge: CUP 2002), 122–3.

¹⁸Keylor, Twentieth Century World, 115–7, 120; Hans W. Gatzke, ‘Russo-German Military Collaboration During the Weimar Republic’, American Historical Review, 63/3 (1958), 565–97; Georges Castellan, ‘Reichswehr et armée rouge’, in Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (ed.), Les Relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939 (Paris: Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques no.58 1954); id., ‘Le Réarmement clandestin de l'Allemagne dans l'entre-deux-guerres’, in Les Relations franco-allemandes de 1933 à 1939: travaux du colloque d'historiens français et allemands (Paris: Editions du CNRS 1976), 277–96; id., Le réarmement clandestin du Reich 1930–1935. Vu par le 2e Bureau de l'Etat-Major Français (Paris: Plon 1954); Manfred Zeidler, Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920–1933. Wege und Stationen einer ungewöhnlichen Zusammenarbeit (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag 1993); and Wilhelm Deist, ‘The Rearmament of the Wehrmacht’, and Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Foreign Policy and Preparations for War’, both in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Germany and the Second World War. Vol. I: The Build-up of German Aggression (Oxford: OUP 1990), 375–86, 555–60.

¹⁹Evgeni Primakov, Missions à Bagdad. Histoire d'une négociation secrète (Paris: Seuil 1991).

²⁰See Sabine Dullin, ‘Les Diplomates soviétiques à la Société des Nations’, Relations internationales 75 (Autumn 1993), 329–43.

²¹The invitation by Marx for Stresemann to stay on as foreign minister was highly unusual – as the latter was a member of a different party. See Jonathan R.C. Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman (Oxford: OUP 2003), 260–1. For this reference the authors are grateful to Dr R. Gerald Hughes of the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

²²<www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>, accessed 1 Dec. 2005.

²³See Mark A. Heller, ‘Iraq's Army: Military Weakness, Political Utility’, in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin eds, Iraq's Road to War (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1994), 37–50; and Sean McKnight, ‘The Failure of the Iraqi Forces’, in John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey eds, The Gulf War Assessed (London: Arms and Armour Press 1992), 173–91.

²⁴<www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>, accessed 1 Dec. 2005.

²⁵See Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War. The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Co 1995), 355–432; US News & World Report, Triumph without Victory. The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Random House 1992) esp. 264–394; and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (London: Faber and Faber 1993).

²⁶Marks, Ebbing of European Ascendancy, 83.

²⁷Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty, Les relations franco-allemandes, 1815–1975 (Paris: Armand Colin 1977), 226.

²⁸Michael Ignatieff, ‘Bush's First Strike’, The New York Review of Books, 29 Mar. 2001, 6–10, at 6.

²⁹See Modris Eksteins, The Limits of Reason: German Democratic Press and the Collapse of Weimar Democracy (Oxford: OUP 1975).

³⁰See Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf (Manchester: MUP 1992); and Stephen Badsey, ‘The Media War’, in Pimlott and Badsey, The Gulf War Assessed, 219–45.

³¹For a detailed account of the international politics and Saddam's ‘astute’ manoeuvrings, see John Pimlott, ‘The Gulf Crisis and World Politics’, in Pimlott and Badsey, The Gulf War Assessed, 46–8.

³²Keiger, Poincaré, 194.

³³Jolyon Howorth, ‘French Policy in the Conflict’, in Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane (eds), International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict 1990–91 (New York: St Martin's Press 1994), 175–200, at 182–5; id., ‘France and the Gulf War: From Pre-war Crisis to Post-war Crisis’, Modern & Contemporary France 46 (July 1991), 3–16; and Margaret Blunden, ‘Is This Really the End of the Defence Consensus?’, Modern & Contemporary France 51 (Oct. 1992), 32–7. Twelve days into Operation Desert Storm, the US-led air campaign against Iraq, Mitterrand's authorization of participation by the modest forces France had deployed to the Gulf cost him his defence minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a founder member of the Franco-Iraq Friendship Society, who resigned on 29 Jan. 1991 in protest at joining an American attack on an Arab nation.

³⁴For the latest scholarship on French policy in this episode, see Sally Marks, ‘Poincaré-la-peur. France and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923’, in Kenneth Mouré and Martin S. Alexander (eds), Crisis and Renewal: France 1918–1962 (New York: Berghahn 2002), 28–45.

³⁵See Sally Marks, ‘Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study of Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience’, European Studies Review 13/3 (July 1983), 297–334; also Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts. The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960 (London: James Currey 1991), 35; and Jacques Nobécourt, Une Histoire politique de l'Armée. Vol. I: De Pétain à Pétain, 1919–1942 (Paris: Seuil 1967), 91–4, 108–9. For French civilians' reactions to the presence of sub-Saharan African French troops among them too, see Joe Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom. A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Oxford: James Currey 1999), 158–79.

³⁶Archives de l'Assemblée Nationale, Commission de l'Armée de la Chambre des Députés—séance du 9 juillet 1930. Audition de M. le ministre Maginot et de MM. les généraux Weygand, Targe et Lefort, 18, carton XIV, dr. 448 (emphasis added). See also Judith M. Hughes, To the Maginot Line. The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1971); Martin S. Alexander, ‘In Defence of the Maginot Line: Security Policy, Domestic Politics and the Economic Depression in France’, in Robert Boyce (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940. The Decline and Fall of a Great Power (London: Routledge 1998), 164–94; and Robert A. Doughty, ‘The Maginot Line’, Military History Quarterly 9 (Winter 1997), 48–58.

³⁷Poidevin and Bariéty, Les relations franco-allemandes, 232.

³⁸Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 270. See Gaynor Johnson (ed.), Locarno Revisited. European Diplomacy, 1920–1929 (London: Routledge 2004); and Keylor, Twentieth Century World, 121–5.

³⁹Charles de Gaulle, who had spent most of the 1914–18 war in German captivity, published a celebrated book in 1924 about the German conduct of the war, concluding, with evident anxiety about the future, that the Kaiserreich's defeat was in very great measure the outcome of its own leadership's feuds, internal disputes over strategy and poor decision making. Originally entitled La discorde chez l'ennemi, de Gaulle's book has recently become available in an English translation under the title The Enemy's House Divided, transl., annotation and intro. by Robert Eden (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press 2002). See also the review of this edition by Annika Mombauer, on [email protected] (Apr. 2004), accessed 26 Apr. 2004.

⁴⁰Alan Sharp, ‘Anglo-French relations from Versailles to Locarno, 1919–1925. The Quest for Security’, in Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (eds), Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century. Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Routledge 2000), 120–38.

⁴¹Gen. Maxime Weygand, Mémoires. II: Mirages et Réalité (Paris: Flammarion 1957), 70. For the enduring and sternly Germanophobic influence down to his death in 1929 of Foch, a soldier who above all was ‘[f]or the diplomats…the embodiment of the victory in 1918’, see Nicole Jordan, ‘The Reorientation of French Diplomacy in the mid-1920s: The Role of Jacques Seydoux’, English Historical Review 117/473 (Sept. 2002), 867–88, 885 and esp. n.59 therein.

⁴²Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 605–6.

⁴³Quoted in Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe 1914–1940 (London: Arnold 1995), 38.

⁴⁴A theme treated in David Styan, France and Iraq. Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris 2006).

⁴⁵See Frédéric Guelton, ‘Typologie des missions militaires françaises dans l'Est européen’, in Centre d'Etudes d'Histoire de la Défense, Bâtir une nouvelle sécurité: la coopération militaire entre la France et les Etats d' Europe centrale et orientale de 1919 à 1929 (Vincennes: SHAT/CEHD 2001), 51–67; Bernard Michel, ‘Le rôle de la France dans la formation des officiers d'Europe centrale dans les années vingt’, in ibid., 39–49; and other contributions in this collection, passim; Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘L'impérialisme du pauvre: la politique économique du gouvernement français en Europe centrale et orientale de 1918 à 1929’, Relations internationales 7 (autumn 1976), 219–39; M. C. Thomas, ‘To Arm an Ally: French Arms Sales to Romania, 1926–1940’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 19/2 (June 1996), 231–59; Antoine Marès, ‘Mission militaire et relations internationales: l'exemple franco-tchécoslovaque, 1918–1925’, Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 30 (Oct.–Dec. 1982 ), 559–86; François Grumel-Jacquignon, La Yougoslavie dans la stratégie française de l'entre-deux-guerres (1918–1935): aux origines du mythe serbe en France (Berne: Peter Lang 1999); Traian Sandu, Le système de sécurité français en Europe centre-orientale: l'exemple roumain, 1919–1933 (Paris: L'Harmattan 1999); Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925. French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1962); and id., The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926–1936. French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland (Princeton: PUP 1988).

⁴⁶France reduced conscript service to 18 months in 1923 and to 12 months in 1928. The French standing army fell from 712,000 soldiers in 1921 to 600,000 in 1927 and to 422,000 in 1929 – i.e., just half the 825,000 men of the army of 1914. See [Kew, The National Archives], FO [Foreign Office records]371/17654, C8811/85/17, British military attaché, Col. T.G. Heywood, report on French Senate's war estimates debate, 17–18 Dec. 1934; also Col. François-André Paoli, L'Armée française de 1919 à 1939. Vol. III. Le Temps des Compromis, 12 juin 1924 – 30 juin 1930 (Vincennes: Publications du Service Historique de l'Armée 1974), 51–75, 245–94; cf., however, Philip C.F. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1967), 40–8, who argues that Weygand was content with France's army after the 1927–28 Laws, so long as these were respected and fully implemented by subsequent governments – which, of course, they were not.

⁴⁷Stephen Badsey, ‘Coalition Command in the Gulf War’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command. The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey's 1997 and 2002), 195–215.

⁴⁸The ‘constabulary’ metaphor here is developed in a characteristically robust and refreshing polemical analysis by Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff. America's Defense of the New World Order (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky 2004) esp. 52–8, 71–7; cf. ‘Fighting on Two (or More) Fronts: Four's a Crowd’, The Economist, 1 Mar. 2003, 45–6.

⁴⁹See Michael L. Dockrill and J.D. Goold, Peace without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919–23 (London: Batsford 1981); and Michael Dockrill and John Fisher (eds), The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory? (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001).

⁵⁰See Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force. The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster: Pagefast 1996).

⁵¹‘Memorandum by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston on the question of an Anglo-French alliance’, 28 Dec. 1921, in Rohan Butler and J.P.T Bury (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), (London: HMSO 1960), First Ser., Vol.XVI, Doc.768.

⁵²See Anthony Lentin, ‘Lloyd George, Clemenceau and the Elusive Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty, 1919: “A Disastrous Episode”?’, in Sharp and Stone, Anglo-French Relations, 104–19.

⁵³Orme Sargent, 10 Nov. 1933, FO 371/16709, C9556/245/18.

⁵⁴Quoted in review by Sally Marks, American Historical Review 97/1 (Feb. 1992), 186–7, of Anne Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War (New York: Cambridge UP 1990). For more on Seydoux's role in this period, see Jordan, ‘The Reorientation of French Diplomacy’, 867–88.

⁵⁵See J.F.V. Keiger, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy: Constraints and Continuity’, in Alistair Cole, Patrick LeGalès and Jonah Levy (eds), Developments in French Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2005), 138–53. For French policy in the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis, see Howorth, ‘French Policy in the Conflict’.

⁵⁶Paul Volcker et al., Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (Volcker report), 7 Sept. 2005, Vol.1, 27, at <www.iic-offp.org>, accessed 18 Oct. 2005; nevertheless the report also points to the benefits derived from Iraqi oil sales by the United States, which ultimately received 36 per cent of Iraqi oil shipments.

⁵⁷Styan, France and Iraq.

⁵⁸Volcker report, 14.

⁵⁹We consciously offer this as an analogue of the notorious ‘Ten Year Rule’ that was in force in Britain from 1921 to 1932 – an instruction from government to the Chiefs of Staff that, in preparing the annual armed services' estimates and in planning future weapons procurement, they should work to the assumption that Britain would not be involved in a major war for at least ten years. The damage this did from the late-1920s onwards to Britain's ability to make available well-trained and equipped army contingents for duty overseas (e.g. to fulfil Locarno obligations, or help punish any German breaches of Versailles) was very great. See Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980); and John R. Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy. The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919–1926 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) esp. 15–30, 142–89.

⁶⁰Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Oxford: OUP 1983), 229.

⁶¹Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 396.

⁶²See Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 1991 (London: Osprey 2003), 17–20.

⁶³Edward M. Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction. Prospects for Proliferation (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000), 21–6.

⁶⁴See Sean McKnight, ‘The Failure of the Iraqi Forces’; Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero. The Autobiography (London: Bantam Press 1992), 466–89; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq. The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994), 187–93, 203–14, 220–4.

⁶⁵Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, 483.

⁶⁶Philip Towle, Enforced Disarmament. From the Napoleonic Campaigns to the Gulf War (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997), 183.

⁶⁷Contrast the interwar era. Then, as the Geneva Disarmament Conference adjourned sine die, France's chief of general staff pronounced that ‘the problem [of trying to contain Germany] was almost a mathematical one, as a definite number of men would be required to hold a definite length of frontier’, since the Reich had the potential to reconstitute sufficient armed forces by 1936 to ‘guard her frontiers and…fight an offensive war on the Polish or Czech fronts, or both, or to attack on the Western Front’. FO371/17653, C3827/85/17, Gen. Maurice Gamelin conversation with British mil. attaché Col. T. G. Heywood, 11 June 1934.

⁶⁸For an elegant ‘with credulity health-warning attached’ introduction to this rapidly expanding area of strategic and military literature – a literature of decidedly uneven quality – see Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2005), 105–20; also id., Strategy for Chaos. Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass 2002); and id., The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, occasional no.28 1997). See also Stephen Biddle, ‘Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells us about the Future of Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996), 139–79.

⁶⁹See Williamson Murray and Maj-Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War. A Military History (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP 2003). By contrast, if Iraqi resistance to the US and its (few) allies mutated into irregular and terrorist operations, the overwhelming superiority of US combat power was far less likely to yield decisive victory at low cost as it had little training, experience or aptitude for dispersed and extended ‘low-intensity conflict’. This was the nub of the US–UK strategic quandary in the second phase of the 2003 Iraq War, when insurgency did indeed flare from June 2003. See Alastair Finlan, ‘Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-insurgency Strategy in Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16/1 (March 2005), 1–21.

⁷⁰See Rolf-Dieter Muller, ‘Total War as a Result of New Weapons? The Use of Chemical Agents in World War I’, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds), Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: CUP 2000), 95–111; Holger Herwig, ‘Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany's U-Boat Campaign, 1917–1918’, in ibid., 189–206; and Christian Geinitz, ‘The First Air War against Noncombatants? Strategic Bombing of German Cities in World War I’, in ibid., 207–25.

⁷¹Balfour (Washington Delegation) – Curzon, n.d. [13 Nov. 1921], DBFP, Vol.XIV, Doc.417. See Malcolm H. Murfett, ‘Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921–22’, in Brian J.C. McKercher ed, Arms Limitation and Disarmament. Restraints on War, 1899–1939 (New York: Greenwood Press 1992), 83–103; also Erik Goldstein, The Washington Naval Conference (London: Frank Cass 1992); Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties. Naval Arms Control Between the Wars (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP 1994); and Christopher Hall, Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921–37 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1987).

⁷²Murfett, ‘Look Back in Anger’, 96; this distaste suggested a long afterlife for the pejorative view of submarines by the Royal Navy's Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, who just before the 1914 war condemned them as: ‘Underhand, unfair – and damned un-English’.

⁷³Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 4.

⁷⁴Tyrrell comment on Lord Hardinge (British ambassador, Paris) to Curzon, 20 Nov. 1921, in DBFP, Vol.XIV, Doc.438.

⁷⁵See John Pimlott, ‘The International Ramifications’, in Pimlott and Badsey, The Gulf War Assessed, 203–6; Khidhir Hamza, with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner's 2000); and Ignatieff, ‘Bush's First Strike’, 6–10. Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968 and ratified in 1970, and IAEA inspections had occurred in respect of Iraq's two declared civil nuclear power facilities throughout the decade after the Israeli air force's knock-out strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981. See Towle, Enforced Disarmament, 184–5; and Dan McKinnon, Bullseye Iraq (New York: Berkley Books 1988).

⁷⁶Bronwen Maddox, ‘Soft Bark and a Weak Bite’, Financial Times, 4 July 1994, 18; the article's author is now the Foreign Editor of the London Times.

⁷⁷Quoted, ibid.

⁷⁸Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 398.

⁷⁹In addition to Edward M. Spiers's article in the present collection, see his ‘Ethics and Weaponry’, in John Bourne, Peter Liddle and Ian Whitehead eds, The Great World War, 1914–45. 2: Who Won? Who Lost? (London: Harper Collins 2001), 421–34.

⁸⁰See Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 150–84, 194–202, 214–9, 232–40, 244–58.

⁸¹Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 399.

⁸²Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions. Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Praeger 1999)

⁸³Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 39.

⁸⁴Ignatieff, ‘Bush's First Strike’, 6.

⁸⁵Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 267–70.

⁸⁶For more details, see Klaus Tenfelde, ‘Disarmament and Big Business: The Case of Krupp 1918–1925’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 16/3 (Sept. 2005), 531–49.

⁸⁷Edmonds, Occupation of the Rhineland, 269–70; Keylor, Twentieth Century World, 119–20.

⁸⁸See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished. A US-UN Saga (New York: Random House 1999).

⁸⁹H. Blix, ‘Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lessons of Iraq’, The Washington Quarterly 15/4 (1992), 57–65, quoted in Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 38–9.

⁹⁰See Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 258–70.

⁹¹Quoted in Maddox, ‘Soft Bark and a Weak Bite’, 18.

⁹³Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq. The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: Bloomsbury 2005), 36–7; cf. Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and For All (New York: Simon and Schuster 1999), 130–7, 187.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹⁴Richard Butler, Saddam Defiant. The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2000); cf. however, Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential (London: I.B. Tauris 2005); and id., Endgame, passim.

⁹⁵Kyd quoted in Maddox, ‘Soft Bark and a Weak Bite’, 18; cf. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq, 271–3; and Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 35–7.

⁹⁶UNSCOM was lent a U2 spy-plane to take high-resolution images in support of the teams of ground inspectors. Towle, Enforced Disarmament, 191.

⁹⁷The IMCC's problems are briefly but perceptively explored in Keylor, Twentieth Century World, 119–20. A forthcoming book by Richard Shuster, German Disarmament After WWI: The Diplomacy of International Arms Inspection, 1920–31 (London: Routledge 2006) examines the inspections within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany, foreign policy considerations of the coalition nations, such as the British notion of the balance of power versus French security concerns, and their effect on military operations in Germany.

⁹⁸Ignatieff, ‘Bush's First Strike’, 8–9.

⁹⁹Towle, Enforced Disarmament, 190.

¹⁰⁰See Spiers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 38–9.

¹⁰¹A. Walter Dorn and Douglas S. Scott, ‘Compliance Mechanisms for Disarmament Treaties’, in Verification Yearbook (2000), 229–47, at 232; available at <http://www.vertic.org/assets/VY00_Dorn-Scott.pdf>, accessed on 4 Apr. 2005. These authors also note that: ‘The 16 Principles of Verification adopted by the UN General Assembly first demonstrated the new international consensus on the requirement for verification of disarmament treaties’, drawing upon the Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No.3 (./.–15/3), para. 60 (para. 6, section 1). Reproduced in Trust & Verify, 90/V (March 2000), 10.

¹⁰²Blix, Disarming Iraq, 299. For details of the obstruction of UNSCOM inspectors from as early as the autumn of 1991, see Pimlott, ‘The International Ramifications’, 198–9, 203–6; and Towle, Enforced Disarmament, 188–201.

¹⁰³Maddox, ‘Soft Bark and a Weak Bite’, 18.

¹⁰⁴Dorn and Scott, ‘Compliance Mechanisms’, 233, 238.

¹⁰⁵See Blix, Disarming Iraq, 30.

¹⁰⁶Towle, ‘The Disarmament of Germany after 1919’ contribution to this collection.

¹⁰⁹Pimlott, ‘The International Ramifications’, 206.

¹⁰⁷Quoted in Towle article above, p.

¹⁰⁸Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, 229.

¹¹⁰See Stephen Badsey, Modern Military Operations and the Media (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, occasional series no.8 1994), a slightly amended version being reprinted as Stephen Badsey, ‘The Influence of the Media on Recent British Military Operations’, in Ian Stewart and Susan L. Carruthers (eds), War, Culture and the Media: Representations of the Media in 20th Century Britain, (London: Flicks Books 1996), 5–21; Peter Young, Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War (London: Frank Cass 1992); and Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War. Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000).

¹¹¹ For examples of this kind of military success undermined by public disaffection, see Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, ‘France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002), 1–32; Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: OUP 2003); Maurice Vaïsse, ‘La guerre perdue à l'ONU?’, in Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed.), La Guerre d'Algérie et les Français (Paris: Fayard 1990), 451–62; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1999 ); and Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1977).

¹¹²See Badsey, ‘The Media War’, 219–45; and Taylor, War and the Media, passim.