The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish military intelligence cooperation and Swedish security policy during the first part of the Cold War

Abstract

This article deals with Scandinavian intelligence cooperation and its significance for Swedish security policy during the first part of the Cold War. First, the development of the cooperation is described. Second, it is related to a wider context. Third, intelligence in Swedish security policy-making is discussed. Common security interests caused the cooperation. For Sweden, it represented an important part of the wider contacts with the West. Although military intelligence was important for Swedish security policy-making in some respects (e.g. military readiness), it did not have a significant influence in others (e.g. the politicians' threat perceptions). One important reason is the Swedish tradition of weak connections between the political and military leadership.

Key Words:

• Scandinavia
• Sweden
• intelligence

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my thanks to Sara Collmar, Olof Kronvall and Jan Ångström who have provided very useful comments on earlier drafts of this text.

Notes

¹On the Swedish military intelligence cooperation with the West in general, see, for instance, Om kriget kommit … Förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949–1969 [Had there been a war … Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949–1969] (Stockholm: Fritzes 1994); and Fred och säkerhet: Svensk säkerhetspolitik 1969–89 [Peace and Security: Swedish Security Policy 1969–89] (Stockholm: Fritzes 2003). On WIR, see Mikael Alenius, ‘“Informell allians”– Den svenska militära underrättelsetjänstens samarbete med västmakterna 1950–1960’[‘“Informal Alliance”– Swedish military intelligence cooperation with the Western Powers, 1950–1960’] in Per Iko and Kent Zetterberg (eds.), Kvalificerat hemlig: Fyra studier om svensk underrättelsetjänst och underrättelsetjänst i Sverige [Top Secret: Four essays on Swedish intelligence and intelligence in Sweden] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2002). On FRA, see Wilhelm Agrell, Den stora lögnen: Ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i allt för många akter [The great lie: A security policy double-dealing in far too many acts] (Stockholm: Ordfront 1991), 161–2. On general aspects of Swedish military intelligence during the Cold War, see, for instance, Den militära underrättelsetjänsten [The military intelligence service] (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget 1976), 61–74; Om kriget kommit … , 136–42; Underrättelsetjänsten – en översyn [The military intelligence service – an overhaul] (Stockholm: Fakta info direkt 1999), 61–4; and Stig Ekman, Den militära underrättelsetjänsten: Fem kriser under det kalla kriget [The military intelligence service: Five crises during the Cold War] (Stockholm: Carlssons 2000).

²Where nothing else is indicated, this whole section is based on Magnus Petersson, ‘Man lär sig … “vem man kan hålla i hand när leken blir allvar”: Svensk militär underrättelsetjänst och Norge under första delen av det kalla kriget’[‘You find out … “whose hand to hold in time of trouble”: Swedish-Norwegian military intelligence co-operation during the first part of the Cold War’] in Sven G. Holtsmark, Helge Ø. Pharo and Rolf Tamnes (eds.), Motstrøms: Olav Riste og norsk internasjonal historieskrivning [Against the current: Olav Riste and Norwegian international history writing] (Oslo: Cappelen 2003), 257–93; and Magnus Petersson, ‘Brödrafolkens väl’: Svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949–1969 [‘The welfare of the brother folk’: Swedish-Norwegian security relations, 1949–1969] (Stockholm: Santérus 2003), 248–63.

³This background section relies heavily on Evabritta Wallberg's introduction in Thede Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia. Utgivna genom Evabritta Wallberg [Some studies to the history of the T-office. Published through Evabritta Wallberg] (Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia 1999); and Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 52, 60, 79–80, 92–3 and 96–7.

⁴The reasons behind the unification of Grupp B and T-kontoret are described by Lars Olof Lampers in Det grå brödraskapet: En berättelse om IB [The grey brotherhood: A story about IB] (Stockholm: Fritzes 2002), 187–92. See also Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia; and Bo Westin, ‘Omständigheterna kring Thede Palms avsked från underrättelsetjänsten’[‘The circumstances behind the discharge of Thede Palm’], Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift 4/2000.

⁵ T-kontoret also gathered intelligence for domestic security, especially in the early 1960s. See Magnus Hjort, Den farliga fredsrörelsen: Säkerhetstjänsternas övervakning av fredsorganisationer, värnpliktsvägrare och FNL-grupper 1945–1990 [The dangerous peace-movement: The security services supervision of peace organizations, conscientious objectors, and FNL groups, 1945–1990] (Stockholm: Fritzes 2002), 77–8 and 267–75. It can be pointed out that 30–50 per cent of C-byrån's reports during World War II concerned Norway. See Krister Thun, ‘C-byråns verksamhet i Norge 1939–1945 – sedd ur ett förvarningsperspektiv’[‘The operations of the C-bureau in Norway, 1939–1945 – from the perspective of forewarning’] in Per Iko and Kent Zetterberg (eds.), Kvalificerat hemlig Fyra studier om svensk underrättelsetjänst och underrättelsetjänst i Sverige [Top Secret: Four essays on Swedish intelligence and intelligence in Sweden] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2002).

⁶Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 69–91.

⁷On scepticism against Palm and Evang, see Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 57–68; Westin, ‘Omständigheterna kring Thede Palms avsked från underrättelsetjänsten’; and Olav Riste and Arnfinn Moland, ‘Strengt hemmelig’: Norsk etteretningsteneste 1945–1970 [‘Top Secret’: Norwegian military intelligence 1945–1970] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997), 20 and 55–6.

⁸Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 74–5.

⁹Ibid., 71–2.

¹⁰Ibid., 71. The antagonism between Mørch and Lunding is described by Wilhelm Christmas-Møller in Obersten og Kommandøren: Efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitikk og socialdemokrati 1945–1955 [The colonel and the commodore: Intelligence, security policy and social democracy 1945–1955] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1995).

¹¹Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 75–6.

¹²Ibid., 80.

¹³Olof Kronvall's Den bräckliga barriären: Finland i svensk säkerhetspolitik 1948–1962 [The fragile barrier: Finland in Swedish security policy 1948–1962] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2003), elaborates in detail on Swedish estimations of Finland and the actions taken by the Swedes to prevent Finland from becoming an Eastern Bloc country during these years. See also Anna Helkama-Rågård, ‘De ofullbordade katastrofernas land’: Finlandsbilden hos den svenska säkerhetspolitiska eliten 1961–1968 [‘The country of the uncompleted catastrophes’: The perception of Finland in the Swedish security policy elite 1961–1968] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2000); Olof Kronvall: ‘Finland in Swedish Security Policy, 1948–1962’ in Karl L. Kleve (ed.), The Cold War, Military Power and the Civilian Society: Report from the Conference in Bodø, Sept. 12–13, 2002 (Bodø: Norwegian Aviation Museum 2003); and Jerker Widén, Notkrisen och dess efterspel: USA:s relationer med Sverige under en av kalla krigets höjdpunkter, oktober 1961–mars 1962 [The Note Crisis and its aftermath: US relations with Sweden during one of the peaks of the Cold War, Oct. 1961–March 1962] (Göteborg: Forskningsprogrammet Sverige under kalla kriget 2004).

¹⁴The operation is, as far as I know, firstly mentioned in Riste and Moland, ‘Strengt hemmelig’, 50.

¹⁵For cooperation between the Norwegian and Swedish security police, see esp. Trond Bergh and Knut Einar Eriksen, Den hemmelige krigen: Overvåkning i Norge 1914–1997. Bind 2. Storhetstid og stormkast 1955–1997 [The secret war: Supervision in Norway 1914–1997: Vol. 2. The period of greatness and tempests] (Oslo: Cappelen 1998), 424–5, 455–65, 490, 509 and 517–8.

¹⁶See also Om kriget kommit … , 140–1.

¹⁷Palm, Några studier till T-kontorets historia, 76.

¹⁸Riste and Moland, ‘Strengt hemmelig’, 108–17 and 276.

¹⁹See, for instance, Agrell, Den stora lögnen; Om kriget kommit … ; Charles Silva, Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly: Swedish-American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952 (Stockholm: Univ. of Stockholm 1999); Simon Moores, ‘“Neutral on our side”: US Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration’, Cold War History 2/3 (April 2002); Juhana Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 1945–54: Understanding Neutrality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), and Petersson, ‘Brödrafolkens väl’.

²⁰The concepts of integration vs. screening, and deterrence vs. reassurance, have been frequently used to describe especially Norwegian security policy during the Cold War. The first dichotomy was originally used by Rolf Tamnes in ‘Integration and Screening: The two faces of Norwegian Alliance Policy, 1945–1986’, FHFS notat 5/1986. The second dichotomy was originally used by Johan Jørgen Holst in the article ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv’[‘Norwegian security policy in a strategic perspective’], Internasjonal politikk 5/1966, especially p. 165. See also Johan Jørgen Holst, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv [Norwegian security policy in a strategic perspective] (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt 1967).

²¹Kronvall, Den bräckliga barriären; Petersson, ‘Brödrafolkens väl’; and Olof Kronvall and Magnus Petersson: Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991 [Swedish security policy in the shadow of the super powers, 1945–1991] (Stockholm: Santérus 2005).

²²See, for instance, Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam 1991); Agrell, Den stora lögnen; Om kriget kommit … ; Mats Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954–60 (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press 1997); Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt: Atombomben, Norge og verden 1945–1970 [The balance of fear: The atom bomb, Norway and the world, 1945–1970] (Oslo: Tiden 2001); Kronvall, Den bräckliga barriären; and Petersson, ‘Brödrafolkens väl’.

²³Swedish war plans 1945–1975 are described in detail in Bengt Wallerfelts book Si vis pacem – para bellum: Svensk säkerhetspolitik och krigsplanläggning 1945–1975[Si vis pacem – para bellum: Swedish security policy and war planning 1945–1975] (Stockholm: Probus 1999).

²⁴See, for example, Ekman, Den militära underrättelsetjänsten.

²⁵Allen Dulles: The Craft of Intelligence (NY: Harper & Row 1963), 154.

²⁶See, for example, Göte Blom and Per Rudberg, Vår beredskap – Var den god? Marin beredskap tiden 1938–1990[Our readiness – Was it good? Naval readiness, 1938–1990] (Stockholm: Marinlitteraturföreningen 1996).

²⁷Quotation from Wilhelm Carlgren: ‘Regeringen, ÖB och utrikespolitiken: Reflexioner över anteckningar av general Thörnell om erfarenheter från krigsåren’[‘The government, the Supreme Commander and the foreign policy: Reflections on notes by general Thörnell about experiences from the war’], Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift 6/1982, 281.

²⁸The Norwegian solution of these problems is described and analysed in Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie: Bind 5 [Cold War and internationalisation 1949–1965. Norwegian foreign policy history: Vol. 5] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997), 22–3.

²⁹Carlgren, ‘Regeringen, ÖB och utrikespolitiken’.

³⁰Karl Molin, Omstridd neutralitet: Experternas kritik av svensk utrikespolitik 1948–50[Disputed neutrality: The experts' criticism of the Swedish foreign policy 1948–50] (Stockholm: Tiden 1991), and Hans Zettermark, ‘Överflödigt befäl? Frågan om ÖB-institutionen i samband med 1945 års försvarskommitté och 1948 års försvarsbeslut’[‘Superfluous commander? The question about the institution of Supreme Commander in connection with the Defence Committee of 1945 and the Defence decision of 1948’], Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift 4/1999.

³¹Per Iko, ‘Ett totalare försvar? Samordningen av totalförsvarets högsta och centrala ledning’[‘A more total defence? The coordination of the high and central command of the total defence’] in Kent Zetterberg (ed.), Totalförsvar och atomvapen: Tre studier kring uppbygnaden av det svenska totalförsvaret och kärnvapendimensionen 1950–1970[Total defence and nuclear weapons: Three essays on the build-up of the Swedish total defence and the nuclear dimension] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan 2001), esp. 65; and Stefan Ekecrantz, Hemlig utrikespolitik: Kalla kriget, utrikesnämnden och regeringen 1946–1959[Secret foreign policy: The Cold War, the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, and the government, 1946–1959] (Stockholm: Santérus 2003), 176–8. Ekecrantz analyses a slightly different view of intelligence in Swedish security policy-making, namely to what extent politicians were aware of Swedish intelligence activities (161–215).

³² Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikespolitiska frågor 1953[Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1953] (Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 1954), 22–5.

³³Olof Kronvall, ‘Hotet. Den svenska hotbilden från 1945 till 1960-talet – några aspekter’[‘The threat. Swedish threat perceptions from 1945 to the 1960s – some aspects’] in Lars Wedin and Gunnar Åselius (eds.), Mellan byråkrati och krigskonst. Svenska strategier för det kalla kriget[Between bureaucracy and the art of war: Swedish strategies for the Cold War] (Stockholm, Försvarshögskolan 1999), 120.

³⁴[Stockholm, Sweden, Krigsarkivet [The Military Archives of Sweden]], Nils Swedlunds arkiv [Nils Swedlund's Archive], Volym [Volume] 4, ‘PM 18/6 54’.

³⁵On the relationship between Undén and Sohlman, see, for example, Mats Karlsson, Vår man i Moskva: En studie över den svenske ambassadören Rolf Sohlmans syn på Sovjetunionen och dess utrikespolitiska intentioner 1947–1950[Our man in Moscow: A study of the Swedish ambassador Rolf Sohlman's views of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy intentions, 1947–1950] (Göteborg: Forskningsprogrammet Sverige under kalla kriget 1999); and Olof Kronvall, ‘Rolf Sohlman’ in Gunnar Artéus and Leif Leifland (eds.), Svenska diplomatprofiler under 1900-talet[Swedish diplomatic profiles during the twentieth century] (Stockholm: Probus 2001).

³⁶Nils Swedlunds arkiv, Volym 4, ‘PM 1/6 55’.

³⁷Hans Christian Cars, Claës Skoglund and Kent Zetterberg, Svensk försvarspolitik under efterkrigstiden[Swedish defence policy during the post war period] (Stockholm: Probus 1986), 29.

³⁸For Åkerman's views, see Kronvall, ‘Hotet’, 121–2. For Ehrensvärd's views, see [Stockholm, Sweden, Krigsarkivet], Stig H:son Ericsons arkiv [Stig H:son Ericsons Archive], Volym 1, 22/9 1955; and Kronvall, ‘Hotet’, 122.

⁴¹ Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikespolitiska frågor 1956[Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1956] (Stockholm: Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl Utrikesdepartementet 1957), 47.

³⁹Nils Swedlunds arkiv, Volym 4, ‘PM 12/11 55’; Nils Swedlunds arkiv, Volym 4, ‘Erlander 21/11 55’; and Stig H:son Ericsons arkiv, Volym 1, 19 Nov. 1955.

⁴⁰Östen Undén, Anteckningar 1952–1966. Utgivna genom Karl Molin [Notes, 1952–1966. Published by Karl Molin] (Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia 2002), March 9 and 10, 1955. On official optimism, see also Anders Berge, Det kalla kriget i Tidens spegel: En socialdemokratisk bild av hoten mot frihet och fred 1945–1962[The Cold War as reflected in Tiden: A Social Democratic image of the threat to freedom and peace, 1945–1962] (Stockholm: Carlsson 1990), 104 and 199.

⁴² Utrikesfrågor 1956, 14.

⁴³[Stockholm, Sweden, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv [Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive]], HP 1 Ab, 89, New York, 21 Nov. 1956, Östen Undén to Tage Erlander.

⁴⁴Nils Swedlunds arkiv, Volym 4, PM 3/1 1957.