Coercing to reconcile: North Korea's response to US ‘hegemony’

Abstract

Since 1993 North Korea's response to US ‘hegemony’ has been a seemingly paradoxical attempt to bandwagon with the United States by means of military coercion. However, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea has failed to normalize its relations with the United States. In the years ahead, it can either pursue more proactively the strategy of bandwagoning with the United States, shift its strategic focus to China, or embark upon a policy of equidistance between the United States and Japan on the one hand and China on the other.

Key words:

• North Korea
• United States
• hegemony

Acknowledgements

I thank Robert Dujarric, Michael Green, and Thomas Mahnken for their invaluable comments on the earlier drafts of this article. This article was originally presented in the panel on ‘Strategies to Accommodate US Military Dominance: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals’, organized by Thomas Mahnken, at the 47th Annual International Studies Association Convention held in San Diego, California, on 24 March 2006.

Notes

²‘Resolution of the Nuclear Issue: Elements to be Considered’, 12 Oct. 1993, provided by C. Kenneth Quinones on 23 July 2003.

*The views expressed in this article are the author's own.

¹For the history of North Korea's use of force, see the author's ‘Calculated Adventurism: North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 16/2 (Fall 2004), 181–226 <www.kida.re.kr/english2005/publications/kjda2004.htm>; ‘Calculated Adventurism: North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2000’, a dissertation submitted to the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, May 2003; ‘North Korea's “Second Nuclear Diplomacy”: Rising Risks and Expectations’, and ‘Korean Peninsula in the Renewed Process for Change’, in The National Institute for Defense Studies (ed.), East Asian Strategic Review 2004 (Tokyo: Japan Times 2004), <www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/e2004.html>; and ‘North Korea's “First” Nuclear Diplomacy, 1993–94’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/4 (Dec. 2003), 47–82.

³‘North Korean Nuclear Program’, Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, 16 Oct. 2002.

⁴‘Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks’, Korean Central News Agency (henceforth KNCA), 29 Aug. 2003.

⁵The operation plan was named ‘OP5026’. For details, see ‘OPLAN 5026–Air Strikes’ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5026.htm>.

⁶Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997), 315.

⁷Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2004), 244.

⁸Hwang Il-do, ‘Bug Jangsajeongpo: Alryeojiji anhneun Daseos gaji Jinsil (North Korea's Long-Range Artillery: Five Unknown Facts)’, Sindong-a, Dec. 2004, <www.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2004/11/23/200411230500004/200411230500004_1.html>; and Yu Yong Won, ‘Sudogwon-eul Sajeonggeori An-e Neohgo Issneun Bughan-ui Dayeonjang Rokes Mich Jajupo Yeongu (Study on North Korean MRL and Self-Propelled Artillery that Put Seoul Metropolitan Area within their Range)’, Wolgan Chosun, March 2001 <http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200102/200102280011_1.html>.

⁹Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 1999), 130.

¹⁰See, for example, Joel S. Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, Choong-suk Oh, The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea, A Report of the CSIS International Security Program, Dec. 2005, 1 and 6.

¹¹‘KCNA on DPRK's nuclear deterrent force’, KCNA, 9 June 2003.

¹²‘DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period’, KCNA, 10 Feb. 2005.

¹³Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities, 22 March 2006, 3.

¹⁴ Sankei Shimbun, 26 June 2005, 1.

¹⁵‘Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration’, Pyongyang, 17 Sept. 2002.

¹⁶‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea’, KCNA, 31 March 2005.

¹⁷‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing’, 19 Sept. 2005.

¹⁸Michishita, ‘North Korea's “First” Nuclear Diplomacy, 1993–94’, 47–82.

¹⁹ OhmyNews, 14 Nov. 2005.

²⁰Bong-Geun Jun, interview by author, Seoul, ROK, 16 May 2002.

²¹A defected former North Korean diplomat, interview by author, Seoul, ROK, 15 May 2002.

²²Kim Nam Jin et al., Hyangdo-ui Taeyang Gim Jeong Il Janggun[Gen. Kim Jong Il: The Leading Sun] (Pyongyang: Pyeongyang Chulpansa 1995), 397–402. The English edition of this book is Kim Jong Il: The Lodestar of the 21st Century, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Gwang Myeongsa 1997), 40–5.

²³‘Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’, A/RES/60/173, 16 Dec. 2005, GA/10437.

²⁴Ministry of Unification, Bughan Gaeyo 2004 (Survey of North Korea 2004) (Seoul: Ministry of Unification 2004), 299.

²⁵The Bank of Korea, ‘Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004’, 31 May 2005. The Bank of Korea assessed that the North Korean economy had grown steadily, ‘as energy supply has improved somewhat and efforts have been made to increase production capacity since the implementation of the Economic Management Improvement Measures in July 2002’. Education Center for Unification, Bughan Gyeongje, Eodikkaji wassna?[What is the status of North Korean economy?] (Seoul: Education Center for Unification 2005), 212.

²⁶Rural Development Administration, ‘2005 Bughan-ui Gogmul Saengsanryang Chujeong Balpyo’[Assessment of North Korean Grain Production in 2005 Announced], 29 Nov. 2005.

²⁷Denny Roy, ‘North Korea and the “Madman” Theory’, Security Dialogue 25/3 (1994), 311.

²⁸Press Conference with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Commonwealth Parliamentary Offices, 13 Dec. 2002.

²⁹ Xinhua News Agency, 31 Oct. 2005.

³⁰Lee Young Hun, ‘Bug-Jung Muyeog-ui Hyeonhwang-gwa Bughan Gyeongje-e Michineun Yeonghyang (Current Status of North Korea-China Trade and its Impact on North Korean Economy)’, Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, 13 Feb. 2006; Ministry of Unification, Peace and Prosperity: White Paper on Korean Unification 2005 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification 2005), 54; and Ministry of Unification, ‘Trade Volume between North Korea and Japan’, 2 March 2006.

³¹Ministry of Unification homepage <www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EPA/EPA0101L.jsp>; Ministry of Unification, ‘Inter-Korean Trade Volume from 2000 to 2005 (23 Jan. 2006)’, <www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EPA/EPA0101L.jsp>; Korea International Trade Association, ‘2005 Inter-Korean Trade Exceeds a Historic High US$1 Billion’, 26 Jan. 2006, <http://global.kita.net/kita/kitanews_viw.jsp?no=482>; and the Bank of Korea, ‘Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004’.

³²Ministry of Unification homepage <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/EUF/EUF0101R.jsp>.

³³Ibid.; and Ministry of Unification, ‘Achievements and Prospects of the Participatory Government's Policy toward North Korea after the First Half of its Term’, 26 Aug. 2005.

³⁴Ministry of Unification, ‘Achievements and Prospects’.

³⁵‘Address at a Luncheon Hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council’, Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President, Republic of Korea, 12 Nov. 2004.

³⁶International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005/2006 (London: Routledge 2005).

³⁷‘North Korean Nuclear Program’, Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, 16 Oct. 2002; ‘President Bush Discusses Iraq’, Remarks by President Bush and Polish President Kwasniewski in Photo Opportunity, Office of the Press Secretary, 14 Jan. 2003; and ‘Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs’, Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 July 2004.

³⁸According to David Asher, North Korea's criminal sector may account for as much as 35–40 percent of its exports and a much larger percentage of its total cash earnings. David L. Asher, ‘The North Korean Criminal State, its ties to Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation’, Remarks to the Counter-Proliferation Strategy Group, Woodrow Wilson Center, 21 Oct. 2005.

³⁹‘Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act’, JS-2720, 15 Sept. 2005.

⁴⁰David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006', Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 26 June 2006, 1.

⁴¹‘US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’, Security Consultative Committee Document by Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura, and Minister of State for Defense Ohno, 29 Oct. 2005.

⁴² Xinhua News Agency, 19 Jan. 2006.

⁴³William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, ‘North Korea Policy Review, Findings and Recommendations’, Unclassified Report, 12 Oct. 1999.