Managed great power relations: Do we see ‘One-Up and One-Down’?

Abstract

In addressing whether the much debated global implications of the rise of China represent an opportunity or a threat, this article presents a model of managed great power relations (MGPR), paying special attention to the relationship between a rising power and a dominant power in world politics, China and the United States. The inevitable question is whether there is now a ‘one up and one down’ beginning to happen – namely, is China ‘up’ and the United States ‘down’? Three categories of criteria are needed to approach this question: the shift of power distribution, perceptions toward major powers, and the recognition of differing approaches and mentalities. Clearly, this question is linked to the perception of whether the rise of China is a threat or an opportunity. This article analyzes the implications of China's rapid economic growth to the ongoing dynamics of international relations and the possible reconfiguration of major power relations in the twenty-first century.

Key words:

• China's Rise
• Sino-US Relations
• Managed Great Power Relations

Notes

¹See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 2001), 401 and 4.

²See Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Make Money, Not War’, Foreign Policy 146 (Jan.–Feb. 2005), 46.

³For insightful analysis of China's rise and its impact, see David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2005); and Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford UP 2005).

⁴See Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books 1990). Another interesting analysis of US preeminence in world politics is G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2002).

⁵See Quansheng Zhao, ‘The Shift in Power Distribution and the Change of Major Power Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 24/4 (Dec. 2001), 49–78.

⁶The Japanese Self-Defense Agency was recently upgraded to full cabinet ministry status. This clearly indicates that Japan wishes to become a stronger military and political power. With enormous natural resources fueled by the surge in oil prices in recent times, Russian President Vladimir Putin is more confident about Russia's power and has become more assertive in his dealings with the United States and other Western powers. For the case of Japan, see Michael J. Green, ‘Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo's New Assertiveness Is Good for Washington’, Foreign Affairs 86/2 (March/April 2007), 142–7; and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs 2007).

⁷See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976).

⁸See Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton UP 1997); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown 1977).

⁹See International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys, <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx>.

¹⁰See Kori Schake and Klaus Becher, ‘How America Should Lead’, Policy Review 114 (Aug./Sept. 2002), 8. For rankings see <www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp>.

¹¹Li Changjiu, ‘Zhongmei Jingji Bijiao’[Economic Comparison Between China and the United States]China Strategic Review,No. 1–2 (2007), 61–75.

¹²See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs 2004).

^‡In 2006, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted a public opinion survey on global views, based on which a report entitled “The United States and the Rise of China and India” was produced.

¹³Emilio Casetti, ‘Power Shifts and Economic Development: When Will China Overtake the USA?’Journal of Peace Research 40 (2003), 672.

¹⁴See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China's New Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 82/6 (Nov./Dec. 2003), 22–35.

¹⁵See Kent E. Calder, ‘China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (March/April 2006), 129–39.

¹⁶For a detailed analysis of China's interests in securing sea lanes in a global context, see Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipping Lanes are Safe’, Foreign Affairs 86/3 (May/June 2007), 7–13.

¹⁷See Quansheng Zhao, ‘Moving Toward a Co-Management Approach: China's Policy toward North Korea and Taiwan’, Asian Perspective 30/1 (2006), 39–78.

¹⁸See Sheng Lijun, Saw Swee Hock and Chin Kin Wah (eds.), ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies 2005) and Sheng Lijun, ‘China's Influence in Southeast Asia’, Trends in Southeast Asia 4 (April 2006).

¹⁹See James D. Fearon, ‘Iraq's Civil War’, Foreign Affairs 86/2 (March/April 2007), 2–15.

²¹For an insightful analysis of China's eye-catching anti-satellite test in early 2007, see Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, ‘China's Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing’, Foreign Affairs 86/3 (May/June 2007), 2–6.

²²See John L. Thornton, ‘China's Leadership Gap’, Foreign Affairs 85/6 (Nov./Dec. 2006), 133–40.

²³See Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2004).

²⁴See Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge To China's Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2005).

²⁰For a comprehensive study of China's domestic problems, which could derail its peaceful rise, see Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower – How China's Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise (New York: OUP 2007).

²⁵See Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989), 138, and Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Touchstone 2001), 152–3.

²⁶See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979), 106, and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 373.

²⁷Email communication with Harvey Nelsen, who is scheduled to present a paper on this topic at the International Studies Association Southern Convention, Savannah, Georgia, Oct. 2007.

²⁸See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton UP 1984), 244, and Stephen Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty (New York: Columbia UP 2001), 182.

²⁹See David Lampton, ‘China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's Expense’, in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2005), 306–26.

³⁰For an insightful analysis of Sino-American relations, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2001).

³¹See Quansheng Zhao, ‘America's Response to the Rise of China and Sino-US Relations’, Asian Journal of Political Science 14/1 (Dec. 2005), 1–27.

³²See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books 1987), esp. Chapter 6. For a historical analysis of the Japanese case, see Michael A. Barnhart, Japan and the World since 1868 (New York: Edward Arnold 1995).

³³See Christopher Hill, ‘Update on the Six-Party Talks’, address to The Brookings Institution (Washington DC: 22 Feb. 2007), transcript and video available at <www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20070222hill.htm>.

³⁴Quansheng Zhao, ‘Moving toward a Co-management Approach: China's Policy toward North Korea and Taiwan’, Asian Perspective 30/1 (April 2006), 39–78.

³⁵For more on the North Korea threat to China, see Zhang Liangui, ‘Coping with a Nuclear North Korea’, China Security (Autumn 2006), 2–18.

³⁶All players in the region, even the North Koreans, have recognized the special stabilizing role of the US in the Asia-Pacific. Because of this, they are willing to cooperate, or at least negotiate (the case of North Korea) with Washington, albeit to different degrees. In other words, no country wants to challenge the US position in the region or withhold cooperation, as long as the US stance is in accordance with its own interests. Furthermore, all participating parties have clearly recognized the ground-breaking nature of the Six Party Talks. It is the only multilateral security forum led by the US and China, and it may evolve into a new security framework.

³⁷See Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Straight (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press 2005).

³⁸See Jae Ho Chung's book for more about the US role in Korea-China relations Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia UP 2007).

³⁹See Tammen's International Studies Review article about the US lack of strategy in regard to China's rise: Ronald L. Tammen, ‘The Impact of Asia on World Politics: China and India Options for the United States', International Studies Review 8/4 (Dec. 2006), 563–80.

⁴⁰Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, ‘America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy’, Brookings Review 21 (Fall 2000), 2–6.

⁴¹Murray Hiebert and Susan V. Lawrence, ‘China Talks on Korea’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 May 2003, 18–19.

⁴²Susan Lawrence and Jason Dean, ‘A New Threat’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 Dec. 2003, 16–18.

⁴³After Bush's criticism, Chen Shui-bian revised the questions for his proposed referendum. The new version asks whether Taiwan should buy more advanced weapons if China refuses to withdraw its missiles, and whether the island should try to open talks with Beijing. The latter rebuked both proposals as provocative. See Philip P. Pan, ‘China Rebukes Taiwan's Leader on New Plans for Referendum’, Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2003.

⁴⁴Philip P. Pan, ‘China Thanks Bush for Taiwan Stance’, Washington Post, 22 Dec. 2003, A22.

⁴⁵See Colin L. Powell, ‘Interview with Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV’ and ‘Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV’, 25 Oct. 2004. Available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/37366pf.htm>.

⁴⁶Andrew Peterson, ‘Dangerous Games across the Taiwan Strait’, Washington Quarterly 27/2 (Spring 2004), 23–41.

⁴⁷See Robert S. Ross, ‘Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (March–April 2006), 141–8.

⁴⁸Robert Zoellick, ‘Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?’ Issued by the US Dept. of State, 21 Sept. 2005. Available at <www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.

⁴⁹Glenn Kessler, ‘US Says China Must Address Its Intentions’, Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2005, A16.

⁵⁰Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, International Interactions 29 (2003), 269–71.

⁵¹See World Journal, 21 April 2007, A5.

⁵²David Lampton, ‘What Growing Chinese Power Means for America’, Testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 June 2005.

⁵³For a detailed analysis of Washington's position on the issue of China's rise, see Quansheng Zhao, ‘America's Response to the Rise of China and Sino-US Relations’, Asian Journal of Political Science 14/1 (Dec. 2005), 1–27.