Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence

Abstract

Power-transition theory and institutionalist theory offer sharply contrasting views about the implications of China's rise. Power-transition theory sees China's rise as most likely dangerous because it will pose a challenge to the international order underpinned by American power. Institutionalist theory sees China's rise presenting at least an opportunity for building cooperation, rather than intensifying conflict. The logic of these two theoretical perspectives as it pertains to China's rise is explained and their different implications for three flashpoints in East Asia (the South China Sea, Korea, and the Taiwan Strait) is set forth. These expectations are then compared with the still skimpy empirical record of the post-Cold War era. Events in the South China Sea and Korea mainly lend credence to the expectations of institutionalist theory, though the evidence is arguably inconclusive. In the Taiwan Strait, however, the evidence mainly lends credence to the expectations of power-transition theory.

Key words:

• Power-transition theory
• institutionalist theory
• China's rise

Notes

¹For an example of the strongly held views that cross the academic and policy communities, see ‘Watching China: Arthur Waldron & Critics’, Commentary 116/3 (Oct. 2003), 10–23.

²Power-transition theory predicts conflict in cases where a ‘crossover’ in relative power is imminent and the rising power is dissatisfied with the contours of the international system the currently dominant power has fostered. A satisfied rising power creates the possibility of a peaceful transition, the classic case being the rise of the US which supplanted Britain as the world's dominant economic power at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, as often noted, at best power-transition theory establishes necessary but not sufficient conditions for great power conflict. Those who have invoked the logic of power-transition theory to analyze the case of China, however, typically assume that Beijing is more or less dissatisfied with an international order that reflects Washington's handiwork, a legacy of the preponderant economic and military power of the US during the twentieth century. But it is unclear whether China is in fact a dissatisfied power today, or will be one as it approaches the crucial crossover point in a power transition. Indeed, part of the problem is that the criteria for assessing a state's satisfaction are unclear. Does a strong disagreement about influence over outcomes constitute dissatisfaction, or must the disagreement focus on more fundamental principles or ‘rules of the game?’ For a useful review of evidence questioning the assumption that China today is a revisionist power determined to re-write the rules of international politics, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’International Security 27/4 (Spring 2003), 5–56.

³Containment is not the only policy response available to states concerned about the rise of a dissatisfied challenger. Preventive war, for example, is a historically important option that can also be rooted in the logic of power transition. Some would argue that Germany's decision for war in 1914 was informed by the belief that it was necessary to confront a rising Russia before it became too powerful. See William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics 39/3 (April 1987), 353–81. In the nuclear era, however, preventive war is a prohibitively dangerous option, and one that has not been among the more serious proposals for addressing the issues raised by China's rise. For a wide-ranging consideration of the various possible policies for managing the dangers of power transitions see Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House 2000). For an exploration of possible American incentives to strike a nuclear China preventively or preemptively, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of US Primacy’, International Security 30/4 (Spring 2006), 7–44.

⁴Arthur Waldron has been one of the most consistent voices expressing pessimism about the Chinese communist regime's prospects. He has repeatedly questioned its viability and predicted its imminent collapse. See Arthur Waldron, ‘After Deng the Deluge’, Foreign Affairs 74/5 (Sept.–Oct. 1995), 148–53; Arthur Waldron, ‘The Chinese Sickness’, Commentary 116/1 (July–Aug. 2003), 36–42.

⁵The principal danger for China may well be, as Minxin Pei has suggested, that it will fall prey to the same internal rot and resulting political pressures that rocked Indonesia. See Minxin Pei, ‘Will China Become Another Indonesia?’Foreign Policy 116 (Fall 1999), 94–109. See also Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2006); Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House 2001). But for an argument suggesting reasons China may be more stable than these authors suggest, see Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Present at the Stagnation’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (July/Aug. 2006), 177–82.

⁶China's Public Security Ministry claims there were 87,000 mass incidents (demonstrations, riots) in 2005, a 6 percent increase over 2004. See Edward Cody, ‘In Face of Rural Unrest China Rolls Out Reforms’, Washington Post, 28 Jan. 2006, LexisNexis.

⁷These groupings roughly parallel the three images Kenneth Waltz presented in Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia UP 1959).

⁸See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf 1973); John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95), 5–49; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton 2001); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Univ. of Chicago Press 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1981).

⁹See Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983), 323–53; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War’, International Security 20/1 (Summer 1995), 5–38.; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War’, International Organization 56/2 (Spring 2002), 297–337; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization 51/4 (Autumn 1997), 513–52; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton UP 2001); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1999); Randall L. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994), 72-107; Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia UP 1998).

¹⁰Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 6/1 (Autumn 1996), 54–7.

¹¹The theory does, however, predict the consequences of the relentless pursuit of power: to the extent others perceive the accumulation of power exceeding reasonable security requirements, it increases the probability of eliciting a counterbalancing reaction from others worried about the way such increased capabilities might be used. Because such perceptions are uncertain, neorealist theory is typically supplemented with auxiliary arguments about the security dilemma to explain why increases in power are sometimes viewed as excessive. To figure out exactly how each state responds to these challenges, one must include particular state attributes that neorealism does not include, such as history, geography, political ideology, the personality of leaders, and available military technologies. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1988); Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978), 167–214; Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception’, World Politics 20/3 (April 1968), 454–79; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization 44/2 (Spring 1990), 137–68; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865–1940’, International Organization 51/1 (Winter 1997), 65–98.

¹²See Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books 1984); Robert M. Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, World Politics 38/1 (Oct. 1985), 226–54; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton UP 1984).

¹³See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage 1987).

¹⁴On concerns about the security implications of economic engagement, see the annual reports of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission at <www.uscc.gov>.

¹⁵See Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Tammen et al. Power Transitions. For a view that disputes the incentives for a challenger to initiate war, see Dale Copeland The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000).

¹⁶For a report on the consensus of expert opinion, and dissenting views, see ‘Chinese Military Power, Report of an Independent Task Force’, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2003, <www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf>. See also Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. 2005); and The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2005).

¹⁷Steven Greenhouse, ‘New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China into Third Place’, New York Times, 20 May 1993, A1, LexisNexis; ‘Revised Weights for the World Economic Outlook; Annex IV’, World Economic Outlook (1993), LexisNexis; Jim Rohwer, ‘Rapid Growth Could Make China World's Largest Economy by 2012’, South China Morning Post, 28 Nov. 1992, 1, LexisNexis; William H. Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton 1993). For competing estimates of Chinese GDP and an attempt to evaluate their merits during the mid-1990s, see Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1994), 14–18. For an attempt to specify alternative trajectories and the factors shaping them, see Crane et al., Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints.

¹⁸Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Submitted by Mr Cox of California, Chairman. House Report 105–851, 14 June 1999 <www.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851-html/index.html>. See also the criticisms of the report in Walter Pincus, ‘Hill Report on Chinese Spying Faulted, Five Experts Cite Errors, “Unwarranted” Conclusions by Cox Panel’, Washington Post, 15 Dec. 1999, A16; Alastair Iain Johnston, W.K.H. Panofsky, Marco DiCapua, and Lewis R. Franklin, The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford Univ. Dec. 1999), <www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/coxfinal3.pdf>. Since the late 1990s, Congress has mandated various reports to assess the potential dangers a rising China might pose. For two of the most important annual efforts, see Dept. of Defense, ‘Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China’, <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf> and the annual reports to the US Congress filed by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, available at <www.uscc.gov>. For discussion of the military significance of China's manned space program, see Arun Sahgal, ‘China in Space: Military Implications’, Asia Times, 5 Nov. 2003, <www.taiwansecurity.org/News/2003/AT-051103.htm>.

¹⁹Indeed, among the historical referents usually invoked to illustrate the dangers that power-transition theory explains, Germany's decisions on the eve of World War I may have reflected precisely this sort of projection about future dangers that an allegedly rising Russia could pose rather than fear of an imminent crossover. See Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power’.

²⁰Keohane, After Hegemony; Axelrod and Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy’; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security 20/1 (Summer 1995), 39–51. Cf. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95), 5–49.

²¹In a summary contrasting institutionalist theory with realism, Keohane and Martin argue: ‘Realists interpret the relative-gains logic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from cooperation than it is. However, just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation … . [I]nstitutions provide valuable information, and information about the distribution of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the relative-gains logic is correct. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time’. (Keohane and Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, 45). Historical referents for the optimism about building conditional cooperation through institutionalized solutions include relations in the post-World War II period among Western European states and between the US and Japan.

²²China and the US both recoil from the costs of defecting from cooperation (including China's loss of the US market for its exports, the American loss of China as a holder of US debt) which could send disastrously disruptive ripples throughout the institutions of the global economy.

²³See Lardy, China in the World Economy; Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2002); Lawrence J. Lau, ‘Chinese Economic Outlook and Key Issues’, Focus Ventures, Asian Forum, Shanghai, 14 Oct. 2003, <www.stanford.edu/%7Eljlau/Presentations/Presentations/031014.pdf>; Lawrence J. Lau, ‘China in the Global Economy’, UTStarcom China Telecom Executive Management Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 22 Sept. 2003, <www.stanford.edu/%7Eljlau/Presentations/Presentations/030922.pdf>.

²⁴In late 2003, Chinese analysts began to explicitly address the concerns expressed in power-transition arguments by arguing that China's economic and developmental requirements made integration with, rather than a challenge to, the current international system imperative. This claim was initially articulated in Zheng Bijian's speech at the Boao Forum in Nov. 2003 outlining the thesis of China's ‘peaceful rise’ (often relabeled ‘peaceful development’) that has become a central plank of China's foreign policy. See Zheng Bijian, ‘New Path for China's Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia’, Boao Forum for Asia, 3 Nov. 2003, <http://history.boaoforum.org/english/E2003nh/dhwj/t20031103_184101.btk>; Zheng Bijian, ‘China's “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs 84/5 (Sept./Oct. 2005), 18–24; Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China Debates Its “Peaceful Rise Strategy”’, Yale Global Online, 22 June 2004, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4118>; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford UP 2005).

²⁵If one includes not just the Spratlys, but also the Paracels and disputed maritime zones, the competing claimants include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.

²⁶See Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, at <www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf>. ASEAN states issued their own Declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992, calling for the peaceful resolution of outstanding territorial disputes and urging all ‘all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes’. (ASEAN Declaration on The South China Sea Manila, Philippines 22 July 1992, at <www.aseansec.org/1196.htm>.)

²⁷See Allen S. Whiting, ‘ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension’, Asian Survey 37/4 (April 1997), 299–322; Masashi Nishihara, ‘Aiming at New Order for Regional Security-Current State of ARF’, Gaiko Forum (Nov. 1997), 35–40, FBIS-EAS-97-321; Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies July 1996), 37, 43–4; and Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies Oct. 1995).

²⁸Avery Goldstein, ‘Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival’, International Security 22/3 (Winter 1997/98), 36–73; Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.

²⁹See Fang Hua, ‘Yatai Anquan Jiagou De Xianzhuang, Qushi Ji Zhongguo De Zuoyong’[The Current Asia-Pacific Security Framework, Trends and China's Role], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 2 (2000), 12; Lu Jianren, ‘Yatai Daguo Zai Dongnan Yazhou Diqu De Liyi (Asia-Pacific Great Powers’ Interests in Southeast Asia)’, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 2 (2000), 41, 45; Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force’, International Security 25/2 (Fall 2000), 87–123.

³⁰The US government emphasized that ‘maintaining freedom of navigation in the area was a fundamental interest of the US’ and its State Dept. spokesman warned: ‘The US would … view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law’. (Felix Soh, ‘US Warns against Restrictions in South China Sea, Block Press Tour to Spratlys’, The Straits Times (Singapore) 12 May 1995, 1). On a visit to the Philippines in Aug. 1995, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in discussing the disputes in the South China Sea stated, ‘Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States.’ (Greg Torode, ‘Philippines Offered US Jets; Manila Warns over Continued Chinese Construction Work on Mischief Reef’, South China Morning Post, 2 Aug. 1995, 12). See also Michael Richardson, ‘China's Push for Sea Control Angers ASEAN’, The Australian, 23 July 1996), 6.

³¹This burgeoning institutionalization is reflected in the following clause of the ‘Joint Declaration of The Heads of State/Government of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and The People's Republic Of China On Strategic Partnership For Peace And Prosperity’ issued in Oct. 2003: ‘In regional and international affairs, ASEAN and China have engaged in productive cooperation. The two sides have joined hands in promoting the sound development of the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) and other regional and trans-regional cooperation mechanisms. The two sides have good communication and cooperation on issues of mutual interest and concern and have rendered each other support and cooperation in the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and other international organizations with mutual understanding.’ (Joint Declaration of The Heads of State/Government of The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations and The People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace And Prosperity, 8 Oct. 2003, at <www.aseansec.org/15265.htm>.

³²Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, ‘China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China (London/ New York: Routledge 1999); Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, Chapter 6.

³³China was the first non-ASEAN state to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. See ‘Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, 8 Oct. 2003, <www.aseansec.org/15271.htm>. For an example of the detailed, step-by-step measures for building economic transparency and cooperation, see Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between The Association Of South East Asian Nations and The People's Republic Of China, 6 Oct. 2003, <www.aseansec.org/15157.htm>. On the code of conduct, see Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Phnom Penh, 4 Nov. 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>. See also Philip P. Pan, ‘China's Improving Image Challenges US in Asia’, Washington Post, 15 Nov. 2003, A1.

³⁴See Avery Goldstein, ‘An Emerging China's Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?’, in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia UP 2003), 57–106; also Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.

³⁵This interpretation, consistent with the logic of power-transition theory, indeed seemed to be embodied in Deng Xiaoping's frequently cited admonition for China to ‘bide our time and conceal our capabilities’ (tao guang yang hui) and its echo in the similar advice that Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, offered – that China should avoid trouble while it is at a material disadvantage and instead ‘enhance confidence, decrease troubles, promote cooperation, and avoid confrontation’. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington DC: National Defense UP 2000), xxiv, xxxvi. In contemporary thinking about how to cope with the dominant US, Pillsbury detects the influence of traditional Chinese strategic notions dating to the Warring States period that explains ‘how to survive destruction at the hands of a predator hegemon’ (ibid., xxxv). See also Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000), esp. Chapter 3.

³⁶For a summary of such concerns, see Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert, ‘How China Is Building an Empire’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 Nov. 2003, <www.taiwansecurity.org/News/2003/FEER-201103.htm>.

³⁷On the new security concept and its growing relevance in the post-Cold War world, see Sa Benwang, ‘Woguo Anquan De Bianhua Ji Xin De Pubian Anquanguan De Zhuyao Tezheng’[The Change in Our Country's Security and the Main Features of the New Concept of Universal Security], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan 1 (2000), 51. Yan Xuetong argues that China seeks to dilute American leverage by engaging in ‘all sorts of security cooperation’ participating in ‘various kinds of regional organizations for security cooperation, considers developing subregional East Asian security cooperation (including four-power security dialogues), helps develop countries’ independent regional consciousness, and seeks to promote mutual security confidence’. Because the PRC's neighbors are unlikely to risk war with China unless they have US backing, such efforts enhance China's security. See Yan Xuetong, ‘Dui Zhongguo Anquan Huanjing De Fenxi Yu Sikao’[Analysis of and Reflections on China's Security Environment]Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 2 (2000), 10.

³⁸To be sure, since the early 1970s this formal stance had partly obscured Beijing's tepid support for its socialist ally, the DPRK. After the US began disengaging from Vietnam and as Beijing's top priority became opposition to Soviet influence in Asia, it was an open secret that China was in no hurry to see US forces leave the region. Thus, the shared security concern that had long served as the chief reason for close ties between these communist allies, opposition to the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula, was undermined. And as China embraced its post-Mao reform program after 1978, the other basis for their close relations, a shared commitment to revolutionary socialist ideology, also began to crumble.

³⁹By the end of the 1990s, close ties led China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to establish a ‘Sino-Korean cooperative partnership oriented towards the 21st century’. See ‘Zhu Rongji Zongli Tong Hanguo Zongtong Jin Dazhong Juxing Huitan’[Premier Zhu Rongji and ROK President Kim Daejung Hold Talks]’, Xinhua, 18 Oct. 2000. See also Liu Zhengxue and Wang Linchang, ‘Zhu Rongji Tong Jin Dazhong Huitan, Shuangfang Jiu Shuangbian Guanxi He Diqu Wenti Jiaohuanle Yijian’[Zhu Rongji and Kim Daejung Hold Talks, the Two Sides Exchange Opinions on Bilateral Relations and Regional Issues], Renmin Ribao, 19 Oct. 2000; Weixing Hu, ‘Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean Peninsula’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 14/3 (Fall 1995), 50–67; Kay Moeller, ‘China and Korea: The Godfather Part Three’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 15/4 (Winter 1996), 35–48.

⁴⁰This position was part of China's larger post-Cold War grand strategy that rounded into shape after 1996. See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.

⁴¹See Tao Wenzhao, ‘China's Position Towards the Korean Peninsula’, Paper presented at the ASEM 2000 People's Forum, Seoul, Korea, 17–20 Oct. 2000; Ding Shichuan and Li Qiang, ‘Chaoxian Bandao Heping Jizhi Ji Qi Qianjing’[A Peace Mechanism for the Korean Peninsula and Its Prospects], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (1999), 42–4; Zhang Guocheng, ‘Quadripartite Talks Enter Substantive Stage’, Renmin Ribao 29 Jan. 1999, FBIS-CHI-99-030, Article Id: drchi01301999000119, 6. On China's initial reservations about the four-party talks see, ‘PRC Spokesman: Beijing Hopes for Negotiations on Korea’, Agence France Presse, 18 April 1996, FBIS-CHI-96-076, Article Id: drchi076_a_96005; Moeller, ‘China and Korea: The Godfather Part Three’, 38.

⁴²See Warren Hoge, ‘Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea’, New York Times, 15 Oct. 2006, 1, LexisNexis; Joseph Kahn, ‘China May Be Using Oil to Press North Korea’, ibid., 31 Oct. 2006), 12, LexisNexis; Joseph Kahn And Helene Cooper, ‘North Korea Will Resume Nuclear Talks’, ibid., 1 Nov. 2006, 1, LexisNexis.

⁴³See esp. Thom Shanker and Joseph Kahn, ‘US and China Call for North Korea to Rejoin 6-Nation Talks on Nuclear Program’, New York Times, 21 Oct. 2006, 8, LexisNexis; Glenn Kessler, ‘Rice Sees Bright Spot In China's New Role Since N. Korean Test’, Washington Post, 22 Oct. 2006, A21, LexisNexis.

⁴⁴See Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 184–6. American allies have also evinced little concern that a rising China might somehow benefit from the peaceful management of tensions on the peninsula. Most notably, South Korea has voiced support for China's preference to pursue a negotiated solution, expressed concern about the Bush administration's abandonment of the Clinton policy of engagement with Pyongyang, and shares China's trepidation about the unpredictable consequences of coercive options the US has at times seemed to be seriously entertaining since the 2002–03 nuclear crisis began to unfold.

⁴⁵The initial reactions to the nuclear test suggested that the risk of US military strikes was only one danger. Other worrisome possibilities for China included a significant strengthening of the US-Japan security alliance, growing support within Japan for increasing the country's own military capabilities, and perhaps even a reconsideration of Tokyo's commitment to eschew nuclear weapons. See, for example, Thom Shanker and Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Japan Assures Rice That It Has No Nuclear Intentions’, New York Times, 19 Oct. 2006), 14, LexisNexis.

⁴⁶See Chas. Freeman, ‘China's Changing Nuclear Posture’, Proliferation Brief 2/10 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 11 May 1999); Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security 25/4 (2001), 5–40.

⁴⁷In a sense, this continues a tradition for the US in which the American view of Taiwan has never really been based on the intrinsic value of Taiwan per se. From the moment President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait following the onset of the Korean War until the Nixon–Kissinger opening to Beijing, Washington viewed the government of the ROC as a political-ideological asset in Cold War rivalry with a monolithic Soviet bloc. Following the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972 until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington viewed Taiwan as an inconvenient anomaly that could not be permitted to complicate the US strategic entente with Beijing designed to counter Moscow's influence in Asia.

⁴⁸This is reflected is some of the arguments among American conservatives who see strategic value in US support for Taiwan. See Ross H. Munro, ‘Taiwan: What China Really Wants’, National Review, 11 Oct. 1999, LexisNexis; Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Asia’, Commentary 110/4 (Nov. 2000), 17–26. Mirroring this American perspective, some Chinese analysts complain that the US views Taiwan as an asset useful for checking or containing China. See Ma Shikun and Zhang Yong, ‘US Arms Encourage the Arrogance of “Taiwan Independence”’, Renmin Ribao, 28 Aug. 1999, 3, FBIS-CHI-1999-0830, WNC Doc. No. 0FHC8Y9022O6DY, World News Connection; ‘Promote Peaceful Reunification of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait with Greatest Sincerity and Effort’, Ta Kung Pao, 26 Oct. 2002, FBIS-CHI-2002-1026, WNC Doc. No. 0H4P3KO00GEIQQ, World News Connection.

⁴⁹Such advocates can argue that muting conflict and sustaining cooperation with a US-dominated international order is a rational means to the end of increasing China's strength which will ultimately put the country in a position to produce a resolution of the Taiwan problem that Beijing finds acceptable. While this argument would be politically prudent behind closed doors in Beijing, its logic is not consistent with the expectations of institutionalist theory, since it envisions defection and exploiting relative gains at some date uncertain.

⁵⁰For a regularly updated collection of relevant Chinese, Taiwanese, and American documents, official statements, and academic analysis covering these topics and all major events affecting cross-Strait relations, see http://taiwansecurity.org/TSR-Strait.htm

⁵¹Indeed, Taiwan's leaders stoke such smoldering fears in Beijing when they insist that there is no need for any formal declaration of independence because their country is already a sovereign state.

⁵²Since spring 2005, China's cultivation of relations with the main opposition party leaders from Taiwan (the KMT and PFP) suggest a more sophisticated proactive effort by Beijing to shape public opinion in Taiwan about the feasibility and desirability of negotiating a deal that both sides of the Strait will find acceptable. The magnitude of the economic benefits available from ties with the mainland are reflected in the difficulty that Taiwan's leaders have faced in sustaining restrictions as industrious Taiwanese discover ways to circumvent many of the formal rules.

⁵³See, for example, Taiwan's rejection of ‘a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with China such as China signed with Hong Kong and Macau … because it is a product of China's ‘one country, two systems’ formula’ (Melody Chen, ‘Taiwan Will Not Sign Pact with China, Mac States’, Taipei Times, (14 Nov. 2003) <http://taiwansecurity.org/TT/2003/TT-141103.htm>.

⁵⁴See, for example, ‘US-Made Air-to-Air Missiles Delivered to Taiwan: Report’, Agence France Presse, (15 Nov. 2003), <http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2003/AFP-151103.htm>. Washington's military ties to Taiwan allegedly bolster the status quo by (1) increasing Beijing's estimate of the likelihood the US will intervene if a rising China tries to coerce Taiwan, (2) making it more difficult for the mainland to destroy Taiwan's own defenses, and (3) introducing a grave but unspecified risk of American retaliation against China.

⁵⁵American actions have sent inconsistent signals. Washington's decision permitting Taiwan's President Chen to stop over in the US and participate in highly visible political activities that may have boosted his reelection chances, along with Chen's commitment to holding a referendum on a new constitution for Taiwan during his second term, elicited strong warnings from Beijing that, intentionally or not, the US was encouraging pro-independence forces on the island, and that a move to independence would mean war. See especially ‘Independence Stance May Trigger War’, China Daily, 18 Nov. 2003, <www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/18/content_282630.htm>. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to the White House in Nov. 2003, President Bush issued an unusually candid warning to Taiwan not to provoke a crisis by taking any steps that unilaterally challenged the status quo in the Strait. The US could hardly afford a dangerously escalating confrontation with China while managing difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while it was seeking China's help in building a regional consensus on ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

⁵⁶On this possibility, see Charles Lipson, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs’, World Politics 37/1 (Oct. 1984), 1–23. On the enduring concerns about relative gains in economic affairs, even when states are close allies, see Michael Mastanduno, ‘Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy’, International Security 16/1 (Summer 1991), 73–113. For a penetrating theoretical reassessment of the distinction between relative and absolute gains, see Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton UP 1999).