Securing borders: China's doctrine and force structure for frontier defense

Abstract

The study of military doctrine is one tool that scholars can use to understand a rising power's potential for involvement in interstate war. In its evolving joint operational doctrine, China pursues a defensive approach to securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. Despite the prominence of a Taiwan conflict in China's defense planning, frontier defense remains a core mission for China's armed forces, involving almost half of the PLA's ground forces. China's force structure is consistent with a defensive doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the border itself while most maneuver units capable of offensive operations are based hundreds of kilometers away in the interior. Due to the potential for ethnic unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring states, China's defensive posture on the Asian continent is likely to endure.

Key Words:

• China
• strategy
• military doctrine
• borders

Acknowledgements

I thank Kenneth Allen, Michael Glosny, Paul Godwin, Evan Medeiros, Ellis Melvin, Christopher Twomey, Andrew Yang and especially Dennis Blasko for helpful comments and suggestions. Ruijie He provided expert research assistance. A previous version of this article was presented at the November 2005 CAPS-RAND-CEIP International Conference on the PLA, in Taipei, Taiwan. The Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program supported by Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies and the Visiting Scholars Program at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences provided generous financial support for this research.

Notes

¹See, for example, Nazli Choucri and Robert Carver North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman 1975); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1981); A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf 1958).

²On military doctrine, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).

³On the role of doctrine in signaling, for example, see Evan Brady Montgomery, ‘Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty’, International Security 31/2 (Fall 2006), 151–85.

⁴See, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense 2006).

⁵As David Finkelstein notes, China does not publish a document similar to the National Security Strategy in the US, but its strategic goals for the development of military power can be identified through a range of Chinese sources and statements. See David M. Finkelstein, ‘China's National Military Strategy Revisited’, paper presented at the conference ‘Exploring the “Right Size” for China's Military’, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 6–8 Oct. 2006.

⁶ 2006 nian Zhongguo de guofang[China's National Defense in 2006] (Beijing: Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/29/content_5545898.htm.

⁷Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘China as a Major Asian Power: The Implications of Its Military Modernization’, in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (eds.), Shaping China's Security Environment: The Role of the People's Liberation Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2006), 107–35.

⁸See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 138–67, 396–400.

⁹Li Xing (ed.), Bianfang xue[The Science of Frontier Defense] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 2004); Mao Zhenfa (ed.), Bianfang lun[On Frontier Defense] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, [internal circulation]1996).

¹⁰On China's military strategy, see Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.), Zhanlue xue[The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 2001); Wang Wenrong (ed.), Zhanlue xue[The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe 1999). On campaign doctrine, see Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds.), Zhanyi xue[The Science of Military Campaigns] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe 2000); Xue Xinglin (ed.), Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan[Campaign Theory Study Guide] (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe 2002). On paramilitary training manuals, see Cai Xiru (ed.), Bianfang lilun[Theory of Frontier Defense] (Beijing: Jingguan jiaoyu chubanshe [internal circulation]1996); Ping Qingfu (ed.), Bianjing guanli xue[The Science of Border Management] (Beijing: Jingguan jiaoyu chubanshe [internal circulation]1999).

¹¹Chen Yong et al. (eds.), Gaoji jishu tiaojian xia de lujun zhanyi xue[The Science of Army Campaigns under High Technology Conditions] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 2003).

¹²For scholarly studies of doctrine regarding conflict over Taiwan, see Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security 25/4 (2001), 5–40; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Coercive Contradictions: Zhanyixue, PLA Doctrine, and Taiwan Scenarios’, in David M. Finkelstein and James Mulvenon (eds.), The Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses 2005), 307–27.

¹³On this distinction, see Li, Bianfang xue, 1–39; Mao, Bianfang lun, 1–6; Zheng Shan (ed.), Zhongguo bianfang shi[History of China's Frontier Defense] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 1995), 1–3.

¹⁴Li, Bianfang xue, 5. Also, see Mao, Bianfang lun, 5.

¹⁵This paragraph draws on M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes’, International Security 30/2 (Fall 2005), 55–60. Also, see Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940); Mao, Bianfang lun; Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, Adelphi Paper No. 287 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 21–96; Joseph Witney, China: Area, Administration and Nation Building, Dept. of Geography Research Paper No. 123 ( University of Chicago, 1970); Zheng Shan, Zhongguo bianfang shi.

¹⁶Bu He, ed., Minzu lilun yu minzu zhengce[Nationality Theory and Nationality Policy] (Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1995), p. 27.

¹⁷On the frontier areas, see Ma Dazheng and Liu Ti, Ershi shiji de Zhongguo bianjiang yanjiu: yimen fazhan zhong de bianyuan xueke de yanjin licheng[China's Borderland Research in the Twentieth Century] (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), 1–60; Niu Zhongxun, Zhongguo bianjiang dili[China's Frontier Geography] (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), 1–7.

¹⁸Sun Jianmin, Zhongguo lidai zhibian fanlue yanjiu[Research on China's Historical Approach for Governing the Frontiers] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe 2004), 395.

¹⁹Wang Enmao, Wang Enmao wenji[Wang Enmao's Collected Works] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 1997), 393.

²⁰Li, Bianfang xue, 189.

²¹Sun, Zhongguo lidai zhibian fanlue yanjiu, 401.

²²Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity’.

²³Wang Guosheng, ‘Sunzi bingfa yu xiandai bianfang jianshe [Sun Zi's Art of War and Modern Frontier Defense Construction]’, Zhongguo junshi kexue 19/5 (2006), 23. Also, see Li, Bianfang xue, 493–8; Sun, Zhongguo lidai zhibian fanlue yanjiu, 399.

²⁴Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 265.

²⁵Li, Bianfang xue, 192.

²⁶Ibid., 355–8.

²⁷Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 304.

²⁸Wang Qing, ‘Jia shi hou gongan bianfang gongzuo ying zhuyi de wenti’[Problems in Public Security Border Defense Work to Note After China's Entry into the WTO], Gongan yanjiu 4 (2002), 23–6.

²⁹Nan Li, ‘From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military's Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post–Mao Era’, Peaceworks No. 39 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2001).

³⁰On these compromises, see Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity’.

³¹ Deng Xiaoping wenxuan[Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1994), 161.

³²For an overview of frontier policy during the Qing, see Nicola Di Cosmo, ‘Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia’, International History Review 20/2 (1988), 287–309.

³³Bu He, Minzu lilun yu minzu zhengce, 27; Zhang Hui, ‘Woguo kuajie minzu ji qi dui bianfang gongzuo de yingxiang’[Our Country's Cross-Border Ethnic Groups and Their Influence on Frontier Defense], Wujing xueyuan xuebao 18/3 (2002), 17–19.

³⁴These are summarized in Li, Bianfang xue, 346–7. On counter-terrorism, see Zhang Zhenfa et al., ‘Bianjing fankongbu zhandou de tedian ji duice’[Characteristics and Countermeasures for Border Counterterrorist Action], Wujing xueyuan xuebao 18/6 (2002), 63–5.

³⁵Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 490–505.

³⁶Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 459.

³⁷Li, Bianfang xue, 151. Also, see Mao, Bianfang lun, 232–4, 256–61; Zhang Hui, ‘Woguo kuajie minzu’, 19.

³⁸Li Qing, ‘Yazhou diyuan chongtu bankuai yu woguo de anquan huanjing’[Asia's Geopolitical Tectonic Plates of Conflict and Our Country's Security Environment], Junshi lishi yanjiu 2 (2004), 178.

³⁹Wang Jun and Wang Yongming, ‘Liansuo fanying beijing xia bianjing diqu fanji zhanyi zhihui de qiantan [Brief Exploration of Campaign Command in a Border Area Counterattack Under the Background of a Chain Reaction]’, Guofang daxue xuebao 5 (2002), 37.

⁴⁰Wang, Zhanlue xue, 270.

⁴¹Wei Yanping et al., ‘Xibu bianjing diqu wujing jidong budui fanji zuozhan zhi guanjian’[Opinions on Armed Police Counterattack Operations in Western Border Areas], Wujing xueyuan xuebao 19/1 (2003), 80–1.

⁴²Li, Bianfang xue, 161–72, 195–6; Mao, Bianfang lun, 241–8; Wang, ‘Sunzi bingfa’, 23–4; Wang Yaning, ‘Shilun woguo bianjing anquan zhanlue de neihan’[On the Implications of Our Country's Border Security Strategy], Wujing xueyuan xuebao 21/6 (2005), 14–16.

⁴³ Renmin ribao, 16 Sept. 2000, p. 1. Also, see Harry Hongyi Lai, ‘China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects’, Modern China 28/4 (2002), 432–66.

⁴⁴Mao, Bianfang lun, 241–55; Wang, Zhanlue xue, 270.

⁴⁵Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity’, 78–82.

⁴⁶Xu Tao and Li Zhiye (eds.), Shanghai hezuo zuzhi: xin anquan guan yu xin jizhi[Shanghai Cooperation Organization: New security concept and new mechanism] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe 2002).

⁴⁷The other joint campaigns include blockades, amphibious assaults, air defense, anti-landing operations and airborne operations. Unless otherwise stated, the description of the campaign is synthesized from Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 303–23; Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 459–73; Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 264–79.

⁴⁸Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 264.

⁴⁹Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 305.

⁵⁰Ibid., 319.

⁵¹The history of expanding war aims, however, demonstrates this can never be ruled out. See Eric J. Labs, ‘Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims’, Security Studies 6/4 (1997), 1–49.

⁵²Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 464; Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 273–6.

⁵³Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 265.

⁵⁴Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 314.

⁵⁵In many ways, the combination of defensive and offensive operations reflects the continuity of doctrinal principles developed by Mao Zedong in the 1930s, especially the concept of ‘active defense’. See Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949–1999’, in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. McDevitt (eds.), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2003), 23–55.

⁵⁶For a description of this strategy, see M. Taylor Fravel, ‘The Evolution of China's Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlue Xue’, in David M. Finkelstein and James Mulvenon, (eds.), The Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses 2005), 79–100.

⁵⁷In addition, past doctrine envisioned a Soviet attack on Beijing, where Han Chinese would be more likely to engage in guerrilla operations.

⁵⁸Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 465.

⁵⁹Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 305.

⁶⁰Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 310.

⁶¹Li, Bianfang xue, 369.

⁶²One explanation for the lack of detailed discussion of the PLAAF's role might stem from the sources consulted for this study, which come primarily from the army or army-dominated institutions such as the National Defense University.

⁶³Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 269.

⁶⁴Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 304; Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 460.

⁶⁵Chen, Lujun zhanyi xue, 309, 313–14; Wang and Zhang, Zhanyi xue, 462–3; Xue, Zhanyi lilun xuexi zhinan, 265, 275.

⁶⁶For overviews of the PLA's command structure, see Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge 2006), 16–46; David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press 2002), 108–83.

⁶⁷ Directory of PRC Military Personalities (n.p., Oct. 2006).

⁶⁸Li, Bianfang xue, 304–6.

⁶⁹The military regions adjacent to China's international boundaries include Lanzhou (Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India), Chengdu (Nepal, India, Bhutan, Burma, Laos and Vietnam), Guangzhou (Vietnam), Shenyang (North Korea, Russia) and Beijing (Russia and Mongolia).

⁷⁰Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military, 153. On traditional invasion routes, see Shen Weilie and Lu Junyuan (eds.), Zhongguo guojia anquan dili[The Geography of China's National Security] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [internal circulation]2001).

⁷¹Wang, ‘Sunzi bingfa’, 24.

⁷²Li, Bianfang xue, 304–6.

⁷³ http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/common/article.jsp?infoid=ABC00000000000033760

⁷⁴Blasko, Chinese Army Today, 87–8. In addition, border defense militias (bianfang minbing) serve as a reserve force for both the PLA and PAP border defense troops, supporting both external and internal security missions. See Li, Bianfang xue, 304–5.

⁷⁵On the tortured evolution of the PAP, see Murray Scot Tanner, ‘The Institutional Lessons Of Disaster: Reorganizing The People's Armed Police After Tiananmen’, in James Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds.), The People's Liberation Army as Organization: V 1.0., Reference Volume (Santa Monica: RAND Corp. 2002), 587–635.

⁷⁶Li, Bianfang xue, 246–8.

⁷⁷Mao, Bianfang lun, 116.

⁷⁸The Ministry of Public Security had assumed responsibility for the external security of these border areas in 1981. Apparently, the transfer of PLA troops to secure China's border with North Korea stemmed from efforts to bring all borders into conformity with the ‘divided work defense management’ system, not efforts to coerce North Korea amid the ongoing nuclear crisis. See Li, Bianfang xue, 246–8.

⁷⁹‘Guowuyuan bangongting, Zhongyang Junwei bangongting guanyu tiaozheng guojia bianfang weiyuanhui chengyuan de tongzhi’[State Council and Central Military Commission Notice on Adjusting the Members of the National Frontier Defense Commission], Guobanfa[1999], no. 63, from http://www.fsou.com.cn/html/text/chl/234/23485.html. Also, see ‘China Data Supplement’, China Actuell, Dec. 2006, 16.

⁸⁰ http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-08/13/content_22245.htm.

⁸¹ Guofang bao, 30 Aug. 2004, 4, web edition.

⁸² 2006 nian Zhongguo de guofang. This amounts to approximately 250 million US dollars at current exchange rates or more than 1 billion US dollars using the World Bank's purchasing power parity methodology.

⁸³ Jiefang junbao, 6 Aug. 2002, 6, web edition.

⁸⁴ Guofang bao, 30 Aug. 2004, 4, web edition.

⁸⁵‘Xinjiang Military Region has Remarkably Improved the Conditions for Frontier Defense Companies’, Urumqi Renmin Jundui, 12 March 2002, in OSC #CPP20020405000149.

⁸⁶Li, Bianfang xue, 374–6.

⁸⁷Interview with Indian diplomat, March 2005.

⁸⁸ 2006 nian Zhongguo de guofang.

⁸⁹Waijiao bu (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyue ji: ZhongHa juan[Collection of Treaties of the PRC's Boundary Affairs: China-Kazakhstan] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [internal circulation]2005), 546–51.

⁹⁰Blasko, Chinese Army Today, 155.

⁹¹ 2006 nian Zhongguo de guofang.

⁹²Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford UP 2005).