Southeast Asian perspectives on the China challenge

Abstract

Why have Southeast Asian states' threat perceptions regarding China been reduced significantly over the last 15 years? This article argues it is the result of astute Chinese diplomacy, successful Southeast Asian regional security strategy, and the relative restraint exercised by the major regional powers. The paper is divided into three sections that first outline Southeast Asian strategic imperatives and Chinese strategic aims in the region; followed by an analysis of Southeast Asian views of the consequences of China's rise in the military, political, and economic realms; and an analysis of Southeast Asian responses to the China challenge with regard to their larger regional security strategies. It concludes with outstanding questions about the strategic implications of China's rise for the region.

Key words:

• China
• Southeast Asia
• regional security strategy

Notes

¹On Chinese opportunism, see Ang Cheng Guan, ‘The South China Sea Dispute Revisited’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 54/2 (2000), 201–15.

²A summary and reflection of this evolving approach can be found in Wang Jisi, ‘China's Changing Role in Asia’, paper delivered at Salzburg Seminar, Session 415, 2003; and Alice Ba, ‘China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia’, Asian Survey 43/4 (2003), 630–8. Wang suggests that Chinese assessments of the regional security environment are now more sanguine. He says that China's regional strategy is circumscribed by the issues of economic cooperation, developments on the Korean peninsula, efforts at forging regional security institutions, the Taiwan question, the Sino-Japanese relationship, and the US factor.

⁴Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security, (Stanford UP 2005), 174.

³Michael Leifer, ‘China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation’, in David Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: Routledge 1997).

⁵Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge 1989); Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003).

⁶Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Strategy’, in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (eds.), Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford UP 2004).

⁷Alice Ba, ‘Southeast Asia and China’, in Evelyn Goh (ed.), Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China (Singapore: IDSS 2005), 103.

⁸Shee Poon Kim, ‘The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19/4 (1998), 369–87.

⁹‘Turning a Rising China into Positive Force for Asia’, Straits Times, 26 Sept. 2001.

¹⁰This realist predisposition is waived for only one state in the Asia-Pacific – the United States – which most Southeast Asian states have come to regard as a benign power that could act as arbiter. This somewhat complacent view may be changing, though, with concerns about US unilateralism and the fallout of US foreign policy since 9/11.

¹¹Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of a Rising Power (New York: Routledge 1999); Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and Security Regionalism: Comparing and American Positions’, in Melissa Curley and Nick Thomas (eds.), Advancing East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge 2006).

¹²James Shinn (ed.), Weaving the Net: The Conditional Engagement of China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 1996); Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory’, in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastaduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia UP 2003); Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack and Paul Evans, ‘The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific’, in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995), 250–4.

¹³Rosemary Foot, ‘China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought’, Asian Survey 38/5 (1998), 425–40; Goh and Acharya, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum’. The first defense white paper, titled China's National Defense in 2002, is available at <www.china.org.cn/e-white/>, together with a list of other white papers, including a second defense paper in 2004.

¹⁴See Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge 2000), Chapter 6; Johnston, ‘Socialization in International Relations’.

¹⁵For a discussion of the ‘ASEAN way’, see Katsumata (2003).

¹⁶‘China Snuggles Up to Southeast Asia’Asia Times, 7 Oct. 2003. ASEAN has invited all its dialogue partners to sign the treaty. China was the first to accede to the treaty, along with India, and they were followed in 2004 by Japan, South Korea, and Russia, leaving the United States as a conspicuous exception.

¹⁷Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 173–4. The text of the Joint Declaration is available at: <www.aseansec.org/15265.htm>.

¹⁸For a very positive review, see David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security 29/3 (Winter 2004/5), 64–99.

¹⁹See ‘New group for “Asian century” shuns U.S.’, International Herald Tribune, 12 Dec. 2005; Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord’, YaleGlobal 20 Dec. 2005; Yang Razali Kassim, ‘The Rise of East Asia? ASEAN's driver role key to ties between Japan and China’, IDSS Commentaries, 22 Dec. 2005.

²⁰See Chu Shulong, ‘ASEAN+3 and East Asian Security Cooperation’, in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh (eds.), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007); Remarks by Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to the Lee Kuan Yew School, Singapore, 22 May 2006.

²¹See, for instance, Gerald Segal, ‘The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan’, World Policy Journal 10/2 (Summer 1993), 27–32; Aaron Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’, International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993/94), 5–33; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, ‘The Coming Conflict with America’, Foreign Affairs 76/2 (March/April 1997), 18–32.

²²M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes’, International Security 30/2 (Fall 2005) 46–83; Ang Cheng Guan, ‘Vietnam-China Relations Since the End of the Cold War’, Asian Survey 38/12 (1998), 1122–41.

²³The implications of this non-binding declaration have been debated – see Ralf Emmers, ‘ASEAN, China, and the South China Sea: An Opportunity Missed’, IDSS Commentaries, 2001; Leszek Buszynski, ‘ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25/3 (2003), 434–63; Wu Shicun and Ren Huaifeng, ‘More Than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, Chinese Journal of International Law 2/1 (2003), 311–20.

²⁴See Michael Glosny, ‘Heading Toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China's Policy toward Southeast Asia’, Asian Security 2/1 (2006), 37–8.

²⁵‘Beijing offers Manila $2.6bn in funds’, Straits Times, 28 April 2005; ‘Philippines warms to China with care’, Straits Times, 7 June 2006.

²⁶‘RI-China seal multibillion deal to strengthen trade’, Jakarta Post, 26 April 2005; ‘Interview with Indonesia's Defence Minister: Running low on ammunition’, Straits Times, 13 May 2005; ‘China offers arms to Indonesia’, South China Morning Post, 26 April 2005.

²⁷See Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington DC: East-West Center 2005), 19–23.

²⁸For a contrasting, optimistic assessment of potential joint Southeast Asian capabilities to counterbalance Chinese power, see Bernard Loo, ‘Military Modernization, Power Projection, and the Rise of the PLA: Strategic Implications for Southeast Asia’, in Evelyn Goh and Sheldon Simon (eds.), China, America and Southeast Asia: Perspectives on Politics, Economics and Security (London: Routledge forthcoming).

²⁹‘China's Rise: Export Boon for SE Asia’, Straits Times, 29 April 2002; ‘China's Economic Prowess Is Not a Threat’, International Herald Tribune, 4 March 2003.

³⁰‘ASEAN Trade Prospects Bright’, China Daily, 7 Sept. 2006.

³¹‘China's Rise: Export Boon for SE Asia’, Straits Times, 29 April 2002; ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the 21st Century, Oct. 2001, available at <www.aseansec.org>. For a succinct analysis of the economic and political significance of the China-ASEAN negotiations see Ba, ‘China and ASEAN’, 622–47.

³²‘China Boom Will Boost Region's Prosperity’, Straits Times, 25 April 2002; ‘Turning a Rising China into Positive Force for Asia’, Straits Times, 26 Sept. 2001.

³³See Friedrich Wu et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investments to China and ASEAN: Has ASEAN Been Losing Out?’Economic Survey of Singapore, 2003.

³⁴See Glosny, ‘Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?’, 30–1.

³⁵‘Turning a Rising China into Positive Force for Asia’, Straits Times, 26 Sept. 2001.

³⁶Suthiphand Chirathivat, ‘China's Rise and Its Effects on ASEAN-China Trade Relations’, in Goh and Simon, China, America and Southeast Asia.

³⁷Tan Khee Giap, ‘ASEAN and China: Relative Competitiveness, Emerging Investment-Trade Patterns, Monetary and Financial Integration’, in Goh and Simon, China, America and Southeast Asia.

³⁸A systematic comparison of seven key ASEAN states' strategic perceptions of China and the US is found in Goh, Betwixt and Between.

³⁹Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, 66.

⁴⁰See Khong, ‘Coping with Strategic Uncertainty’.

⁴¹The existing literature on hedging in the Asia-Pacific is unsatisfactory; the term is applied to multiple states, acting in a variety of ways against a range of outcomes. See, for instance, Robert Manning andJames Przystup, ‘Asia's Transition Diplomacy: Hedging Against Future Shock’, Survival 41/3 (Autumn 1999), 43–67; C.P. Chung, ‘Southeast Asia–China Relations: Dialectics of “Hedging” and “Counter-Hedging”’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2004), 35–43; Evan Medeiros, ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability’, Washington Quarterly 29/1 (Winter 2005/6), 145–67; Evelyn Goh, ‘Understanding “Hedging” in Asia-Pacific Security’, PacNet 43, 31 Aug. 2006.

⁴²Goh, Meeting the China Challenge, 1–4.

⁴³For details, see Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Complex Balancing and Hierarchical Order’, mimeo, 2006.

⁴⁴The United States is viewed as the key strategic force in the region for two reasons: its alliance with Japan forestalls Japanese remilitarization; and its military presence deters Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea.

⁴⁵See Amitav Acharya, ‘Regional Institutions and Security Order: Norms, Identity, and Prospects for Peaceful Change’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford UP 2002).

⁴⁶This is an initial finding based on interviews with officials. While the preference for US preponderance and China's secondary role is clear, it is at the moment more difficult to substantiate the suggested preference for the other nations as second-tier powers; how this would impact on relations and expectations; or how the hedging strategy is calibrated to incorporate these second-tier powers.

⁴⁷One Thai analyst has suggested that the current distribution of influence in the region is 80 percent US, 15 percent Japan, and 5 percent China. He ventures that so long as American influence exceeds 50 percent, stability will be maintained. Author interview, Bangkok, April 2004.

⁴⁸Author interview, Bangkok, April 2004.

⁴⁹For more details, see Goh, Betwixt and Between; Goh, Meeting the China Challenge; Goh, ‘Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies’.

⁵⁰See Goh, Betwixt and Between, Introduction.

⁵¹Alice Ba, ‘Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement and Sino-ASEAN Relations’, Pacific Review 19/2 (June 2006), 157–79.