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Abstract
Napoleon shaped his Empire with the expansion of dynastic possessions, the cultivation of princely clientele and the establishment of satellite and allied states. He built his imperium on the foundation of historic French relationships. This expansion began with the Revolutionary Republic and achieved its fullest extent under the Empire. Expansion was not pursued as a universal principle, but instead, each state became a part of a grand strategic objective related to respective enemies. In some cases, states served as buffers between France and their immediate enemies, but shortly thereafter served a dual role as offensive and defensive components of the Republic, and later Napoleonic Empire.
Notes
1Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1998), 3, 85–6; Walter Barberis, Le armi del Principe: La tradizione militare sabauda (Turin: G. Einaudi 1988), xviii–xix, 5, 14, 24–5; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row 1976), II, 945–9; David Parrott, ‘The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and Their Citadels, 1540–1640’, War in History 7/2 (April 2000), 141–4. For the continued significance of Piedmont in relation to Spanish power in Italy see Christopher Storrs, ‘The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665–1700) (Part I)’, War in History 4/4 (Dec. 1997), 371–97; (Part II), War in History 5/1 (Jan. 1998), 1–22.
2Graham Webster, The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD, 3rd ed. (Norman: Oklahoma UP 1998), 28–38; cf. Fergus Millar, ‘Emperors, Frontiers and Foreign Relations, 31 BC to AD 378’, Britannia 13 (1982), 1–23.
3The placing of the French Revolutionary Wars in their historical context pertaining to the Habsburg Empire was first argued by Tim Blanning and Gunther E. Rothenberg, see T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman 1986) and his The French Revolutionary Wars 1787–1802 (New York: Arnold 1996); Gunther E. Rothenberg, ‘The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution an Napoleon’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18/4 (Spring 1988), 771–93. More recently Michael Hochedlinger supported this perspective in Austria's Wars of Emergence, War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797 (Harlow, UK: Longman 2003). Gary Savage advanced this argument viewing it from Paris in ‘Favier's Heirs: The French Revolution and the Secret du Roi’, Historical Journal 41/1(March 1998), 225–58. cf. Introduction in Frederick C. Schneid, Warfare in Europe, 1792–1815 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2007), xi–xxiv.
4See Ralph D. Handen, ‘The End of an Era: Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II’, in Louis XIV and Europe, edited by Ragnhild Hatton (Columbus: Ohio State UP 1976).
5Cristina Borreguero Beltrán, ‘The Spanish Army in Italy, 1734’, War in History 5/4 (Nov. 1998), 405; for a classic account see Spencer Wilkinson, The Defence of Piedmont, 1742–1748: A Prelude to the Study of Napoleon (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1927), 23–4.
6Wilkinson, Defence of Piedmont, 202–25; Reed Browning, The War of Austrian Succession (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 231–4.
7Virgilio Ilari, Piero Croaciani and Ciro Paoletti, Bella Italia Militar: Eserciti e Marine nell'Italia pre-napoleonica (1748–1792) (Rome: Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Ufficio storico 2000), 11–6.
8Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence, 360–96.
9Carnot's orders to Bonaparte reprinted in full, in, Léonce Krebs and Henri Moris, La Campagne dans les Alpes pendant la Révolution (Paris: E. Plon 1891), II, 375–8.
10David Parrott, Richelieu's Army (Cambridge: CUP 2001), 91–100, 102, 112, 116–8, which addresses the War of Mantuan Succession (1628–31) against Habsburg Spain. Parrott argues that prior to 1635 Richelieu's strategy in Italy was defensive, but once France possessed an adequate number of soldiers and allies, it pursued offensive operations against Spanish and Imperial armies.
11M. De Clerq, Recueil des Traités de la France (Paris: A. Durand et Pedone-Lauriel 1880), I, 319–22; An outstanding and detailed examination of the war of the First Coalition in Italy is Virgilio Ilari, Piero Croaciani and Ciro Paoletti, La Guerra della Alpi (1792–1796) (Rome: Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Ufficio storico 2000).
12According to the ‘etat’ of 5 March 1796, one month before the campaign, Bonaparte's army numbered 108,677. Yet ‘present under arms’ was 62,187. The figure is still deceiving, as 22,625 men were allocated either to garrison duty or to the ‘coastal divisions’ along the Mediterranean. The Army of Italy could have mustered no more than 39,562 men available. By the time Napoleon arrived to take command at the end of March the army's numbers increase a bit to 40,575. Gabriel Fabry, Campagne de l'Armée d'Italie 1796–1797 (Paris: R. Chapelot 1901), 644–6, 649–51. Krebs and Moris place the strength of ‘Italie’ at 47,000 by 9 April. Even if the larger figure is accepted roughly 12,000 troops were en route to the front, or completing their amalgamations; although they would all arrive after the first week of fighting. Krebs and Moris, Campagne dans les Alpes, II, 371–4.
13De Clerq, Recueil des Traités, I, 335–44; cf. Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence, 436–8.
14Karl Roider, Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (Princeton UP 1987), 330; Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence, 428–30, 444–5.
15De Clerq, Recueil des Traités, I, 245–9; Frederick C. Schneid, Napoleon's Conquest of Europe, The War of the Third Coalition (Westport, CT: Praeger 2005), 16.
16Virgilio Ilari, Piero Croaciani, Ciro Paolletti, Storia Militare dell'Italia Giacobina: dall'armistizio di Cherasco alla pace di Amiens, (1796–1802) (Rome: Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Ufficio storico 2001) I, 141–64.
19Cobenzl to Colloredo, 20 July 1805, ibid., 174, fn.2.
17Napoleon had been the President of the Italian Republic too, but President and King were considered two entirely different things.
18 Denkschrift der Staatskanzlei über eine Annäherung an Preuβen, 1 Sept. 1804, Auguste Fourier, Gentz und Cobenzl: Geschichte der österreichischen Diplomatie in den Jahren 1801–1805 (Vienna: W. Braumüller 1880), 293–4.
20F. Martens, Receuil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères (St Petersburg: Imprimerie du Ministère de Voies de Communication 1875), II, 405–21.
21Ilari, Storia Giacobina, I, 152; Frederick C. Schneid, Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy: Army, State and Society, 1800–1815 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995), 14; Virgilio Ilari, Piero Croaciani and Ciro Paoletti, Storia Militare del Regno Italico (1802–1814) (Rome: Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Ufficio storico 2004), I, 49–55.
22Edouard Driault, La politique orientale de Napoleon I: Sebastiani et Gardanne, 1806–1808 (Paris: F. Alcan 1904), 6, 151–2; Abbé Paul Pisani, Le Dalmatie de 1797 à 1815: Episode des conquêtes napoleonniennes (Paris: A. Picard 1893), 146; Gordon Griffiths, ‘Napoleon's Adriatic Policy’ (PhD Dissertation: Univ. of California 1942), 49–51.
23Paul F. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806–1807 (New York: AMS Press 1966), 66.
24Piers Macksey. The War in the Mediterranean, 1803–1810 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1981, orig. 1957), 6. Macksey looks at Britain's strategic advantage by controlling the Mediterranean, but admits difficulties due to French control of the coastline. Yet, the reverse may be said from the French perspective. The British were kept on the peripheries of Europe, unable to gain access to the continent despite their naval presence in the Mediterranean.
25P. Coquelle, ‘L’Ambassade du maréchal Brune à Constaninople', Revue d'histoire diplomatique 8 (1904), 72–3.
26Pisani, La Dalmatie, 147. The French occupation was established by a division under General Gabriel Molitor that was detached from the Armée d'Italie; Griffiths, Adriatic Policy, 30.
27This is particularly the case with the Serbs who were in revolt against the Ottoman Turks beginning in 1804. The Serbs initially looked to Vienna, but the Austrians refused to provide support. Subsequently, a Serbian delegation to St Petersburg found firmer ground. Russian support and influence increased through 1806 and thereafter. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia 1741–1881 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1966), 103–5; Barbara Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914 (Cambridge: CUP 1991), 11–8.
28Griffiths, Adriatic Policy, 51.
29Paris, France, Archives de la guerre, Service historique de l'armée du terre[AGSHAT], Xp 22, Napoleon to Marmont, Dec. 1805; Napoleon to Prince Eugène, 21 Feb. 1806, Napoleon, Correspondance du Napoleon I (Paris: Plon, 1858–1862), XII, no. 9864, 83, and Napoleon to Eugène, 7 July 1806, no. 10461, 519; Napoleon to Marmont, 7 July 1806, no. 10462, 519–20.
30Rothenberg, Military Border in Croatia, 108.
31Pisani, La Dalmatie, 159. The squadron was under Vice-Admiral Dmitri N. Senyavin. Pisani estimates roughly 20,000 Russians at Corfu and on the Ionian Islands. Most of these were originally earmarked for the abortive invasion of Naples which was attempted in Jan. 1806. See William Flayhart. Counterpoint to Trafalgar, The Anglo-Russian Invasion of Naples (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press 1992), 145–72; and Macksey, War in the Mediterranean, 77–89.
32As early as 1804 the Russians sent a General Ivelich to Montenegro seeking an alliance with King-Bishop Petar I. Macksey, War in the Mediterranean, 47n.
33Rothenberg, Military Border in Croatia, 105, Rothenberg relates Archduke Ludwig's (commander of the Military Border) order to Austrian commander on the Serbian border to pay attention to the activities of Russian agents in Belgrade.
34Ibid., 107. For reasons for Austrian aloofness to Russian overtures, see Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), 301.
35Napoleon to Lauriston, 20 June 1806, Napoleon. Correspondance, XII, no. 10387, 582; Auguste Marmont, Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse de 1792 à 1841 (Paris: Perrotin, 1857), III, 6–7. Francesco Giannetto, ‘La Diplomazia del Regno d'Italia Napoleonica nei suio Rapporti con l'Impero ottomano’, Clio: trimestrale di studi storici 17 (1981) p. 387; Driault, Politique orientale, 58.
36Marmont, Mémoires, 6–7.
37Francesco Giannetto, ‘Il Regno d'Italia Napoleonica e il pascialato di Giannina’, Clio: trimestrale di studi storici 19 (1983), 189–90.
38Ibid., 190–1.
39Giannetto, ‘il pascialato di Giannina’, 192; Giannetto, ‘Diplomazia con ottomano’, 387–8.
40Napoleon to Talleyrand [forwarded to Sébastiani], 9 June 1806, Napoleon, Correspondance, XII, 550–1, no. 10339; Driault, Politique orientale, 55.
41Sébastian to Talleyrand, 24 Dec. 1806, in Edouard Driault, ‘Correspondance du général Sébastiani, Ambassadeur a Constantinople: (du 24 Dec. 1806 à 10 Mars 1807)’, Revue des études napoleoniennes 4 (1913), 402.
42Napoleon to Talleyrand, 20 Jan. 1807, Napoleon, Correspondance, XIV, no. 11669, 273; Alfred Dumaine, ‘Un Consulate de France en Bosnie sous le premier Empire’, Revue d'histoire diplomatique 38 (1938), 161; Driault, Politique orientale, 165.
43Rothenberg, Military Border in Croatia, 110–1. Grenzer is the term for soldiers of the military border.
44On French policy in Germany during the age of Louis XIV see, Georges Livet, ‘Louis XIV and the Germanies’, and Janine Fayard, ‘Attempts to Build a ‘Third Party’ in North Germany, 1690–1694’, in Louis XIV and Europe edited by Ragnhild Hatton (Columbus: Ohio State UP 1976); and A. Chéruel, ‘La Ligue ou alliance du Rhin’, Séances et travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales (Paris: Picard 1885). The German princes’ perspectives on French are found in Peter H. Wilson, German Armies, War and German Politics, 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press 1998), Chapter 5, ‘Princely Leagues and Associations'.
45The Blenheim campaign is a perfect illustration with Prince Eugene of Savoy's Imperial army contending with the French along the upper Rhine at the same time as Marshal Tallard's French army, and Max Emmanuel III's Bavarian army faced The Duke of Marlborough in Bavaria.
46Sydney Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy during the Wars of the First Coalition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1957), II, 959–60; Paul Sauer, Adler über Württemberg, Baden und Hohenzollern: Südwestdeutschland in der Rheinbundzeit (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1987), 26, 42; Peter H. Wilson, From Reich to Revolution, German History 1558–1806 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 340–2. The most recent work on this is, Peter H. Wilson, ‘Bolstering the Prestige of the Habsburgs: The End of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806’, International History Review 28/4 (Dec. 2006), 709–36.
47De Clerq, Receuil des Traités, II, 171–80; see particularly Articles 35–8 concerning military obligations, 178–9. According to the Rheinbund treaty, Bavaria was required to field 30,000 men, Westphalia, 25,000 and Saxony 20,000. These figures do not represent the total number of troops within the respective armies. Bavaria possessed 47,000 men, and Westphalia 38,000 by 1812.
48The Wittelsbach line died out in 1777 and passed to the Pfalz line (Palatinate).
49Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1995), 206.
50Sauer, Adler über Württemberg, Baden und Hohenzollern, 26.
51Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 32; Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power (London: UCL Press 1999), 129–31.
52The Treaty of Bogenhausen, signed 24 Aug. 1805; De Clerq, Recueil des Traités, II, 120–3; Marcus Junkelman, Napoleon und Bayern: von den Anfängen des Königreiches (Regensberg: F. Pustet 1985), 91.
53The Bavarians fielded 40,000 by the end of March 1809, with French strength at approximately 60,000, and an additional 10,000 from Baden and Württemberg. By mid-April, Napoleon arrived with reinforcements; the Bavarians comprised 25 percent of Imperial forces in south Germany. See John H. Gill, With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and His German Allies in the 1809 Campaign (London: Greenhill Press 1992), 68–100; cf. Max Leyh, Die Feldzüge des Bayerischen Heeres unter Max I. (IV) Joseph von 1805 bis 1815 (Munich: Schick 1935), 126–41.
54Schneid, Napoleon's Conquest of Europe, 135; Grosse Generalstab, ‘Die Preuβischen Kriegsvorbeitungen und Operationsplane von 1805’, in Kriegsgeschichte Einzelschriftenliche (Berlin: Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte 1898), I, 33–7.
55After Jan. 1810, when Napoleon annexed north Germany, he gave command of the entire region, including the Kingdom of Westphalia to Marshal Louis Davout. The marshal was charged with the enforcement of the Continental System in north Germany. Pierre Charrier, Le Maréchal Davout (Millau: Fondation Napoléon 2005), 434–5.
56Gill, With Eagles to Glory, 414–5; The most recent scholarship on Westphalia and its army is, Michael Pavkovic, ‘“The Palladium of Westphalian Freedom” Recruitment and Conscription in the Kingdom of Westphalia’, in Napoleonic Conscription: A Revolution in Military Affairs, (eds.) Donald Stoker, Hal Blanton and Frederick Schneid (London: Routledge 2008).
57Moritz Exner, Die Antheilnahme der Königlich Sächsischen Armee am Feldzuge gegen Oesterreich und die kriegerischen Ereignisse in Sachsen im Jahre 1809 (Dresden: Baensch 1894), 21.
58André Bonnefons, Un allié de Napoleon, Frédéric-Auguste Premier roi de Saxe et Grand-Duc de Varsovie, 1763–1827 (Paris: Perrin 1902), 128–35; Wilson, German Armies, 310.
59Bonnefons, Un allié de Napoleon, 128–35, 181, 194.
60Michael Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin (Norman: Oklahoma UP 2002), 47–54 and passim.
61Although the Grand Duchy was under the nominal control of Frederick Augustus I and Napoleon maintained the appearance of his independence on the Polish throne, the French emperor sent orders through Frederick Augustus and then directly to Warsaw. Actual direction of the army was left to the French and French allied Polish generals such as Prince Josef Poniatowski.
62Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 78–84, 108, 130–1; cf. Jeremy Black, ‘Hanover/England, Saxony/Poland. Political Relations Between States in the Age of Personal Union and Aims’, in Die Personalunionen von Sachsen-Polen 1697–1763 und Hannover-England 1714–1837 Ein Vergleich, (ed.) Rex Rexheuser (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2005), 431–54.
63Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 30; Wilson, Reich to Revolution, 331; See section II in this article: ‘Dalmatia, the Balkans and Illyria’, for Russia's role in the Mediterranean; Roderick McGrew, Paul I of Russia: 1754–1801 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992), 311–2; Hugh Ragsdale, ‘A Continental System in 1801: Paul I and Bonaparte’, Journal of Modern History 42/1 (March 1970), 76–7; De Clerq, Receuil des Traités, I, 467–75; Martens, Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie, VI, 337, 341–5, 350–1; II, 397–400, refers particularly to Russian involvement in negotiations preceding the Reichdeputations-Hauptschluss. For Austrian concern about Russia, see Frederick C. Schneid, ‘The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Monarchy during the War of the Third Coalition’, Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 2007 (2008), 313–21.
64Frederick C. Schneid, ‘The Dynamics of Defeat: French Army Leadership, December 1812–March 1813’, Journal of Military History 63/1 (Jan. 1999), 22–5.
65The Army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw amounted to 30,000 men in 1809, and 60,000 by 1812. Half the Polish Army was in Spain in 1809. Charrier, Le Maréchal Davout, 268; Roman Soltyk, Relations des Opérations de l'Armée aux orders du Prince Joseph Poniatowski, pendant le campagne de 1809 en Pologne contre les Autrichiens (Paris: Gaultier-Laguionie 1841), 39.
66For Prussia's strategic dilemma in 1809 see, John H. Gill, ‘“I Fear Our Ruin is Very Near”: Prussian Foreign Policy during the Franco-Austrian War of 1809’, Selected Papers of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 2002 (Tallahassee, FL, 2004), 281–91.
67Napoleon to Frederick Augustus I, 6 March 1809, Napoleon, Correspondence de Napoleon Ie , XVIII, no. 14864, 318.
68Soltyk, Opérations de l'Armée aux Poniatowski, 131–4.
69Philip Garland, ‘Russia and the 1809 Campaign: “These are not the actions of an ally”’, Selected Papers of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1997 (Tallahassee, 1997), 461–71. Garland argues that Alexander played a double-game, using Russian forces in Galicia to prevent a Polish uprising in favor the Polish army under Poniatowski, and the enlargement of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It is abundantly clear that the Poles and the Russian army under Golitsyn did not cooperate. Nonetheless, although Alexander desired to prevent the expansion of Napoleonic Poland, he was willing to occupy Galicia at Austria's expense, and keep that territory given to Austria in 1795. Regardless of Alexander's general antipathy for Napoleon, Russian intervention in 1809 was not perceived favorably in Vienna.
70Napoleon to Joseph, 19 May 1806, Napoleon, Correspondance, , XII, no. 10250, 383.
71See Flayhart, Counterpoint to Trafalgar, passim.
72Mackesey, War in the Mediterranean, 12–7 on the strategic significance of Sicily and Malta.
73De Clerq, Receuil des Traités, I, 432–5; Ilari et al., Storia Giacobina, II, 1165–6.
74Ferdinand entered into a secret agreement with the British upon the collapse of Amiens, see Virgilio Ilari, La Due Sicile nelle Guerre Napoleoniche (1800–1815) (Rome: Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Ufficio storico 2005), I, 23–8, 32–5. Cf. Schneid, Napoleon's Conquest of Europe, 69–75, for the role of Naples in French, British and Russian grand strategic thought.
75For a short discussion of the French campaign in Naples see, Frederick C. Schneid, Napoleon's Italian Campaigns, 1805–1815 (Westport, CT: Praeger 2002), 47–58; for an in-depth examination see Ilari, La Due Sicile, I, 44–102.
76Napoleon to Joseph, 19 May 1806, Napoleon, Correspondence, XII, no. 10250, 385.
77Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813 (New York: Vintage Books 1977), 58–9.
78Jonathan Israel, TheDutch Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), 1094–6.
79Ibid., 1127.
80Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 282, 392–4.
81De Clerq, Recueil des Traités, I, 484–91.
82Schama, Patriots and Liberators, passim.
83Schneid, Napoleon's Conquest of Europe, 21–2, 53–5, 58–9; Guy Stanton Ford, Hanover and Prussia, 1795–1803; A Study in Neutrality (New York: AMS Press 1967), Chapters 7 and 8.
84A fascinating examination of the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Anglo-Hanoverian relations can be found in Brendan Simms, “‘An Odd Question Enough”, Charles James Fox, the Crown and British Policy during the Hanoverian Crisis of 1806’, Historical Journal 38/3 (Sept. 1995), 567–96; John Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793–1815 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1969), 17, 77; and Wilson, German Armies, 312; cf. Black, ‘Hanover/England, Saxony/Poland’, 431–54.
85Charrier, Le Maréchal Davout, 432–56.
86For a concise survey see Ole Feldbaeck, ‘Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars: A Foreign Policy Survey’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26/2 (June 2001), 89–101; Christer Jorgensen, The Anglo-Swedish Alliance against Napoleonic France (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 87–9.
87De Clerq, Receuil des Traités, I, San Ildefonso, 287–92, for convention against Portugal, 420–3, for convention against Britain, II, 117–9.
88For Spain's economic crisis see Jacques Barbier, ‘Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: The Dilemma of Charles IV's Spain’, Journal of Latin American Studies 12/1(1980), 21–37; cf. Jacques Barbier and Herbert Klein, ‘Revolutionary Wars and Public Finances: The Madrid Treasury, 1784–1807’, Journal of Economic History 41/2 (June 1981), 315–39.
89André Fugier, Napoléon et l'Espagne (1799–1808) (Paris: F. Alcan 1930), II, 30–1.
90For the most recent and comprehensive account of the Peninsular War see Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).
91Adolf Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801–1810 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus 1877), 344–5; cf. Garland, ‘Russia and the 1809 Campaign’, 461–71.
92Alexander's pledge can be found in Garland, ‘Russia and the 1809 Campaign’, 466, and Ferdinand's concerns are cited in Austria-Hungary, Kriegsarchiv, Kriege unter der Regierung des Kaiser Franz: Krieg 1809, I: Regensberg (Vienna: Seidel 1907), 210.
93Ibid., 169, 172–4.
94Ibid., 172; for the importance of Prussia to Austria's plans, see also Manfred Rauchensteiner, Kaiser Franz und Erzherzog Carl: Dynastie und Heerwesen in Österreich 1796–1809 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 1972), 95–8.
95Virgil, The Aeneid, Book I, verse 278.