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Abstract
A large collection of captured documents from the very highest levels of the Iraqi government offers a chance to gain insight into why Saddam Hussein was unwilling and unable to alter his strategy on the eve of the 2003 war that toppled his regime. This paper explores some of the perceptions and misperceptions that Saddam Hussein took away from the 1991 Gulf War and shows how they affected his decisionmaking on the eve of the war in 2003. It concludes with some thoughts on the policy implications of these findings.
Notes
1Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), ‘First Interview with Saddam Hussein in Twelve Years’, Special Dispatch Series, No. 437 (5 Nov. 2002), <www.memri.org>, accessed 2 Jan. 2008.
This paper was written at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) as part of a project sponsored by the US Department of Defense. This ongoing project will make available for scholars a broad collection of primary source documents from the regime of Saddam Hussein. (See the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' speech to the Association of American Universities, Washington DC, 14 April 2008, at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228>, accessed 25 July 2009). Despite the official nature of the overall research effort, this paper represents only the authors' personal views; it does not represent the views of IDA, the Department of Defense, or any command or agency of the Department. The authors thank Dr Robert Jervis, Dr Thomas Mahnken, Dr Williamson Murray, Jessica Huckabey, Elizabeth Nathan, David Palkki, and Carolyn Leonard for their comments on earlier drafts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL, 4 April 2008.
2ISGQ-2003-M0005705, ‘Meeting chaired by Saddam Hussein discussing events following the end of the 1991 war, c. 1993’, cited in Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 2008), 264–5.
3The Iraqi material cited in this paper comes originally from captured Iraqi records and media files (audio and videotapes) originally accessed as part of a US Joint Forces Command project known as the Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP). More directly, Iraqi materials referred to in this paper come primarily from two IPP studies. Kevin M. Woods, et al., The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official US Joint Forces Command Report (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press 2006) and Woods, The Mother of All Battles.
Records captured in Iraq as a result of the 2003 war include tens of millions of pages of the regime's most sensitive documents as well as thousands of hours of recorded conversations between Saddam and members of his inner circle. The original paper copies and electronic media captured during Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ remain in the Middle East awaiting final disposition and eventual return to Iraq. Captured records are generally handled in accordance with military practice dating back to the US Civil War (the 1863 Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field provided for the protection, exploitation, and return of captured libraries), international law (based on Article 53 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, 1907), and various temporary military and occupation authority orders such as Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 4– Management of Property and Assets of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party (25 May 2003) issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Copies of captured documents are covered under various parts of the Federal Records Act (Title 44, Chapter 31 – Records Management by Federal Agencies). Electronic copies of this collection, however, are part of a US government captured records database. A recent decision by the Department of Defense will in the near future make portions of this collection available to non-governmental scholars.
Although the specific details of access to the data are still in development, the intent of this project is similar to that of the post-World War II organization known as the American Committee for the Study of War Documents. This organization, formed in 1955, existed to:
direct an organized effort for the fullest scholarly utilization of documents which came into the possession of the Allies as a result of World War II; to secure the aid of the appropriate governmental agencies in making these documents available for study by American scholars; to enlist the support and cooperation of universities and colleges, faculties and graduate students, and of other scholarly organizations, in the systematic exploration of this material; to collaborate with scholars and institutions abroad in regard to such studies.
See ‘Other Activities’, American Political Science Review 50/2 (June 1956), 614–15.
4A review of the membership of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council and lists of senior advisors to Saddam between 1979 and 2003 reveals significant stability and loyalty at the top. See Edmund A. Ghareeb, Historical Dictionary of Iraq (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press 2004). Defections, although rare, were occasionally significant. Among the most important defections from Saddam's regime include Hussein Kamil (son-in-law and Director of the Military Industrial Commission), Wafiq As-Samarrai (former Director of Military Intelligence), Nizar Khazaraji (former Army Chief of Staff). Defections were the exception.
5See for example, Jerrold M. Post, ‘Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile’, Political Psychology 12 (June 1991), 279–89. See also David Ronfeldt, Beware the Hubris-Nemesis Complex: A Concept for Leadership Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1994); Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1991); Ofra Bengio, ‘How Does Saddam Hold On?’, Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2000), 90–103; Ofra Bengio, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (London: OUP 2002); Mark Bowden, Tales of the Tyrant, The Atlantic (May 2002), <www.theatlantic.com/doc/200205/bowden>; Norman Cigar, ‘Iraq's Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat’, Journal of Strategic Studies 15/1 (March 1992), 1–29; Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 1998); Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (London: Brassey's 1991). For governmental documents, see National Intelligence Estimate NIE 92-7, ‘Saddam Husayn: Likely to Hang On’, Secret, June, 1992, declassified Nov. 2000), available at <www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp>. See also numerous other declassified CIA documents pertaining to Iraq's leadership available at that URL.
6A common public opinion which Post has termed not only ‘inaccurate, but also dangerous’ in Post, ‘Saddam Hussein of Iraq’, 279.
7Ibid.
8Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, ‘Individuals and Their Role in Creating Policy’, in James A. Hursch (ed.), Theories of International Relations (Washington DC: National Defense Univ. 1990), 53–4.
9We adopt these hypotheses directly from Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. See their ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In’, International Security 25/4 (Spring 2001), 135–40.
10Russett and Starr, ‘Individuals and Their Role’, 53.
11See Chaim D. Kaufmann, ‘Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making’, International Studies Quarterly 38 (Dec. 1994), 557–86.
12Robert Jervis, ‘War and Misperception’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988), 699–700.
13Ibid., 700.
14Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge 2005), 66.
15President Bush made the new strategy clear in a 1 June 2002 speech with ‘we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path to action. And this nation will act.’ The new US strategy that included preemption was officially codified in Sept. 2002 National Security Strategy.
16Woods, Iraqi Perspectives, pp. 31–2.
17Efforts to destabilize the Ba'ath regime actually date to the end of the 1991 Gulf War. News reports in 1992 indicated that the United States provided financial backing to groups seeking to oust Saddam Hussein. See Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Plan on Iraq Told to Congress’, New York Times, 2 June 1992; Elaine Sciolino, ‘Greater US Effort Backed to Oust Iraqi’, New York Times, 2 June 1992; and Patrick E. Tyler, ‘US and Iraqis Tell of a Coup Attempt Against Baghdad’, New York Times, 3 July 1992. Efforts reportedly continued throughout the mid-1990s: see Jim Hoagland, ‘How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed’, Washington Post, 26 June 1997. Congressional push for regime change followed Saddam's obstructionist stance toward UN weapons inspectors. A series of actions (PL 105-174 signed 1 May 1998; Section 590 of HR 4328, PL 105-277 signed 21 Oct. 1998, and PL 106-113 signed 29 Nov. 1999) allocated $23 million to indirectly oppose Saddam. On 31 Oct. 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act was signed into law (ILA, HR 4655, PL 105-338) authorizing $97 million for Iraqi ‘opposition organizations’. A provision of the Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Aid appropriation (HR 4811, PL 106-429) 6 Nov. 2000, added an additional $25 million to the general effort to support a coup. US policy change post-9/11 was indicated by senior level statements concerning the enduring and possibly intensifying threat of Iraq's WMD programs and vague links to international terrorism. President Bush's 29 Jan. 2002 State of the Union speech framed the administration's position by including Iraq as a member of the ‘axis of evil’, along with Iran and North Korea. In a May 2003 interview, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that within days of 9/11, the administration had determined ‘on the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when … It was a debate about tactics and timing’. See Dept. of Defense News Transcript, ‘Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair’, 9 May 2003, <www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid= 2594>, accessed 30 April 2009.
18Saddam had tried in previous years to improve relations with the US, because ‘[he] did not consider [it] a natural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel’. (See Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1. html>, accessed 1 Aug. 2008). This option was foreclosed, however, after President Bush's 17 March 2003 ultimatum that ‘Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours.’ See White House Press Release, 17 March 2003, <www.white house.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>, accessed 29 Feb. 2008.
19For instance, Antulio J. Echevarria II of the US Army War College has argued that the ‘concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success, and hence was more a way of battle than an actual way of war. Unfortunately, the American way of battle has not yet matured into a way of war.’ Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2004), v.
20Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976), 217–18.
21ISGQ-2003-M0006753, ‘Saddam and his commanders discuss the retreat from Kuwait, c. 1992’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 266.
22Robert Jervis. Email to Woods, 21 July 2008.
23ISGQ-2003-M0005705, Iraqi document titled ‘Meeting chaired by Saddam Hussein discussing events following the end of the 1991 war, c. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 300.
24ISGQ-2003-M0003943, ‘Iraqi lessons-learned conference, c. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 269.
25ISGQ-2003-M0003474, ‘Saddam Hussein meeting with the national command (1992)’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 266–7.
26ISGQ-2003-M0003852, ‘Saddam meeting with his Ministerial Council on 4 Aug. 1990’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 54.
27Williamson Murray, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II: Operations/Effects and Effectiveness (Washington DC: US GPO 1993), 136–8.
28Eliot A. Cohen (ed.), Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V: A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (Washington DC: US GPO 1993), 641.
29Woods, Mother of All Battles, 203–5. See also William M. Arkin, ‘Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm’, Airpower Journal 11 (Spring 1997), 4–21.
30Woods, Mother of All Battles, 3–5; Richard L. Russell, ‘CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq’, Political Science Quarterly 117 (Summer 2002), 201–3.
31ISGQ-2003-M0003869, ‘Saddam meeting with his senior military commanders after the withdrawal from Kuwait, 3 March 1991’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 270.
32CMPC-2004-001639, ‘Report on strategies and damages of enemy air strikes (c. May 1991)’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 273–5.
33Ibid.
34CMPC-2003-006876, ‘Iraqi report on Gulf War air losses (c. 2001)’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 276–7.
35Ibid. The Coalition did lose 75 aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopter, but that figure includes combat and non- combat losses. Combat-only losses amounted to 42 downed aircraft. See ‘The Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield Timeline’, American Forces Press Service News Articles, Dept. of Defense, 2000, <www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45404>, accessed 1 Aug. 2008.
36ISGP-2003-00030181, ‘Study on the Role of the Iraqi Air Force and Air Defense Command in Confronting the American Attack (classified Iraqi top secret and personal – 1991)’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 270–1.
37CMPC-2004-001639, ‘Iraqi report on strategies and damages of enemy air strikes (c. May 1991)’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 276. Ironically, ‘half the force’ was precisely what Schwarzkopf was aiming at in terms of attrition of Iraqi ground forces before launching the ground offensive. He never actually got there with the air campaign, though he thought he did. Russell, ‘CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq’, 202.
38Saddam's reputation for brutality that included senior members of his government and even his own family is deserved, and documented in books such as Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 1991); Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (London: Bloomsbury 2000); and Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Report.
39US Dept. of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington DC: US GPO April 1992).
40ISGQ-2003-M0004555, ‘Audio recording Saddam Hussein attending a military seminar, 27 Nov. 1995’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 279.
41Ibid.
42Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam 1992), 424.
43Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: HarperCollins 1995), 363.
44Most Western histories assume the purpose of the supporting Iraqi attacks was to link up with the 5th Mechanized Division in Khafji. A review of Iraqi plans and after-action reviews indicates that while there were early, but not very realistic, options to reinforce success down the east coast of Saudi Arabia, the primary mission of the supporting armored division was to draw Coalition airpower away from the mechanized forces attacking Khafji. From the Iraqi point of view, these supporting operations were considered a success. The presumption that the armored division was ‘stopped’ by Coalition airpower before they could reach their objective, while logical, does not appear to be accurate. For example, see Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1993). For an updated US perspective see, Paul W. Westermeyer, US Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji: 28 Jan. – 1 Feb. 1991 (Washington DC: US Marine Corps History Division 2008).
45Woods, Mother of All Battles, 5–6.
46NGIC-96-0404, ‘Lecture: The Pre-Emptive Attack and the Spoiling Attack, 20 July 1985’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 16. The future commander of II Corps, Ibrahim Abd al-Sattar Muhammad, delivered a lecture where he described advantages of preemptive attacks. The lecture notes contained a comment that Saddam was interested in this subject and offered pointers as the lecture was prepared.
47ISGP-2003-00009833, ‘Draft transcript of interviews compiled for an official Iraqi history of events, c. 1995’, and ISGP-2003-10151507, ‘Audio tape of Lt. Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad discussing 1991 Gulf War, dated 11 May 1995,’ cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 16–18. Asked during a formal interrogation by the FBI in 2004 who had planned the attack on Khafji, Saddam answered simply, ‘me’. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baghdad Operations Center, Saddam Hussein interview number 11, 3 March 2004, <www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/12.pdf>
48ISGP-2003-10151507, ‘Audio tape of Lt. Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad discussing 1991 Gulf War, dated 11 May 1995’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 16–18.
49ISGQ-2003-M0006181, ‘Iraqi high ranking personnel analyzing the Battle of al-Khafji, c. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 26. The unidentified speaker said he was quoting the director of the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID).
50ISGQ-2003-M0003958, ‘Military Seminar on the Um Al-Ma'arik, 10 May 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 25–26 The speaker goes on to note the dilemma in choosing a day or night retreat under the enemy's air dominance. If the 5th Division retreated during the day, it was exposed to observation but could spread out and maneuver as individuals. If it retreated at night, it would have to remain in a formation (for navigation and passage of lines purposes), which made the Coalition's targeting easier. The 5th Division commander concluded that ‘retreating at night is no different than retreating during the day’ as far as losses are concerned.
51ISGQ-2003-M0006168, ‘IV Corps Commander and senior staff discuss operations during 1991 war, c. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 20–1.
52ISGQ-2003-M0006183, ‘Iraqi commanders discuss Battle of al-Khafji, c. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 22.
53See Woods, Mother of All Battles, 18.
54Ibrahim al-Marashi, ‘The Nineteenth Province: The Invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf War from the Iraqi Perspective’ (PhD dissertation, Univ. of Oxford 2004), 291–3.
55IISP-2003-00026728, ‘Study on the 1991 Gulf War in Kuwait, 1 Aug. 1995’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 26–7.
56ISGQ-2003-M0003869, ‘Saddam meeting with his senior military commanders after the withdrawal from Kuwait, 3 March 1991’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 288–90.
57ISGP-2003-00009833, ‘Draft transcript of interviews compiled for an official Iraqi history of events, c. 1995’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 27.
58ISGQ-2003-00055154, ‘Al-Bakr University, “concept sketch for al-Khafji”, undated’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 19. The role of this battle in Iraqi professional military education was confirmed to Woods during interviews with various former Iraqi general officers between 2003 and 2007.
59Murray, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. II, 190–1.
60Some independent studies disagree with these numbers, in particular one by Dr Theodore Postol of MIT, who suggests the Patriot success rate was far lower (See Theodore Postol, ‘Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot’, International Security 16/3 (1991), 119–71). Regardless, the figures for actual casualties and damage on the ground are approximately the same.
61Steve Fetter, George N. Lewis, and Lisbeth Gronlund, ‘Why were Scud casualties so low?’Nature 361 (Jan. 1993), 293–6.
62Staff Lieutenant General Hazim Abd-al-Razzaq al-Ayyubi, Forty-Three Missiles on the Zionist Entity (1998) FBIS translation JN2511082498. Al-Ayyubi's detailed public memoirs closely match portions of his war diary, which was captured in Iraqi government files in 2003.
63ISGQ-2003-M0005002, ‘Saddam Hussein meeting with Iraqi officials concerning post Gulf War Iraq, c. late 1994/early 1995’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 302.
64It is not always clear what actions Saddam included in the term of ‘Israeli aggression’. In the case of the Gulf War, Israel declared the right to defend itself but was vigorously encouraged to remain on the sidelines of the war by the US in order to preserve the Coalition. Saddam seems to credit the missile strikes with having a deterrent effect on future ‘aggression’ against a broader concept of Arab interests.
65ISGP-2003-00033136, ‘Role of the General Military Intelligence Directorate in Um Al-Ma'arik Battle and in controlling riots (Iraqi Top Secret), 15 July 2001’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 290–91. This GMID report is dated 2001. However, at least one Iraqi intelligence report available from Jan. 1991 paints a similar picture. See ISGP-2003-00037278, ‘Collection of Intelligence Reports, 1 March 1991’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 185. Also on 15 Feb., the Iraqi missile forces received a report from the Palestine Liberation Organization about the effects of the missile strikes in Israel as of 10 Feb. This report alleged 14 dead, 273 injured, 818 ‘psychologically shocked’, 3,000 evacuated, and 1,000 houses destroyed in Israel, though it is not clear whether this was for the entire Iraqi missile campaign to that date or for a particular round of attacks. See ISGQ-2003-00046019, ‘Partial Daily Journal of the Commander of Iraqi Missile Forces, part 2, c. 1991’. The journal noted that the report, though received on 15 Feb., was prepared on 10 Feb. 1991.
66Jon D. Hull, ‘The Palestinians Back Another Loser’, Time, 11 March 1991, <www. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972503-1,00.html>, accessed 31 Dec. 2007.
67ISGP-2003-00033136, ‘Role of the General Military Intelligence Directorate in Um Al-Ma'arik Battle and in controlling riots (Iraqi top secret), 15 July 2001’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 291–2.
68ISGQ-2003-M0007446, ‘Meeting between Saddam and Ba'ath Party members discussing the 1992 US Presidential Election, Jan. 1993’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 299.
69Ibid., 304–5.
70For an explicit public use of the word ‘defeated’, see Open Source Center document GMP20030117000061, ‘Saddam Husayn Highlights Resistance in Gulf War Anniversary Speech’, 17 Jan. 2003. See also William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (New York: Cambridge UP 2007), 194.
71William Branigin, ‘A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers’, Washington Post, 27 April 2003, A25. See also Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 42.
72Perspectives of the Iraqi II Republican Guard Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Hamdani, cited in Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 8–9.
73Perspectives of the Iraqi II Republican Guard Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Hamdani, cited in Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 9.
74Perspectives of Lt. Gen. Yahya Taha Huwaysh-Fadani al-Ani, former commander Iraqi coastal and naval forces cited in Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 8.
75Perspectives of the Iraqi II Republican Guard Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Hamdani, cited in Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 7.
76Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 7–8.
77See for example Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press 1986).
78Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 280–1.
79Kenneth Boulding quote cited in Ashton Applewhite et al., And I Quote: The Definitive Collection of Quotes, Sayings, and Jokes for the Contemporary Speechmaster, Revised (New York: St Martin's Press 2003), 37.
80For a similar Iraqi assessment of the performance of the Republican Guard, which was not involved in the Battle of Khafji, see Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives 43, 47.
81MEMRI, ‘First Interview with Saddam Hussein in Twelve Years’. Interestingly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair survived a parliamentary revolt in late Feb. 2003 over his policy toward Iraq.
82Open Source Center document GMP20030129000259, ‘Saddam Addresses Military Commanders, Says US “To Be Defeated” 29 Jan. 03’, 29 Jan. 2003.
83Ibid.
84Ibid. As early as 1992, Saddam had privately maintained that the nadir of the Iraqi Army's capability came at the end of Operation ‘Desert Storm’ and that it had been improving since. See ISGQ-2003-M0006753, ‘Saddam and his commanders discuss the retreat from Kuwait, c. 1992’, cited in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 266.
85Open Source Center document GMP20030129000259.
86Perspectives of the Iraqi II Republican Guard Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Hamdani, cited Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 13.
88MEMRI, ‘The Iraq Crisis (1): Iraq Prepares for War, 11 Feb. 2003’, Special Dispatch Series, No. 467, <www.memri.org>, accessed 28 Dec. 2007.
87Open Source Center document GMP20030117000061, ‘Saddam Husayn Highlights Resistance in Gulf War Anniversary Speech’, 17 Jan. 2003.
89MEMRI, ‘First Interview with Saddam Hussein in Twelve Years’.
90Open Source Center document GMP20030316000206, ‘Saddam Husayn Meets Commanders, Says War to Spread to “Entire Globe”’, 16 March 2003.
91Open Source Center document GMP20030117000061.
92Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 25–6.
93Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 25.
94Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 25–32.
95The Coalition struck 517 targets described as ‘Railroads and Bridges’ (470 with precision munitions) during Operations ‘Desert Storm’. See Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V: 514 and 517.
96Makiya, Republic of Fear, xviii–xxii; Human Rights Watch, ‘Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath’, Middle East Watch (June 1992), 29–56.
97Coalition planners anticipated the preemptive destruction of bridges by the Iraqis as a part of defensive hydrology strategy that, in addition to bridges, would involve the destruction of dams. See Gregory Hooker, Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Assessments (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2005), 53–4.
98Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 145–6.
99The authors have reviewed a number of these plans ranging from local facility plans to town and finally province level plans. Generally, these plans were organized as military style operations orders including logistics and training annexes.
100Early analyses of the insurgency argued, from the speed of its development and its sophistication, that it must have been preplanned. For example, see, Tom Shanker, ‘Husseini Agents are Behind Attacks in Iraq, Pentagon Finds’, New York Times, 29 April 2004 and Brian Bennett, ‘Who Are the Insurgents?’, Time, 16 Nov. 2003.
101See Woods, Mother of All Battles, 70–2, 78–81, and 144–7.
102See Ibid. According to Iraqi air force records, 137 fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft were flown in Iran during the 1991 war. For their part, the Iranians acknowledged that only 22 Iraqi aircraft were illegally flown into their territory. Not surprisingly, no Iraqi aircraft were ever returned.
103Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-Theorization”’, Intelligence and National Security 19/2 (June 2004), 177.
104ISGQ-2003-M0004609, ‘Saddam and members of the Revolutionary Command Council discuss American reactions to invasion of Kuwait’, cited in Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives, 12.