The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean crisis, January‐October 1935

Abstract

This essay examines the role of Fascist Italy's Naval High Command during the months that preceded the Italian assault on Ethiopia in October 1935. It examines the internal political relationship between the Naval Chief‐of‐Staff, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, Benito Mussolini and the other leaders of the Fascist armed forces as the plan to attack Ethiopia evolved. It demonstrates how Mussolini's expansionist agenda, of which the conquest of Ethiopia marked merely the initial stage, compelled the naval staff (in early 1935 contemplating a future conflict against France and Yugoslavia) to change operational policy and plan for a war against the Royal Navy. Accordingly, Cavagnari, faced with incomplete naval building programmes and serious all round fleet deficiencies, repeatedly warned the dictator, amid rising Anglo‐Italian tension, that Italy would lose any war against Britain. Ultimately, this essay challenges the view that the Italian Navy and Air Force constituted any serious threat to Britain's imperial defence capability.