“My second choice was Armenia”: motivations for diasporic return migration among Iranian Armenians to Armenia

ABSTRACT

This article examines the concept of ethnic return migration in the permanent settlement of Iranian Armenians in the Republic of Armenia. Scholarship on ethnic return migration (or diasporic “homecoming”) almost exclusively focuses on mobility to or from affluent Western multicultural democracies in North America, Europe and Oceania. This article therefore provides a new opportunity to test the generalizability of existing models on return migration. Iranian Armenians fit within what the scholarship refers to as ethnic or diasporic return migrant – that is, migrations motivated, largely, by affective orientation to ethnicity and perceived home country. However, these migrations are not primarily motivated by ethnic or national longing for an ancestral homeland, but rather a variety of economic and political reasons sit behind these migrants’ decisions to choose Armenia instead of moving to a Western country or remaining in Iran.

KEYWORDS:

• Ethnic return migration
• Iranian Armenians
• diaspora
• Armenian diaspora
• Armenia
• transnationalism

Introduction

In their fraught attempts to define “diaspora”, theorists usually cite the desire to return to an ancestral homeland as a key characteristic (Dufoix 2008; Grossman 2019; Safran 1991). However, despite the longing for the homeland forming an expressed desire among many diaspora groups, most never return to live in the real or imagined homeland. Furthermore, when ethnic return migration does occur, it is often less straightforward than a simple yearning to repatriate, but more often involves other economic and political motivations, which determine migration choices (Darieva 2011; Della Gatta 2017). The Armenian diaspora is an informative case study of this phenomenon. Historically considered archetypal of a diaspora (Safran 2004; Sheffer 2003), the Armenian diaspora, a diverse, global population, has a complicated relationship with the modern iteration of the homeland, the former Soviet Republic of Armenia. Iranian Armenians exemplify this complexity, particularly as they often express ambiguous feelings of belonging to a homeland both in Armenia and Iran (Barry 2018; Yaghoobi 2022). This article examines the case of post-Soviet migration of Iranian Armenians to the Republic of Armenia, and the varied motives that sit behind their decisions to choose Armenia over Europe and North America, or over remaining in Iran.

Iran’s once large Armenian community has shrunk due to emigration. Classified as a “persecuted religious minority” under the Lautenberg amendment (1989) and the Specter amendment (2004), Iranian Armenians have been moving to the U.S., in large part, for the last several decades (Fittante 2017). However, not all Iranian Armenians have decided to take advantage of this classification. A much smaller stream of Iranian Armenians has, instead, opted to “return” to their perceived ancestral homeland in neighbouring Armenia. Technically, Iranian Armenians are not return migrants, as most more accurately fit the category of diaspora and had very limited access to Armenia before 1991. Rather, they more comfortably fit within what the scholarship refers to as ethnic or diasporic return migrants – that is, migrations motivated, largely, by affective orientation to ethnicity and perceived home country (Tsuda 2009). Nonetheless, ethnic return migration (or diasporic “homecoming”) scholarship almost exclusively treats mobility to or from affluent Western multicultural democracies (Australia, the U.S., Canada, England). As such, the existing scholarship’s models are based on a rather skewed form of diasporic “return”. Iranian Armenians thus provide a unique opportunity to the existing scholarship to test its findings’ generalizability. In addition, despite their long history of migrating to and living in Armenia, there exists no scholarship on the Iranian Armenians of Armenia.

This article begins with an outline of the history of return by Iranian Armenians before moving onto the context of ethnic return migration theory. It then unpacks why, with political and social conditions deteriorating in Iran, many Iranian Armenians have opted to take advantage of their existing resources – familiarity with the country, language, and personal networks – to pursue business interests in Armenia. From this discussion, the article then sets out the parameters and methodology of this research before moving to the empirical section. Based on the interviews conducted for this study, the article reinforces the findings that short visits, typically as tourists, and investment in items such as property, often set up longer term settlement and entrepreneurship among Iranian Armenian migrants in Armenia. Furthermore, in many cases, Iranian Armenians continue a process of community boundary formation in the “new” country despite their ethnic affinity with the majority – by supporting each other in finding employment and places to live. The retention of a rather robust Iranian Armenian identity as distinct from the local Armenian identity (even up to 30+ years post-migration) complicates scholarly associations about ethnic enclaves and integration/assimilation. Finally, this article looks at how quality of life considerations and social mobility inform Iranian Armenians’ decisions to move to Armenia as opposed to Western countries. An affordable cost of living coupled with less social restrictions alongside a familiar language make Armenia an attractive choice.

This case study adds to recent scholarship, which has sought to broaden more traditional South–North migration routes (Ho 2017; Yang 2018; Mulvey 2020). By doing so, it seeks to complicate assumptions in the scholarship on diasporic homecoming or ethnic return scholarship (Tsuda 2009, 2019). By expanding the traditional routes that the ethnic return scholarship typically covers, we identify a more complex set of motivations – some of which have little do with affective orientation to the perceived homeland. From this vantage, we argue that diasporic return migrants and more traditional return migrants – for whom entrepreneurship is common motivation – possess more commonalities than the scholarship acknowledges.

While this article focuses on entrepreneurship, it does not seek to simplify the motivations of these migrants as purely economic; political and social issues are also important. It notes that, for Iranian Armenians, Armenia is not always a first choice, and the economic pursuits of these migrants reflect this situation, where they have been unable to secure a passage of migration to another European or North American country – preferring not to make use of the United States’ refugee migration scheme. Still, while not the only motivation, the economic component remains important to understanding what factors incentivize permanent settlement.

A history of Iranian Armenian migration to Armenia

Most Iranian Armenians trace their origins to the forced deportations of Shah Abbas I in 1603–1604 (Barry 2018). An estimated 400,000 Armenians were deported en masse from the South Caucasus, alongside Georgians, Jews and other ethnic groups, as part of a scorched-earth tactic in the Safavid-Ottoman War (Ghougassian 1998, 31). Most Armenian deportees were settled in villages in central and southwest Iran, while a smaller number settled in the capital, Isfahan, where a prosperous and culturally significant community flourished in the suburb of New Julfa. The Safavid government actively prevented Armenians from trying to return to their former homeland (Arakel of Tabriz 2010, 77).

The first mass “repatriation” of Iranian Armenians came in the wake of the Iran-Russia Wars of the early nineteenth century. By the end of the second war, Iran ceded modern Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to Russian control in the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), which also delimitated a border between Iran and historic Armenia, effectively creating a clear definition of who Iranian Armenians were as opposed to Armenians from Armenia. Turkmanchai allowed for population exchanges between Muslims and Christians, resulting in an estimated 45,000 Iranian Armenians (mostly from Iran’s Azerbaijan province) migrating north of Aras over the next 20 years (Bournoutian 1998, 56). Another mass “repatriation” took place following the Second World War, when the Soviet Union briefly encouraged Armenians in the Diaspora to relocate to Armenia as part of post-war reconstruction, in 1946 and 1947. Approximately 23,489 Iranian Armenians resettled in Armenia during this time (Malekian [Melkonian] 2007, 296), mostly rural migrants from central and south-western Iran, as well as Iranian Azerbaijan.

Apart from a few individual migrants, mostly students, there was almost no emigration of Armenians from Iran to Armenia after this time except for a small number of families in the 1970s and 1980s. Iran and the Soviet Union were on opposite sides during the Cold War, and Iranian Armenians became aware of the hardships faced by migrants to Soviet Armenia, including difficulties due to the post-war shortages as well as persecution from the Soviet authorities (Touryantz 1989, 87–88). Following Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Iranian authorities initially made it difficult for Iranian Armenians to travel to Armenia, and usually only people reuniting with family in Armenia or sole travellers were able to travel – meaning that significant return migration was not possible. This began to change by the mid-1990s, although the war with Azerbaijan, and shortages of many basic goods and electricity in Armenia owing to a blockade from Turkey and Azerbaijan, discouraged migration. Nevertheless, Iranian Armenians began to visit Armenia as tourists more frequently, as Armenia granted visa-free travel for Iranian citizens.

Ethnic return migration

The scholarship distinguishes return migration as motivated by: (1) shared ethnicity with the host society’s mainstream population; (2) a strong emotional attachment to the destination country; and (3) the absence of pressure to assimilate – rather, a tendency to reinforce cultural traditions (Lee 2018). The existing scholarship has also demonstrated relatively high levels of self-employment among return migrants. Equipped with social and financial remittances, return migrants often take advantage of the specific resources to launch and develop successful businesses. Furthermore, the scholarship has demonstrated the extent to which both formal and informal human capital, which includes language skills, professional qualifications, and social skills shapes the mobilities of returnees.

Within the return migration scholarship, ethnic (or diasporic) return migration features as a distinct mobility. Ethnic return migration refers to those, who have chosen to settle in countries with which returnees perceive themselves to share a common ancestry (Tsuda 2009; Suh 2020). Distinct from traditional return migrants, ethnic return migrants are, largely, foreigners in their perceived ancestral “homelands”. As with return migration more generally, ethnic return migration typically foregrounds ethnicity as the central factor motivating or driving migration. However, ethnic returnees frequently encounter barriers, which relate to cultural differences (Tsuda 2009; Cook-Martín and Viladrich 2009; Fittante 2017). By emphasizing these sentimental (rather than the practical) motivations, ethnic return migration expands on existing migration paradigms, which conceptualize international migration as largely driven by economic considerations.

Nonetheless, while ethnicity may motivate ethnic returnees, these outflows still have strong economic implications, particularly in countries that have adopted policies, which promote “diasporic homecomings” (Joppke 2005; Seol and Skrentny 2009; Jain 2013). In addition, increasingly competitive global job-markets in North America, Oceania, and Western Europe have caused many children of immigrants to relocate permanently to their parents’ countries of origin. In their perceived countries of origin, these ethnic “returnees” often found their own businesses or gain employment in international organizations. As many cities in the “Global South” simultaneously undergo significant economic and institutional development, these “returnees” can accelerate their socioeconomic prospects in attaining high-level positions and establishing a high-quality of life relative to the general population. Distinct from other forms of return migration, ethnic return migration is motivated not only by economic but also affective considerations. And these latter considerations often redound in social capital: “Returnees” are driven by personal or nationalistic ambitions to contribute to the advancement of their respective homelands, even if the work they do has little to do with nation building – or even if the work they do only reinforces existing socioeconomic disparities among the local population.

But the scholarship on ethnic return migration has a particular slant: It almost exclusively evaluates “return” from or to affluent countries: Brazil to Japan (Tsuda 2009), Finland to Sweden (Hedberg 2009), the U.S. to South Korea (Lee 2018; Suh 2020), the U.S. to Armenia (Fittante 2017), the U.S. to India (Jain 2013), the U.S. to Vietnam (Nguyen-Akbar 2014), China to South Korea (Song 2019), Germany to Greece (King and Christou 2010), etc. As a result, ethnic return migration either unpacks returnees’ experiences in multicultural democracies or among those who migrate from them. However, in the case of ethnic return migration between nations outside of the Global North, the situation is more complex than the existing scholarship has demonstrated. For example, it does not account for economic risks that many returnees take.

While Iranian Armenians have an extensive history of “returning” to Armenia, the most recent iteration of this migration (from the 1990s onward) manifests a rather distinct set of motivations than those the return migration scholarship has analysed. The last few decades of Iranian history have eventuated in increasingly tenuous economic and political realities for those in the country. In addition, Iranian Armenians’ classification as a “persecuted religious minority” has led to a mass re-location to the United States (Fittante 2018; Fee 2022). Following the Iranian Revolution (1979), the U.S. government began classifying several groups in Iran as “persecuted religious minorities”, first, under the Lautenberg amendment (1989) and then again under the Specter amendment (2004). As a result, Iranian Armenians were able to move to the U.S. based on their religion, with the largest concentration now located in Southern California (Fittante 2018; Fee 2022). Further shrinking the Armenian population in Iran, Iranian Armenians also migrated to North America outside of the refugee process as well as to Europe and Oceania.

Rather than become “persecuted” and move to the U.S. or remain in Iran’s increasingly constraining socioeconomic circumstances, many Iranian Armenians have opted instead to move (or “return”) to Armenia, where they seek new economic opportunities while also dedicating themselves to a culturally acceptable cause – that is, contributing to or helping “build” Armenia’s growing economy (Fittante 2017).

Iranian Armenian “return” complicates and expands the existing scholarship on return migration. For return migration, Iranian Armenians’ choice to move to Armenia rather than remain in Iran or relocate to the U.S. (as a “persecuted religious minority”) complicates scholarly assumptions about migrants’ motivations. In moving to Armenia, diasporic returnees from Iran self-selectively take a calculated risk. Unlike many of their friends and family, who have had to start new lives in the U.S., some Iranian Armenians have opted instead to take advantage of their existing resources – familiarity with the country, language, and personal networks – to pursue business interests in Armenia.

Iranian Armenian “returnees” have several economic advantages. For example, while transfer of assets, particularly currency, between countries is problematic because of U.S. led sanctions against Iran’s banking system, there are numerous methods available to those who want to bypass these sanctions and the option of moving cash across the border is also possible. Also, Iranian Armenian access to Armenia is facilitated by relatively positive political relations between Iran and Armenia, which, along with geographic proximity, makes travel between the two countries easy since there are no strict visa requirements. In addition, Iranian Armenians are eligible for a returnee visa if they wish to stay for longer periods but do not want to become citizens (such as young men who do not want to perform military service in Armenia) and can stay for up to ten years on such a visa (Barry 2018).

In departure from the ethnic return scholarship, Iranian Armenians often prove that strong emotional attachment to the “homeland” does not necessarily take precedence over more pragmatic considerations. In fact, many Iranian Armenians have long lived (forming an immigrant enclave) and worked apart from local population. In addition, they typically maintain a strong sense of otherness from local Armenians and aspire to leave the “homeland” as soon as their economic prospects enable them to do so. Because Iranian Armenians do not “return” from or move to the Global North, they offer the migration scholarship an opportunity to analyse a distinct mobility. An analysis of their pre-migration motivations and post-migration experiences yields a new set of perspectives, one that will become increasingly prominent in decades to come, as many cities in the Global South develop economically and the means to mobility increase commensurately.

Methods

Findings from this article are culled from fieldwork carried out in Yerevan, Armenia from September 2021 to January 2022. The fieldwork consisted of 40 in-depth interviews – 38 Iranian Armenians and, for policy questions, one with Armenia’s High Commissioner of Diaspora Affairs¹ and one with an Armenian anthropologist, whose research relates to historical Iranian Armenian settlement in Armenia.² Among Iranian Armenians interviewed, time of residency in Armenia spanned between three and 53 years. The participants’ ages ranged from 27 to 95 years old. Only three interviewed were under the age of 30; the majority consisted of middle-aged Iranian Armenians (median age approximately 45). In terms of gender, 14 were women and 24 were men. In terms of occupation, 18 of those interviewed were entrepreneurs/business owners and 20 worked in corporate, academic, or other professional sectors. With very few exceptions, those interviewed came from Tehran and were college educated.

The interviews were approximately 60 minutes. Each interview was loosely structured around four key themes: (1) family and personal history (which also included number of visits to Armenia before moving); (2) reasons for moving to Armenia; (3) personal and professional experiences in Armenia; and (4) future plans (whether in Armenia or elsewhere). With participants’ permission, the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.³ For interviews, the first author relied on his existing network as well as snowballing methods to recruit a diverse sample of Iranian Armenians. The majority of those interviewed had moved to Yerevan during or after the 1990s; however, two Iranian Armenians, who had moved in the 1960s (from outside of Tehran to outside of Yerevan) were also included. All but three of those interviewed moved directly from Iran. But the first author also interviewed three Iranian Armenians, who had spent several years in other countries before moving to Armenia – these included Australia, Germany, and England. Iranian Armenians worked in various capacities, but, reflective of the larger population of post-1990s Iranian Armenian “returnees”, most often worked in high-skilled capacities, either as business owners or within international organizations. If participants spoke English, they chose whether interviews were conducted in Armenian or English. Among the 40 interviewed, 22 took place in English. The remaining 18 took place in Armenian. For transcriptions, the first author developed a system of organizing and coding data based on year of migration, age at the time of migration and reason(s) for migrating.

While in Armenia, the first author also undertook extensive participant observation at many social gatherings and events. As a non-Armenian married to an Iranian Armenian (from Tehran), the first author initially inhabited an intermediate insider/outsider position at these social events. However, this intermediate position proved dynamic on account of relative familiarity with the Armenian language and cultural practices. Thus, during the fieldwork, several interactions developed into personal friendships. Insights gleaned from these relationships led to a much clearer understanding of the complex relationship many Iranian Armenians feel regarding Armenia as well as their motivations for moving to Armenia. These motivations combined a genuine emotional connection to the country, ambitious economic goals, and a strong sense of reluctance about the host population and its cultural distinctiveness.

Because of the first author’s existing network and Iranian Armenian spouse, there was very little resistance in terms of gaining access to people for interviews. Practically everyone sought out to interview set ample time aside to assist. Two participants, who had moved to Armenia from Iran in childhood, declined to be interviewed because they no longer identified as Iranian Armenian. In addition, one other person identified feeling uncomfortable and declined. But these were rare exceptions. Otherwise, very few challenges in gaining access to and interviewing a diverse sample of Iranian Armenians in Armenia were encountered.

Short visits and entrepreneurship

As the existing scholarship has articulated, there often exists a direct link between short visits and return migration (Duval 2002, 2004; Ley and Kobayashi 2005). These short visits provide prospective returnees both familiarity and social networks, which motivate more permanent settlement in the homeland. By acquiring important social capital during short-term visits, prospective returnees ease their post-migration settlements, both socially and economically. In addition, the scholarship has demonstrated the extent to which property ownership also plays an important role in facilitating return migration (Carling and Pettersen 2014). Through the establishment of networks as well as the ownership of property, prospective return migrants have the means to mobilize socially and economically more quickly than those without these resources. Iranian Armenians “returnees” confirm these findings. Among those interviewed, respondents often discussed earlier visits to Armenia and family property ownership as factors, which influenced their decisions to move.

After Armenia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it became much easier for Iranian Armenians to visit their perceived homeland. As a result, many began visiting frequently and even buying or building property in Yerevan (particularly along the central arteries of Komitas and Kochar – where they form distinct communities). To be sure, some Iranian Armenians moved to Armenia at the time of independence; however, a great many, instead, visited Armenia frequently before, ultimately, deciding to make a permanent move. Distinct from the large, Syrian Armenian population, which has been re-located to Armenia and elsewhere as a result of the war in Syria (Della Gatta 2017), Iranian Armenians from the 1990s onward developed familiarity with Armenia over the course of several visits, which often began during childhood. These visits provided future returnees a strong foundation to build on when they did, ultimately, decide to move to Armenia.

For some Iranian Armenians, these short visits provided a relative respite from the strictures in which they had grown up in Iran. Growing up in post-revolutionary Iran, many Iranian Armenians enjoyed the social freedoms, which they were unaccustomed to receiving in their highly insulated communities back home. For example, Arman first came to Armenia in 2001. After coming to Armenia multiple times each year, he eventually moved in 2012. He explained why he enjoyed coming to Armenia:

Iran is a kind a closed country. Starting from how do you dress, what do you drink, what do you have to say, to speak. Anyway, the nationality, the freedom, all of them come hand to hand, make you make this decision … I need to live in Armenia. I need to live here. I feel myself free here.

For Arman, who grew up in Iran, coming to Armenia felt liberating. Armenia provided him freedoms he did not have in Iran, where Islamic rules govern restrictions on clothing and a prohibition on alcohol. This is part of a common theme in these interviews, where economic opportunities and risks are often intertwined with political considerations for Iranian Armenians migrating to Armenia. In addition, the repeat visits strengthened an affective emotion based on ethnicity (or nationality), which he had inculcated during his childhood. This combination of affective emotional connection as well as increased freedom ultimately led him to move to Armenia permanently.

Still, these short visits do more than merely cultivate affective ties to the perceived homeland. Although largely overlooked in the existing scholarship, these short visits also inculcate entrepreneurship for prospective returnees. Many Iranian Armenians, who made several short visits to Armenia, used the trips not merely to reinforce a sense of emotional or nationalistic attachment to the perceived homeland; rather, the trips also proved important ways for them to learn how they could transfer their skills and develop successful businesses.

For example, Njdeh first began visiting relatives in Armenia at the age of 16 in 2000. With his immediate family, he frequently visited Armenia before deciding to move permanently in 2012. While these short-term visits strengthened his affective ties to Armenia, they also provided an education in entrepreneurship:

Every time I was coming here, I was doing small projects. Or taking the projects as freelance, I was sitting here at home or in a cafe and doing the programming. I could work like that. But in 2010 or earlier, when I was already a graduate from my Bachelor's, especially when I entered the Master's I was very well informed about the energy sector, about the global challenges, etc. So from time to time, I was meeting people here. I even met the foreign minister at the time, the energy minister. So, I was just talking about renewable energy saving. But, at that time, the country was very closed, they weren't open to such topics. So, I wasn't seeing somewhere for myself. Plus, the market [was] very new for me. So, as an individual, I couldn't do a lot. So, I kept, let's say, exploring and meeting people, meeting, let's say, businessmen who are already working in Armenia.

While Armenia was largely an abstraction to Njdeh before 2000, repeat visits (particularly during summers) cultivated not only his affective ties to the country, but also developed his professional interests and built his professional network. What began merely as family visits, gradually, became an education in entrepreneurship, as Njdeh cultivated his own professional expertise and learned how to apply it to Armenia’s nascent market. In Iran, he developed interests in renewable energy; he applied these skills in Armenia. First, he networked with people in similar fields in Armenia and as his network grew, he began to identify professional opportunities to transfer his skillset to Armenia. Once he had a sufficient base of operations, he permanently moved to Armenia, where he first worked for an Armenian company in renewable energy before later becoming a freelancer.

These short-term visits provided a specific class of Iranian Armenians, who had the means of owning property and opening their own businesses, an alternative to moving to the U.S. as “persecuted religious minority”. As Armenia’s economy has grown in the last several decades, more economically established Iranian Armenians, who do not wish to begin “from scratch” in the U.S. (or elsewhere) have opted instead to come to Armenia. While these short-term visits often began as social encounters with family and friends, they also gradually expose prospective returnees to professional opportunities upon which they can capitalize.

Entrepreneurship

Although less studied in the ethnic (or diasporic) return migration scholarship, scholars have analysed the connection between entrepreneurship and return migration. For example, Cohen and Haberfeld have noted that those who return to Israel from the U.S. tend to have attained higher levels of education and would likely have achieved less economic success had they remained (2001). Also, the scholarship has found evidence to correlate self-selected return migration and entrepreneurship (as compared to the native populations of the home countries). As Batista et al argue, “it is actually the most entrepreneurial migrants that decide to return, when they are not pushed to do so” (2017). Diverse studies that explore the links between voluntary return migration and entrepreneurship include China (Ma 2002), Ghana (Black and Castaldo 2009), Albania (Piracha and Vadean 2010), Morocco (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015), Mozambique (Batista, McIndoe-Calder, and Vicente 2017), and others.

Iranian Armenians reinforce and extend these findings. Because the post 1990s Iranian Armenian returnees often have chosen Armenia rather than the U.S., they rather vividly illustrate self-selectivity. In addition, while the government of Armenia does not collect reliable statistical data upon which to draw quantitative findings, fieldwork in Armenia made some very visible commonalities among post-1990s Iranian Armenian “returnees” – that is, upper-middle backgrounds, home ownership, and self-employment or employment with large, international organizations. Unlike the Syrian Armenians, who form an entrepreneurial class within Armenia’s service and food industries, Iranian Armenians are particularly conspicuous in the housing and IT sectors. Furthermore, their concentration in these sectors is not coincidental.

During the period leading up to and after Armenia’s independence, the country experienced extreme hardships – a massive earthquake in northern Armenia (1988), war with Azerbaijan (1988–1994), and rampant governmental corruption. Industrial and agricultural outputs also plummeted while unemployment peaked. Armenians endured several years of food and electricity shortages. These conditions resulted in the mass exodus of Armenians from their homeland, particularly among young and middle-aged men. As a result, there existed rather significant demographic disparities, which, for some entrepreneurial and patriotic Iranian Armenians, created new opportunities in areas related to infrastructure.

But the entrepreneurial class of Iranian Armenians, who decided to move to Armenia, manifested generational differences in terms of their orientations toward Armenia. While Iranian Armenians, who have settled in Armenia from the early 2000s onward, were usually conditioned and socialized through repeat, short-term childhood visits to Armenia, there did exist another, smaller group of Iranian Armenians, who decided to move to Armenia during the period leading up to independence. Those who came as adults directly after independence in early and mid-1990s consistently pointed to patriotism as their primary motivation and entrepreneurialism as secondary, including prominent figures such as the former leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Armenia, Hrant Markarian. In contrast, for those who have been coming from the early 2000s, the inverse more frequently proved true. This shift, in part, reflects the changing economic and political realities for Armenia and Iran in the last several decades.

While Iranian Armenians had only very limited access (and very few personal ties) to Armenia before the fall of the Soviet Union, they nonetheless cultivated strong emotional attachments to the country. Among several business owners interviewed, this concomitance (of pragmatic entrepreneurship and affective motivation) recurred. Arlene exemplifies this duality. The owner of a large tourist agency and Armenian carrier, Armenian Airways, Arlene came to Armenia in 1991. Growing up in Tehran, Arlene developed a strong affective orientation to Armenia:

Since our childhoods, we have lived with a dream to visit our homeland, to Armenia, we could not even imagine that we would once see Armenia. We often wondered whether our children would be able to see Armenia. I have moved to Armenia not for business, but as an Armenian, to live in my Armenian land.⁴

Once in Armenia, Arlene had to endure the challenges, which afflicted other Armenians of the period following the demise of the Soviet Union. However, he also took advantage of the opportunities these challenges created. After dabbling in several business ventures, Arlene developed quite successful businesses in Armenia in tourism and transportation. As with many entrepreneurial Iranian Armenians in Armenia, Arlene manifests the convergence of both return migrants’ pragmatic transference of skills and resources as well as ethnic return migrants’ affective emotional motivation. This pragmatic patriotism has enabled many Iranian Armenians, particularly those coming before the mid-1990s, to overcome daunting challenges and mobilize the entrepreneurial ambition to achieve significant economic success.

On the other hand, Iranian Armenians, who have been coming from the early 2000s, also identified a strong affective orientation to Armenia; however, this affective orientation often played a more secondary role. For example, Narbeh moved to Armenia in 2001. He explained how he ended up in Armenia:

I tried to do [move to Canada or the U.S.], but it was not happening. So, my second choice was Armenia. You know, for Iranians, especially after the revolution, the passport is not [laughs]. So, we have not many choices. We have two or three choices: Europe, North America, or Armenia. That's the thing … I couldn't go to Canada to start a new career, okay, so let's go to Armenia to continue my studies. You know, at that time, I think it was the right time, because I surfed the right wave. At that time, there was a construction. And, at that time, I couldn't find work. So, I established a company.

Taking advantage of a construction boom in Armenia in the early 2000s, Narbeh made use of his skills as an architect and, along with an Iranian Armenian friend, founded an architectural firm. This architectural firm has become quite visible and successful in Armenia. While Narbeh frequently emphasized that he did not regret his decision to move to Armenia, he also conceded that coming to Armenia, at least at the time, was “not a good choice between the choices.” Unwilling to move to the U.S. with HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, which aids much of the migration of Iranian Armenians to the U.S. as a “persecuted religious minority”) and unsuccessful relocating to Canada as an immigrant, Narbeh took what he perceived was the last of his three options – that is, a move to Armenia. For Narbeh, as for many other Iranian Armenian returnees, remaining in Iran did not exist as a realistic option (he, like practically all those interviewed, also said he would not consider migrating as a “persecuted religious minority”).

Although Iran, technically, is a larger economy than Armenia, this fact does not capture the rather existential anxiety many Iranian Armenians, and Iranians in general, feel about Iran’s deteriorating economic and political circumstances. Furthermore, in Iran, there exists a lot of social pressure, usually from family, on young men to pursue careers abroad rather than in Iran where connections often matter more to career mobility than qualifications. And the perception that conditions in Iran are worsening also plays an important role in generating migration out of the country not only to North America and Northern Europe but also to Armenia. For those Iranian Armenians unwilling to relocate to the U.S. as a “persecuted religious minority”, they often move to Armenia, instead.

Rather than transferring pre-existing skills and resources, other Iranian Armenians took advantage of emerging opportunities by changing professions altogether. Henry, who manages construction projects in Armenia, took on an entirely new profession post-migration:

I have not worked here. What I have done does not have anything to do with my profession, although I do book-keeping at home as a hobby. My first work is the building on Aram Avenue, the second one is this building that we are staying in, and the third one is being built together with some people on the ground next to this (building) that I own with these people. This is my job. And my (other) activity has been helping national and social families. I have had some families, whom I have helped for three, four or five years.⁵

While Henry had no professional experience in construction management, a person in his social network encouraged him to collaborate on several prominent building projects in Armenia. As a result, Henry has developed a new, successful career in Armenia. But Henry articulates another important aspect of Iranian Armenian entrepreneurialism. As Henry told me, Iranian Armenians in Armenia support each other in finding work and places in which to live – indeed, the high-end building within central Yerevan to which Henry refers (on Aram Street) is occupied almost exclusively by Iranian Armenians. Henry was invited into an industry in which he had no experience and would not have otherwise been involved had it not another Iranian Armenian offered him the work. In turn, he extends this same “service” to other Iranian Armenians, who come to Armenia. The social and professional ties that Iranian Armenians have developed within Armenia enables them to insulate themselves from the Armenian population at large. As a result, Iranian Armenians in Armenia very often live in buildings and work in professions, which are largely populated by other Iranian Armenians. Because of they frequently have sufficient capital within the context of Armenia to select where they live and what they do, Iranian Armenians have formed their own immigrant enclaves in Yerevan.

Quality of life and the springboard effect

Ostensibly, the opportunity to move to the U.S. may seem a way to mobilize economically and develop a higher quality of life. And, for many Iranian Armenians, this has proven true. However, for many Iranian Armenians, life in the U.S. would mean sacrificing their quality of life and sense of independence. Gleaning insights from people within their social networks, many Iranian Armenians understand the challenges of moving to the U.S., where they would not be able to compete in the English-speaking market. For these Iranian Armenians, who do not want to work in less advanced positions, learn a new language, and move to a foreign country, Armenia proves a more attractive alternative. For example, Raffi moved to Armenia in 1994. He founded a bus line, which daily transits between Iran and Armenia. When asked about his motivations for moving to Armenia, he said the following:

Further, there is the opportunity of living well. For them (i.e. the Americans) two things are important, patriotism and good-living. It is not easy to have a good life in America. Part of the people that left for America, have come back, like my brother, his wife and their children. I love to have a free life. I can work today and then leave for Sevan and then eat shashlik till 3am – something that I cannot afford doing if I leave for America. It is this way of life that brings people to Armenia, as well as their connection with Iran. There are some, who have money in banks, houses, work, they send their wives and children to Armenia and visit them every couple of months. Commuting frequently works out well for a lot of people; they have their work and whenever it occurs to them, they can be in Armenia after a one and half hour flight. Besides, the way of life in Armenia is similar to that in parts of Iran, the language barrier with English does not exist here, the language is Armenian. There are many factors that make Iranian Armenians come to Armenia.⁶

As Raffi explained, he has learned from many friends and family that moving to the U.S. embeds several risks and sacrifices. Citing his family’s standing in Iran, he preferred to establish his own company and work in Armenia rather than take those risks. By doing so, he maintains quality of life that is satisfactory to him. Thus, for Iranian Armenians like Raffi, Armenia is a more rational choice than the U.S. For Raffi, Armenia has become a permanent home. However, for several other Iranian Armenian entrepreneurs in Armenia, they can maintain this quality of life and accumulate capital for a potential move in the unforeseeable future and access their birthplace easily if they need to do so.

Lacking sufficient means to establish themselves comfortably in the U.S. or Western Europe, many of Armenia’s Iranian Armenians use the social and financial resources they do have to establish themselves in Armenia to grow these resources and then relocate. For example, Narek first visited Armenia in 2000, but then returned every year until ultimately moving in 2012 at the age of 16. Initially, Narek relied exclusively on his parents to support him financially. After several years, however, he launched a successful IT company. When asked why he chose Armenia over the U.S., he said the following:

Everyone has a different understanding or expectation for their life. So, it depends on what you want with your life. If you want to work and die like a robot, stay in Iran. If you want to be successful in your life and reach your goals, Armenia is a very good place to start with and then you can move. Because if you go to Europe, you have to work two shifts. In America, I think it is harder. And every day of the week in the evening, if you go to cafes, they are full of people talking. They don’t care. I don’t care either. That’s why Armenia is a very enjoyable place for me.

Narek described his very practical rationale for moving to Armenia in terms that had very little do with any emotional connection to the “ancestral homeland”. Remaining in Iran would have meant, for Narek, working “like a robot” to achieve very little professionally. Similarly, living in the U.S. or Western Europe would have meant beginning at an entry level position (or multiple entry level positions) to make ends meet. However, in Armenia, he has sought to cultivate his professional life without sacrificing his quality of life. He has taken advantage of Armenia’s emergent economy, particularly in the IT sector, to carve out a niche for himself. As he described, he learned about this potentiality, first, from multiple social visits to Armenia, and, later, by living and studying in the country. Narek’s response highlights a more practical side of ethnic (or diasporic) return migration. For Narek and many other entrepreneurial Iranian Armenians in Yerevan, Armenia offers them the opportunity to establish businesses and grow capital, which they hope to transfer to another country, where they can maintain the same standard of living. They recognize that, by staying in Iran or moving to the U.S., they would not be able to maintain the quality of lives they have in Armenia.

However, again, as ethnic return migrants, Iranian Armenians in Armenia frequently qualify their plans by reiterating an emotional connection to the country and the desire to help contribute to the development of the country. For many Iranian Armenians, Armenia operates as a potential springboard, but then develops into a more permanent move. For example, after several repeat visits with his family between 2001 and 2010, Vahe decided to move to Armenia but, at the time, only for higher education. In 2007, his family purchased an apartment, so he had a place in which to live and, by 2010, he had gained considerable familiarity with the country. As with Narek, Vahe chose Armenia for its convenience and potentiality; however, this evolved relatively quickly:

It was not my decision, in one shot, to stay in Armenia. It was like, ‘Yes, AUA [the American University of Armenia] is a good opportunity; it's a good place and it only adds to the options.’ It's not limiting in any terms. After graduating, I can move elsewhere, I can return to Iran, or I can stay in Armenia. And I have the example of people, who already stayed in Armenia after finishing AUA in front of my eyes. So that was very touchable and sensible. But that transformation came really quick. So, it was within two, three months, that I started sensing, I don't really feel like going elsewhere.

While Vahe moved to Armenia to obtain a degree, he found a niche for himself and decided to remain. As a pivot, Armenia offers many Iranian Armenians an additional incentive to advance their careers. They can rely on it as a staging ground to begin acquiring financial or intellectual capital and then move elsewhere, or, as with Vahe, remain in Armenia. After living and working in Armenia for eight years, Vahe undertook a two-year educational programme in the Netherlands. While in Netherlands, Vahe reevaluated his time in Armenia as well as his future. He ultimately decided to move back to Armenia, where he could transfer his skills to contribute to Armenia. A combination of practical and affective considerations motivated this decision.

Discussion and conclusion

The existing ethnic return migration scholarship has done much to unpack the various ways ethnicity can motivate immigration, particularly between affluent and less affluent countries. This approach expands the existing migration scholarship, which tends to focus on rationalistic causes in motivating migration. The scholarship has also highlighted the important policies and institutions, which have arisen to broker this sort of migration.

But ethnic return migration occurs in more diverse contexts than the scholarship indicates. When analysing ethnic return migration from and to countries outside of Western Europe, Oceania, and North America, a distinct set of patterns emerges. This distinct set of patterns blends the scholarship on ethnic return as well as the scholarship on return migration. As the scholarship has demonstrated regarding many return migrants, who struggle to compete in the increasingly competitive and costly global market, some ethnic return migrants move to the homeland – or, in the case of Iranian Armenians, the perceived homeland – and found their own companies, take management positions, or work in international firms. While the scholarship typically assesses the children of immigrants moving from affluent countries in the U.S. or Western Europe, Iranian Armenians demonstrate that ethnic return migrants can also rely on the homeland as a potential staging ground or springboard through which they can ultimately move to the U.S. or elsewhere. Return migration therefore is also a strategy by which immigrants from less affluent countries can participate and compete in the global market economy. Indeed, these Iranian Armenian returnees, who wish to compete in the global market economy, consciously avoided moving to the U.S. despite the access they possessed as a “persecuted religious minority”. Instead, they decided to found businesses in Armenia, where they could grow their capital before, at least potentially, moving elsewhere.

Although there has been a long history of return migration of Iranian Armenians to Armenia, especially during the 1830s and 1940s, the current trend of return migration offers a new understanding of Armenians’ relationship with their perceived homeland. This article makes several contributions to the literature on ethnic return migration, as it provides a unique angle of looking at migration from a non-Western country to the perceived country of origin. This study confirms some established notions about ethnic return migration from Western countries, such as the role of ethnicity and familiarity with the destination country as motivators for migration, and the correlation between short visits to the country of origin and eventual return migration. However, this analysis introduces several important differences from the existing literature, such as the significance of the entrepreneurial class, not specialized in any one industry, in this migration, and how quality of life is prioritized over economic opportunity in the return migrants’ decision-making.

It also remains unclear if the Iranian Armenian community will stay long term in Armenia, as political and economic stability owing to its diplomatic isolation and military hostilities from neighbouring Azerbaijan create a sense of an uncertain future. Furthermore, it is possible that the children of these migrants will be less attached to the Iranian-Armenianness of their identity, as they are raised speaking local varieties of Armenian and have little to no fluency in Persian. Future scholarship should continue analysing these and other phenomena, which this case study introduces.

In addition, studies of Iranian Armenians in Armenia can broaden ethnic enclaves conversations. The existing scholarship has highlighted the social and economic upshots of co-ethnics self-sorting themselves into residential concentrations within several large cities. As scholars have noted, ethnic claves significantly influence immigrants’ social and economic integration (Damm 2009; Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). In Armenia, both Iranian and Syrian Armenian “returnees” form ethnic enclaves without ethnic difference. These enclaves highlight some shortcomings of the existing scholarship. As Roger Waldinger has pointed out, “[W]hat was an immigrant enclave economy in 1980 became an ethnic enclave shortly thereafter and has remained so ever since” (1993, 448). Waldinger notes the rather arbitrary substitution of the word ethnic for the previously used word, immigrant. Building on the scholarship of Wimmer and Schiller, future scholarship may investigate the extent to which the use of the ethnic has imposed an internal homogeneity on transnational immigrants (2003). Rather than unpack the internal complexity of groups and sub-economies formed within them, the ethnic enclave model may reify identity categories and simplify complex realities. And case studies of Iranian (as well as Syrian) Armenians in Armenia can do much to de-essentialize the existing ethnic enclave scholarship. Furthermore, this case study also opens several important questions regarding integration and assimilation. Does ethnic return migration result in cultural assimilation or perseverance? As this analysis has highlighted, even many Iranian Armenians, who have lived in Armenia for 30+ years, retain a strong sense of cultural distinctness. In what cases do ancestral returnees maintain or lose this sense of distinctness? And what would it mean for a returnee to assimilate?

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Östersjöstiftelsen.

Notes

1 The High Commissioner, Zareh Sinanyan, is an Armenia-born American Armenian. Previously, Sinanyan served as a city councilmember and mayor of Glendale, California, where Armenians make up approximately 40 per cent of the city’s 200,000+ population (Fittante 2018). He would more suitably fit what the scholarship refers to a return migrant.

2 In association with Sweden’s Ministry of Education, the Ethics Review Authority (Etikprövningsmyndigheten) reviewed and approved this research (registration number 2021-03685).

3 Three participants asked me, instead, to take notes instead of audio-recording.

4 For Armenian, see Online Appendix.

5 For Armenian, see Online Appendix.

6 For Armenian, see Online Appendix.