The political discourse of Arabs in Israel: moralism, radical realism, and realistic realism

ABSTRACT

Using the discriminatory character of Israeli politics as our point of departure, this paper argues that for large numbers of Palestinian Israeli citizens, new realistic terms of collective engagement are attractive and possible. Based on analytical Marxism and writings about realist normative political theory, we contend that politicians can advance strategies that establishing foundations for resolving the minority’s trap. Meanwhile, constructing identities is always delimited by the capacity of politicians to meet material needs and preserve certain distinct elements of the old “trapped identity”. This framework guides elaboration of the recent political discourse and strategies of the Israeli Knesset members Ayman Odeh and Mansour Abbas. While Odeh is a radical realist, Abbas is a realistic realist, excluding arguments based on values that the Israeli state cannot accept. Nonetheless, Abbas’ project is not only fragile but has also demanded the substantial political and moral sacrifice.

KEYWORDS:

• Discourse
• Arabs
• Israel
• moralism
• realism
• indigeneity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Strictly speaking, this refers to the “Palestinian catastrophe” of 1948, but some scholars use the term more broadly to refer to “the accumulated Palestinian experience since the 1948 war up to the present” (Manna 2013, 87; for the role of the Nakba in the settler colonialism paradigm, see: Sabbagh-Khoury 2022).

2 In this study, by Palestinian citizens in Israel we mean Palestinians with Israeli citizenship who live in Israel. For convenience and considerations of style, we also refer to them as Palestinian Israeli citizens, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinian citizens.

3 For a similar observation about the literature more generally, see: Haklai and Abu Rass (2022).

4 Our focus here is on the Palestinian citizens of Israel under a one-state reality, in which they are not exactly a minority but rather a discriminated indigenous people. Yet, their citizenship gives them several important benefits compared to Palestinians who have no citizenship (Lustick 2019; Sorek 2015).

5 Material relations are left out of other models of agent-structure, and particularly the structuration model of Anthony Giddens (Porpora 1993, 212). What Giddens means by structure are cultural rather than material conditions (Porpora 1989, 200; Porpora 1993, 219).

6 This might happen if new economic circumstances (i.e. neoliberalization) threaten to undermine the shared world of common significance (Honig 2015), as a result of a shift in power relations, or both. In Israel, for example, neoliberalism undermined the civic orientation of Jews toward public matters and the common good (Shafir and Peled 2002), and the success of the iron wall doctrine corrupted the sense of justice of the Jewish majority (Lustick 2019). As Raef Zreik (2016, 361) put it, "The total imbalance of power had seduced – and still seducing – Israel to think that it can manage without Palestinian recognition."

7 Shafir and Peled (2002, 21) viewed Israeli politics as evolving “from a colonial frontier to civil society.”

8 Demographic structures are extra-discursive social constructions that have various consequences, whether or not people are aware of them (Porpora 2018, 185).

9 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal (2003) regard the popular uprising in 1834 against Ibrahim Pasha as the beginning of Palestinian history. Others date the beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century. Still others, date it much later.

10 As of December 31, 2021 (CBS 2021).

11 For further information about the surveys presented in Table 2; see: Navot, Swaid, and Khalaily (2022).

12 Historically, communists have understood that what they must not do is explain their position in moral terms to their opponents (Leiter 2015, 35–36).

13 The survey was conducted by during August 2021 and included 501 participants representing the adult Arab population of Israel. The respondents were asked by the phone to answer the following question: “What do you consider to be the first and foremost component of your identity?” with choices given in advance: Muslim, Israeli, Palestinian, etc. For further information, see: Qadaya (2022b).

14 The survey was conducted in December 2020 and included 504 participants representing the adult Arab population of Israel. The survey was commissioned by Qadaya. Respondents were asked to answer by the phone the following question: “To what extent do you support or oppose LGBTQ community rights?” For further information, see: Qadaya (2022b).

15 The survey was conducted during July 2022 and included 751 participants representing the adult Arab population of Israel. For further information, see: Qadaya (2022b).

16 A Pearson correlation test to better understand the nature of the correlation between socioeconomic status, measured on a scale ranging from 1 (much lower than average) to 5 (much higher than average), and support levels for LGBTQ rights, measured on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly support). A strong positive correlation between socioeconomic status and support levels for the LGBTQ community (r = .15, p < .01), participants of higher socioeconomic status expressing higher levels of support. For further information, see: Qadaya (2022b).