The power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from populism to clientelism, and militarization of the government

Abstract

Since the1979 revolution, Iran has experienced two non-class power structures—populism and clientelism. Populism, a product of the revolution, helped Ayatollah Khomeini to rule Iran for a decade with absolute power. Clientelism in Iran is linked to Shiism, as well as to a rentier state, and to the revolution, which resulted in many autonomous groups formed in patron – client bonds. Neither clientelism nor Shiism can be analysed using classical class system theory. Instead of horizontal layers of classes, the power structures in both Shi'ism and clientelism are based on vertical columns of rival and autonomous groups. The traditional Shi'a institution of Marja'iyat (source of emulation), has come into conflict with an elected government. The reformist government elected in 1997 failed to deliver on its democratic promises and to end the destructive role of autonomous groups. Therefore, disenchanted with state-sponsored reforms, Iranian society seems to be moving towards pragmatism and utilitarianism, while the political power structure leans towards militarism.

Notes

I would like to thank Mehran Kamrava for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article. As more social thinkers recognise and write about the clientelistic nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this article builds on work I have presented and published since 1997, including ‘Clientelism, the characteristic of political power structure in Iran’, Iran Farda: Monthly Journal of Economic, Social, and Scientific Studies, IIV (44), July 1998; ‘From populism to pluralism: the Islamic Republic in transition’, 8 April 1998, at http://www.Iranian,com/Opinion/May98/Power/index.html; ‘Who holds the power in Iran: transition from populism to clientelism to pluralism’, Mehregan (An Iranian Journal of Culture and Politics), 6 (3), 1997; and ‘Political clientelism replaces religious populism in Iran: a case of vertical power structure of rival groups’, paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association 31st Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 19 – 22 November 1997.

1 For a full justification of Islamic government, see Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Government, trans Joint Publishers Reset Service, Arlington, VA, 1979. In his book Khomeini clearly indicates that ‘the ulema [clerics] were appointed by the imam for government and for judgment among people and their position is still preserved for them’ (p 73); ‘Ulema (plural of ‘alim) are the heirs to the prophets' (p 74). He adds: ‘If knowledgeable and just jurisprudent undertakes the task of forming the government, then he will run the social affairs that the prophet used to run and it is the duty of the people to listen to him and obey him’ (p 37).

2 Maziar Behrooz, ‘The Islamic state and the crisis of Marja'iyat in Iran’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, XVI (Q), 1996, pp. 93 – 100.

3 J Cole, ‘It takes a following to make an ayatollah’, Washington Post, 15 August 2004, B4.

4 Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, Washington, DC: Washington Institute and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000.

5 Anthony Hall, ‘Patron – client relations: concepts and terms’, in Steffen W Schmidt et al (eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, pp 510 – 512.

6 Ibid.

7 JD Powell, ‘Peasant society and clientelist politics’, American Political Science Review, 64 (2), 1970, pp 411 – 425; R Lemarchand,; and Steffen W Schmidt et al (eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.

8 Christopher Clapham (ed), Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, London: Frances Printer, 1982.

9 Edward Reeves, The Hidden Government: Ritual, Clientelism, and Legitimization in Northern Egypt, Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1990, p 170.

10 Ibid, pp 157 – 158.

11 Ibid.

12 Mario Caciaghi & Frank Belloni, ‘The ‘new’ clientelism in southern Italy: the Christian Democratic Party in Catania’, in SN Eisenstadt & René Lemarchand (eds), Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981.

13 Ibid.

14 Peter Flynn, ‘Class, clientelism, and coercion: some mechanisms of internal dependency and control’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 12 (2), 1974, pp 133 – 156.

15 S Hutchinson, ‘The patron – dependent relationship in Brazil: a preliminary examination’, cited in Flynn, ‘Class, clientelism, and coercion’.

16 Flynn, ‘Class, clientelism, and coercion’.

17 N Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil 1947 – 1964, New York: Wiley Press, 1968.

18 K Vick, ‘Class is pivotal in Iran runoff’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 24 June 2005, A20.

19 A Akbar Rafsanjani, ‘Views of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani on the political problems of the country’, Hamshahri Daily Newspaper, 1417, November 1997.

20 ‘Iran: invisible piers and visible smuggled goods’, Special Economic Report, available at http:sol;/jomhouri.com/a/03art/0011643.php.

21 Ibid.

22 Nedaay-e Daneshjoo, 12, cited in the Journal of Iran-e Farda, 37, 1376 (1997), p 27.

23 Reeves, The Hidden Government.

24 Nedaay-e Daneshjoo.

25 Sharg, 3 March 2005, at www.Sharghnewspaper.com/831218/html/online.htm.

26 Mowbien, 19, 1997, cited in Raahe Toudeh, 65, 1997, p 40.

27 Abbas Kakavand, ‘The multiple rules’, Akhbar-e Rooz, online daily, 27 June 2004, at http://www.iran-chabar.de/1383/05/06/kakawand830506.htm.

28 Ibid.

29 Douglas Jehl, ‘US scholar, barred by Iran, suspends Amity Bid’, New York Times, 9 March 2005.

30 Ibid.

31 Associated Press, ‘Iran law mandates nuclear program’, Los Angeles Times, 29 May 2005, A10.

32 See BBC News online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/06/050603_mf_reply.shtml.

33 See http://us.f528.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowLetter?MsgId=6370_61345_30300_2574_124330_0_22107_ 240056_670087070&Idx=54&YY=72025&inc=25&order=down&sort=date&pos=2& view=a& head=&box=Inbox.

34 His younger associate, Mohammad Nabi Habibi, replaced Asgar Oladi, a long-time secretary general of jmi, in 2004.

35 In 2000 Asgar Oladi declared that ‘the financial circulation of the Aid Committee of Imam Khomeini will reach 700 billion toumans this year. The source of 500 billion toumans of this sum consists of state credits, and the rest was acquired from charity and the financial sources of the Committee itself.’ See Payvand's Iran News, at http://www.payvand.com/news/01/jan/1153.html.

36 ‘Imam charity committee and a challenge under the People Trust’, Baztab online daily, 24 September 2004, at www.baztab.com/news/16386.php?action=print.

37 See http://news.iran-emrooz.de/more.php?id=6075_0_7_0_M.

38 Dariush Sajjadi, ‘Peechak-e Enheraaf: Baracy Hamgarei va Mosharekat Mafiaye-e Halqeh Rohanion Madreseh Haqqaani ba Mafiay-e Qodrat dar Israel’, (Deviant turn: a study of the homogeneity and participation of the mafia clerical circle of Haqqaani Seminary and the mafia power in Israel), http://www.geocities.com/dariushsajjadi/farsimaterial/Peechak2.pdf, 2003. Sajjadi adds that the Haqaani Seminary was behind the murder of political opponents. This series of murders is known as the chain murders in Iran.

39 Akbar Ganji, Alijenab-e Sourkh poush va Alijenaban-e Khakestari (The Red Eminence and the Grey Eminences: Pathology of Transition to the Developmental Democratic State), Tehran: Tarh-e no, 2000.

40 Sajjadi, ‘Peechak-e Enheraaf’, p 7.

41 Mesbah Yazdi was the only high-ranking ayatollah to openly endorse Ahmadinejad for president. After the latter's victory Mesbah Yazdi was the only high ranking ayatollah that Ahmadinejad visited at his home in Qom.

42 Mihan, an online journal, 56, 2002, at www.Iran-Emrooz.de.

43 For detailed information on the chain murders, see Akbar Ganji, Ghosts' Darkhouse: Pathology of Transition to the Developmental Democratic State, Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1999; and Ganji, The Red Eminence and the Gray Eminences.

44 ‘The president of the University of Science and Technology is dismissed from hospital and attackers will be prosecuted’, Baztab, 5 November 2004, at http://www.baztab.com/news/18014.php and www.baztab.com/print.php?id=17863.

45 For details see Baztab, 2 January 2005, at http://www.baztab.com/print.php?id=19901.

46 For details, see Baztab, 31 December 2004, at http://www.baztab.com/print.php?id=19974.

47 During his campaign for the presidency, Ahmadinejad proudly declared that he was a member of the Basij (state militia) even during his teaching tenure at the university.

48 Rooydad, 5 September 2004, at http://rooydad.com/2004/09/blog-post_109439674901622214.html.

49 Rafsanjani's statement on the presidential election after his defeat, at http://news.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/news/more/2378/.

50 Ibid.

51 The total number of the Basij population is estimated at several million. In a ceremonial meeting in the city of Hamedan, in the presence of several ircg commanders, including General Kiani, the regional commander of Basij forces, Mardani, the president of the Student Organization of Basij said that 530 000 students had joined it. Of these 90 000 are active at 2600 resistance stations at various campuses. Accordingly, they publish about 1000 student publications, of which 250 are scientific. See http://www.iran-emroz.net/index.php?news2/print2/2731.

52 Mohammad Reza Khatami, ‘We were defeated by a garrison party’, at http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/news/more/2463/.

53 Ibid.

54 For details, see Zahra Ebrahimi, Sharq, 14 July 2005, reprinted at http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/news2/print/2829/.

55 Ibid.

56 Mohsen Armin, Emrooz, 16 August 2005, at http://www.emrouz.info/ShowItem.aspx? ID=4900&p=1; and Iraj Nadimi, Emrooz, 14 August 2005, at http://www.emrouz.info/ShowItem.aspx?ID=4855&p=1.

57 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, ‘The reformist movement in Iran’, in Daniel Heradstveit & Helge Hveem (eds), Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

58 Ansar-e Hezbollah, ‘The right faction, leave Osoulgaran [fundamentalists] alone!’, at http://www.ansarnews.com/index.php?papu=article/showarticle&code=50.