The African ‘oil rush’ and US national security

Abstract

The world's major oil-consuming nations, led by the USA, China and the Western European countries, are keenly interested in the development of African oil reserves, making huge bids for whatever exploration blocks become available and investing large sums in drilling platforms, pipelines, loading facilities and other production infrastructure. Indeed, the pursuit of African oil has taken on the character of a gold rush, with major companies from all over the world competing fiercely with one another for access to promising reserves. This ‘oil rush’ has enormous implications both for African oil producers and for the major oil-importing countries. For the producing countries it promises both new-found wealth and a potential for severe internal discord over the allocation of oil revenues (or ‘rents’); for the consuming countries, it entails growing dependence on imports of a vital substance from a region of chronic instability, with obvious national security overtones. Both these trends are reflected in US policy towards African oil. Desperate to procure additional supplies of foreign oil (to make up for the decline in domestic output), the Bush administration has made strenuous efforts to increase the role of US energy firms in African production. But because instability in Africa is an obstacle to such investment, it has sought to boost the internal security capacity of friendly African states and has laid the groundwork for direct US military involvement in Africa. At the same time Washington has become deeply concerned by China's growing interest in African oil, provoking an intense competitive contest between the two, with growing military overtones. In the end African societies will most probably suffer from this competition as an influx of arms bolsters the capacity of entrenched African regimes.

Notes

1 bp, bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, London: bp, 2005, p 4 (hereinafter cited as bp, srwe -2005).

2 Jeffrey Ball, ‘Angola possesses a prize as Exxon, rivals stalk oil’, Wall Street Journal, 5 December 2005.

3 The authors first advanced this argument in a paper with this title delivered at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington, DC, 18 November 2005.

4 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (doe/eia), International Energy Outlook 2005, Washington, DC: doe/eia, 2005, Tables A4, E1, pp 93, 157 (hereinafter cited as doe/eia, ieo -2005).

5 For articulation of this point of view, see Kenneth S Deffeyes, Hubbert's Peak, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001; David Goodstein, Out of Gas, New York: WW Norton, 2004; and Paul Roberts, The End of Oil, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2004. See also Jeffrey Ball, ‘As prices soar, doomsayers provoke debate on oil's future’, Wall Street Journal, 21 September 2004.

6 doe/eia, International Energy Outlook 2002, Washington, DC: doe/eia, 2002, p 25.

7 See Russell Gold, ‘In deal for Unocal, Chevron gambles on high oil prices’, Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2005.

8 doe/eia ieo -2005, Table E1, p 157.

9 Quoted in Margaret Ross, ‘Africa's elephants of the deep’, The Lamp, Winter 1998 – 99, p 4. The Lamp was the official magazine of the Exxon Corp before its merger with Mobil.

10 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Production, The Gulf of Guinea and US Strategic Energy Policy, Hearings, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 15 July 2004, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004, pp 11 – 12 (hereinafter cited as sfrc, Gulf of Guinea).

11 For background on this initiative, see Michael T Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004, pp 56 – 73.

12 National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, Washington, DC: The White House, 17 May 2001, ch 8, p 11 (hereinafter cited as nepdg, nep -2001).

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid, ch 8, p 6.

15 Ibid, ch 8, pp 6 – 7.

16 sfrc, Gulf of Guinea, p 10.

17 nepdg, nep -2001, ch 8, pp 11 – 12.

18 Statement of Spencer Abraham before the House Committee on International Relations, 20 June 2002, at www.energy.gov, accessed 7 December 2003.

19 Cited in doe/eia, ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Brief, February 2005.

20 Ibid.

21 For background on Sudan and oil, see doe/eia, ‘Sudan’, Country Analysis Brief, March 2005, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.html, accessed 14 November 2005.

22 For background on the Pentagon's regional priorities, see Dana Priest, The Mission, New York: WW Norton, 2003.

23 The authors first made this argument in M Klare & D Volman, ‘Africa's oil and American national security’, Current History, May 2004, pp 226 – 231.

24 For background on US military activities in the Gulf area, see Klare, Blood and Oil, pp 26 – 55, 74 – 112. See also Michael Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, New York: Free Press, 1992.

25 For background on these efforts, see Michael T Klare, Resource Wars, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001, pp 81 – 108; and Klare, Blood and Oil, pp 132 – 139.

26 US Department of State (dos), Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, Washington, DC: dos, 2004, p 371.

27 Testimony of Donald R Norland, former US ambassador to the Republic of Chad, House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, The Chad – Cameroon Pipeline: A New Model for Natural Resources Development, Hearing, 18 April 2002, p 8.

28 US Department of Defense News Briefing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael A Westphal, 2 April 2002, at www.defenselink.mil.

29 Quoted in Mike Crawley, ‘With Mideast uncertainty, US turns to Africa for oil’, Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 2003.

30 dos, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2006, Washington, DC: DOS, 2005, pp 191 – 193, pp 287 – 289, p 443, pp 587 – 590 (hereinafter cited as DOS, CBJ -2006).

31 Ibid, pp 199 – 205, p 553.

32 Ibid, p 587.

33 Ibid, p 590. See also Steven R Weisman, ‘US to sell military gear to Algeria to help it fight militants’, Washington Post, 10 December 2002; and ‘US plans to sell weapons to Algeria’, Reuters, 10 December 2002.

34 dos, cbj-2006, pp 191 – 198.

35 Ibid, p 316.

36 Ibid, pp 207 – 217, 317 – 320.

37 For background on the psi and tsi, see Donna Miles, ‘New counterterrorism initiative to focus on Saharan Africa’, American Forces Press Service, 17 May 2005, at www.eucom.mil; Catherine Fellow, ‘US targets Sahara “terrorist haven”’, bbc News, 8 August 2005; ‘Pan-Sahel Initiative’, Global Security.org report, nd, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm; and ‘Trans-Sahara counterterrorism initiative’, Global Security.org report, nd, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm.

38 Quoted in Charles Cobb, Jr, ‘Larger US troop presence may be needed in Africa, says nato commander’, All Africa News, 2 May 2003, at http://allafrica.com.

39 ‘Seven carrier strike groups underway for exercise “Summer Pulse 04”’, US dod press release, 3 June 2004; ‘Allied countries join forces in maritime exercise’, US dod press release, 1 July 2004; Sara Omo, ‘USS Enterprise kicks off majestic eagle’, US Navy news service, 13 July 2004; and Omo, ‘Enterprise heads home after its final Summer Pulse exercise’, US Navy news service, 16 July 2004.

40 US European Command Press Release, ‘Maritime security conference brings navies together’, 5 October 2004, at http://www.eucom.mil, accessed 22 March 2005.

41 US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S Land begins Gulf of Guinea deployment’, 28 January 2005; Terry Burnley, ‘Emory S Land completes Gulf of Guinea deployment’, Navy Newstand, 22 March 2005; US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S Land stops in Douala, Cameroon’, 9 February 2005; and US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S Land pulls pier-side in Port Gentil, Gabon’, 15 February 2005.

42 ‘Coast Guard cutter Bear kicks off 6th Fleet deployment’, Navy Newstand, 7 June 2005.

43 Sailors, marines participate in West African training cruise ’05’, Navy Newstand, 30 September 2005.

44 Quoted in Greg Jaffe, ‘In massive shift, US is planning to cut size of military in Germany’, Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2003.

45 See ‘US naval base to protect Sao Tome oil’, bbc News World Edition, 22 August 2002, at news.bbc.co.uk, accessed 6 March 2003.

46 See Vince Crawley, ‘Oil may drive troop staging: US looks at Africa, the Caspian as forward-operating locations’, Army Times, 22 September 2003; John T Correll, ‘European command looks south and east’, Air Force, December 2003, pp 61 – 64; Jaffe, ‘In massive shift, US is planning to cut size of military in Germany’; Jaffe, ‘Pentagon prepares to scatter soldiers in remote corners’, Wall Street Journal, 27 May 2003; and Eric Schmitt, ‘Pentagon seeking new access pacts for African bases’, New York Times, 5 July 2003.

47 See Emily Wax, ‘A US beachhead on Horn of Africa’, Washington Post, 5 December 2002.

48 ‘US deploys further forces in Africa’, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 4 August 2004, at http://jiaa.janes.com, accessed 24 October 2004.

49 Ibid; and ‘US to bolster counter-terrorism assistance to Africa’, Jane's Defense Weekly, 6 October 2004.

50 US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, China's Influence in Africa, Hearings, 109th Congress, 1st session, 28 July 2005, pp 15 – 16 (hereinafter cited as hirc, China's Influence in Africa).

51 For background on foreign intervention in African states associated with the pursuit of oil concessions, see Augustine Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria, New York: Praeger, 1990; E Wayne Nafzinger, The Economics of Political Instability: The Nigerian – Biafran War, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982; G Aforka Nweke, External Intervention in African Conflicts: France and French-speaking West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967 – 1970, Working Papers in African Studies, Boston, MA: Boston University, African Studies Center, 1980; and Robert Bruce Shepard, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: from Kennedy to Reagan, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.

52 doe/eia, ieo-2005, Tables A1, A4, pp 89, 93.

53 For background on China's pursuit of foreign energy, see Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao & Roland Dannreuther, The Strategic Implication's of China's Energy Needs, Adelphi Paper no 346, Oxford: Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002; and Erika Strecker Downs, China's Quest for Energy Security, Santa Monica, CA: rand, 2000.

54 On China's investments in Sudan, see doe/eia, ‘Sudan’, Country Analysis Brief, March 2005, at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.html, accessed 14 November 2005. On cnooc's investment in Nigeria, see David Barboza, ‘Chinese energy giant to buy stake in Nigerian oil field’, New York Times, 10 January 2006.

55 hirc, China's Influence in Africa, p 18. For further discussion of China's interest in African oil, see Rannenberger's full testimony, ibid, pp 18 – 24.

56 On Chinese military ties with Sudan, see Peter S Goodman, ‘China invests heavily in Sudan's oil industry’, Washington Post, 23 December 2004. On the deal with dicon, see Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 September 2004.

57 HIRC, China's Influence in Africa, p 16.

58 Ibid, pp 17 – 18.

59 Ibid, p 1.

60 US dod, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, Washington, DC: dod, 2005, p 10.

61 For background on these programmes, see Rannenberger's 2005 testimony in hirc, China's Influence in Africa, pp 22 – 23.

62 dod, China's Influence in Africa, p 9.

63 See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.