Less is more: the problematic future of irregular warfare in an era of collapsing states

Abstract

US success against irregular threats is inversely related to the priority senior US officials (civilian and military) attach to the effort. When one investigates the return on investment in the global war on terror (gwot), now increasingly described as the Long War, in Iraq versus in the Philippines, it is clear that US efforts in the Philippines are achieving great success with minimal resources, while efforts in Iraq are achieving limited success with almost unlimited resources. The same is true of US success against an irregular threat in El Salvador in the 1980s. During that period the focus of US military attention was in Europe. El Salvador was a backwater that was never of particularly great importance to the Pentagon. This paper will seek to understand why limited efforts against irregular threats seem to result in greater success than all-out efforts.

Notes

1 RF Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of US Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973, p 475.

2 Two documents that defined early US foreign policy and restricted military adventures are Washington's ‘Farewell Address’ and John Quincy Adams' speech to the US House of Representatives on 4 July 1821, in celebration of Independence Day.

3 Weigley, The American Way of War, pp 317 – 318.

4 See FW Kagan, ‘War and aftermath’, Policy Review, August – September 2003, pp 2 – 3. The best discussion on ncw is given by D Alberts, J Gartska & F Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, ccrp Publications, 1999.

5 Kagan, ‘War and aftermath’, pp 3 – 7.

6 For a thorough discussion of the limits of air power, see Robert A Pate, Bombing to Win—Air Power and Coercion in War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

7 CS Gray, ‘National style in strategy: the American example’, International Security, 6 (2), 1981, p 26.

8 M Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, New York: Basic Books, 2002 offers a thorough, contemporary discussion of the importance of ‘small wars’ and the rise of US power.

9 This thesis on military strategy failing to achieve strategic outcomes is addressed in the monograph, AJ Echevarria II, Towards an American Way of War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004.

10 AJ Bacevich, J Hallums, R White & T Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, Cambridge, MA: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, p v.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid, p vi.

13 Ibid.

14 This cadre was predominantly comprised of Special Forces majors and master sergeants, although a few service members from other branches and services also became advisors. They all spoke Spanish and were culturally savvy. An informal Special Forces network debriefed outgoing advisors and prepared incoming advisors before their deployment to El Salvador. This informal system created a strategic coherence that was never evident in Washington, in the US embassy or in the Regional Combatant Commander's headquarters.

15 GR Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines: ‘The Indirect Approach’, US Army War College Civilian Research Project, 2006, pp 5 – 6.

16 Ibid, p 6; and DS Maxwell, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines: what would Sun Tzu say?’, Military Review, May – June 2004, p 22.

17 C Walley, ‘Impact of semipermissive environment on force-protection in Philippine engagements’, Special Warfare, Summer 2004, p 36.

18 CH Briscoe, ‘Balikatan exercise spearheaded arsof operations in the Philippines’, Special Warfare, September 2004, pp 17 – 18.

19 Ibid, pp 18 – 19; and interviews conducted by author while in the Philippines and at uspacom headquarters, HI in November 2005.

20 See Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, p 10; Briscoe, ‘Balikatan exercise’, p 18; and Col Linder, interview by the author, November 2005, JSOTF-PI, Manila.

21 Dr Gordon McCormick developed a coin model that accounts for the domestic and international environments, to include the dynamic relationships among the government, insurgents, people and international actors. Variations of this model have been taught to Special Operations officers at the Naval Postgraduate School for many years. Fortunately a few of these officers were present at socpac to influence the plan. See GH McCormick, ‘A “pocket model” of internal war’, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming.

22 Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, p 12.

23 Ibid, p 13.

24 sf advisors were initially not allowed to accompany afp units below the battalion level. This eventually changed and sf advisors were allowed down to the company level.

25 Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, p 13.

26 See C Walley, ‘Civil affairs: a weapon of peace on Basilan Island’, Special Warfare, September 2004, pp 31 – 34; and Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, pp 13 – 14.

27 F Gallardo, ‘Balikatan over but Abu Sayyaf problem far from over’, MindaNews, 29 December 2002, p 1.

28 T Crampton, ‘US aids fragile peace in the southern Philippines’, International Herald Tribune, 28 February 2003.

29 Wilson, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, p 16.

30 Ibid, p 17.

31 Ibid, p 20.

32 The strategic culture in portions of the Special Operations community is fortunately inconsistent with that of the conventional military. This difference facilitated the development of the successful strategy for the Philippines.

33 CH Briscoe et al, Weapon of Choice—US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003, pp 93 – 96.

34 See Ibid, p 96; S Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp 8 – 9.

35 CH Briscoe et al, Weapon of Choice, pp 93 – 96.

36 See Briscoe et al, Weapon of Choice, pp 101, 104; and Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, p 10. Many of the Special Forces teams were augmented with air force special tactics airmen who were specially trained to direct tactical airstrikes with smart bombs. This permitted the Special Forces to split apart into smaller teams to cover more of the mountainous battlefields.

37 Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, pp 10 – 11.

38 Briscoe et al, Weapon of Choice, pp 106 – 107.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid, p 102.

41 HS Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, pp 4 – 7.

42 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p 269.

43 Interviews by author, Bagram, March 2002.

44 Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, p 110.

45 Interview by author, Deh Rawod, Afghanistan, 26 May 2003.

46 One senior military officer commented that Rumsfeld constantly demanded that socom identify targets to strike.