Between Development and Security: the European Union, governance and fragile states

Abstract

This article focuses on the recent attention in the European Union on fragile states, as expressed, among others, in the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the European Consensus on Development of 2006. Most understandings of the notion of state fragility concern limited state capacity, the inability of institutions to deal with social and political tensions or problems of state legitimacy. The EU is no exception to this general trend of seeing state fragility in terms of governance deficits. Its approach to preventing and responding to state fragility, which was adopted by the European Council in 2007, is being tested in six pilot countries. The article analyses the governance-oriented measures that have been adopted in the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) agreed between the European Commission and five of the six pilot countries, concluding that there is a profound gap between the political-economic analyses of the CSPs and the support policies implemented by the EU. The approach of the European Commission revolves around attempts to reconstruct state capacities in fragile states through technocratic measures. Fundamental problems of state capture, ethnic relations, human rights violations and extreme inequalities are beyond the purview of policy makers in the European Union.

Notes

This article was first presented as a paper at the Conference on ‘New Modes of Governance and Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific’, Murdoch University, Perth, 12–13 February 2009.

1 M François & I Sud, ‘Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states’, Development Policy Review, 24(2), 2006, p 145.

2 M Duffield, ‘Governing the borderlands: decoding the power of aid’, Disasters, 25(4), 2001, p 310.

3 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009; and Council of the European Union, An EU Response to Situations of Fragility: Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Note 15118/07, Brussels, 19 November 2007.

4 European Commission, EU Response to Situations of Fragility in Developing Countries: Engaging in Difficult Environments for Long-term Development, Report of the External Debate, 2007, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Consultation2_Fragile_states_report_EN.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

5 Cf R Youngs, ‘Fusing security and development: just another Euro-platitude?’, Journal of European Integration, 30(3), 2008, p 435.

6 See W Hout, ‘Development and governance: an uneasy relationship’, in W Hout & R Robison (eds), Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development, London: Routledge, 2009; and G Hydén, ‘Beyond governance: bringing power into policy analysis’, Forum for Development Studies, 33(2), 2006, pp 215–236.

7 World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005, p 8; and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of Work Bank Support to Low-Income Countries under Stress, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006, p 21.

8 World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States, p 1.

9 Milliken and Krause have pointed out that many of the states that gained independence after the Second World War were conceptualised as ‘pseudo-states’ rather than real states and that ‘the puzzle is not how and why they may fail, but how and why they exist or persist at all’. Their perceptive analysis leads to the conclusion that such states may never have been very effective in the performance of central state functions. Although very relevant for a thorough political understanding of the dynamics of fragile states, this line of analysis is not taken up in the current paper as its focus is on donor policies rather than political processes in recipient states. See J Milliken & K Krause, ‘State failure, state collapse, and state reconstruction: concepts, lessons and strategies’, Development and Change, 33(5), 2002, p 763.

10 The World Bank has estimated that countries bordering fragile states face a reduction of their gross domestic product of 1.6% per year on average as a result of the spillover of such problems. See World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States, p 27.

11 D Cammack, D McLeod, A Rocha Menocal & K Christiansen, Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice, Report Submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006, pp 16–18.

12 Ibid, pp 25–26.

13 For instance, C van der Borgh, ‘A fragile concept: donors and the fragile states agenda’, The Broker Online, 9 July 2008, at http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/layout/set/print/articles/A-fragile-concept, accessed 4 September 2009.

14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, DCD/DAC(2007)29, 2007, at http://www.aideffectiveness.org/web/images/pdf/38293448.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

15 World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States, p 1.

16 OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, Paris: OECD, 2008, p 12.

17 World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States, p 13; and OECD, Fragile States, p 6.

18 World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, Fragile States, p 5.

19 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Engaging with Fragile States, p 21.

20 Ibid, p 97.

21 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World.

22 Ibid, p 13.

23 European Parliament, Council and Commission, ‘The European Consensus on Development’, Official Journal of the European Union, 24 February 2006, C46, p 14.

24 European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication ‘Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized Approach within the European Union’, SEC(2006)1020, 30 August 2006, p 8.

25 European Commission, Governance and Development, Communication from the European Commission to the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM(2003)615 final, 20 October 2003, pp 20–24.

26 Council of the European Union, An EU Response to Situations of Fragility, p 2.

27 European Commission, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility: Engaging in Difficult Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007)643 final, 25 October 2007, p 8.

28 Council of the European Union, An EU Response to Situations of Fragility, pp 4–6.

29 See European Commission, Fragile States, 2007, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/governance/fragile_states_en.cfm, accessed 4 September 2009. Apparently these pilot countries were chosen under the Portuguese presidency of the European Council, which may explain why countries like Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste were included. Yet no formal statements on the selection process have been uncovered.

30 No CSP was available for Haiti.

31 République de Burundi–Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008–2013, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, p 23, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_bi_csp10_fr.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

32 The CSP does not refer to other than ethnic and religious causes for the tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis. This is in contrast to analyses of deeper structural political-economic causes of the conflict, related to the unequal distribution of and access to resources, which have been discussed in the literature on Burundi. For instance, MB Jooma, ‘We Can't Eat the Constitution’: Transformation and the Socio-economic Reconstruction of Burundi, ISS Paper 106, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005.

33 République de Burundi–Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays, pp 3–4.

34 Ibid, pp 10–11.

35 Ibid, p 14.

36 Ibid, pp 20–21.

37 Ibid, p 22.

38 République de Guinée-Bissau–Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008–2013, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, p 36, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_gw_csp10_fr.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

39 Ibid, p 29. Magalhães Ferreira adds several ‘structural conditions’ to these causes brought about by the country's unequal distribution of wealth and the grip on resources by the political group in power, which rules by maintaining profound clientelist networks. The structural conditions mentioned by Magalhães Ferreira include poor and inefficient governance, profound divisions within the political elite and the military, incapacity of public institutions to provide basic social services, corruption, poverty and dependence on foreign aid. P Magalhães Ferreira, ‘Guinea-Bissau: between conflict and democracy’, African Security Review, 13(4), 2004, p 54.

40 République de Guinée-Bissau–Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays, pp 5–6

41 Ibid, pp 6–7.

42 Ibid, p 19.

43 Ibid, pp 31, 37–38.

44 Sierra Leone–European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, Part 2, p 1, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_sl_csp10_en.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

45 Ibid, p 6. Keen discusses the deep-rooted causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which are related to the underdevelopment of the country's economy and the pervasiveness of social exclusion. In his view the lack of education, unemployment and failure of local justice produced grievances among all participants in the Sierra Leone conflict, and the violence that swept the country in the 1990s can be explained largely in terms of group efforts to draw attention to these grievances. See D Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 2004, pp 289–296.

46 Sierra Leone–European Community, Country Strategy Paper, pp 6–7.

47 Ibid, Part 2, pp 3–4.

48 Timor-Leste–European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, p 2, at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_tl_csp10_en.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

49 Ibid, pp 9–12.

50 Ibid, p 23.

51 Ibid, pp 70–77.

52 European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2007–2010), pp 3–4, at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/yemen/csp/mip_07_13_en.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

53 Yemen–European Community, Strategy Paper for the Period 2007–2010, pp 12–14, at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/yemen/csp/07_13_en.pdf, accessed 4 September 2009.

54 Ibid, p 12. Hill has pointed out that the government of Yemen, which faces the risk of civil war in the north of the country, a separatist movement in the south, as well as the activity of terrorist groups, has gradually been losing control over the country as the oil revenues that support it have started to fall. As a result of this, Hill argues, the government is less able to maintain its tribal power base, which had been supported by the ‘web of personal loyalty through the distribution of oil rents’. See G Hill, Yemen: Fear of Failure, Chatham House Briefing Paper MEP BP 08/03, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008, p 6.

55 European Commission, Multiannual Indicative Programme, pp 6–8.

56 I Briscoe, ‘The EU response to fragile states’, European Security Review, 42, 2008, p 9.

57 P Chabal & J-P Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 1999, p 4.

58 V Fritz & A Rocha Menocal, Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007, p 44.