How Neopatrimonialism Affects Tax Administration: a comparative study of three world regions

Abstract

Neopatrimonialism is a concept that has predominately been applied to describe governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, however, it has also been used to describe governance in states from other world regions. However, scholars have rarely attempted systematically to compare neopatrimonial rule in different regional settings. This paper aims to narrow this gap by examining the effect of neopatrimonialism on the tax administration as a core state function in six countries from three different world regions: Argentina, Venezuela, Indonesia, the Philippines, Kenya and Zambia. We conclude that neopatrimonialism is a valuable concept for comparative area studies with the potential to foster dialogue on the ‘state in operation’ across the regional divide. Nevertheless, several indicators are more valid for some world regions than for others. We find that there is no systematic relationship between neopatrimonial trajectories and the strength of tax administration. Individual actor decisions influence the outcomes of neopatrimonialism substantially.

Acknowledgements

This article presents results of the research project ‘Persistence and Change of Neopatrimonialism in Various Non-oecd Regions’, which is based at the giga German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, and is funded by the German Research Foundation (dfg). The authors gratefully acknowledge valuable comments by participants of the workshop ‘Neopatrimonialism in various world regions’, held on 23 August 2010 in Hamburg.

Notes

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5 This study deals only with the collection of central state taxes, as the administration of local taxes often operates under conditions distinct from the central level. The analysis also does not include the collection of non-tax revenue, such as fees or service charges by other authorities or ministries.

6 Field research conducted between February and June 2009 included data collection, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions in all six countries. Number of interviews: Argentina: 50, Venezuela: 52, Indonesia: 66, Philippines: 54, Kenya: 47, Zambia: 49. In order to improve comparability, common indicators, questionnaires and topic guides were used.

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