Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural Investment in Africa

Abstract

What role does China play in the recent rush for land acquisition in Africa? Conventional wisdom suggests a large role for the Chinese government and its firms. Ou r research suggests the opposite. Land acquisitions by Chinese companies have so far been quite limited, and focused on production for African consumption. We trace the evolution of strategy and incentives for Chinese agricultural engagement in Africa, and examine more closely several of the more well known cases, sorting out the myths and the realities.

Notes

1 Deborah Bräutigam thanks Johns Hopkins University, American University, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation, while Haisen Zhang thanks the nsfc–cgiar International Cooperation Project ‘Comparative Research on China–Africa Agricultural Public Investment and Rural Poverty’ (2013–17, Grant Item Number: 71261140371) for financial support of this research. We also thank Tang Xiaoyang and Yuan Li for research assistance. Throughout this paper we focus on farming investment and, where possible, do not include fisheries and forestry investment, conventionally included in Chinese agricultural investment statistics.

2 For examples, see M Edelman, ‘Messy hectares: questions about the epistemology of land grabbing data’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), 2012, pp 485–501; C Oya, ‘Methodological reflections on “land grab” databases and the “land grab” literature “rush”‘, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), 2013, pp 503–520; and I Scoones, R Hall, SM Borras Jr, B White & W Wolford, ‘The politics of evidence: methodologies for understanding the global land rush’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), 2013, pp 469–483. An article by L Cotula also addressed some of the problems with the database approach and the lack of attention to local agency. See Cotula, ‘The international political economy of the global land rush: a critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography and drivers’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3–4), 2012, pp 649–680. Other recent studies that emphasis agency include a special issue on ‘The Role of the State in Land Grabbing’, Development and Change, March 2013; and T Lavers, ‘“Land grab” as development strategy? The political economy of agricultural investment in Ethiopia’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 2012, pp 105–132; and DA Alemu & I Scoones, ‘Negotiating new relationships: how the Ethiopian state is involving China and Brazil in agriculture and rural development’, ids Bulletin, 44(4), 2013, pp 91–100.

3 L Horta, ‘China–Mozambique: old friends, new business’, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=53470&lng=en, accessed 10 May 2013. As of 2009 this story continued to be repeated by the writer. ‘China and Mozambique invest in the Zambezi Valley to make Chinese “grain store”, says researcher’, Macau Hub, 21 July 2009.

4 Ibid.

5 French tfi News, ‘La Chine exploite le riz’, at http://tinyurl.com/6ful9s, accessed 10 May 2013.

6 D Gray, ‘China farms the world to feed a ravenous economy’, Associated Press, 4 May 2008.

7 Ibid.

8 ‘Buying farmland abroad: outsourcing’s third wave’, The Economist, May 2009, at http://www.economist.com/node/13692889, accessed 10 May 2009. ‘China secured the right to grow palm oil for biofuel on 2.8m hectares of Congo, which would be the world’s largest palm-oil plantation.’ The zte story was repeated almost verbatim by environmentalist Lester Brown, who wrote that China ‘has secured rights to 2.8 million hectares in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. L Brown, Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization, New York: WW Norton, 2009, p 9. Columbia University Professor Saskia Sassen wrote that ‘China secured the right to grow palm oil for biofuels on 2.8 million hectares of Congo, which would be the world’s largest palm oil plantation’. S Sassen, ‘Land grabs today: feeding the disassembling of national territory’, Globalizations, 10(1), 2013, pp 25–46.

9 grain, ‘Seized: the 2008 landgrab for food and financial security’, 24 October 2008, at http://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security, accessed 10 May 2013.

10 Ibid, p 2. For comparison, there were no mentions of ‘United States’ or ‘American’, and only one mention of a British company.

11 Ibid, p 3. The Chinese government pledged to establish the China–Africa Development Fund, which at maturity will be a $5 billion equity fund. The fund will support Chinese investments and joint ventures in any economic sector, not simply agriculture.

12 grain, ‘grain releases data set with over 400 global land grabs’, 23 February 2012, at http://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/4479-grain-releases-data-set-with-over-400-global-land-grabs.

13 As the original Land Matrix database has changed since its launch in 2012, these figures were obtained from the Guardian newspaper’s website, which downloaded the original database. ‘International land deals: who is investing and where—get the data’, Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/datablog/2012/apr/27/international-land-deals-who-investing-what, accessed 10 May 2013.

14 I Hofman & P Ho, ‘China’s “developmental outsourcing”: a critical examination of Chinese global “land grabs” discourse’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 2012, pp 1–48. Although this article was critical of the existing data, the annex it included, with the title ‘Chinese investments’, was a largely uncritical compilation of all Chinese agricultural activities (including small agricultural aid projects) that had been mentioned in the media, by NGOs, or in academic sources.

15 C Smaller, W Qiu & Y Liu, ‘Farmland and water: China invests abroad’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Manitoba, August 2012, p 8.

16 For examples of blogs critical of these studies, see ‘land grab’ postings at ‘China in Africa: The Real Story’, and ‘Rural Modernity’.

17 M Ncube, ‘The expansion of Chinese influence in Africa—opportunities and risks’, 14 August 2012, at http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612/, accessed 10 May 2013. Authors’ emphasis.

18 MC Rulli, A Saviori & P D’Odorico, ‘Global land and water grabbing’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(3), 2013, pp 892–897.

19 L Cotula, S Vermeulen, R Leonard & J Keeley, Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa, London/Rome: iied/fao/ifad, 2009, p 55.

20 Ibid, p 55.

21 Ibid, p 37.

22 D Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; D Bräutigam & X Tang, ‘China’s engagement in African agriculture: “down to the countryside”‘, China Quarterly, 199, 2009, pp 686–706.

23 L German, G Schoneveld & E Mwangi, Contemporary Processes of Large-scale Land Acquisition by Investors: Case Studies from Sub-Saharan Africa, Occasional Paper 68, Bogor, Indonesia: cifor, 2011. This paper also makes the case for African agency.

24 G Schoeneveld, The Anatomy of Large-scale Farmland Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper 85, Bogor: cifor, 2011, p 2.

25 Ibid, p 7.

26 See, for example, a World Bank paper that was based on the media reports collected by grain. K Deininger & D Byerlee, Rising Global Interest in Farmland, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011.

27 grain, ‘Collating and dispersing: GRAIN’s strategies and methods’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), 2013, p 533.

28 W Anseeuw, J Lay, P Messerli, M Giger & M Taylor, ‘Creating a public tool to assess and promote transparency in global land deals: the experience of the Land Matrix’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), 2013, pp 521–530.

29 For example, the Beta version of the Land Matrix database underpinned the analytical paper written by some of the coalition members. W Anseeuw, M Boche, T Breu, M Giger, J Lay, P Messerli & K Nolte, Transnational Land Deals for Agriculture in the Global South: Analytical Report based on the Land Matrix Database, Bern/Montpellier/Hamburg: International Land Coalition (ilc)/Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (cirad)/Centre for Development and Environment (cde)/German Institute for Global and Area Studies (giga)/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (giz), 2012.

30 Scoones et al, ‘The politics of evidence’, p 473.

31 Although most of the recent literature on ‘land grabs’, including a special issue of Globalizations (March 2013) have touched on the many problematic assumptions about Chinese agricultural investments in Africa, few studies go into any details on China. Exceptions are: T Allan, M Keulertz, S Sojamo & J Warner, Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa, London: Routledge, 2013, which contains a chapter by one of the authors of this article, D Bräutigam, ‘Chinese engagement in African agriculture: fiction and fact’, pp 91–113; and a collection of papers on China and Brazil in Africa in a special issue of the ids Bulletin, 44(4), 2013.

32 D Bräutigam, Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green Revolution, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998.

33 P Ai, ‘From proletarian internationalism to mutual development: China’s cooperation with Tanzania, 1965–95’, in G Hyden & R Mukandala (eds), Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp 156–201; and D Bräutigam & X Tang, An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania, Discussion Paper 01214, Washington DC: Development Strategy and Governance Division, ifpri, October 2012.

34 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Foreign Aid’, Beijing, April 2011.

35 World Bank, cited in C Eicher, ‘Flashback: 50 years of donor aid to African agriculture’, paper presented at the InWEnt, ifpri, nepad, cta conference, ‘Successes in African agriculture’, Pretoria, 1–3 December 2003.

36 For a discussion of these changes, see Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift, pp 232–272.

37 Bräutigam, Chinese Aid and African Development.

38 ‘Africa: top option for China’s agricultural investment’, Xinhua, 28 September 2002, emphasis added.

39 D Bräutigam, ‘Doing well by doing good’, The China Business Review, September–October 1983, pp 57–58; and Bräutigam, Chinese Aid and African Development.

40 C Wei, ‘Zhongguo Nongye “Zou Chu Qu” De Xianzhuang, Wenti Ji Dui Ce’ (Chinese agriculture “going global”: situation, problems and countermeasures), Guoji Jingji Hezuo (International Economic Cooperation), 1, 2012, p 32.

41 gmg Global, ‘Corporate profile’, gmg Global Annual Report 2011. In October 2010 gmg Global established a second company in Cameroon to develop a 45 000 ha concession for rubber, but according to the gmg website, this concession is not yet in operation. gmg Global, ‘Our business’, at http://www.gmg.sg/business_divisions.html, accessed 11 May 2013. The Annual Report 2012 listed a figure of 20 763 ha under cultivation in both Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon (p 92).

42 Ministry of Finance, ‘Duiwai Jingji Jishu Hezuo Zhuanxiang Zijin Guanli Banfa’ (Regulations for management of the special fund for foreign economic and technical cooperation), Beijing, 9 December 2005, at http://qys.mof.gov.cn/czzxzyzf/201112/t20111206_613354.html, accessed 14 August 2013.

43 ‘China agri ministry, Development Bank support agri projects’, SinoCastChina Business Daily News, 22 November 2006.

44 China–Africa Agriculture Investment Company, ‘Guanyu women’ (About us), at http://www.caaic.com.cn/Article_List.aspx?columnID=1, accessed 16 August 2013.

45 ‘China’s twelfth Five Year Plan’ (English Translation), at http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version, accessed 25 May 2013; and National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Shi Er Wuliong Waizi He Jingwai Touzi Guihua’ (12th Five Year Plan of foreign capital utilization and overseas investment (2011–2015)), July 2012, at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/W020120724346802518900.pdf, accessed 12 August 2013.

46 State Council, ‘Guanyu guli he yindao minying qiye jiji kaizhan jingwai touzi de shishi yijian’ (Opinion on encouraging and guiding the implementation of the overseas investment of private enterprises), Beijing, 29 June 2012, at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2012tz/t20120703_489354.htm, accessed 16 August 2013.

47 State Council, ‘Guanyu yinfa guli he yindao minying qiye jiji kaizhan jingwai touzi de shishi yijian’ (Opinion on encouraging and guiding the implementation of the overseas investment of private enterprises), Beijing, 19 June 2012, at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2012tz/t20120703_489354.htm, accessed 14 August 2013.

48 Ministry of Commerce, Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, ‘Guanyu zuo hao 2012 nian duiwai jingji jishu hezuo zhuanxiang zijin shenbao gongzuo de tongzhi’ (Strengthening economic and technical cooperation in 2012: notice on special funds requirements), Beijing, 12 July 2012, Cai Qi, 141, 2012, accessed 13 August 2013. The programme on special funds for economic and technical cooperation allowed firms to apply for subsidies for fees, life and accident insurance. Several provincial governments, for example Anhui Province, also provided special funds for outward investment, including in agriculture.

49 People’s Republic of China, Customs Statistics, 2013. Chinese exports of cereals to Africa include food aid. Additional details on China’s food aid are available at World Food Program, International Food Aid Information System, at http://www.wfp.org/fais/reports/irma-by-recipient.

50 Customs Statistics.

51 Information Office of the State Council, ‘China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013), People’s Republic of China, August, 2013.

52 Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre, ‘Jingwai Nongye Ziyuan Kaifa Diaoyan Baogao’ (Investigation report on Chinese overseas investment in agriculture resources), unpublished document, Ministry of Agriculture, People’s Republic of China, Beijing, 2008. The survey covered investment in crops, animal husbandry and fisheries, but not forestry. All the companies were provincial and local state-owned companies; no central state-owned companies or private companies were included.

53 Ministry of Commerce, ‘List of foreign-invested enterprises (institutions)’, personal communication, May 2013.

54 S Marks, cited in B Sautman & H Yan, ‘Chinese farms in Zambia: from socialist to “agro-imperialist” engagement?’, African and Asian Studies, 9, 2010, p 314. Marks was reporting on a presentation by J Keeley (confirmed by personal email communication from Keeley, 7 June 2013).

55 B Sautman & H Yan ‘Chinese farms in Zambia’, pp 307–333.

56 P Fandio, ‘Razzia chinoise sur terres camerounaises’, Arte, 12 September 2009, at http://www.arte.tv/fr/razzia-chinoise-sur-terres-camerounaises/2837674,CmC=2837676.html, accessed 23 May 2013.

57 X Ren, ‘Gengyun zai kamailong tudi shang—shanxi nongken shishi ‘zouchu qu’ zhanlue jishi’ (Plough the land in Cameroon—Shaanxi Nongken’s ‘going out’ strategy), 24 January 2007, at http://www.chinavalue.net/General/Blog/2007-1-24/4044.aspx, accessed 10 May 2013.

58 ‘China–Cameroon cooperation posts steady growth’, Xinhua, 20 January 2007.

59 J-B Tagne & S Gouin, ‘Quand le Cameroun nourrit la Chine’, October 2010, at http://http//www.Politis.fr%2021,%20accessed%2022%20May%202013.%20Unless%20otherwise%20indicated,%20all%20quotes%20in%20this%20paragraph%20are%20from%20this%20source.

60 C Ngorgang, ‘Chinese in Cameroon: an agricultural misunderstanding’, Vita Magazine, 30 December 2009.

61 Cameroon rice prices from 2008, at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/77971/CAMEROON-Lifting-of-import-taxes-fails-to-reduce-food-prices. Chinese rice prices from 2010.

62 grain, ‘Unpacking a Chinese company’s land grab in Cameroon’, October 2010, at http://farmlandgrab.org/16485%2022%20October%202010, accessed 10 May 2013.

63 J-B Tagne, ‘Enquête sur la riziculture chinoise à Nanga-Eboko’, Le Jour (Cameroon), 13 August 2010.

64 Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu), Cameroon: Country Report, London: eiu, March 2012, p 13.

65 Large Chinese firms not uncommonly diversify into what appear to be unrelated sectors. zte had established a subsidiary, zte Energy, which in turn set up a company, zte Agribusiness Corporation, to invest in biofuels.

66 F Kilubi, ‘Un milliard Usd de Pékin pour des palmeraies à huile en République démocratique du Congo’, Le Phare, 30 May 2007, at http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/44029, accessed 15 March 2010.

67 ‘Le Ministère de l’Agriculture et la Coopération [sic] zte ont signé une convention de partenariat’, Documentation et Information pour l’Afrique, 2 November 2007.

68 Gray, ‘China farms the world to feed a ravenous economy’.

69 ‘teda and zte Agribusiness Company Ltd sign an investment framework agreement’, Invest teda Newsletter, 11 July 2009, at http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/2009/07/11/invest-teda-newsletter/, accessed 15 March 2010.

70 B Tai, ‘Chinese agribusiness company in DR Congo to offer thousands of jobs for locals’, Xinhua, 10 July 2009, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/10/content_11686244.htm, accessed 15 March 2010.

71 ‘L’ambassadeur Wu Zexian: la Chine n’a pas de vises impérialistes’, interview in Le Potential,14 January 2008, posted on the website of the Chinese embassy in the DRC, at http://cd.china-embassy.org/fra/xw/t399806.htm, accessed 8 December 2008.

72 L Putzel et al, Chinese Trade and Investment and the Forests of the Congo Basin, Working Paper 67, Bogor: cifor, 2011, p 33. See also ‘Convention de Partenariat entre la RD Congo et la zte International Investment Co Ltd en vue de l’Implantation et de l’Exploitation d’une Palmaraie Industrielle’, Ministry of Agriculture, DRC, 1 November 2007, p 2.

73 ‘Kinshasha’s missing millions’, Africa-Asia Confidential, 3(4), 2010.

74 Interview, Chinese official, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing, 2011.

75 Putzel et al, Chinese Trade and Investment and the Forests of the Congo Basin, p 33.

76 Horta, ‘China, Mozambique’; and Horta. ‘The Zambezi Valley: China’s first agricultural colony?’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (csis), Africa Policy Forum Blog, 20 May 2008, at http://csis.org/publication/zambezi-valley-chinas-first-agricultural-colony, accessed 10 January 2012. All quotations are from these two sources.

77 grain, ‘Seized’.

78 S-MS Ekman, ‘Leasing land overseas: a viable strategy for Chinese food security?’, unpublished master’s thesis, Department of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, 2010; and D Bräutigam & S-M Ekman, ‘Rumours and realities of Chinese agricultural engagement in Mozambique’, African Affairs, 111(444), 2012, pp 483–492.

79 L Cotula et al, Land Grab or Development Opportunity?, p 55.

80 M Fairbairn, ‘Indirect dispossession: domestic power imbalances and foreign access to land in Mozambique’, Development and Change, 2013, 44, pp 335–356.

81 Ekman cited in J Hanlon, ‘Land moves up the political agenda’, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 22 February 2011.

82 J Hanlon, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Report Mozambique, Oakland Institute, 2011, at http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_country_report_mozambique_0.pdf, accessed 9 March 2012.

83 Horta, ‘The Zambezi Valley’.

84 Coalition for African Rice Development (card), ‘Mozambique’s rice statistics’, at http://www.riceforafrica.org/card-countries/g1/mozambique/353-mozambiques-rice-statistics, accessed 10 January 2012.

85 International Rice Research Institute (irri), ‘Rice in Mozambique’, at http://irri.org/partnerships/country-profiles/africa/mozambique/rice-in-mozambique, accessed 9 March 2012.

86 card, ‘Mozambique’s rice statistics’; irri, ‘Rice in Mozambique’; and ‘China to help Mozambique increase its rice production’, Macao Hub, 31 March 2006.

87 X Teng, ‘Policy proposals to buy and rent land overseas to grow grain submitted to the State Council,’ 21st Century Business Herald, 8 May 2008, at http://www.21cbh.com/, accessed 21 May 2008; and Y Zhang, ‘Zhongguo Nongken Haiwai Tuohuang’ (China State Farm Agribusiness Corporation farming overseas), Oriental Outlook, 12 June 2008. Unless otherwise noted, all information in this paragraph comes from these two sources.

88 S Chichava, China in Mozambique’s Agriculture Sector: Implications and Challenges, Maputo: Institute of Social and Economic Studies (iese), 2010, at http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/noticias/2010/China%20in%20Mozambique_09.2010_SC.pdf, accessed 10 January 2012.

89 Centre for Chinese Studies, ‘Evaluating China’s focac commitments to Africa and mapping the way ahead’, University of Stellenbosch, January 2010, p 73.

90 S Chichava, J Duran, L Cabral, A Shankland, L Buckley, L Tang & Y Zhang, ‘Brazil and China in Mozambican agriculture: emerging insights from the field’, ids Bulletin, 44(4), 2013, p 107.

91 Hubei Farm, ‘Hubei–Gaza Friendship Farm agricultural development enters the phase of large-scale marketing operation’, 29 July 2011.

92 S Chichava, J Duran, L Cabral, A Shankland, L Buckley, L Tang & Y Zhang, Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture: The Case of Mozambique, Working Paper 49, London, Future Agricultures, March 2013.

93 ‘Zhuhu Feizhou Haiwai Nongchang Jianshi Tisu Zhuhu’ (Africa overseas farms expand rapidly), 16 April 2013, at http://hubeifarm.com/news_show.asp?Class_Fid=140&Class_ID=6&ID=328, accessed 24 May 2013.

94 Chichava et al, Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture.

95 http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/zimbabwe?investment_natures=A, accessed 24 May 2013.

96 For a sample, see C Friss & A Reenberg, ‘Land grab in Africa: emerging land system drivers in a teleconnected world’, Global Land Project, 2010, p 34, at http://www.globallandproject.org/arquivos/GLP_report_01.pdf; B Hurst, ‘The twenty-first century land rush’, American Enterprise Institute, 22 September 2010, at http://www.american.com/archive/2010/september/the-21st-century-land-rush, accessed 24 May 2013; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, African Agriculture: From Meeting Needs to Creating Wealth, November 2011, at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111113_Facts-and-Figures.pdf, p 19; and Smaller et al, ‘Farmland and water’, p 18.

97 P Pham, cited in W Ide, ‘China supports global pariahs, gets resources and criticism in return’, Voice of America News, 27 June, 2011, at http://www.voanews.com/content/china-supports-global-pariahs-gets-resources-and-criticism-in-return-124648814/141455.html, accessed 24 May 2013.

98 ‘Zhong shuidian gongsi zhongbiao jinba buwei zui da nongye kaifa xiangmu’ (China International Water and Electricity Company wins largest agricultural development project in Zimbabwe), Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 23 February 2003, at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/200302/20030200070817.shtml, accessed 24 May 2013; and ‘Zimbabwe: Minister Moyo denies Chinese group contracted to farm Nuanetsi Ranch’, The Herald (Zimbabwe), 14 February 2003.

99 A Meldrum, ‘Mugabe hires China to farm seized land’, Guardian, 13 February 2003.

100 ‘Zimbabwe: Minister Moyo denies Chinese contracted to farm Nuanetsi Ranch’.

101 A Mukaro, ‘Chinese firm abandons Nuanetsi project’, Zimbabwe Independent, 8 April 2005, at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/12261.html, accessed 14 August 2008; and S Moyo, ‘Land concentration and accumulation after redistributive reform in post-settler Zimbabwe’, Review of African Political Economy, 38(128), 2009, p 269.

102 G du Venage, ‘Harare’s ties with Beijing begin to falter; China unhappy as unpaid bills mount up for aircraft, engineering work and construction projects across Zimbabwe’, South China Morning Post, 19 May 2006.

103 G Bao , ‘Anhui Nongken: “Zouchuqu” kaipi xintian di’ (Anhui agribusiness: ‘going out’ to break new ground), Zhongguo Nongchang (China State Farms), 16 March 2012, at http://www.ahnk.com.cn/display.asp?id=6818, accessed 24 May 2013.

104 Interview, Chinese researcher, Beijing, 12 April 2013.

105 Interview, Anhui State Farm Agribusiness Corporation, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe, June 2013.

106 Africa Rice, at http://www.africarice.org/arc2013/rationale.asp, accessed 25 May 2013.

107 At least 13 000 ha of land was allocated for this project. The factory was completed at the end of 2012, but the land development had not been completed as of this writing. F Maïga, ‘Sucrerie: N-Sukala ouvre ses portes’, L’Essor, 12 November 2012, at http://www.essor.ml/newspaper/sucrerie-n-sukala-ouvre-ses-portes.html; and interview, Chinese researcher, Beijing, 12 April 2013.

108 Data from mofcom, Beijing, April 2013.

109 Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre, ‘Investigation report on Chinese overseas investment in agriculture resources’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Haisen zhang

Deborah Bräutigam is in the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, USA Email: [email protected]. Haisen Zhang is at the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China. Email: [email protected].