![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
Abstract
The current global political economy is characterised by the intensifying economic interaction of BRICS and ‘near BRICS’ economies, with emerging powers increasing their influence in neighbouring regions. The growing partnership between Turkey and Russia constitutes a useful case study for examining this transformation, in which Western supremacy and US hegemony are under increasing challenge. Turkish–Russian relations shed light on broader themes in global political economy. First, significant economic interdependence may be generated among states with different political outlooks, in the form of loose regional integration schemes driven by bilateral relations between key states and supporting private actors or interests. Second, growing economic interdependence may coexist with continued political conflict and geopolitical rivalry, as indicated by the Syrian and Ukrainian crises. An important strategy that emerges is the tendency to compartmentalise economic issues and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid negative spill-over effects. This facilitates the coexistence of extensive competition with deepening cooperation, as reflected in relations in the field of energy.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the ISA Flasco Conference at the University of Buenos Aires (July 2014) and at invited lectures at Princeton (October 2013), Cambridge (November 2014) and Stanford Universities (March 2015). We would also like to thank the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies at Stanford University for facilitating this research. We appreciate the able assistance of Duygu Sever, Erdem Demirtaş and Benal Nazlı Üstünes.
Notes
1. On a changing global order where BRICS are becoming increasingly important actors, see Kupchan, No One’s World. For examples of the growing literature on BRICS, see Armijo, “The BRICS Countries”; Brütsch and Papa, “Deconstructing the BRICS”; Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance”; and Macfarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICS.” Specifically on Russia and China and the emerging Russia–China axis as a coalition of authoritarian BRICS, see Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.”
2. On rising middle power activism led by MIST countries in the context of MIKTA, see Jongryn, MIKTA. MIKTA is a recently formed organization that includes five G20 countries, including Australia, that are not members of the first-generation BRICS. On the broader notion of emerging powers, see Schweller, “Emerging Powers.” For an insightful analysis highlighting cooperation between Brazil and Turkey, examples of BRICS and near BRICS, respectively, in the context of ‘second-generation middle powers’, see Sandal, “Middle Powerhood as a Legitimation Strategy.” Sandal’s study underlines a type of cooperative relationship which is conducive to the strengthening of the liberal international order. The present study, in contrast, by pointing towards the authoritarian bias inherent in Russia and Turkey’s relationship, highlights the challenges to the future of the liberal international order. On near BRICS with reference to Turkey, see Öniş and Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order.” On foreign policy activism in the near BRICS, with a focus on recent Turkish policy, see Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism.”
3. Turkish–Russian relations, both historically and in the current era, have generated a substantial literature. For an analysis of the different aspects of bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey in recent decades, see Aktürk, “Turkish–Russian Relations”; Warhola and Mitchell, “The Warming of Russian–Turkish Relations”; Kınıklıoğlu and Morkva, “An Anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations”; Yanık, “Allies or Partners?”; Torbakov, The Georgia Crisis; Tekin and Williams, Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus; Aras, Dealing with Russia; Kudryashova, Активизация российско–турецких отношений; Türker, “An Analysis of Turkish–Russian Rapprochement”; Trenin, “From Damascus to Kabul”; and Warhola and Bezci, “The Return of President Putin.”
4. Aras, Turkey and the Russian Federation; Aktürk, “Towards a Turkish–Russian Axis?”; Balcer, “The Future of Turkish–Russian Relations”; and Hill and Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia.” Scholars who advance the strategic partnership thesis, as well as addressing some challenges associated with it, tend to concentrate on the bilateral links bewteen the two countries from a predominantly security perspective. The present article adopts a broader political economy approach and examines the complex interdepence of Turkey and Russia in the context of the growing literature on the dynamics of rising powers in a changing global order.
5. For an insightful analysis of the triangular dynamics of US–Russia–China relations and interaction with regional powers in the newly emerging multipolar system, see Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules.
6. On the nature of the political system and authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia, see Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia; Sakwa, “Putin’s Leadership”; and Horvath, “Putin’s ‘Preventive Counter-revolution’.” For an insightful analysis of political and economic changes in Russia and its role in global affairs, see Treisman, The Return. On the nature of democratisation in Turkey during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era and its limits, see Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey; Öniş, “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism”; and Öniş, “Sharing Power.”
7. On the evolution and performance of BSEC, see Aydın, “Europe’s New Region”; and Aydın, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea.”
8. The first country to officially recognise Turkey was the short-lived Republic of Armenia, with the Gümrü (Alexandropol) Agreement on December 2, 1920. Soysal, “Türkiye-Ermenistan Barış Andlaşması”; and Soysal, “Türkiye ve Sovyet Rusya Dostluk ve Barış Andlaşması.”
9. On the economic and social impacts of the Stalinist era, see Hosking, The First Socialist Society; Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; and Levine, “Society and the Stalinist State.”
10. For a more detailed assessment of this period, see Yılmaz, “Turkey’s Quest for NATO Membership”; and Bilgin and Coş, “‘Stalin’s Demands’.”
11. On September 18, 1984 the USSR and Turkey signed their first Natural Gas agreement. The widespread usage of natural gas in Turkey started in 1988, with the completion of the 842-km natural gas pipeline connecting Turkey and the USSR.
12. We have significantly benefited in this context from interviews with Nihat Gökyiğit, a leading businessman, who played an important role in laying the foundations of strong trade and investment relations with Russia and the former Soviet Republics from the second half of the 1980s onwards in his capacity as Chair of the Turkish–Russian Business Council; and from an interview with Çiğdem Tüzün, who was also a key figure in negotiations between the Turkish private sector and Russian state officials in her capacity as Director of DEIK from the late 1980s to 2006.
13. For a solid account of the deepening of economic relations between Turkey and Russia during the late 1980s and the role of private actors, notably DEIK, in the process, see Altun, Dış Dünyanın Anahtarı DEİK.
14. Eder et al., The Suitcase Trade; and Eder and Öz, “From Cross-border Exchange Networks.”
15. Primakov, Турция.
16. For some examples of such resentment in the Turkish media, see “Rusya’ya Sorumluluk Çağrısı”; “Rus Riyakarlığı”; “Rus Büyükelçi Dışişleri’ne çağırıldı”; “Türkiye’den Rusya’ya: İlişkiler Bitebilir”; and “Rusya bir kez daha uyarıldı.”
17. These included the February12–15, 2009 visit by Turkish President Gül to Russia; the August 6, 2009 visit by President of the Russian Federation Putin to Turkey; the signing of the Cooperation Agreement on the ‘Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy’, and ‘Agreement on the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities’; Erdoğan’s January 12–13, 2010 visit to Russia and a joint statement on cooperation on nuclear power plants; President Medvedev’s May 11–12, 2010 visit to Turkey and signing of a cooperation agreement for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant; the memorandum of understanding on the security of Samsun–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline; memorandums on agricultural trade issues; the second meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council in Russia, March 15–17, 2010; President Gül’s September 8, 2010 visit to Russia; Prime Minister Erdoğan’s July 18, 2012 visit to Moscow; and the High Level Cooperation Council meeting in İstanbul, December 3, 2012. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dış Politika Kronolojisi.
18. On the nature of expanding interactions, see Kudryashova, Активизация российско–турецких отношений.
19. Özdal et al., Türkiye–Rusya İlişkileri.
20. Ibid.
21. Kanbolat “Davutoğlu in Moscow.”
22. Speech by Vladimir Putin, at the High Level Russian–Turkish Cooperation Council, Saint Petersburg, November 22, 2013.
23. “Ülkemize Gelen Yabancıların Milliyetlerine Göre Dağılımı- 2012 Yılı Sınır Giriş Çıkış İstatistikleri”; and “Ülkemize Gelen Yabancıların Milliyetlerine Göre Dağılımı- 2013 Yılı Sınır Giriş Çıkış İstatistikleri.”
24. “10 yılda 200 bin Rus Gelin.”
25. “Antalya’da 18 bin Rus Gelin”; and “Yabancılarla evlilikler artıyor.”
26. “Moskova ve Antalya’da Rus-Türk Okulu Açılması Planlanıyor.”
27. Aydın, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea.”
28. Personal interview with a high-level Turkish diplomat, October 24, 2008.
29. For an extensive assessment, seeVasiliev, ЧЕРНОМОРСКИЙ РЕГИОН ВО ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ КОНЦЕПЦИЯХ ТУРЦИИ: РОССИЯ И ТУРЦИЯ НА ЧЕРНОМ МОРЕ.
30. Martin, “Turkey and the USA.”
31. Shchedrov, “Georgia Crisis.”
32. Dyomkin, “Russia Says.”
33. Personal Interview with a high-level Turkish Diplomat, October 24, 2008.
34. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the triangular Turkish–US–Russian relations within this context, see Özel and Yılmaz, Turkish American Relations.
35. Baev, Russia and Turkey.
36. Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Place in the Missile Shield.”
37. For Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s comments on this topic, see “Kırım’da Çözüme Her Türlü Katkıyı Yapmaya Hazırız.”
38. Michaelopoulos, “Greece accuses Turkey.”
39. “Turkey Refuses to Join Anti-Russia EU Sanctions.”
40. “Türkiye’den Rusya’ya Et İhracatında Rekor Artış.”
41. Tekin and Williams, Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus; Tekin and Williams, "EU-Russian Relations"; Müftüler-Baç and Başkan, “The Future of Energy Security”; Bilgin, “Energy Policy in Turkey”; and Bayer, “Termination of the Vendetta of the Black Sea?” For an insightful study assesing the implications of Russia’s energy policies for Turkey–EU relations, see Özpek, “Securing Energy or Energizing Security.”
42. Bourgeot, “Russia–Turkey”, Baev and Overland, "Joint Declaration". The Nabucco is a nascent pipeline project that aims to connect Turkey to Austria with the aim of diversifying the natural gas suppliers and delivery routes for Europe thus reducing European dependence on Russian energy.
43. “Russia Seeks Turkey’s Permission.”
44. Kılavuz and Yılmaz, Restoring Brotherly Bonds.
45. “What Russia’s Halt of ‘South Stream’ Means.”
46. “Putin Scraps South Stream Gas Pipeline.”
47. “Ankara says Turkish Stream not just Transit Project”; “Turkish Stream to Replace South Stream Gas Pipeline”; and “Russian Project Jeopardizes Turkey’s Energy Advantage.”
48. “Doğalgaz Fiyatlarına Yüzde 6 İndirim.”
49. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yıldız, Speech at the Caspian Forum, Istanbul, December 5, 2013; and Peker, “Russia, Turkey Complete Initial Talks.”
50. Primakov, Турция.
51. Turkish Energy Strategy in the 21st Century.
52. For an insightful analysis of the strategic effects of nuclear energy development, see Stulberg and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Renaissance.
53. Ülgen, Nükleer Enerjiye Geçişte Türkiye Modeli.
54. Öniş, “Sharing Power.”