Foreign Terrorist Fighters: managing a twenty-first century threat

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) have emerged as a significant security challenge. Since the 1980s and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the notion of a ‘foreign fighter’ has been closely linked, if not synonymous, with those ideologically or religiously motivated individuals who have travelled to join conflicts in Islamic lands. This article will explore the contemporary FTF movement, offering a comparison of Afghanistan in the 1980s and Syria in the contemporary period. It will explore the international community’s expansive responses to the challenge of FTFs, with special focus on the role of the United Nations.

Keywords:

• Terrorism
• United Nations
• Middle East
• conflict and security
• Arab uprisings

Notes

1. For a detailed exploration of the Muslim religious responsibility to protect Islamic communities under occupation, see Azzam, Join the Caravan; and Azzam, In Defence of Muslim Land.

2. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 7.

3. Percy, Mercenaries.

4. Bradley, International Brigades in Spain.

5. Malet, Foreign Fighters; and Arielli, “When are Foreign Volunteers Useful?”

6. Windrow, Our Friends beneath the Sands.

7. Smail, Crusading Warfare.

8. Baxter, “From Migrants to Citizens”; Bowen, “Does French Islam have Borders?”; and Peucker et al., “Muslim Active Citizenship in Australia.”

9. Maley, The Afghanistan Wars.

10. Coll, Ghost Wars.

11. Kalinovsky, “Decision Making and the Soviet War.”

12. Weinbaum, “War and Peace in Afghanistan.”

13. Lansford, A Bitter Harvest, 113–135.

14. Arguably one of the most prominent Islamic scholars of the Afghan Jihad was the Palestinian, Abdullah Azzam. Azzam wrote extensively on the Muslim responsibility to protect Islamic communities under duress. His works have been credited with triggering the transnational nature of the Afghan resistance against the USSR. See Azzam, Join the Caravan; and Azzam In Defence of Muslim Land.

15. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 6.

16. Azzam reformulated the Muslim call to defensive Jihad from a collective responsibility to an individual responsibility that bound all Muslims personally to assist their brethren in Afghanistan against the USSR. Before this reformulation Azzam had excused the majority of Muslims from fighting against the USSR, provided some Muslims did it. As the USSR managed to withstand the initial Afghani resistance, Azzam began to frame the Afghani Jihad as a personal duty incumbent upon all Muslims.

17. Azzam, Join the Caravan; and Azzam, In Defence of Muslim Land.

18. The 1982 Hama Massacre epitomises the brutality of the Assad dynasty’s repression of Sunni opposition groups inside Syria. In 1982 the Syrian Sunni Muslim Brotherhood confronted the Assad regime in the city of Hama. The brutality of the regime’s response left over 10,000 civilians dead, crushed the Brotherhood’s uprising and effectively silenced the Sunni opposition group’s campaign against the government. For more information regarding the Hama Massacre, see Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama.

19. Aras and Falk, “Authoritarian ‘Geopolitics’ of Survival,” 331–332.

20. Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 60–61.

21. Washington Institute, “Foreign Fighters Trickle.”

22. Zelin et al., Convoy of Martyrs, 12–13.

23. Rich and Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” 122.

24. Rich and Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” 9.

25. Al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State.”

26. Islamic State, “The Return of the Khalifa,” 6.

27. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 8.

28. Ibid.

29. Islamic State, “The Flood.”

30. Martinez, “Number of ISIS Fighters in Iraq.”

31. Islamic State, “The Failed Crusader,” 38–42.

32. Islamic State, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy,” 26–42.

33. Islamic State, “The Flood,” 3.

34. See, for example, UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2011/612, vetoed by China and Russian Federation, October 4, 2011; UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2012/77, vetoed by China and Russian Federation, February 5, 2012; and UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2014/348, vetoed by China and Russian Federation, May 22, 2014.

35. Rich and Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” 123.

36. For a detailed analysis of Gulf state funding, see Dickinson, Playing with Fire.

37. “Syria Peace Talks break Up.”

38. “Who’s Responsible for Geneva II Failure?”

39. “Syria.”

40. Ibid.

41. “UN Security Council is failing Syria.”

42. “Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails.”

43. “Syria Conflict.”

44. UNSC, S/RES/2178, September 24, 2014.

45. UNSC, S/RES/2161, June 17, 2014; UNSC, S/RES/2170, August 15, 2014; UNSC, S/RES/2178; UNSC, S/RES/2195, December 19, 2014; and UNSCl, S/RES/2199, February 12, 2015.

46. “Security Council adopts Two Resolutions.”

47. UNSC, S/PV.7272, September 24, 2014.

48. UNSC, S/RES/2178, 3.

49. Ibid.

50. UNSC, S/PV.7272, 4.

51. In 2014 the US Department of the Treasury named several individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13224. For more information regarding these individuals and their role in supporting al-Qaeda and its linked affiliates, see US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury designates Three Key Supporters”; and US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators.”

52. For US President Barak Obama’s response, see “Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution.” For Interpol’s endorsement, see “Interpol Global Role against Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” For UAE statement, see Permanent Mission of the UAE, “UAE Statement in the Security Council.” For Kuwait’s response, see “Kuwait urges Global Efforts.”

53. UNSC, S/PV.7272, 3 (emphasis added).

54. For information on the establishment and activities of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), see United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, “ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.”

55. UNSC, S/RES/2178, 7.

56. For more information regarding the establishment of the committee, see Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Guide to Counter Terrorism.

57. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 3.

58. There are in fact two resolutions from 1988 and 1990, but they don’t say very much – nothing about FTFs.

59. Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 60–61.

60. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 3 (emphasis added).

61. US Department of State, “Joint Statement Issued by Partners”; White House, “Annex”; US Mission to the United Nations, “UNSC Council Counter-terrorism Committee”; Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee, “Special Meeting of the Counter-terrorism Committee”; and White House, “Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL.” In addition to these meetings and initiatives, several conferences, primarily focused on the growing FTF phenomenon and countering violent extremism, have been held by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The GCTF was established in September 2011 and is comprised of over 30 member states. The forum works in close cooperation with the UN and several other global organisations such as Interpol. For a full list of GCTF conferences and initiatives, see Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Coordinating Committee.”

62. Security Council Committee, Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178, 2–4.

63. For more information on R2P, see United Nations, “The Responsibility to Protect.”

64. United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, The Threat posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 3.

65. US Homeland Security, “Budget in Brief.”

66. Stock, “Interpol Statement.”

67. Ibid. Stock was elected Secretary General at the 83rd Interpol General Assembly session in Monaco, November 2014. For more information, see “Jürgen Stock.”

68. US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force, 29.

69. “Paris Attacks.”

70. “DNA Testing Law becomes Official.”

71. US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force, 6.

72. US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force.

73. Ibid., 6.