![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
Abstract
Debate surrounds the relative importance of development aid and development policy in donor efforts to support international development. Likewise, the literature on UK development policy points to its putative stability and consistency over time. Both perspectives, however, underplay the political contention which characterises UK development policy and its variable effects. This article, therefore, examines UK development policy between 1997 and 2016 and the varying extent to which it gave rise to contentious politics over time. It explores three politically-significant periods in the context of UK development policy between 1997 and 2016: the first between 1997 and 2003, characterised, I argue, by political consensus and managed contention; a second between 2003 and 2010, characterised by transition and emerging political contention; and a third, between 2010 and 2016, characterised by contentious politics and political fracturing. I associate the first period with effective political vision and direction and the third with a significant erosion of both, to the detriment of UK development policy and its efficacy. In conclusion, I argue that UK development policy has been most effective when it has been underpinned by a clear and consensual political vision.
Notes
1. Sachs, The End of Poverty, 233–234, 237, 298–299.
2. Behrman, The Most Notable Adventure, 329.
3. Tomlinson, “Commonwealth, the Balance of Payments,” 413.
4. White, “British Aid,” 152.
5. Ireton, Britain’s International Development Policies, 2–3.
6. Ponting, Breach of Promise, 216.
7. Labour, “Britain Will Win.”
8. Labour, “New Labour.” In contrast, the 1997 Conservative manifesto merely acknowledged ‘the aspiration of meeting the UN’s target of 0.7% of GDP as aid as a long-term objective’ (Conservatives, “You Can Only”).
9. Between 1979 and 1988, for instance, ODA as a percentage of GNP fell from 0.51% to 0.32% while staffing in the Overseas Development Administration fell from 2318 in 1979 to 1510 in 1989 (Burnell, “Introduction,” 4, 9).
10. Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy, 28.
11. Manning, “Development,” 551.
12. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really, 107.
13. Short resigned over Labour support for the Prevention of Terrorism Act (in 1988) and for the first Gulf War (in 1990).
14. Short, An Honourable Deception? 78–79.
15. SoSID, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge, 6, 16. Through an emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’, Labour sought a focus on the poorest countries, rather than Commonwealth allies or those of strategic concern to the UK.
16. Labour, “Ambitions for Britain.”
17. Conservatives, “Time for Common Sense.”
18. See DFID Explanatory Commentary on the Act: https://webarchive.nationalarchives. gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/ida.asp
19. OECD, Development Cooperation Report 1997, 90–91; OECD, Development Cooperation Report 2003, 102.
20. OECD, Development Cooperation Report 1997, 91.
21. OECD, Development Cooperation Report 2003, 102.
22. TII, The Report, Executive Summary, Para 611.
23. TII, The Report, Section 10.4, Paragraph 119. This and the next paragraph offer details of specific failings. See also TII, The Report, Executive, Para 817.
24. Labour, “Britain Forwards.”
25. Conservatives, “It’s Time for Action.”
26. Liberal Democrats, “The Real Alternative.”
27. UKIP, “We Want Our Country Back.”
28. Glennie, Straw, and Wild, “Understanding Public Attitudes,” 17.
29. For details of the MDGs, see https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
30. Criticism of the paper in Moore and Unsworth, “Britain’s New White Paper,” suggests an erosion of the political leadership within DFID under Hilary Benn.
31. SoSID, Eliminating World Poverty: Building, 71. The Labour government had insufficient time to translate this policy commitment into programmatic outputs before leaving office in May 2010.
32. Conservatives, “Invitation to Join”; Labour, “Future Fair for All.”
33. Liberal Democrats, “Change that Works for You.”
34. UKIP, “Empowering the People.”
35. HMG, The Coalition, 22.
36. The report is available from: https://www.post2015hlp.org/the-report/
37. One of the main innovations of the coalition with respect to development policy was the establishment of the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (reporting to the House of Commons Committee on International Development) in October 2010.
38. Glennie, “Andrew Mitchell’s Legacy?”
39. Foreman, “The Great Aid Mystery.”
40. DFID, Public Attitudes Towards Development, 2.
41. Glennie, Straw, and Wild, Understanding Public Attitudes, 17.
42. See Birrell, “Ten Great Myths.”
43. UKIP achieved a breakthrough in the 2013 local government elections, winning 23% of the vote and 147 seats (up from four in 2012).
44. Before it received royal assent in March 2014.
45. Watt, “Lib Dems’ bid.”
46. HMG, A Secure and Prosperous, Paras 1.13 and 5.118.
47. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, 480; Lyons, “Fantastically Corrupt.”
48. HMG, A Secure and Prosperous, Para 5.11
49. Ibid., Para 6.13.
50. Or at least shifts the balance between poverty and fragility set out in the 2009 White Paper towards a weaker focus on poverty.
51. Former Labour Foreign Secretary David Miliband, for instance, has advocated a shift in focus from ‘poverty’ to ‘fragility’ in the delivery of humanitarian aid (Miliband and Gurumurthy, “Improving Humanitarian Aid,” 120).
52. Coffey et al., “Justine Greening’s First Year.”
53. Most recently in HM Treasury, “A Country That Lives,” Para 3.12.
54. Morris, “Nigel Farage.”
55. Provost and Jones, “Shh, don’t tell.”
56. UKIP, “Believe in Britain.”
57. Martin, “New Foreign Aid,” citing figures from OECD, “Development Aid Rises Again.”
58. “Liam Fox Challenges Overseas Aid Pledge,” BBC News, 17 May 2011. https://www.bbc. co.uk/news/uk-politics-13420536
59. Croucher, “Boris Johnson.”
60. Tapfield, “Meet the Minister.”
61. Without specifying how, Fallon has called for UK ODA to be used to discourage mass migration from Africa; Mason, “Fallon: UK Aid.”
62. The Adam Smith Institute advocates the abolition of the UK aid programme (Worstall, “Finally, An Idea”), while the Tax Payers Alliance advocates reductions in UK aid spending and abandonment of the 0.7% aid target (Brown, “Foreign Aid Scandal”).
63. See NAO, “Managing the Official” or ICAI reports at https://icai.independent. gov.uk/reports/
64. See https://www.cgdev.org/cdi-2015. In 2009, however, the UK’s ranking fell temporarily to 12th. With this exception, it has consistently ranked in 6th or 7th place.
65. OECD, OECD Development Cooperation Peer.
66. Although the US provides more ODA than the UK, the United States Agency for International Development is an agency of the State Department rather than a full ministry.
67. Although this separation is qualified, not least by DFID’s partnership with the FCO and MOD through the current Stabilization Unit and its predecessors.