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Abstract
Domestic internal security missions have become a centrepiece of Brazil and Mexico’s counter-narcotic efforts. Relying on a set of interviews, this article addresses narratives of elites engaged in the decision-making process and implementation of military operations to counter drug trafficking crimes in Rio de Janeiro and Tijuana. In spite of different levels of drug trafficking organisation and international ramification, this article points out the existence of shared narratives of growing insecurity and criminal strength in Brazil and Mexico, justifying state military reaction against a perceived national security threat. The article thus suggests the relevance of civil–military elites’ perception in defining public policies’ instruments and, ultimately, in upholding the militarisation of security in democratic regimes.
Acknowledgements
This work was initially developed for the workshop ‘Drugs, Politics and Society’ at Oxford University in October 2016, organised by Maziyar Ghiabi. The author is grateful to the support of Olivier Dabène, her current dissertation adviser, to Asma Faiz, Maria Teresa Martinez-Trujillo, Hussein Abou Saleh, Laura Matte and the anonymous reviewers for the valuable feedback and comments on this article. Finally the author would like to thank the Capes Foundation in Brazil (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior) [0436-14-3] and Sciences Po Doctoral School in France for having funded the dissertation fieldwork in Tijuana and Rio de Janeiro.
Notes
1. In 2015, Mexico had an intentional homicide rate of 17.15 per 100,000 people (Inegi/Conapo 2015) while Brazil was 28.9 per 100,000 (Ministry of Health-SIM/Ibge, 2015). Both percentages are much higher than the average world intentional homicide rate the World Bank estimated for 2015 of 5 per 100,000. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5.
2. Desmonds Arias and Goldstein, “Violent Pluralism,” 17.
3. About 40–50% of heroin apprehended in US comes from Mexico, also a major clandestine producer of methamphetamine for US consumption. https://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf. According to the last World Drug Report, Brazil was reported 1747 times by 56 recipient countries in 2005–2014. Together with Argentina, Brazil is the ‘most frequently mentioned in major individual drug seizures’. UNODC, World Drugs Report, 39.
4. In this sense, Peter Andreas criticises the characterisation of organised crime as ‘a crime syndicate that acts globally’ since crime organisation ranges from self-smugglers to independent small-scale entrepreneurs and loose transnational gangs; Andreas, Border Games, 20.
5. Calderon Hinojosa, “Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad,” 41–42.
6. Cavallieri and Lopes, “Índice de Desenvolvimento Social,” 7.
7. As the literature highlights, Ministries of Defence, headed by a civilian minister and ideally advised by a non-exclusively military staff, are a fundamental vehicle for ensuring civilian control over armed forces and thus for sustaining a more democratic pattern of civil–military relations; Bruneau, Ministries of Defence and Democratic Control, 5.
8. Hunter, Eroding Military Influence, chapter 1; Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil–military Relations in Brazil,” 108; Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian,” 12.
9. López González, Presidencialismo y Fuerzas Armadas, 18.
10. While Comando Vermelho (CV) uses walkie talkies to operate in favelas, Arellano Felix organisation (AFO) had a secure radio system used in the border area of Tijuana in the early 2000s; Jones, Mexico’s Illicit Drug Networks, 55. In San Diego, AFO worked with gangs as Los Angeles based 18th street gang, San Diego Barrio Logan street and the so-called Mexican Mafia prison gang; Shirk, “Tale of Two Mexican Border,” 487.
11. Resende, Operação Rio, 40.
12. Cavallieri and Vial, “Favelas Na Cidade Do Rio,” 2.
13. Research on illegal drug markets in Rio de Janeiro relies mostly on ethnographic research conducted in favelas. There are few (almost none) empirical studies on the dynamics of international drug trafficking and the connection with matutos, the ones bringing cocaine from Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Colombia to Brazil. Rafael, Um Abraço Para Todos, 84–85; Zaluar, “Juventude Violenta,” 347.
14. Besides CV, three other criminal groups are known to operate in the state of Rio de Janeiro: Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), Amigo dos Amigos (ADA), both originated from internal splits within CV, and the milícia, which gathers corrupted police officers. In December 2007 city councilman Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz (Nadinho) was accused of leading the milícia at Rio das Pedras, in the Western part of Rio, being arrested with other public officials who were equally part of this criminal organisation, such as the state deputy Natalino Guimarães and the councilman Jerominho. Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito, Relatório Final Da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito, 34.
15. Ibid.
16. Misse, “Les Organisations Criminelles Au Brésil,” 51.
17. Zaluar and Barcellos, “Mortes Prematuras e Conflito,” 25.
18. Desmonds Arias, Drugs and Democracy, 189–190.
19. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Industry, Commerce and CAC, 2006, National Congress, Brazil. https://www.comunidadesegura.org/files/active/0/Reatorio%20subrelatoria%20de%20industria%20comercio%20e%20cac.pdf.
20. Interviews with residents in Complexo da Maré, Rio de Janeiro: student 04/13/2016, high school teacher 04/22/2016 and taxi driver 05/12/2016.
21. Interview with student from Complexo da Maré, 04/13/2016:
22. Though CV members have been reported to pay bribes to police officers, during my fieldwork, residents in Alemão and Penha related the increase of police operations inside favelas to insufficient payment as CV lost drug related profits with UPP expansion. As CV did not engage in diverse activities as AFO, this suggest the relation between the group and police officers was rather asymmetric favouring the latter. This does not seem to be the case in Tijuana, where police officers worked for cartel de Sinaloa or AFO, a deeper level of collusion in contrast to Rio, and could monitor police operations, regularly making threats through unsecured police radios. In early 2009, two mid police officers in Tijuana confessed that they earned ‘US$500 and US$700 a month to facilitate criminal operations’; Sabet, “Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance,” 19, 22 and see note 28.
23. Between 1995 and 2010, the population growth rate in Tijuana was 57.5%, well above the rates in Puebla (25.94%) and Ecatepec de Morelos (13.5%); Reynoso, “¿Qué Cuenta El Rancho Tijuana?,” 53.
24. Alegría Olazabal and Ordoñez Barba, Legalizando La Ciudad, 53.
25. US General Administration. https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104,872.
26. Astorga analysed General Records of the US Department to document illicit drug trade activities at the beginning of the twentieth century; Astorga, Drogas Sin Fronteras, 27–31.
27. Morton, “War on Drugs in Mexico,” 1638.
28. Shirk, “Tale of Two Mexican Border Cities,” 493.
29. Zeta is an investigative newspaper created in 1980 in Tijuana whose offices were attacked in March 1987. In 1997, its co-founder and prize-winner Jesus Blancornelas was ambushed and attacked by 10 gunmen in his way to the airport. After that, Zeta offices were daily secured by a military tank; Jesus Blancornelas. 1999. “Hace dos años.” Zeta. November 19–25.
30. Interview with Julian Leyzaola 09/29/2016.
31. Sabet, “Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance,” 17.
33. For homicide rates at the state and capital levels in Rio de Janeiro, please consult the data from ISP/RJ (Instituto de Segurança Pública). https://www.isp.rj.gov.br/dadosoficiais.asp. According to a survey applied by IBPS (Instituto Brasileiro de Pesquisa Social), 92% of residents in favelas with UPPs and 77% of residents in favelas with no UPPs approved the project in 2010. https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/pesquisa-mostra-alta-aprovacao-das-upps-em-favelas-sejam-pacificadas-ou-nao-2911694.
34. The term was dubbed by Ventura, Cidade Partida.
35. Favelados are those who live in favelas.
36. Moreira Alves and Evanson, Vivendo No Fogo Cruzado; Lees, “Cocaine and Parallel Polities,” 50–52; Zaluar and Alvito, Um Século de Favela, Introduction. Some police stations installed as part of the UPP programme are made of containers, which are unsafe and unsanitary for police officers. Interview with police officer, 04/18/2016.
37. Data from Instituto de Segurança Pública/State Public Security Secretary, Rio de Janeiro. https://www.isp.rj.gov.br/dadosoficiais.asp.
38. Interview with social activist from Complexo do Alemão, 04/14/2016. Interview with Isabel Santos, NGO Justiça Global, 05/10/2016.
39. According to official statements and documents, 1937 army soldiers were engaged in the mission, besides 120 police officers and 25 law enforcement agents, all subordinated to the Military Commander during the entire operation. The Army provided 50 lightweight vehicles, 40 transport vehicles, 20 motorcycles, six armoured vehicles, two ambulances and two helicopters. Seven different Army Infantry Divisions were deployed, staying an average of three months on the ground, in order to avoid a long exposure to the environment that could eventually lead to corruption and discipline break.
40. The Armed Forces were authorised to arrest people only when a suspect was caught in the act of committing an offence; only police officers were legally authorised to detain suspects.
41. Interviews with former Ministers of Defence in Brazil Nelson Jobim and Celso Amorim (22/03/2016, 23/03/2016). Regarding the drivers’ death, please consult https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2010/11/833,834-motorista-morre-em-tentativa-de-assalto-na-br-116-em-duque-de-caxias-rj.shtml.
42. Folha de São Paulo 11/21/2011. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2010/11/836,598-armed-forces-willstrengthen-security-in-rio-where-six-days-of-attacks-have-left-43-dead.shtml.
43. Interview with retired military officer, 05/04/2016.
44. Interview with retired military officer, 03/30/2016.
45. Interview with former Ministry of Defence, Celso Amorim, 03/23/2016.
46. Carvalho, Forças Armadas e Política, chap. 1.
47. Decree no. 3897/2001, art. 2, para. 2.
48. Decree no. 3897/2001, art. 5.
49. Brazilian Army, Manual de Fundamentos de Operações, EB20-MF10.103.
50. See note 46.
51. La Jornada 09/07/2016. https://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/09/07/index.php?section==estados&article==037n1est and BBC 09/07/2016. https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5,322,160.stm.
52. See note 7.
53. Interview with former Director of Kidnapping Unit, Ministério Público, 08/03/2016.
54. Interview with business leader 06/29/2016; interview with resident 08/03/2016; interview with businessman 08/02/2016; interview with business leader 08/03/2016.
55. El Mexicano, El cártel de Tijuana, número uno en secuestros http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/3/estatal/2008/05/31/272020/el-cartel-de-tijuana-numero-uno-en-secuestros.aspx. 05/31/2008; Jones, “The Unitended Consequences,” 158.
56. Sabet, “Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance,” 15.
57. Interview with business leader 08/08/2016.
58. Interview with former Tijuana resident 07/01/2016; interview with civic association leaders 08/01/2016.
59. Interview with businessman 02/08/2016.
60. In comparison, during the Condor Operation in 1976, conducted to eradicate pavot and cannabis crops in three states (Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango), 10,000 soldiers were deployed; Astorga, “Géopolitique Des Drogues Au Mexique,” 56.
61. Joaquin López Doriga TV news show, 01/02/2007. Consulted at Videoteca Televisa, México City.
62. Interview with congressman Jorge Ramos, 06/17/2016.
63. Interview 05/26/2016.
64. The emphasis is mine.
65. Semanario Judicial y su Gaceta Novena Época. Instancia: pleno, tomo XI, 2000 April, Tesis P.J./36/2000, p.552.
66. Interview with military officer, 07/13/2016.
67. El Universal, Cienfuegos: no confundir seguridad interior con seguridad pública, 12/05/2016. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/12/5/cienfuegos-no-confundir-seguridad-interior-con-seguridad-publica.
68. Galindo, Gómez and Castellanos, Seguridad Interior: Elementos para El Debate, 14-25.
69. Interview with active-duty military 04/14/2016; interview with active-duty military 04/07/2016.
70. Felbab-Brown, “Calderón’s Caldron,” 2–3; interview with Julian Leyzaola 09/26/2016.
71. Felbab-Brown, “Calderón’s Caldron,” 5.
72. See note 70.
73. Interview with active-duty military 08/04/2016.
74. Interview with former head of intelligence services 05/26/2016; Interview with former security member during Calderón tenure 07/26/2016.
75. Data on crime rates is based on complaints made to the attorney general office; SENSP (2016).
76. See note 57 above and author interview with journalist from Zeta Tijuana, 08/01/2016.
77. Jones, Mexico’s Illicit Drug Networks, 89.
78. Interview with business leader 06/29/2016.
80. In April 2015, when a boy named Eduardo de Jesús was killed by a police officer while playing in front of his house, the local newspaper “Voz das Comunidades” edited an issue to mark 100 days of daily shootings inside the community; Voz das Comunidades, 100 dias sem Paz.
81. Interview with social activist from Complexo do Alemão, 04/14/2016; painter from Complexo do Alemão 04/28/2016; student and funk MC (singer) from Complexo da Penha 04/12/2016; health employee working in Alemão 04/26/2016.
82. Interview with journalist from Complexo do Alemão, 04/15/2016.
83. See https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/05/complexo-do-chapadao-nova-fortaleza-do-trafico.html and https://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2015–052015-05-03/na-hierarquia-da-violencia-chapadao-e-o-novo-alemao.html.
85. Interview with military officer, 04/07/2016.
86. See note 30 above.
87. Tijuana received about US$8.2 million in 2008 ($104 million pesos) and a marginally reduced amount in 2009 and 2010; Sabet, “Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance,” 25.
88. Interview with police officer 04/18/2016 , Interview with police officer 04/19/2016, Interview with retired police officer 05/14/2016.
89. Interview with former Ministry of Defence, Nelsonn Jobim, 03/22/2016.
90. Rolnik develops an index through which she demonstrates the correlation between territorial exclusion and violence in urbanised landscapes. See Rolnik, Exclusão territorial e violencia.