A diplomatic failure: the Mexican role in the demise of the 1940 Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías

Abstract

In 1940 Mexico implemented a new revolutionary strategy in its fight against drug trafficking and addiction with a policy that legalized the sale of morphine to opiate addicts. While this approach to drug addiction was not entirely new or unique, it was strongly opposed by the United States, which responded by declaring an embargo on narcotic shipments to Mexico. As a result, Mexico was forced to abandon the plan just a few months after it was implemented. Often seen as a moment when Mexico might have gone in a different, less prohibitionist drug-policy direction, this episode has been overwhelmingly interpreted as an early and striking example of U.S. drug-control imperialism in Latin America. While such interpretations are not incorrect, they have missed an equally critical element of the story—a series of catastrophic diplomatic failures on the Mexican side which undermined various opportunities Mexico had to salvage the policy in some form. The episode thus stands in contrast to more well-known diplomatic challenges during the period in which Mexico’s diplomats have been lauded for outmaneuvering their U.S. and European counterparts.

Keywords:

• Drugs
• narcotics
• Mexico
• diplomacy
• imperialism

Acknowledgements

Funding for this research was provided by the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center (University of Cincinnati), the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (Harvard University), and the Social Science Research Council’s ‘Drugs, Security, and Democracy’ program. My thanks also to Maziyar Ghiabi for organising this special issue, and to the anonymous readers for their insightful comments.

Notes

1. Scholars today are somewhat less convinced that it was quite the triumph it is often assumed to have been. See Maurer, “Empire Struck Back.” See also Meyer, Mexico and the United States; Brown and Knight, Mexican Petroleum Industry.

2. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, “Mexican Draft Regulations for the Treatment of Addicts,” 4.

3. Salazar Viniegra, Leopoldo. 1945. “Opio y política: Historia de una humiliación.”[Opium and Politics: History of a Humiliation.] Excelsior (Mexico City), December 19. My thanks to Mariana Flores Guevara for providing me with a copy of this article.

4. See, for example, Meyer, Lorenzo. “Vivir con una soberanía relativa,” [Living with a Relative Sovereignty] Terra, September. 26, 2013. https://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/lorenzo-meyer-vivir-con-una-soberania-relativa,c4996ea013a51410VgnVCM10000098cceb0aRCRD.html (accessed May 4, 2017); Katia D’Artigues, “El Presidente que legalizó las drogas,” El Universal, June 11, 2015, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada-de-opinion/columna/katia-dartigues/nacion/politica/2015/11/6/el-presidente-que-legalizo-las (accessed May 4, 2017); “De cuando en México las drogas fueron legales, https://lareddeartemisa.wordpress.com/2011/06/25/de-cuando-en-mexico-las-drogas-fueron-legales/ (accessed May 4, 2017); Nancy Cázares, “Cuando el ‘Tata’ Cárdenas legalizó las drogas,’” La Izquierda Diario, May 6, 2016, http://desa.laizquierdadiario.com/Cuando-el-Tata-Cardenas-legalizo-las-drogas (accessed May 4, 2017).

5. Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, 122–3; Astorga, Drogas sin fronteras, 202–27; Flores Guevara, “La alternativa mexicana”; Pérez Montfort, Tolerancia y prohibición, 282–307; Enciso, “Los fracasos del chantaje,” 71–3.

6. Salazar Viniegra, Leopoldo. 1945. “Opio y política: Historia de una humiliación.”[Opium and Politics: History of a Humiliation.] Excelsior (Mexico City), December 19.

7. For an overview, see Gootenberg and Campos, “Toward a New Drug History.”

8. For the argument that during the Cárdenas presidency Mexican policymakers were ‘better skilled in international negotiations, more realistic in the evaluation of historical contexts, and more creative in situations of crisis than their European and US counterparts’, see Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 1. Dwyer, Agrarian Dispute, similarly argues that Mexican diplomats skilfully employed ‘weapons of the weak’ to outmanoeuvre their US counterparts, especially during the mid-1930s agrarian crisis. For other examples of skilled Mexican diplomacy, see Hall, Oil, Banks, and Politics, especially 140–4.

9. Flores Guevara, “La alternativa mexicana,” 67–72.

10. For the classroom morphine experiment, see the undated transcript in Manicomio General, Expedientes de Personal, Legajo 2, Expediente 3, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (hereafter, MG, EP, Exp. 2, Leg. 3, AHSSA); for the target practice, see the correspondence beginning August 12, 1938, in the same file; on his grading, see Flores Guevara, “La alternativa mexicana,” 73; on the experiments with marijuana see Astorga, Drogas sin fronteras, 205–211.

11. “El problema comercial de las drogas,” El Nacional, July 6, 1938, p. 1.

12. Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición de motivos.”

13. Campos, Home Grown.

14. Memcon with Dr Salazar Viniegra, May 27, 1939; File: Mexico, Dr Salazar Viniegra; Subject Files of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916–1970; Records of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Record Group 170, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter simply “Mex-LSV, NARA”); Provisional Minutes … June 2, 1939; Mex-LSV, NARA.

15. Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición de motivos,” 558.

16. Meeting minutes numbered 24–30, between October 25 and December 20, 1938, Consejo de Salubridad General, Actas de Sesión, Libros, 1 (hereafter: CSG/AS/Lbs/1), AHSSA.

17. Stewart to the Secretary of State, March 22, 1939; Mex-LSV, NARA.

18. “Se acusa al Dr. Salazar Viniegra de dar mariguana a los locos de la Castañeda” Excelsior, Nov. 1, 1938; “Médicos académicos fumaron ‘Dna. Juanita,” El Universal, Oct. 22, 1938; “La mariguana sí es dañosa,” El Universal, Oct. 24, 1938.

19. For example, compare: Creighton to the Commissioner of Customs on June 15, 1938, and then on February 21, 1939, along with Stewart to the Secretary of State, December 12, 1938, all three in Mex-LSV, NARA.

20. Memcon with Dr Salazar-Viniegra, May 27, 1939; Mex-LSV, NARA. The other Mexican official was possibly Manuel Tello, the official Mexican representative to the League.

21. Provisional Minutes … June 2, 1939; Mex-LSV, NARA.

22. Salazar Viniegra, Leopoldo. 1945. “Opio y política: Historia de una humiliación.”[Opium and Politics: History of a Humiliation.] Excelsior (Mexico City), December 19.

23. Flores Guevara, “La alternativa mexicana,” 134–8. By May of 1938 the State Department was counselling Treasury to back off and allow events to take their own course in Mexico. Gorman to Creighton, May 17, 1938; Mex-LSV, NARA.

24. For the final council deliberations on the programme, see Actas de Sesión #61–62, November 2–3,1939, CSG/AS/Lbs/1, AHSSA. Cárdenas signed on January 5, 1940. http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?cod_diario=191983&pagina=5&seccion=1 (accessed May 7, 2017).

25. Castillo Nájera to SRE, February 9, 1940, III-2398–6, Archivo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México City (hereafter, SRE).

26. Siurob to SRE, March 14, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE. For the Secretariat’s decidedly weak explanation, see, in the same file, Ernesto Hidalgo to Siurob, March 15, 1940.

27. Anslinger to F. Thornton, February 3, 1940; File: Mexico, New Regulations; Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; Record Group 170; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter Mex-New Regs, NARA).

28. Anslinger note, dated February 1, attached to Daniels to Sec. of State, January 31, 1940, Mex-New Regs, NARA; Anslinger to Shamhart, February 15, 1940, Mex-New Regs, NARA.

29. Sáenz Rovner, “Prehistoria del narcotráfico en Colombia,” 74–5.

30. Note from Treasury, February 27, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

Creighton to the Commissioner of Customs, February 28, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA; Memcon by Robert G. McGregor, Jr., February 29, 1940, Mex-New Regs, NARA.

31. Creighton to ‘Ed’ [Shamhart], March 5, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

32. Acta de Sesión #9, March 12, 1940, CSG/AS/Lbs/2, AHSSA.

33. Ibid.

34. However, Siurob appears to have already been aware of the delay, for he immediately complained about it to foreign relations officials. Siurob to SRE, March 14, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE.

35. The meeting Minutes refer to ‘Article 8’ of the Convention but it was clearly Article 14 that was being referred to; http://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-191-M-136-1937-XI_EN.pdf (accessed May 7, 2017).

36. Anslinger to Fuller, April 6, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

37. Acta de Sesión #10, March 14, 1940, CSG/AS/Lbs/2, AHSSA.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Siurob to SRE, March 14, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE; Castillo Nájera to SRE, March 19, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE.

41. Siurob to Parran, March 19, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

42. From Gallardo Moreno to Siurob, March 21, 1940, Ramo Presidentes-Lázaro Cárdenas, Gal. 3, Exp. 422/3; AGN, Mexico City; Anslinger to Maxon, March 21, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA. Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, 129–30.

43. Siurob to Daniels, March 23, 1940; Mex-New Res, NARA. On the US reading of the contradictions, see documents appended to Anslinger to Fuller, April 6, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

44. “Puntos fundamentales para la aplicación Legal del nuevo Reglamento de Toxicomanías, El Nacional (Mexico D.F.), March 22, 1940, Section 1, 1–2.

45. “El Reglamento Federal de Toxicómanos … ,” March 26, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE.

46. Castillo Nájera to Siurob, March 30, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE.

47. Acta de Sesión #12, April 2, 1940, CSG/AS/Lbs/2, AHSSA.

48. Irigoyen to Hay, April 16, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE. For the various press reports along with a translation of the regulations, see Stewart to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1940, Mex-New Regs, NARA.

49. “Sugestiones de la Secretaría … ,” April 20, 1940, III-2398–6, SRE.

50. Flores Guevara, “La alternativa mexicana,” 125–33.

51. On the British system see Lindesmith, “British System of Narcotics Control”; Seddon, “Women, Harm Reduction and History.”

52. Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 132, 199. For another example of deft use of foreign examples to justify Mexican policies, see Hall, Oil, Banks, and Politics, 140–4.

53. The delegates’ names are absent from the minutes. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, “Report to the Council,” 6.

54. “Memcon of discussions … ,” May 4 and 7, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

55. On the Federal Bureau of Narcotics routinely underestimating addict numbers in the US, see Courtwright, Dark Paradise, 110–23.

56. “Memcon of discussions … ,” May 4 and 7, 1940; Mex-New Regs, NARA.

57. Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, 130.

58. Acta de Sesión #16, June 11, 1940, CSG/AS/Lbs/2, AHSSA; “Decreto que suspende…” Diario Oficial, XVVI, No. 3 (July 3, 1940).

59. Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 200–1; 205–7.

60. William B. McAllister demonstrates that Anslinger utilised leverage gained from war shortages for various purposes during these years, though he also shows that the British sometimes undermined Anslinger’s efforts by exporting drugs to Latin America in competition with the US. See his Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 144–9. On wartime leverage see also Reiss, We Sell Drugs.

61. Flores Guevara, “La alternative mexicana,” 156.