Abstract
The aim of this article is to explain the internal conditions of military security in a non-European context. It utilises securitisation as the theoretical perspective and investigates Iranian and Indonesian case studies to explore how the perception of internal threats and vulnerabilities determines the approaches to military security. It begins with a reiteration of securitisation theory assumptions, followed by clarifying the understanding of security in non-Western contexts. The case studies focus on the conditions which facilitate securitisation, including the nature of securitising actors, assumed concepts of security, and securitisation processes and their outcomes. The analysis indicates a necessity for several alterations in securitisation theory to realise its full potential. Civil–military relations in Asian states differ from those in the West, as both Iran and Indonesia show a high degree of military involvement in political affairs. Military security also becomes securitised as a result of internal political rivalries. The perception of threats is a tool in the struggle to extend the capabilities of security agencies or retain influences.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia; Daves, Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi; Ward, Immortal, 242–98; Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled, 16–57.
2 Inter alia Balzacq, Securitization Theory; Stritzel, Security in Translation; Floyd, Security and the Environment.
3 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 491.
4 McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,“ 567.
5 The discursive elements of securitisation theory are more broadly discussed in Stritzel, Security in Translation, 39–47. The language and discourse practices can reflect structured violence relations, based on the exclusion of some groups from security concerns (Hansen, “Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma“), framing the issues in the specific position that legitimise actions against them (Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats“) and labelling them as a threat (Sheikh, “Religious Challenge to Securitization Theory“; Oren and Solomon, “WMD, WMD, WMD“). Also, the securitisation process may express the marginalising potential of those who cannot speak, who are not being listened to and who cannot be heard (Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize,“ 283–7).
6 Balzacq, Securitization Theory, 1.
7 Jackson, “International Organizations, Security Dichotomies,“ 315.
8 Lipschutz, “On Security,“ 10.
9 Wendt, “Anarchy Is what States Make of It,“ 396–7.
10 Grayson, “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate,“ 338.
11 The non-Western context of security became part of the wider debate in the field of security studies mostly after the end of the Cold War, with the growing attention to issues such as state formation, nature of the threats and security concerns, regime and human security, underdevelopment, etc.: Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament; Alagappa, Asian Security Practice; Dannreuther, “War and Insecurity,“ 307–26; Krause, “Insecurity and State Formation,“ 319–54. In securitisation studies this was reflected in the attempts to apply the theory of securitisation in a non-Western context (Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya, Non-Traditional Security in Asia; Wilkinson, “Is Securitization Theory Useable“), reflecting the conditions of non-democratic regimes (Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization“), the nature of the state (Holm, “Algeria: Securitization of State/Regime“; Barthwal-Datta, “Securitising Threats without the State“), religion (Laustsen and Wæver, “In Defence of Religion“; Sheikh, “Religious Challenge to Securitization Theory“), broadening the security discourse and agenda by including developmental and human security aspects, migration and population policies (Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime“; Caballero-Anthony, “Combating Infectious Diseases in East Asia“; Riddell, Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies; Watson, Securitization of Humanitarian Migration; Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize“; Sukarieh and Tannock, “Global Securitisation of Youth“).
12 Holm, “Algeria: Securitization of State/Regime,“ 219.
13 Jones, “Beyond Securitization,“ 403–32.
14 Collins, “Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian Education,“ 573.
15 Jones, “Beyond Securitization.“
16 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 49–70.
17 Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament.
18 The securitisation process is understood as a sequence of events observed by the researcher, the deconstruction of which allows the researcher to determine who are the securitising actors, what threats do they securitise, what is the referent object, why is it threatened, and what are the results.
19 Floyd, Security and the Environment, 5.
20 Ibid., 5–6.
21 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,“ 70.
22 Collins, “Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian Education,“ 570–1.
23 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,“ 68.
24 Emmers, “Securitization,“ 140; Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,“ 69.
25 Jones, “Beyond Securitization,“ 407–14.
26 Acharya and Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory; Buzan and Little, “Why International Relations Have Failed.“
27 eg Barthwal-Datta, Understanding Security Practices; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya, Non-Traditional Security in Asia; Wilkinson, “Is Securitization Theory Useable“; Sheikh, “Religious Challenge to Securitization Theory.“
28 Wilkinson, “Is Securitization Theory Useable,“ 12.
29 Sadri, “Surrounded,“ 22–3.
30 Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Articles 143–51.
31 Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled, 17–9.
32 Ibid., 165–91; Ottolenghi, The Pasdaran, 41–9.
33 Ward, Immortal, 299–329.
34 Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled, 80–1.
35 Weherey et al., Rise of Pasdaran, 49–91.
36 Varasteh, Understanding Iran’s National Security Doctrine, 112–31.
37 Alsaif, Islamic Democracy and its Limits, 110–39; Varasteh, Understanding Iran’s National Security Doctrine, 80–4.
38 Ottolenghi, The Pasdaran, 5–15.
39 Majidyar and Salem, “Iran Observed.“
40 Huseyn Panahov, “Will Iran Keep its Promises? An Election this Month Will Tell the Story,“ The Diplomat, February 2, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/will-iran-keep-its-promises/
41 Afshon Ostovar, “Why Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Is Happy. The IRGC Supported the Nuclear Deal for a Reason. It May only Strengthen Them,“ Politico Magazine, July 15, 2015. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/the-new-danger-from-irans-revolutionary-guard-120158
42 “IRGC Chief: JCPOA No Honorable Document for Iranians,“ Teheran Times, April 5, 2016. http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/300335/IRGC-chief-JCPOA-no-honorable-document-for-Iranians
43 “Defense Minister: West Trying to Hinder Iran’s Defense Program,“ Kayhan International, April 8, 2016. http://kayhan.ir/en/issue/557/2
44 “205 MPs Back Missile Program,“ Teheran Times, April 6, 2016. http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/300322/205-MPs-back-missile-program
45 Tim Hume, “Iran Test-Fires New Generation Long-Range Ballistic Missiles, State Media Report,“ CNN, October 11, 2015. https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/11/middleeast/iran-ballistic-missile-test/index.html
46 Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, “Iran Tests another Mid-Range Ballistic Missile in Breach of UN Resolutions,“ Fox News, December 7, 2015. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/iran-tests-another-mid-range-ballistic-missile-in-breach-of-un-resolutions
47 “Iran Able to Build Intercontinental Missiles,“ Kayhan International, April 27, 2016. http://kayhan.ir/en/news/26070/iran-able-to-build-intercontinental-missiles
48 Chastain, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to Build.“
49 Abdolmohammadi and Cama, “Iran as a Peculiar Hybrid Regime.“
50 During the Cold War Indonesian security practice was based on general interdependence of internal and external factors, which influence such military concepts as archipelic outlook (wawasan nusantara) and total people’s defence (sistem hankamrata); Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, 31–2.
51 Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats,“ 90.
52 Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 38–49.
53 Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, 10; Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 99–101.
54 Baker, “Parman Economy: Post-Authoritarian Shifts.“
55 Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia; Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 201–4, 212–22, 304–13.
56 Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia, 127–90.
57 Supriatma, “TNI/Polri in West Papua,“ 94.
58 The Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite,“ 101–2.
59 Supriatma, “TNI/Polri in West Papua,“ 94.
60 Al Araf and Anton Aliabbas, “A Legal Basis for Domestic Military Intervention,“ The Jakarta Post, February 18, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/18/a-legal-basis-domestic-military-intervention.html
61 Margareth S. Aritonang, “Decree to Boost TNI’s Civilian Role,“ The Jakarta Post, October 19, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/19/decree-boost-tni-s-civilian-role.html
62 Hans Nicholas Jong, “Amid KPK–Police Standoff, TNI Could Reprise Soeharto-Era Role, Say Analysts,“ The Jakarta Post, February 6, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/06/amid-kpk-police-standoff-tni-could-reprise-soeharto-era-role-say-analysts.html
63 Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats,“ 90.
64 Muna, “Securitizing Small Arms,“ 95.
65 Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats,“ 90.
66 Honna, “Military Ideology in Response.“
67 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 15.
68 Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 228.
69 Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats,“ 91.
70 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 3.
71 Ibid., 12–3.
72 Honna, “Military Ideology in Response“; Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, 9.
73 Aspinall and Chauvel, “Constructing Separatist Threats,“ 90.
74 Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity.
75 Mietzner, Political Resurgence of the Military, 135–6.
76 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 23.
77 “Army Inches Back into Civilian Sphere,“ The Jakarta Post, June 27, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/27/army-inches-back-civilian-sphere.html
78 “Military Chief Challenges IS Militants to Come to Indonesia,“ Jakarta Globe, April 14, 2015. http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/military-chief-challenges-militants-come-indonesia/
79 Haeril Halim, “Poll Finds TNI More Popular than KPK,“ The Jakarta Post, October 26, 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/26/poll-finds-tni-more-popular-kpk.html
80 Supriatma, “TNI/Polri in West Papua“; Syailendra, “Inside Papua: The Police Force.“
81 Bantarto Bandoro, “Indonesian Military Flexes Muscle but its Credibility in Question,“ Jakarta Globe, October 7, 2014. http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/indonesian-military-flexes-muscle-credibility-question/
82 Abdolmohammadi and Cama, “Iran as a Peculiar Hybrid Regime.“
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Łukasz Fijałkowski
Łukasz Fijałkowski has a PhD in political sciences and is an assistant professor at the University of Wrocław, Institute of International Studies, Poland. His research interests concentrate on the theories of international security, regionalism and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, he is focusing on the theory of securitisation and its applicability in the context of Southeast Asian regional security.
Jarosław Jarząbek
Jarosław Jarząbek has a PhD in political sciences and is an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at the University of Wrocław/Poland. His research interests focus on security studies, the politics of security and armed forces in Middle Eastern states, and political systems and international relations in the Middle East, as well as Israeli–Palestinian conflict and development of the Palestinian national movement. He was a Fulbright scholar at the University of Central Florida in Orlando and is a coordinator of the Erasmus Mundus Global Studies programme at the University of Wrocław.